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British and Dominion armed forces operations during the Second World War were 
followed closely by a journalistic army of correspondents employed by various media 
outlets including news agencies, newspapers and, for the first time on a large scale in a 
war, radio broadcasters. These war reporters on foreign soil, under the direction of their 
editors and managers on the home front, provided an informational link between the 
fighting military personnel and the public – in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the 
British Dominion nations – eagerly awaiting news of their progress. 
The purpose is to look beyond the news stories that came out of the reporting and 
analyse the correspondents themselves: how they acquired their positions and prepared 
for deployments, what sort of monetary support they received, how they operated under 
difficult field conditions, what they wore and carried, what specific tools made their 
work possible, how they moved among the battles, what they did when they rested, and 
how their labours made some of them household names. This study aims to pull together 
these various aspects of the work and lives of the journalists, illuminating the methods 
and motivations that made them war correspondents; in short, the story behind their 
stories. 
The focus is solely on British and Dominion correspondents in the European and 
North African theatres of the Second World War in order to keep the parameters within 
reasonable limits. It also provides the opportunity to concentrate on a specific group of 
correspondents, which is still large but not so much as attempting the outsized and 
therefore less distinct job of looking at all Allied correspondents. 
Primary sources include the archives of news organisations and the United 
Kingdom National Archives, as well as the invaluable memoirs of correspondents who 
related their personal experiences and details of their work. Other sources include 
relevant secondary material such as historical manuscripts about the overall war or 
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The actions of the British and Dominion armed forces in the most destructive 
conflict to ever plague mankind have been well documented in historical books, films, 
television and radio programmes, and in countless remembrance and memorial pieces in 
magazines and newspapers. Yet at the time of the Second World War, the sources of 
information about the war beyond the government were the print and broadcast reporters 
who often risked their own lives by traveling with the forces abroad and relaying the 
news of the losses and victories in the field back to the readers and listeners at home. 
The media reports, due to official government and military censorship, as well as self-
censorship by the journalists, did not always paint the full picture, as can be seen in the 
examples of Dieppe and “The Miracle of Dunkirk”. Also, at least for the first part of the 
war, the news was hardly a source of high morale, with military defeats abroad and the 
disruption of normal civilian life. Yet the public relied on the daily news reports, those at 
home during the Blitz but later in large part those from distant battlefields, to learn of the 
course of the war, with mixtures of anger, fear, sadness and, ultimately, widespread joy. 
The British public – those at home struggling with what would be characterized as The 
People’s War – demanded ceaseless information about the events of the conflict in 
foreign lands and subsequently some of the most important figures outside of the 
government and the military in the Second World War were those who served as 
eyewitnesses to these events: the war correspondents. 
British and Dominion armed forces operations overseas were followed closely by 
a journalistic army of correspondents employed by various newspapers, magazines and, 
for the first time on a large scale in a war, by radio. These war reporters on foreign soil, 
under the direction of their editors and managers on the home front, provided an 
informational link between the fighting military personnel and the public – in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere in the British Dominion nations – eagerly awaiting news of 
their progress. The Second World War was unprecedented in its breadth, and in the same 
way the news reporting of the daily events of the war was also of a scope never before 
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experienced. Therefore, beyond the news stories that came out of the reporting, it is 
crucial to analyse the correspondents themselves: how they acquired their positions and 
prepared for their deployments, how they operated under difficult field conditions, what 
they wore and carried, what tools made their work possible, how they moved among the 
battles and what they did when they rested, and how their labours made some of them 
household names. The aim of this dissertation is to fill the gap left by the previous works 
of historians, writers and broadcasters with a detailed study focused specifically on the 
job of being a combat correspondent covering the British and Dominion armies during 
the Second World War. 
 
Literature Review 
Opportunity for analytical consideration of the war correspondents is found in the 
wide span of secondary sources. Yet among all the books that study the war in general or 
specific war correspondents, such as biographies, none of these books takes on the job of 
analysing in detail the various aspects of working as a combat correspondent in the 
Second World War, which is distinct from previous wars through its new technology and 
the grand scale of the conflict. This dissertation will fill that gap by looking at the 
Second World War correspondents as a whole, both in their work and their lives as 
journalists, and not just one prominent correspondent or a particular battle covered in the 
press like Anzio or Dunkirk, or a single media outlet such as The Times or the BBC. 
From this more extensive study that looks at a wide range of issues related to the media 
and parts of the government, while remaining focused on the war correspondents of this 
particular conflict, we can learn the methods used as well as the successes enjoyed and 
hardships endured in bringing the news of the Second World War to the British public. 
Phillip Knightley produced what might be considered the gold-standard history of 
war correspondents with his 1975 book, The First Casualty. Knightley starts with the 
Crimean War and, in an updated edition, works through the Iraq war of 2003, addressing 
the issues of, as the book’s subtitle indicates, the varying roles of the war correspondent 
“as hero, propagandist and myth-maker”. While this dissertation takes its cue from 
Knightley and will deal with some of the same issues, that work was much more 
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historically broad in discussing the work of correspondents from a variety of time 
periods and nations; this dissertation will focus solely on the Second World War and 
drill down more deeply into the various facets of the war correspondents’ work during 
this specific period. Also, the focus remains on the correspondents of Britain and its 
Dominion nations rather than Knightley’s research, which considers a much wider range 
of correspondents and therefore is not able to bring as much detail about his subjects as 
this thesis intends. 
Siân Nicholas’s comprehensive history of the BBC’s War Reporting Unit found in 
her book, The Echo of War, and her chapter on the WRU in the compilation, War and 
the Media, inform this study by bringing to light important details about the WRU and 
its development and putting those facts into context regarding the news coverage of the 
war as a whole. Richard Havers’ book, Here is the News, is helpful in that it contains 
numerous verbatim excerpts from BBC broadcasts, including those from the Normandy 
invasion, which act as scripts that can be used to get the feel of the type of reporting 
done by the war correspondents. In a lighter vein, Tom Hickman’s book, What Did You 
Do In The War, Auntie?, provides numerous photographs as well as personal accounts to 
illustrate its depiction of the wartime BBC organisation, while Trevor Royle’s War 
Report also contributes to a greater understanding of BBC battlefield reporting. As these 
are all focused solely on the BBC, however, they only provide pieces of the overall 
picture of Second World War correspondents that is intended to be filled by this thesis. 
Asa Briggs is the most prominent historian of the BBC; his History of 
Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, especially The War of Words, the third in that five-
volume series, is the best authority on Britain’s wartime airwaves and is crucial to 
understanding the events surrounding the development of the BBC’s War Reporting 
Unit. His book is a big-picture view that focuses on the Corporation including its various 
editors and managers and its dealings with government, as well as the opinions formed 
in the leader articles that Briggs explained were quite influential among power brokers in 
continental Europe and Britain alike. Yet for the most part he does not deal with specific 
correspondents or their work, so for the purposes of this dissertation the book is more 
helpful in putting the BBC in the larger context of the war rather than details about its 
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reporters. However, like Jonathan Dimbleby, Briggs also responded in writing to 
questions put to him exclusively for this dissertation and his comments were helpful in 
regards to the BBC’s lack of preparedness for the war as well as censorship of journalists 
and self-censorship by them. 
In The History of The Times book series, produced and published by the 
newspaper, two volumes were valuable to this study, but also offer a contrast in how to 
go about looking at wartime news. The fourth volume, The 150th Anniversary and 
Beyond: 1912-1948, Part II: 1921-1948, focuses largely on managers and editors in a 
romantic, almost sycophantic manner. The 150th Anniversary volume says of the editor 
who served from 1912 to 1919 and from 1922 to 1941: 
 
[Geoffrey] Dawson delighted in and keenly enjoyed the opportunity his 
position opened to him of influencing the trends of politics and the 
careers of friends. No man was more faithful to family, village, county, 
school, college and university… The intimate connexions he had were 
with the hereditary English governing class, the middle class gentry 
and their ennobled offspring. He, himself, ended as he began, a simple 
Squire, with all the Yorkshireman’s dislike for frills and histrionic 
tricks. 
 
The book also intersperses descriptions of world events with quotations from the 
paper’s articles in a way that makes the commentary and analysis of The Times seem as 
if it was part of the British government’s foreign policy apparatus: “This, therefore, was 
the burden of the British Prime Minister’s letter delivered to the German Führer by the 
British Ambassador personally, and that of leading articles in The Times which were 
written with the hope of impressing official circles in Berlin.” In the same vein, the book 
states of the next editor, Robert McGowan Barrington-Ward, who served as the paper’s 
editorial head from 1941 to 1948: “He now looked forward to helping the prosecution of 
the war by a programme that would encourage the people at home, hearten the 
subjugated peoples of Europe, give even the Germans the prospect of some alternative to 
National Socialism.” In the meantime, there is little discussion of the news gatherers 
working in the field leading up to or during the war, except to repeat quotations from 
their dispatches. It does not usually even name the reporters, instead preferring to refer 
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to them as “the Military Correspondent” or “the Vienna Correspondent” or by saying “a 
Correspondent was at Prague”.1 Yet the book is still valuable to this study by offering an 
understanding of what was going on at the top of the organisation and invariably trickled 
down, to some degree, to the correspondents in the field. In contrast to the more 
institutional study that preceded it, Vol. V, Struggles in War & Peace: 1939-1966, 
written by Iverach McDonald, a veteran editor for The Times, gives much more 
consideration to the people who gathered the information for the stories that filled the 
paper, and not just those who wrote the leaders on the front page. McDonald states the 
book is intended to fill holes left by the previous volume, specifically the ones that had 
overlooked the people whose graft made the paper so revered:  “The purpose is to tell 
the paper’s story in a full and rounded way, not concentrating solely or even largely on 
its political opinions as presented in its leading articles, but telling also of the men and 
women engaged in all the many departments of a great newspaper.”2 This included the 
paper’s defence and war correspondents, such as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, Robert 
Cooper and Kim Philby.3 While both books are valuable to understanding the history 
and workings of one of Britain’s most respected newspapers, the volume by McDonald 
provides much more specific – and subsequently valuable to this dissertation – 
information on the correspondents. 
David Ayerst’s 1971 book, Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper, provides some 
valuable information on the war reporters who worked for the Manchester Guardian, 
such as Evelyn Montague and David Woodward, but as with The History of the Times, it 
focuses largely on the organisation, its various editors throughout the years, and its 
impact on British politics. The same is mostly true of Donald Read’s 1992 book, The 
Power of News, a comprehensive history of Reuters. Its focus is also primarily the 
organisation and its major editorial figures rather than reporters. Read, however, is far 
more willing to delve below management and share memorable anecdotes about the 
                                                 
1  The History of The Times, vol. IV, The 150th Anniversary and Beyond 1912-
1948, Part II: 1921-1948 (London: The Times, 1952), pp. 978, 981-982, 984. 
2  Iverach McDonald, The History of The Times, vol. V, Struggles in War and 
Peace 1939-1966 (London: Times Books, 1984), p. 2. 
3  McDonald, pp. 43-45, 916-917, 924-925. 
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working journalists of the venerable wire service. Read’s examination and writing are so 
respected by the company that researchers looking through its archives will find 
notations at the beginning of some file folders indicating items within that were used in 
Read’s book. 
Two biographies of Richard Dimbleby are crucial to understanding the 
Corporation’s renowned reporter and possibly the most famous correspondent of the 
war. The first is Richard Dimbleby: Broadcaster, edited by his BBC colleague Leonard 
Miall, which is a slim volume that includes anecdotes and essays about Dimbleby by 
those who worked directly with him at the Corporation. The other is by his son, Jonathan 
Dimbleby, titled, Richard Dimbleby: A Biography, which is much longer and provides a 
far more complete picture not only of his father’s work over a long and storied career but 
of his life outside of journalism. Jonathan Dimbleby also answered direct questions 
about his father for this dissertation via email, parts of which are quoted. 
Books that are not strictly histories of news reporters or media organisations but 
still provided valuable information on topics discussed in the dissertation include Ian 
McLaine’s Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in 
World War II. As a history of the ministry that controlled censorship of the press, the 
book is a helpful aid in understanding the thinking and work that went into creating 
wartime censorship policy. Contrary to what might be assumed about this control centre 
of censorship and propaganda, McLaine posits that the Ministry of Information actually 
helped contain wartime censorship, rather than let it run wild: “Freed from peacetime 
constraints, the government possessed the power to impose almost any kind and degree 
of censorship on the press. Although mindful of the effect on parliamentary and public 
opinion of the exercise of this power, the War Cabinet had no hesitation in banning the 
Daily Worker and attempting to intimidate the Daily Mirror when the evidence proved 
no foundation for the charge that these newspapers were harming morale and the war 
effort. Had the Ministry shared the Cabinet’s dark suspicions of the press there is no 
doubt that freedom of expression would have been another casualty of war.”4 While 
                                                 
4  Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of 
Information in World War II (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), pp. 276-277. 
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focused on a single ministry in much the same way that the books on The Times and The 
Guardian are focused on those individual media entities and their editorial and 
management staff and procedures, this book provides detailed information on 
government policies and the players involved in forming and executing them that had 
some of the greatest impacts on the work of the war correspondents and is subsequently 
very valuable among the secondary sources. 
Angus Calder’s book The People’s War articulated an important thesis about the 
great involvement in the war of ordinary people on the British home front. In it Calder 
writes, “‘Morale’ – that word which haunted the politicians, the civil servants and the 
generals. What the people demanded, they must now be given.”5 Among the many 
factors that affected popular morale during the war years – including living conditions 
and the availability of food and other crucial supplies – was the information procured 
from the news. Whether the print and radio reports hurt morale as in the early years of 
the war when the Allied forces were suffering continued losses and the United Kingdom 
was suffering the death and destruction of the Blitz, or the news boosted morale as the 
war rolled toward its victorious conclusion, the people demanded information about the 
conflict. “The British were well known to be the world’s most avid newspaper-readers,” 
Calder writes. “In 1943, the number of newspapers bought per head of the population 
was even higher than before the war. It was estimated by the Wartime Social Survey that 
four men out of five and two women out of three saw a newspaper on any one day.”6 
This made the job of a war correspondent all that more important to The People’s War. 
In The Myth of the Blitz, Calder’s 1991 follow-up to The People’s War, he brings up an 
important point that is to be addressed in this dissertation. He writes, “I began around 
1980 in reviews and articles and papers… to write and talk about ‘the Myth of 1940’ and 
‘the Myth of the Blitz’. I did so in a spirit of self-criticism, since I realised that many, 
perhaps most, readers of my People’s War (1969) had seen the book as confirming the 
Myth. Looking it over again, I saw that I had accepted almost without question the 
                                                 
5  Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945 (London: Pimlico, 1992; 
first published by Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 18. 
6  Ibid., p. 504. 
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mythical version of ‘Dunkirk’, though elsewhere I flatter myself that I wasn’t 
beguiled.”7 This dissertation addresses the Dunkirk Myth in the chapter about 
censorship, specifically regarding the issue of self-censorship by journalists, as well as in 
the final chapter that discusses, in part, the overall accuracy of the news stories presented 
to the public. In doing so Calder’s analysis in both of the books offers important 
information and context regarding these subjects. 
Also, books about specific events, battles or people that were of assistance to this 
dissertation include D-Day: June 6, 1944, The Battle for the Normandy Beaches by 
Stephen Ambrose, which is a detailed account of what might be considered the war’s 
most famous battle, while similar historical detail and skilful analysis were employed in 
Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man by Hugh Sebag-Montefiore. Neither of these delves too 
deeply into the work of war correspondents who covered these battles, but they provide 
historical examination that helps to understand these events and compare them to the 
news reports published and broadcast at the time. 
While there are a number of books about the wartime media and the larger 
individual news organisations, with the exception of the aforementioned works of Phillip 
Knightley, Siân Nicholas and a handful of others, such as Jonathan Dimbleby’s 
biography of his father and sections of the corporate histories by Iverach McDonald and 
David Ayerst, the overview of the literature indicates there is a dearth of scholarly work 
focused on British war correspondents, either as a group or as individuals, during the 
Second World War. That is the gap this study intends to fill by looking at the details of 
the work and working lives of the British and Dominion war correspondents and 
building a record of this distinct set of journalists. 
 
Research Agenda 
The aim of this dissertation is to provide a detailed account of the mechanics of 
working as a war correspondent, as well as the impact of their work on the British 
public. That will include how they were chosen and in some cases trained, the 
                                                 
7  Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Pimlico, 1992; first published by 
Jonathan Cape, 1991), p. xiii. 
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institutional support received from their employers, and the practical working 
arrangements and living conditions in the field. This study of the day-to-day aspects of 
the correspondents’ work is intended to provide a better understanding of the reporters 
themselves – how and why they did the jobs for which they lived and sometimes died. 
The dissertation will also consider the question of what role the war correspondents 
played in what has been called “The People’s War”, a label that indicates the great 
degree to which the Second World War engulfed the lives of the British public. The war 
correspondents were the heralds of the day-to-day successes and failures of the British 
and Dominion forces warding off the Axis menace abroad and the dissertation will 
explain how they maintained this vital connection to the public and subsequently 
undertook a vastly important role in society through the news reporting in the pages of 
the daily newspapers and over the radio. 
The dissertation focuses solely on British and Dominion correspondents, which 
has been done for the purpose of the study remaining within reasonable parameters and 
in order to concentrate on a specific group; it is still a large set of professionals to 
examine but not so much as attempting the outsized and therefore less distinct job of 
looking at all Allied war correspondents. While the dissertation is focused on British and 
Dominion journalists covering British and Dominion forces, there were also British 
reporters who covered the American military and, at times, examples of these are used to 
make salient points. Also, the study limits itself primarily to war correspondents 
covering ground forces; while there are references to Royal Air Force and Royal Navy 
operations, the wars conducted in the skies and on the seas constitute specific stories in 
their own right and trying to encompass them would come at the cost of a more 
concentrated examination of the reporting within the land theatres. The reporters in the 
Pacific theatre are excluded for much the same reason: the necessity of maintaining 
focus on specific areas – the European and North African theatres – rather than the entire 
worldwide conflict. Finally, while there were female correspondents, they are not 
included in this dissertation, not due to a lack of quality among their ranks but because 
there were only a small number who normally worked in different or more limited 
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circumstances than male correspondents and therefore would not readily fit into the 
parallels being drawn. 
When considering why reporters from countries such as Canada and Australia 
should be included in this study, and that it should not be solely restricted to journalists 
from Britain, the answer is to be found in four areas: the monarchy’s continued rule over 
Britain and its Dominion nations during the Second World War; the deployment of the 
forces of the Dominion nations; the employers of the correspondents; and the attitude 
and outlook of the war correspondents from these various places. Included in the 12 May 
1937 Coronation Oath of the man who would become the wartime sovereign, King 
George VI, was a vow by which he would govern the citizens of the Dominion nations. 
As read by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Oath solicited: “Will you solemnly 
promise and swear to govern the Peoples of Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, of your Possessions and other Territories to 
any of them belonging or pertaining, and of your Empire of India, according to their 
respective Laws and Customs?” The king replied: “I solemnly promise to do so.”8 With 
this pledge – to some symbolic and to others a sign of real, continued leadership over 
these other nations outside of Great Britain as part of the global network of Dominions – 
it is likely that many journalists of those nations felt they were indeed still part of the 
British Empire (although to what extent depended on their personal views and cannot be 
gauged as a whole). Second, the war correspondents of nations like Canada and 
Australia should be considered together with United Kingdom reporters because none of 
them were solely covering British forces or the forces of their own nations, although this 
was true in some cases, but usually they covered both simultaneously. The British and 
Dominion armed forces often fought side-by-side, from Dunkirk to Tobruk and Alamein 
to D-Day and the push east, and subsequently were covered by war correspondents in 
kind. Meanwhile, the American armed forces largely remained self-contained fighting 
formations, operating apart from, although in concert with, the British. Therefore the 
                                                 
8  The Coronation of their Majesties King George VI & Queen Elizabeth, Official 
Souvenir Programme (London: King George’s Jubilee Trust/Odhams Press Ltd., 1937), 
p. 23. 
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correspondents covering the British and Dominion forces and the journalists reporting on 
the American forces can be considered separate entities, although there was some 
crossover with British correspondents at times covering the Americans, as will be shown 
in limited examples. Third, British news organisations employed citizens of Dominion 
nations as war correspondents. The BBC’s Chester Wilmot would be a prime example; 
following on his coverage of the war for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
Wilmot was loaned to the BBC and became one of its most renowned combat 
correspondents. The BBC also employed as war correspondents Stewart MacPherson 
from Canada and Denis Johnston of the Republic of Ireland (although from a 
neighbouring nation rather than a Dominion state, Johnston had previously covered 
German aerial bombings in Belfast, Northern Ireland). Dominion nation reporters were 
employed by news outlets in their own countries, such as the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC) or newspapers in various Commonwealth countries, but also worked 
as war correspondents at British news outlets: Canadians Charles Lynch reporting for 
Reuters and Robert Cooper for The Times, while the Daily Express deployed Australian 
Alan Moorehead, who became one of the war’s most prominent print correspondents. 
Finally, within the pages of the memoirs of correspondents from Dominion nations there 
is a clear theme that they had Britain as well as their own nations at heart, with a view 
that their countries were part of the British collective of states. Peter Stursberg of the 
CBC expressed this sentiment in his book, Journey Into Victory, while recounting a 
meeting with Lieutenant General Guy Simmonds, commanding officer of the First 
Canadian Division: “The Canadian commander looked even younger than his forty 
years; at that time he was the youngest general in the British forces.”9 Another example 
is found in war correspondent Matthew Halton’s memoir, Ten Years to Alamein. Halton, 
a Canadian, frequently speaks of the British army as “us” and “we”. He writes in praise 
of the withdrawal of both Canadian and British troops from Dunkirk in terms of the 
indomitable spirit of the British: “The British are good at retreat: they cannot be 
                                                 
9  Peter Stursberg, Journey Into Victory: Up the Alaska Highway and to Sicily and 
Italy (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1944), p. 93. 
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demoralized and they always know they’ll come back.”10 He describes fondly his brave 
Canadian countrymen who fought in the North African campaign, but he also speaks of 
the English, Scottish, Welsh, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans and Indians 
who fought in the desert together along with the Canadians as part of one larger group – 
a big tent British fighting force. For these reasons the war correspondents of the 
Dominion nations will also be considered with the journalists from Britain in this study. 
 
Sources 
While the secondary sources mentioned previously will be utilized in the 
dissertation both for factual content and context, the most primary sources about the war 
correspondents during the Second World War are the memoirs of the correspondents 
themselves. William Howard Russell was a pioneer when he spawned the genre of the 
war journalism memoir with his 1858 book, The British Expedition to the Crimea. The 
book, as he explains in his “Notice to the Reader”, is comprised of edited copies of his 
dispatches to The Times, one of the first examples of a professional journalist on the staff 
of a newspaper covering a war rather than newspapers publishing accounts from 
freelancers, civilians or officers serving in the field. With these stories Russell became 
known as an advocate of the foot soldiers, describing their hard living and mistreatment 
by the officers above them, which did not make him popular with military and 
government authorities. He wrote in the book: “My sincere desire is, to tell the truth, as 
far as I know it, respecting all I have witnessed. I had no alternative but to write fully, 
freely, fearlessly, for that was my duty, and to the best of my knowledge and ability it 
was fulfilled.”11 Richard Harding Davis, an American, wrote Notes of a War 
Correspondent, published in 1911, describing his work covering the Cuban-Spanish War 
in 1897 followed by the Greek-Turkish War, the Spanish-American War, the British 
battles with the Boers in South Africa, and the Russo-Japanese War. Other memorable 
                                                 
10  Matthew Halton, Ten Years to Alamein (London: Lindsay Drummond Ltd., 
1944), p. 216. 
11  William Howard Russell, The British Expedition to the Crimea (Chestnut Hill, 
Massachusetts: Adamant Media Corporation, 2005; reprint of London: Routledge and 
Sons, 1877), p. vi. 
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examples of war correspondent memoirs are Philip Gibbs’s coverage of the First World 
War, The Soul of the War, published in 1918, and At War With Waugh by W.F. Deedes, 
a first-person and often comical narrative about reporting on the war in Abyssinia 
alongside Evelyn Waugh, who went on to write the novel Scoop, which satirizes war 
correspondents. While memoirs are largely narrative, they are extremely important to 
any analysis of journalists covering war because they provide details and perspectives 
far beyond what might be divined from the news reports those reporters filed. The 
newspaper and radio stories are their observations and evaluations of the war for a daily 
news audience that simply wanted the facts, but the book-length memoirs provide insight 
into how they got there and what they experienced, how it affected them both physically 
and mentally, and their personal thoughts about all aspects of the war without the 
hindrance of official censorship. The biggest difference between the news stories and the 
memoirs is that the memoirs inject the personal viewpoint of the correspondents that 
were not allowed, and not considered relevant, in their dispatches. The Second World 
War memoirs are not meant to be pure history, but rather a slice of the past from the 
perspective of the authors relating their own anecdotes, observations and assessments of 
the conflict. As Halton of the Toronto Star, and later the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, states on the opening page of Ten Years to Alamein: “The book is a record 
of some of a newspaperman’s adventures and conclusions in Europe during the years of 
democracy’s shame and in a far wasteland in later years when brave men were expiating 
the shame. It is not a history, it is the impact of history on one observer.”12 For this 
reason, memoirs cannot be considered completely reliable. This is not to say the writers 
were intentionally embellishing, but certain factors could slant their accounts: nostalgia, 
foggy memories, or a lack of objectivity that could veer as far as propaganda. Halton, for 
his part, was a virulent anti-Nazi as far back as 1933 when he had begun to observe with 
concern the manoeuvres of the NSDAP and then interviewed Hermann Goering, which 
cemented his fears; he does not try to hide his disdain or forego an agenda that 
condemns the German fascists. He also criticizes the British leaders for inaction against 
                                                 
12  Halton, p. 7. 
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the Nazis prior to the war.13 In his depictions of life and battle in North Africa he does 
not paint an objective picture of the Desert War, as was obvious in the dedication to his 
book: “Dedicated to the British 8th Army with whom I saw the beginning of the 
revenge.”14 Throughout his memoir he portrays the German troops and leaders as 
villains and the British and Dominion forces as long-suffering heroes who eventually 
overcame the odds with superior tactics, skill and heart to win the fight of the desert in 
places like Tobruk and Alamein. While a portrait of history, it was clearly one made 
from a certain angle and, as it was published and sold in 1944 as the war in Europe still 
was being fought, it could be construed as pro-British propaganda. Halton was not 
wrong in his conclusions about the inherent malevolence of the Nazis, as the historical 
record bore out, but his memoir was certainly not an objective historical account. 
Peter Stursberg was another Canadian correspondent covering the war for a news 
outlet from his home country, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. And just like 
Halton, he wrote a relatively short account of his war exploits that was published in 
1944, Journey Into Victory: Up the Alaska Highway and to Sicily and Italy. Yet he also 
added a much more developed memoir of his wartime broadcasting experiences covering 
Montgomery’s 8th Army that was published in 1993. Stursberg admits in his preface to 
The Sound of War: Memoirs of a CBC Correspondent, that there is a possibility for 
nostalgia to slip into correspondents’ remembrances of the war: “As reporters, we tended 
to look at it through rose-coloured glasses, owing, in part, to the prevalent patriotic 
fervor, and, in part, to censorship, which allowed no criticism of the war effort.” He 
observed that the passage of time helped bring the war into focus, but he knew “how 
selective memory can be”, which is why he did a large amount of research for The Sound 
of War. Stursberg consulted “a wealth of reference material” including official war 
histories, books by historians, and hundreds of war news accounts stored in the Canadian 
National Archives, among them transcripts of his own CBC radio reports. He also 
                                                 
13  Ibid., pp. 8, 10-13. 
14  Ibid. 
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consulted with various other Canadian war correspondents of the time.15 Therefore, this 
memoir might be considered a more historically accurate piece of work and 
subsequently more useful as a historical document, although that does not diminish the 
contribution of his earlier work written before the end of the conflict, as it provides his 
impressions while the war was ongoing. 
Regardless of their pure historical merit, memoirs still undoubtedly give the 
perspective of the war correspondents who wrote them and therefore an insight into their 
lives and experiences that will not be found anywhere else, except possibly in interviews 
conducted with them, and even then they are being asked questions rather than conjuring 
their own issues and memories to be related. The greatest value of the correspondents’ 
memoirs lies in their recollections of working in the field – encompassing everything 
from delight to incredible fear and personal hardship – that cannot necessarily be found 
in archival documents and internal organisational reports; the correspondents were 
storytellers and that is how they have passed down the details of their trade during the 
war and whose revelations lie at the heart of this dissertation. Many of the memoirs are 
very well written, descriptive and articulate. The authors were literary and skilled writers 
in relating their accounts and have a strong grasp of history and the context of the war. 
Some memoirs, or at least parts of them, seem almost like travelogues of the places they 
visited as part of their work, which run the gamut from exotic to dreary and very often 
dangerous. Certain distinguishable themes run through many of the memoirs. They often 
express great humanity in their concern for the victims of the war, whether they were 
soldiers or innocents caught up in the destruction. They also show almost unanimous 
respect and admiration for the foot soldiers, while senior officers and censorship 
officers, with whom the correspondents were occasionally frustrated, come in for a fair 
bit of condemnation. They all recall a great sense of camaraderie with fellow 
correspondents, despite often being professional competitors. The correspondents moved 
in the field together and, while trying to get their own stories out first, many seemed to 
form a bond born of shared hardships and small comforts and pleasures. In various 
                                                 
15  Peter Stursberg, The Sound of War: Memoirs of a CBC Correspondent (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. x-xi. 
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memoirs stories are told of traveling in groups in military vehicles and hiding from 
shrapnel in slit trenches next to one another, as well as sharing eggs from street vendors 
in Middle Eastern cities or pilfered bottles of wine in abandoned European villas. Alan 
Moorehead and Alexander Clifford became lifelong friends, although the former worked 
for the Daily Express while the latter was employed by its direct competitor, the Daily 
Mail, and they each speak fondly of the other in their books about the war. Also, many 
correspondents speak of how they are attached to their typewriters and consider the 
clacking hunks of metal their most important piece of kit, whether working in print or 
radio. Describing his exodus to cover the Winter War, Halton writes: “I slung my pack 
over my shoulders, picked up my typewriter and walked across a long, low wooden 
bridge into Finland.”16 
During the Second World War there was great public interest in the 
correspondents’ memoirs, many of which were published before the cessation of 
hostilities. Notable correspondent memoirists of the Second World War include Alaric 
Jacob of Reuters and later the Daily Express, who described his sometimes arduous 
movements through the conflict with A Traveller’s War from 1944. Alan Moorehead of 
the Daily Express produced a trio of books on his experiences in North Africa, compiled 
in one 1944 volume, African Trilogy: The Desert War 1940-1943; he published another 
war memoir in 1970 titled, A Late Education. Some took it upon themselves to write 
about their experiences soon after the war, such as the case of BBC correspondent 
Stewart MacPherson’s 1948 book, The Mike and I. Others waited to finish or nearly 
complete their careers before telling their war stories: Doon Campbell’s 2000 book, 
Magic Mistress, describes his many years at Reuters, including his time as a celebrated 
war correspondent for the British news agency. Talbot of the BBC wrote two books, Ten 
Seconds from Now and Permission to Speak, in 1973 and 1976, respectively. 
Contributions from Canadian war correspondents came from Charles Lynch, whose 
book, You Can’t Print That!, provides the recollections of a long journalism career at 
Reuters, including significant war reporting.  
                                                 
16  Halton, p. 68. 
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In addition to the published memoirs of war correspondents, unpublished archival 
records provided extremely valuable information for this dissertation. Some of the 
greatest detail regarding the correspondents and how they worked is uncovered through 
internal organisational records from the British Broadcasting Corporation Written 
Archives Centre in Reading, the Reuters archive in London, The Times archive in 
London, and the Manchester Guardian archive at Manchester University. These 
collections were invaluable in providing information on the inner workings of these 
media concerns such as memoranda between managers, documents regarding financial 
arrangements and costs, letters and telegrams between editors and reporters, as well as 
correspondence between the organisations and the government and military. 
In the course of the research for this dissertation, requests were made to the BBC 
Written Archives Centre to examine the personnel files of certain combat correspondents 
from the Second World War that were, at the time of the applications, still sealed. BBC 
policy proscribes the release of employee personnel files until s/he has been dead for at 
least thirty years, but in the hopes that the information would not still be considered 
overly sensitive, a special request was made in December 2010 for the file on Edward 
Ward, who died 8 May 1993, as well as the personnel folders of Denis Johnston (died 
1984), Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (died 1987), John Snagge (died 1996), Frank Gillard 
(died 1998) and Godfrey Talbot (died 2000). These remained closed until September 
2011 when the BBC deemed them suitable for release after vetting by the archive staff to 
protect confidential personal or Corporation details. This researcher was subsequently 
the first scholar to view them. These files were especially helpful in writing the sections 
on the selection of war correspondents, salaries and other monies designated for their 
work, and specifically in the case of Edward Ward, the efforts made by the Corporation 
on his behalf while he was the BBC’s only correspondent to be captured and held as a 
prisoner of war. (Ward also wrote a memoir about his experiences as a POW titled, Give 
Me Air.) 
Also within the BBC archives are internal reports, memoranda and 
correspondence regarding war correspondents before the outbreak of war and in its early 
years, as well as the establishment and operation of the War Reporting Unit that 
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provided the bulk of its coverage following D-Day. There are reports regarding the 
financing of war reporting, as well as correspondence with government and military 
officials who ranged from obstructionist to sceptical to enthusiastic about the British 
national broadcaster taking up frontline combat journalism. The archives also contain 
both letters and telegrams from the war zones back to the BBC’s headquarters. 
Additionally, the Corporation published its own annual handbooks with essays by 
editors and reporters regarding the previous year’s highlights and progress. A print 
collection, entitled BBC War Report, provides transcripts of the best broadcast 
dispatches from D-Day to the end of the war. Beyond the BBC’s own archives, the 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College London provided BBC 
correspondent Chester Wilmot’s diaries from the field, including notes about his travel 
to the western theatre of war. 
Like the BBC, the most valuable information to be found in the archives of 
Reuters, The Times and The Manchester Guardian was the trove of personnel files on 
individual war correspondents. The United Kingdom National Archives in Kew was a 
source of many valuable government documents, as well as government and military 
correspondence. These documents were important for understanding the dealings 
between the War Office and the various news organisations, the regulations and 
paperwork for licensing a war correspondent to work in the field, censorship rules, and 
the focus and scope of other official memoranda regarding the Ministry of Information’s 
attempt to control the flow of news during a very sensitive period. 
 
Methodology 
This dissertation attempts to synthesise the reminiscences of the correspondents 
with the archive material and the secondary sources. Taken together this will provide an 
academic analysis of war reporting, as laid out in the dissertation’s chapters. The attempt 
has been made to provide an informational flow throughout the dissertation that 
progressively builds the reader’s understanding of the specifics of the war 
correspondents’ jobs and lives, as well as their importance to the home front. The 
elements to be discussed have been chosen in order to put a bright, comprehensive 
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spotlight on the war correspondents without drifting too far afield into a general history 
of the war, its strategy, or related elements such as politics at home, although there is 
necessarily some of the latter. Therefore, the thesis is comprised of two main parts 
which, taken together, exhibit the major factors that went into gathering and delivering 
the battlefield news to the pages and the airwaves for public consumption. 
The first part of the dissertation addresses issues peripheral to but still bearing 
upon the field work of the war correspondents. The first chapter, “The Media 
Environment”, briefly lays out an overview of the British news landscape, including 
newspapers and broadcasting, as well as the size of their readership or listening 
audience. Another important issue to be considered shall be the different treatment of the 
press and the BBC by the government and the dispute it caused throughout the war 
years. This shall serve as a primer on the media industry that employed the war 
correspondents and the extent of its reach into British society before delving into a closer 
examination of the correspondents themselves and the various aspects of their unique 
jobs in the chapters that follow. 
The next chapter, “What Made a Correspondent”, focuses on how the 
correspondents were selected to perform the unique role of representing their 
organisations in the battle zones. Attributes such as experience and seniority were indeed 
important, but so were intangible qualities observed by editors and managers who chose 
the men who became their war correspondents, and even these desired assets changed as 
the war progressed and the organisations re-evaluated their needs. This chapter also 
considers the training that was conducted to prepare the correspondents for their 
deployments, although this varied depending on the organisation, with the BBC clearly 
taking the most pains to groom its War Reporting Unit. The training was focused 
primarily on military issues ranging from information about formations and equipment, 
and how to avoid giving away valuable information to the enemy, right down to actual 
physical training with army units. Additionally, they needed to know specifics about 
their profession such as how to send stories back to Britain and the rules of censorship; 
in the case of radio reporters, they had to learn everything about their recording and 
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transmission equipment in case their sound engineers were incapacitated in some 
fashion.  
The chapter entitled, “Supporting the Correspondent”, considers the important 
issue of how correspondents were supported at home by their employers through 
salaries, insurance, and other corporate expenses. The salaries are considered in terms of 
how they indicated the value of a correspondent, both within his company as well as 
within British society as a whole, by comparing their pay rate to that of members of the 
public working in different types of positions. For this comparison Guy Routh’s book, 
Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-79, proved helpful, as did A.J. Youngson’s 
book, Britain’s Economic Growth 1920-1966, and Sidney Pollard’s work, The 
Development of the British Economy 1914-1967. The chapter also considers how the 
correspondents and their managers were not always in agreement when it came to 
monetary issues, especially base pay and expenses in the field such as hotel charges and 
the cost of entertaining – usually in the form of drinks or meals purchased for officers – 
to curry favour and gain access to valuable sources. Finally, the chapter looks at how the 
media companies offered moral support, such as the efforts made by the BBC on behalf 
of its correspondent Edward Ward when he was captured and held as a prisoner of war 
for a significant period of time. 
The chapter entitled, “The Correspondent and Censorship”, examines the 
extensive censorship system under which the correspondents worked, including the 
censorship apparatus within the government that dealt with the media on an 
organisational level, the structure that was established in the field to censor the work of 
correspondents before their words left the frontlines, and the issue of self-censorship by 
journalists and what prompted them to curb their own reporting to various degrees. A 
case study is made of the reporting on the Dunkirk evacuation as an example of self-
censorship by the British media as a whole. It also takes account of how the working 
relationship between the news media and the military developed, including the nature of 
the interactions between war correspondents and military commanders and censors who 
curbed the extent of their stories. 
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The dissertation then moves into a direct analysis of the work of the 
correspondents, from their processes to the practical challenges that confronted them in 
the war zones. The chapter, “Techniques and Tools”, focuses on the mechanics of 
reporting in the field and the equipment used to get the stories back to Britain for 
publication or broadcast. These range from carrier pigeons and letters to the advances 
made in radio recording and broadcasting technology over the course of the war, 
including portable recorders that could be carried by one reporter to large broadcasting 
trucks that could send correspondents’ voices back to London from the continent. These 
are some of the operational technicalities overlooked by historians, thus filling a gap in 
the historiography. 
The study of the correspondents in the field continues with the chapter, “Life and 
Peril in the War Zone”, which conveys a cross-section of the lives and activities of the 
correspondents as they worked in the theatres of war. This includes matters such as their 
methods of travel, how they obtained food and shelter and what those consisted of, and 
the conditions under which they worked including journeying for hours to cover 
briefings that were then cancelled, or having to perch their typewriters on the bonnets of 
vehicles or in their laps. Also discussed are the extreme privations and dangers faced by 
the correspondents who insisted on being close to the battles, including being fired upon 
by enemies who did not distinguish them from the Allied troops. Yet there is also a 
consideration of how the correspondents remained in close proximity to the soldiers but 
still managed to enjoy perks that were beyond the reach of the ordinary fighting men. 
While they often lived rough alongside the soldiers in camps or out in the open, the 
correspondents frequently enjoyed the comforts of hotels, or villas that had been 
deserted by their owners; these abandoned homes and other buildings also could be 
sources for the bottles of wine or beer and good, fresh food that the reporters were happy 
to pilfer even while the troops outside were drinking from their canteens of water and 
eating tins of bully beef. In short, they were with the armed forces but not strictly of 
them; although they had many rules to follow and could be sent home by the military 
commanders for not adhering to them, they still enjoyed many of the freedoms of 
privileged civilians. 
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The final chapter, “The Correspondents’ Stories”, analyses a selection of reports 
about some of the war’s biggest battles and how the news of these events was conveyed 
to the public as they happened. By offering information about the war straight from the 
battlefields and briefings with military officials, the correspondents provided vital 
information that enabled the British people to have a direct connection with the war, 
more so than in any previous conflict. This also speaks to why the correspondents, news 
editors and media company managers considered their work to be so important to the 
British public and, in the case of the reporters, why these jobs were worth risking their 
lives. Richard Dimbleby, for example, expressed a belief that he was serving as a link 
between the military personnel and the families and others labouring through hard times 
at home and even coming under fire themselves in The People’s War. By looking at the 
correspondents’ stories, there can be an analysis of why and how they wrote what they 
did and what impact these stories might have had at the time. 
The British people were eager for information about the conflict being fought by 
their loved ones, friends and neighbours, and the correspondents provided updates on the 
fortunes of those men with a breadth, frequency and, in the form of radio, in a medium 
never before experienced with wartime news. Before those circumstances or details 
about individual correspondents can be analysed, however, it is important to examine the 
larger structure under which these war reporters worked. 
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The Media Environment 
 
The British news environment during the pre-war and early-war period is fairly 
easy to sum up: the press was dominant, although its long-held territory was quickly 
being encroached upon by the burgeoning medium of broadcasting. The press – as 
newspapers were collectively known – was the established and trusted outlet for news, 
with certain of the higher-standard papers being especially adept at analysis and depth 
reporting. The BBC was a different sort of vehicle than the press in terms of news 
reporting, providing regular bulletins with facts but little analysis, and with much of the 
information it reported actually provided by the Reuters news agency. The BBC 
subsequently received different treatment from the government and degrees of disdain 
from the press, but it had a large and growing audience and this resulted in a dispute that 
helped shape the role of media outlets in British society during the war and contributed 
to the rise of the radio war correspondents. 
Francis Williams describes how during the 1930s some newspapers attempted to 
increase circulation with offers of gifts to new subscribers. The main competitors in this 
“circulation war” were the largest newspapers: the Daily Express, Daily Mail, News 
Chronicle, and Daily Herald. The papers at one time or another tempted potential 
subscribers with offers of books such as a complete set of the works of Charles Dickens, 
cameras, fountain pens, stockings, shoes, coats, trousers, cutlery, kettles and watches, 
among other things. It was said that a poor family could outfit itself with a large range of 
its necessities by switching back and forth between papers a few times. The strategy 
worked, though, with the Herald becoming the world’s first newspaper to pronounce 
that it had reached a circulation of two million copies. By 1937, as the Herald hovered at 
two million, the Express surged past with a circulation of over 2.3 million, with the 
News Chronicle reaching 1.3 million; the Daily Mail circulation dropped from its 1930 
figure of 1.8 million in 1930 to 1.5 million in 1937.17 
                                                 
17  Francis Williams, Dangerous Estate: The Anatomy of Newspapers (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), pp. 201-203. 
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The battle for circulation figures had “twisted the permanent values of 
journalism,” according to Williams, “turning the relationship between newspaper and 
reader so largely into a mere matter of barter.”18 This inter-war development in the 
industry, however, had one largely positive benefit in the years that followed. Williams 
writes: 
 
Yet what remains of lasting significance is that despite all its excesses 
the newspaper war of the ‘thirties did succeed to a remarkable extent in 
permanently increasing newspaper readership. A surprising number of 
the bought readers stuck. The average daily readership of national 
morning papers in 1930 was 8,929,000. By the end of 1939 it had risen 
to over ten and a half millions.19 
 
In fact, by the end of the 1930s the combined circulation of all British daily 
newspapers – national, provincial, morning and evening – had risen to approximately 
19.5 million and the Sunday papers alone were around sixteen million.20 As Williams 
notes, “…all over the country people who had never read newspapers before were doing 
so. They were to go on reading them in increasing numbers.”21 
Newspapers in Britain in the inter-war and Second World War years, and perhaps 
still today, were categorized into two general types in the public mind that provide a 
better understanding of the state of the British newspaper industry: quality press and 
popular press. Williams explains that they can be further dissected into an additional 
type. He writes:  
 
The Times, the Manchester Guardian and the Telegraph… fall 
naturally enough into one group: that of the so-called quality press 
carrying out those functions traditionally belonging to a serious 
newspaper. At the other end of the scale come the two great mass-
circulation newspapers of our times, the Daily Mirror and the Daily 
Express.... In between these two there lies a middle group of medium-
                                                 
18  Ibid., p. 204. 
19  Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
20  Ibid., p. 206. 
21  Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
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circulation popular newspapers of a somewhat more serious character, 
the News Chronicle, Daily Herald and Daily Mail.22 
 
Williams quotes fluctuating circulation numbers from the 1930s, through the war, 
up until his published study in 1957, but the general designations of the newspapers 
remains accurate. Certainly there are more British newspapers that fit in each category – 
the Financial Times, for example, undoubtedly should be placed in the ranks of the 
serious papers – but for the sake of historical analysis the important distinction remains 
between the “quality” and “popular” press. 
William Berry, the 1st Viscount Camrose, was the owner of the Daily Telegraph 
and previously the owner and editor-in-chief of the Sunday Times and until the end of 
the war the chairman of the Financial Times.23 His 1947 book, British Newspapers and 
Their Controllers, written under his titled name of Camrose, details the ownership of all 
British daily newspapers at the time, as well as also helping place the publications within 
their perceived categories based on content and readership in more detail than Williams. 
Regarding those situated in the capital, which naturally included the biggest and most 
influential, Camrose writes: 
 
The twelve London morning newspapers can be classified as follows: – 
Two higher priced dailies – appealing to the more serious public – 
Times, Daily Telegraph. Four dailies of “mass” circulation – Daily 
Express, Daily Herald, Daily Mail, News Chronicle. Two picture 
dailies of smaller size – Daily Graphic, Daily Mirror. One financial 
daily – Financial Times. One daily paper representing the Licensed 
Victuallers’ trade – Morning Advertiser. One Communist daily – Daily 
Worker. One sporting daily – Sporting Life. The three evening papers 
are the Evening News, the Evening Standard and the Star…. The nine 
Sunday papers can be arranged as follows: – Two appealing to the 
more serious public – Observer, Sunday Times. Five normal-sized 
newspapers of mass circulation – Sunday Dispatch, Sunday Express, 
News of the World, People and Reynolds News. Two picture papers of 
smaller size, also of mass circulation – Sunday Graphic, Sunday 
Pictorial. Of the morning papers the Times, Daily Telegraph, 
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Financial Times, Morning Advertiser and Daily Worker have no 
connection with any other newspaper.24 
 
Camrose’s 1947 list of the existing papers and qualifications that separate them 
into different types display the landscape of London’s press25 that was likely identical or 
at least extremely close to what it was during the war. There were still other notable 
large dailies around Britain, such as the Manchester Guardian, the Glasgow Herald and 
the Scotsman, but the listing adequately indicates the variety of choices available to 
newspaper readers. Camrose notes that this is reflected in the size of the readership that 
was gained in the years of the Second World War: 
 
The number of newspaper readers has substantially increased during 
and since the war but there is not much evidence that there is any 
change in public taste. The mass circulations, as they are sometimes 
called, are considerably larger than they have ever been. As compared 
with 1939, the Daily Express has put on 1,300,000, the Mirror more, 
and the others, with few exceptions, have made lesser, but still 
substantial, gains. Some of the Sunday papers have made very large 
increases indeed.26 
 
After the war began, the economic pinch hit all sectors, including publishing, and 
the government ordered newsprint to be rationed beginning in 1940, causing newspapers 
to shrink to “less than one-third of their pre-war size.”27 This meant a fall in the costs of 
producing the papers, but also in the amount of advertising that could be carried, 
meaning less revenue as paid advertisements accounted for the majority of money made 
by newspapers. Advertising declined from sixty percent of London daily newspaper 
revenue in 1938 to thirty-one percent in 1943, as well as falling from forty-seven to 
twenty-seven percent for Sunday newspapers during that same period. Newspapers, 
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however, continued to be sold at pre-war prices despite their diminished number of 
pages, meaning the finances of papers became more reliant on the readers who 
purchased them rather than advertisers.28 This also meant that companies, still seeking to 
make consumers aware of their products, spread their advertisements around to 
publications that normally would not have been targets for their business. James Curran 
and Jean Seaton write: 
 
Newsprint rationing reduced the distance between quality and popular 
papers. Popular papers were no longer under such pressure to seek ever 
larger audiences because circulation levels were ‘pegged’ during much 
of the war. By reducing costs and redistributing advertising, newsprint 
controls also increased the profitability of many newspapers.29 
 
The other effect of paper rationing, according to Curran and Seaton, was that the 
popular press devoted more of its limited space to news and commentary on public 
affairs: “This brought their level of informative journalism much closer to that of the 
quality daily press.” This also helped in the rise of the publications considered to be on 
the left side of the political discourse by bringing them to different readers than they 
might otherwise have attracted. The Daily Mirror, Sunday Pictorial, Daily Herald, 
Reynolds News, and the Daily Worker had a combined circulation of nine million in 
1945, this despite the Daily Worker having only accounted for one percent of the total 
national circulation before being shut down by the government between January 1941 
and September 1942 for its communist views considered detrimental to the war effort.30 
Despite this general improvement in the fortunes of the newspaper industry during 
the war, it might have done even better except for the rise of another medium that 
became exceptionally significant in the news business: broadcasting. 
Prior to the war the BBC, a state institution funded by public money, was 
primarily an outlet for entertainment, talks, documentaries, and “outside broadcasts” 
comprising live commentary on events such as sports matches, state funerals, and 
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parades; BBC news consisted mostly of bulletins read by studio announcers. Yet the 
BBC had one very large asset: its audience. In September 1939, there were more than 
nine million wireless licenses in the United Kingdom, approximately 73 for every 100 
households. BBC transmitters broadcast 75,636 hours of programming for the home isles 
in 1939, while the Overseas Service delivered 43,198 hours. The king delivered speeches 
over the BBC six times in 1939, including on 3 September to address the outbreak of 
war.31 BBC administrators perceived the outbreak of war as a significant opportunity to 
expand its mandate and format, but the BBC Handbooks give somewhat contradictory 
reports of the Corporation’s war preparedness. The 1940 edition, which focuses on the 
events of 1939, states that at the declaration of hostilities the Corporation ordered “the 
change-over to war conditions…. BBC plans had soon to be modified to meet the 
condition of a war which, in its freedom from attempted invasions and, as both Press and 
BBC were soon to discover, in its lack of news, departed widely from accepted 
forecasts.” The 1941 BBC Handbook is more confident, explaining that Ralph Murray 
made the first broadcast from abroad in 1934 with a report on British troops travelling 
through Calais to the Saar, as well as highlighting Richard Dimbleby’s Spanish Civil 
War reports and the early work of Charles Gardner. Yet the handbook admits that the 
“doldrums period” of the Phoney War produced stumbling blocks: “Plans to cover the 
war were made long before war came. Admittedly we based these plans on the 
completely wrong idea that from the start there would be, as in 1914, violent action.”32 
As Siân Nicholas explains, “BBC plans for reporting the war were equally rudimentary 
[in 1939], its role conceived simply as a mouthpiece for government information.” 
Beginning on 25 August 1939 there were two daily bulletins at 8 a.m. and 12 p.m., 
which first engendered public enthusiasm that quickly turned to annoyance with the rise 
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to “eight daily bulletins [that] became hopelessly repetitive”, forcing the decision on 7 
September to reduce the bulletins to six with the most recent news reported first.33 
The government for which the BBC was supposed to be a “mouthpiece” still gave 
preferential treatment to the press. As prime minister during the early period of the war, 
Neville Chamberlain not only advocated strong censorship of radio but had considered 
doing away with broadcasting altogether.34 The Newspaper and Periodicals Emergency 
Council lobbied hard for a specific sort of regulation on broadcasting requiring that radio 
news reports should be held “until after newspaper reports of the same vent had already 
been published.”35 The close relationship between the Ministry of Information and Fleet 
Street resulted in reluctance to let radio beat print publications to big stories, instead 
requiring the BBC to hold broadcasts until the morning hours when newspapers hit the 
street. The press even went so far as to run what Nicholas calls “scare stories” about the 
BBC coverage of the war: 
 
When the Radio Times publicised that Dimbleby, accompanying the 
BEF with the courtesy rank of captain, had managed to record some 
battle sounds from the French lines, newspaper articles condemned 
BBC ‘plans’ to put microphones on the battlefields (‘A more ghastly 
idea was never conceived’, trumpeted the News of the World). The 
BBC hurriedly reassured listeners that, ‘There will be no awful sound-
glimpses of the battlefields where those we love are perhaps giving up 
their lives…. The bulk of the recordings … will be made with troops 
resting or at headquarters’. In the first months of the war, with military 
news subject to stringent censorship, even this was better than 
nothing.36 
 
Yet the BBC’s Foreign News Committee complained in a December 1942 internal 
report that the broadcaster had made little impact on the public overall and was 
                                                 
33  Siân Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime 
BBC, 1939-45 (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 191. 
34  Ibid., p. 211. 
35  Jonathan Dimbleby, Richard Dimbleby: A Biography (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1975), p. 95. 
36  Siân Nicholas, “War Report (BBC 1944-5), and the Birth of the BBC War 
Correspondent”, War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-2003, edited by 
Mark Connelly and David Welch (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 142. 
35 
considered an “upstart competitor” by the print news outlets: “To this competitor favours 
are allotted according to some arbitrary rule or ratio, or, more simply, in sufficiently 
grudging measure to ensure the minimum of offence to newspaper interests.” The 
committee also opined that “there has been failure to recognise broadcasting as a public 
service and an instrument of war.” Its report stated the BBC, in late 1942, was still 
contending with “the severe limitations imposed by the official attitude and policy” of 
the government.37 In the 1941 BBC Handbook, News Editor R.T. Clark had penned a 
subtle swipe at the government in this on-going argument when referring to “limitations, 
technical and political, under which the BBC’s news service must work – which does not 
exist to embarrass the newspaper.” Up until 1943 the BBC argued with the War Office 
over accreditations for individual correspondents, although this was partly the 
Corporation’s fault for initially requesting credentials for numerous correspondents who 
then went unused.38 News Controller A.P. Ryan concluded the BBC’s difficulties 
stemmed from its treatment “as a new and troublesome kind of newspaper. In fact the 
BBC is something of a newspaper, something of a cinema, and something of its own.”39 
In terms of news delivery, the BBC aimed to stop treating its distinctive medium like a 
print publication, redistributing bulletins from news services such as Reuters, and adapt 
war reporting to radio technology, believing the microphone and the sounds it captured 
could bring the conflict to the public in a manner more original and immediate compared 
to what newspapers delivered. Essentially, the managers of the BBC were attempting to 
convince both the British government and the public to accept a break from the 
established norms of war news reporting, which included trying to adapt censorship 
policies to a medium that was growing along with the war and therefore not as easily 
regulated as print journalism. Various internal BBC memoranda discuss the war as a 
                                                 
37  British Broadcasting Corporation, Written Archives Centre (hereafter BBC 
WAC) R28/280/1, Foreign News Committee, “Report to Controller (News) on Radio 
War Correspondence and News Services from the Fighting Fronts”, 8 December 1942. 
38  British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1941 (London: BBC, 1941), 
p. 99; BBC WAC R28/280/4, Marshall, “D.G.’s Meeting with A.G. and D.P.R. War 
Office”, 18 December 1943. 
39  BBC WAC R28/280/1, Foreign News Committee, 8 December 1942; BBC 
WAC R28/280/2, Ryan, “BBC Reporting of Second Front”, 8 February 1943. 
36 
singular opportunity for the Corporation in which it could produce “sound pictures of 
battle” and “exploit the qualities of immediacy and reality which make broadcasting 
unique as a medium for bringing the war to life.”40 Yet they also express awareness that 
the opportunity was being squandered. The December 1942 report by the Foreign News 
Committee notes, “We all share… feelings of disappointment, indeed of shame, that 
British radio should still be failing, after three years of war, to exploit its unique 
possibilities as a medium for reporting military operations.” The report perceives the 
small group of BBC correspondents as having “made no deep impact on the public 
mind” and that the Corporation was still considered “a little brother to the Press” which 
must produce a disparate product in order to change this perception. Addressing 
propaganda potential, the report also notes “there has been a failure to recognise 
broadcasting as a public service and an instrument of war.”41 
As the BBC was a unique state institution where editorial independence butted 
heads with wartime propaganda, and the immediacy of radio made it harder to control 
the message, Whitehall and the armed forces attempted to influence BBC policy and the 
correspondents it deployed. Asa Briggs states that while the MoI and the BBC had many 
common goals, “Relations were obviously at their worst when the Government became 
uneasy about the constitutional position of the BBC, tried to urge the Ministry to 
establish tight control or even contemplated a complete take-over.” In 1940, then 
Minister of Information Alfred Duff Cooper assured Churchill that the MoI could exert 
“complete control” over BBC news reporting. According to Briggs, this attempt to 
dominate the broadcaster was a continual source of discussion in Whitehall: “The BBC 
was accused of ‘unrelieved pessimism’, and criticism of its bulletins was a feature of the 
meetings even of the War Cabinet.”42 As Duncan Anderson explains, “The BBC 
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presented more of a problem [than the print media]. Churchill and Duff Cooper both 
wanted to exert more control, but the corporation managed to maintain a surprising 
degree of independence.”43 BBC Director-General Cecil Graves wrote to the MoI in 
October 1942 asking for government support at the same level as British newspapers and 
American broadcasting organisations appeared to receive by allowing BBC news 
observers on all Allied operations: “Unless, therefore, the British Government backs the 
B.B.C. and puts its case at least as high as that of the Newspaper Proprietors’ 
Association, there is a real danger that British prowess will be swamped by American 
stories.” Graves claimed to be sensitive to the difficulties of “adjudicating” between the 
press and broadcasting, but framed the BBC’s needs as part of the national war effort: “I 
have no hesitation in saying we could not put our national propaganda on a modern war-
time basis unless the British Authorities are prepared to fight [for the BBC].”44 R.W. 
Foot – who from January 1942 shared the director-general role with Graves, until he 
took sole command of the position in September 1943 – made a similar point about the 
BBC’s usefulness to public morale and propaganda when he addressed perceived press 
competition in a February 1943 note to Minister of Information Brendan Bracken: 
 
I don’t care twopence about the prestige of the BBC or anything of that 
sort, but I do care, as I know you do, that broadcasting should really be 
used to serve the country to the full extent of its possibilities, and until 
we can really get away from the complete fallacy that broadcasting is a 
competitor of the Press, and therefore must be treated as if it were just 
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another newspaper, the country must inevitably fail to receive from 
broadcasting the service to which it is obviously entitled.45 
 
Whitehall had been slow to perceive the growing stature and value of radio. 
However, according to Nicholas, “By November 1943 it had been officially conceded 
that the BBC could make a unique contribution to Forces morale by reporting the war, 
and the press lobbied against this new encroachment on their prerogatives in vain.”46 
Asa Briggs explains that the wartime press restrictions helped drive the public toward 
broadcasting: “A shortage of newsprint, leading to the rationing of space in newspapers, 
magazines and books, gave added power to words on the air.” Briggs adds that in this 
changing news environment, the BBC eventually achieved an imperative status among 
the British public: “Whatever its content, good or bad, the 9 p.m. news bulletin became 
in most households an institution almost as sacrosanct as family prayers are said once to 
have been.”47 The contest between the press and the BBC not only reached parity but 
eventually reversed, with some in the newspapers complaining that the BBC received 
preferential treatment. Times war correspondent Robert Cooper told his editor in a 21 
June 1944 cable from France, “It’s pitiful that British correspondents are still rationed to 
400 words by wireless, which doesn’t always work, when Americans have direct 
transmission to New York by Press Wireless. Cross-Channel cable is laid, and there’s no 
reason why we should not have telephone or up-to-date teleprinter. B.B.C., of course, is 
getting favoured treatment for broadcasts by army channels.”48 
Despite this ongoing battle between the press and the BBC and the changing news 
environment it engendered, the role of the war correspondents during the Second World 
War seemed to have been clear cut. The correspondents in the field were not in the 
business of forming public opinion, but rather keeping the public informed. They 
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attempted to report factually on the war and, in the case of newspapers, let the writers of 
the editorials (known at the time as “leaders” for their place on the front page) offer their 
views and enable the public to make their own subsequent decisions. Paul Addison 
writes: 
 
‘Public’ or ‘popular’ opinion has to be sharply defined. The editorials 
in the Daily Mirror, for example, are evidence only of what the editor 
wanted to say. The fact that three million people bought the paper is no 
help in discovering how many read the leaders, agreed with them, or 
were influenced by them. Then as now politicians and journalists made 
large and often partisan assertions about the way public opinion was 
moving. To depend on such judgments is to go hunting the unicorn.49 
 
Commenting for a March 2014 article in The New York Times about former United 
States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld – one of the architects of the 2003 Iraq war 
who was known for giving misleading comments – NBC News Pentagon correspondent 
Jim Miklaszewski stated that reporters covering the military in wartime do not want to 
deal with government attempts to shape public opinion, but simply to report the situation 
at hand:  
 
Whenever we go to these briefings and we question anybody… we’re 
not looking for opinions, we’re not looking for political spin. We’re 
just looking for facts. That’s what drives this press corps, covering the 
military in particular: ‘Just give us the facts and let us report them.’50 
 
This statement is significant because it shows an historical continuity in war 
reporting: in memoirs and correspondence, a significant number of war correspondents 
who covered the Second World War write about how they wanted to be given solid 
information without spin from military officials in the field so they could make an 
unblemished contribution to the daily news and public record of events. Yet that was an 
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unlikely possibility. Their participation in the propaganda machine, whether intentional 
or not, was almost unavoidable due to the atmosphere of total war at the time; the 
military controlled the message and censored the facts so the war correspondents had to 
be part of that message and submit to censorship at the risk of being perceived as 
defeatist or insubordinate and consequently being prevented from reporting in the war 
zones. Indeed, during the Phoney War, some war correspondents delved into what could 
be considered outright attempts at morale raising, if only due to a lack of hard news. 
Frank Gillard and Richard Dimbleby of the BBC, for example, conducted cheery quiz 
shows featuring soldiers just to fill airtime and keep the fighting forces in the public 
mind. Things eventually changed, both for the war correspondents and the news 
consumers. Addison writes: 
 
After the initial phase of ‘phoney war’, there ensued between May 
1940 and November 1942 a long and increasingly bleak period when 
the news was all of evacuations, retreats and disasters, and the 
overriding obsession was military events. Then, suddenly, the long 
tunnel of defeat was at an end. The Eighth Army defeated Rommel at 
El Alamein and Anglo-American troops invaded north-west Africa. 
Churchill ordered the church bells to be rung throughout the land in 
celebration of the long-awaited turn of the tide.51 
 
The war correspondents subsequently contributed to the public morale, as with 
Gillard and Dimbleby making purposefully positive broadcasts with the troops, or when 
the national mood was shaped simply by reporting facts that were either depressing or 
uplifting to the people at home. It could therefore be said that the correspondents were, 
to some extent, both journalists and propagandists due to the wartime environment. 
Yet the Second World War correspondents were different in ways that contribute 
to our understanding of modern war reportage. The most important and obvious of these 
was the separation of correspondents into two general types: print and radio. Despite the 
shared experience of working in the field under the same conditions, there were contrasts 
between the two mediums due to the manner in which they recorded and delivered their 
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stories that were hallmarks of the new media environment. Furthermore, in terms of 
reporting technology and technique, these correspondents straddled the past and the 
future: while telegrams, letters and even carrier pigeons were being used to deliver the 
news of the war back to Britain by all correspondents, radio reporters began utilising 
specific developments in recording and communication including mobile recorders and 
transmitter trucks. This changed the way that the public received and interpreted the war, 
thereby making this People’s War a unique experience, even if the people’s 
correspondents were men of much the same stock as in previous campaigns. 
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What Made a Correspondent? 
 
It could be said that war correspondents are both born and made, through innate 
qualities they possess as well as prior experience and at times specific instruction. This 
chapter is about the process through which Second World War correspondents were 
chosen for their roles in the field, including the qualities editors and managers were 
looking for, but also the types of backgrounds and experience from which they were 
taken. This included utilizing the background and talents of veteran reporters who had 
covered previous conflicts; throwing young and experienced, but not yet combat 
schooled, journalists into war zones and letting them learn on the job; or, in some 
instances, providing training to reporters to prepare them for their new roles. In all cases, 
there had to be a mixture of knowledge, capability and resolve that caught the eye of 
seasoned editors before a reporter was deployed as a war correspondent. The process of 
selection was far from arbitrary and the men running the news outlets knew the type of 
reporter who would best fit the demanding role for which they were being recruited, a 
job of the type and scope never seen before even in combat journalism. Following that, 
the focus is on the type of training that war correspondents received before being 
deployed to the frontline with the British armed forces. In the cases of press 
organisations, the training appears to have been far less formal, if there at all. 
Meanwhile, the BBC also sent reporters into the field based on experience and aptitude 
but as the war progressed developed a rigorous, set programme for its potential war 
correspondents whom it intended to deploy to the Second Front in 1944. 
 
Historical Perspective 
Second World War battlefield journalism became a unique job that the 
correspondents developed to meet with changes in the scope of the conflict, updated 
censorship rules and new technology, but it was not created in a vacuum; the journalists’ 
style and system of war reporting evolved from the efforts of earlier correspondents. A 
brief consideration of the careers and legacies of some of the journalists who covered 
43 
significant prior conflicts will act as an important historical framework that shall help 
provide a greater understanding of the correspondents in the Second World War. 
The early attempts at first-hand reporting of wars had inherent difficulties. Henry 
Crabb Robinson, a lawyer, became a special correspondent for The Times and sent back 
letters beginning in 1807 about the Peninsular War. He continued to write these 
dispatches for the next two years from Spain, although he relied more on local 
newspaper accounts than his own observations, failing even to mention the mortal 
wounding of the British commander, Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, at the Battle of 
Corunna. Other newspapers attempted to deploy war correspondents, as with the 
Morning Chronicle and a Mr. Finnerty in 1809, and the Morning Post and its reporter 
C.L. Gruneisen in 1837, but these efforts were in vain; Finnerty was caught posing as a 
ship captain’s private secretary and removed before the fleet set sail, while Spanish 
authorities deported Gruneisen during the Carlist War.52 
Irishman William Howard Russell might be dubbed the father of modern 
European war correspondents. Newspapers in the nineteenth century relied primarily on 
letters from soldiers serving on the various battlefronts, but Russell’s reports from the 
Crimean War were, according to author and journalist Phillip Knightley, “the beginning 
of an organised effort to report a war to the civilian population at home using the 
services of a civilian reporter.” His dispatches were also the result of ingenuity, 
resourcefulness and determination that came to define the craft.53 The Times chose 
Russell to cover the Crimean War of 1853-1856 following his work providing stories on 
the bruising political scene in Dublin, and he went on to become one of the most 
influential and well-known news writers of his day, covering conflicts on four 
continents. Russell at first thought the job of a war correspondent to be an odd one as he 
observed the action in the Crimea and gathered stories of the fighting through interviews 
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with those who made it back alive from the frontline. He wrote: “It could scarcely be 
recognised or legitimate business for any man to ride in front of the army in order that he 
might be able to write an account of a battle for a newspaper.” Yet the public eagerly 
read his accounts of the combat and Russell became a household name, as well as 
somewhat of a crusader on behalf of the troops with the aid of supporting editorials on 
the front page of The Times. Knightley notes: “As the Russian winter [of 1854] set in, 
Russell grew caustic in his criticism of the suffering the soldiers had to endure. His 
dispatches dwelt on the pitiful condition of the troops and the command’s lack of 
concern.” He was eventually credited with exposing the poor conditions under which the 
British soldiers in the field had to operate – including inept and neglectful leadership, a 
dearth of supplies and inadequate medical treatment – and his honest and often critical 
reports caused an outcry that forced corrective action back in Britain. Knightley writes: 
“Once the public had been fully aroused to the state of the army in the Crimea, reaction 
was rapid. The government, at first worried only in case recruiting might be affected, 
soon had to face an angry Times demanding that the army’s medical services be 
reformed, a move that eventually took Florence Nightingale, a nurse of professional 
skill, to the war.”54 In short, Russell embodied the phrase “power of the press” by using 
the direct connection between his newspaper and the British public to enact real social 
reform. Russell wrote in his 1858 book, The British Expedition to the Crimea, of how 
newspapers enabled positive change for the soldiers and helped maintain the spirits of 
the public, although he did not take personal credit: 
 
The press, faithful to its mission and its duties, threw a full light on the 
scene which was passing full three thousand miles away from our 
shores, and sustained the heart of the nation by counsels of tenderness, 
hope, and succour… the press upheld the Ministry in its efforts to 
remedy the effects of an unwise and unreasoning parsimony, prepare 
the public mind for the subversion of an effete and corrupt system, 
encouraged people in the moment of depression, excited them by 
recitals of the deeds of their countrymen, elevated the condition and 
self-respect of the soldiery, and with all the force and fire of Tyrtaeus, 
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and with immeasurably greater power and happier results… denounced 
the system and the men responsible for great disasters and the loss of 
valiant lives – “told the truth and feared not” – carried, as it were, the 
people of England to the battle field.55 
 
With these words, and through his own work, Russell set the bar very high for 
those who followed him in the vocation of war reporting, especially in the two world 
wars. From the beginning of the First World War, the British government and military 
authorities showed a great degree of antipathy toward journalists and attempted to 
control the flow of war news via stringent official censorship, official communiqués 
written by army personnel, and press conferences that were consistently, although not 
always truthfully, optimistic. There were also arrests of reporters who ventured into the 
field without permission. It was a difficult time to become a war correspondent; of 
course, that did not prevent numerous men from trying. Philip Gibbs – one of the more 
traditional variety of reporter chosen to cover the fighting because he was already a 
veteran war correspondent, and who became a celebrity reporter as one of only five 
correspondents officially sanctioned by the British Expeditionary Force in France – 
wrote of those who queued up at Britain’s newspaper Mecca, Fleet Street, to become 
battlefield reporters: 
 
There was a procession of literary adventurers up the steps of the 
buildings in the Street of Adventure – all those men who get lost 
somewhere between one war and another and come out with claims of 
ancient service on the battlefields of Europe when the smell of blood is 
scented from afar; and scores of new men of sporting instincts and 
jaunty confidence, eager to be ‘in the middle of things’, willing to go 
out on any terms so long as they could see a ‘bit of fun’, ready to take 
all risks. Special correspondents, press photographers, the youngest 
reporters on the staff, sub-editors emerging from little dark rooms with 
a new excitement in eyes that had grown tired with proof correcting, 
passed each other on the stairs and asked for their Chance. It was a 
chance of seeing the greatest drama in life with real properties, real 
corpses, real blood, real horrors with a devilish thrill in them. It was 
not to be missed by any self-respecting journalist to whom all life is a 
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stage play which he describes and criticises from a free seat in the front 
of the house.56 
 
Geoffrey Pyke exemplified this adventuring spirit possessed by many of the 
would-be and actual correspondents of the time, as well as those who have since joined 
what Russell called a “luckless tribe”. In the first chapter of his book, To Ruhleben – and 
Back: A Great Adventure in Three Phases, Pyke explains how in 1914 he was 
determined to be part of the news corps covering the Great War and believed his best 
chance was to go where the British newspapers would not already have reporters: Berlin. 
A former correspondent for Reuters in Copenhagen, he spoke German and convinced the 
editor of the Daily Chronicle that there should be a correspondent telling the story of life 
behind enemy lines. Pyke admitted he knew it would be extremely dangerous but, rather 
naively, believed the Germans were unlikely to expect such a brazen move by an English 
journalist and that, by being “really careful and really wily”, he could pull it off. He 
lasted six days in the German capital before being arrested as a spy. He spent months in 
jail and was then sent to Ruhleben internment camp, west of Berlin. Pyke eventually 
escaped, however, and in July 1915 sent his sensational story to the Chronicle from 
Holland, to which he had walked from Germany, and it became front-page news; his 
1916 book went on to become a wartime bestseller.57 
Charles à Court Repington, scion of a wealthy family who attended Eton and 
Sandhurst before a distinguished military career, resigned his army commission as a 
lieutenant-colonel after a relationship with the wife of Sir William Garstin became 
public in 1901; he was put on “parole” and declared he would never see Lady Mary 
Garstin again, but went back on his word and was forced out of the service. He turned to 
journalism and went on to become a war correspondent for The Times, using his 
extensive contacts within the military as sources. “…it was his account in The Times of 
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 that earned him almost instant international 
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recognition as an outstanding military commentator.” In 1911 he was appointed editor of 
the British army’s general staff quarterly publication, Army Review, which brought him 
condemnation from some who accused him of losing his independence and becoming a 
mouthpiece for the government, although he had long been a critic of politicians and 
ministers regardless of party and spoke openly about his belief in the threat to Britain 
posed by Germany. “More clearly than most other commentators in the press, on the 
brink of war in 1914, he foresaw the likely unfortunate consequences of inconsistent pre-
war diplomacy and strategic planning.”58 During the First World War, at a time when 
most journalists were denied access to the battle zones, Repington was invited to the 
front line by the British commander-in-chief in France, Sir John French. Afterward 
Repington, named only as “Our Military Correspondent”, provided a dispatch to The 
Times that was published on 14 May 1915 in which he stated a shortage of shells had 
resulted in failure during British attacks in Fromelles and Richebourg earlier that week: 
“The attacks were well planned and valiantly conducted. The infantry did splendidly, but 
the conditions were too hard. The want of an unlimited supply of high explosive was a 
fatal bar to our success.”59 The Times also printed a leader article that added a moral and 
political slant to the reporting of its military correspondent in which the paper stated, 
“This is a war of artillery, and more and more it is coming to depend upon the supplies 
of ammunition…. British soldiers died in vain on the Aubers Ridge on Sunday because 
more shells were needed. The Government, who have so seriously failed to organize 
adequately our national resources, must bear their share of the grave responsibility.”60 
The following day the newspaper published stories quoting munition makers in both 
Leeds and Glasgow proclaiming their readiness to produce the shells needed, including 
telegrams from the West of Scotland Armaments Committee to Sir John French and 
Lord Provost Dunlop of Glasgow, the latter of which read in part: “We, the 
representatives of the employers and working men on Clyde Armaments Committee, 
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wish you to know that we thoroughly realize the situation, and that with the help of the 
Government departments concerned, who are working in cordial cooperation, our gallant 
comrades serving under you shall lack for nothing which the Clyde can produce.” The 
article written by a reporter in Leeds stated, “The general feeling aroused in Leeds by the 
statement of The Times military Correspondent regarding the need for explosive shells at 
the front is that not a moment should be lost in increasing the output.”61 Historian Peter 
Fraser says that the “myth” of the Repington dispatch became so large that it was 
believed to have helped in bringing about a sea change in Westminster. He notes, “The 
public’s response was supposed at the time to have been the main cause of the fall of 
Asquith’s Liberal government. ‘Never before perhaps in the history of the world’ 
recounts a historian of journalism ‘have sixteen words in a newspaper produced such 
epoch-making results.’” Fraser himself believes the effect of the story was overblown in 
light of the real circumstances: “There had been no secrecy about the shortage of shells 
before Repington’s statement.”62 Regardless of whether the problem was already known, 
it was still an example of a war correspondent’s dispatch from the front sparking a major 
stir in British society regarding the welfare of the troops, not unlike that of the reaction 
to Russell’s reportage. 
C.E.W. Bean had already written three books when he was chosen in 1914 to be 
the official news observer for the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) that was heading to 
fight on the Western Front before being diverted to Gallipoli. An Oxford-educated 
lawyer who wrote occasional articles for the Sydney Evening News, Bean gave up the 
law to work as a journalist full time in 1908. He wrote about Australian industry and 
culture while travelling around New South Wales, as well as reporting on the visit of the 
American Great White Fleet, expanding his articles into the books he wrote between 
1909 and 1911. When the First World War broke out he had never covered any conflicts, 
but still won a narrow vote among his colleagues in the Australian Journalists 
Association to be the press representative with the troops and have his stories distributed 
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to participating newspapers. He went on to cover the AIF fighting not only at Gallipoli, 
where he was one of three journalists to witness the beach landings, but in France as 
well.63 Bean was distinguished by being strict to a personal creed that journalists should 
be fully informed of the military’s actions but not criticise the military strategy, which 
meant he fit well into the government censorship of correspondents while going against 
the precedent set by some of his predecessors with a campaigning bent. 
George Lowther Steer, who had previously covered the Abyssinian war, reported 
on the Spanish Civil War for The Times. His biographer wrote: 
 
Steer thought the public considered journalism ‘a rapid assembly of 
inaccurate statements, best forgotten’. They did not know ‘the sweat 
and the discomfort nor the low and unembellished places where the 
facts are best sought’, nor did they understand ‘how atmosphere is 
drafted by running from the highest to the humblest, and being no less 
or more than the equal of each.’64 
 
This was on display in the dispatch for which he became best known: describing 
the bombing of Guernica and revealing the Luftwaffe’s involvement. Steer wrote in his 
lead paragraph on 27 April 1937, “Guernica, the most ancient town of the Basques and 
the centre of their cultural tradition, was completely destroyed yesterday afternoon by 
insurgent air raiders.” Stating, undoubtedly sardonically, that the bomber tactics “may be 
of interest to students of the new military science [of air warfare]”, he described how 
two types of German aircraft bombed the town centre, which had no military or 
industrial targets, and German fighters strafed the defenceless civilian population: “At 2 
am today when I visited the town the whole of it was a horrible sight, flaming from end 
to end. The reflection of the flames could be seen in the clouds of smoke above the 
mountains from 10 miles away. Throughout the night houses were falling until the 
streets became long heaps of impenetrable debris.” Steer’s reporting angered the Nazis 
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so much that the Gestapo put him on a special wanted list of people to be arrested after 
the planned invasion of Britain, as well as prompting Hitler to cancel an interview with 
the Berlin correspondent of The Times. Steer’s story had another direct result that still 
resonates today: his account inspired Pablo Picasso to take up the subject for his famous 
Guernica painting, a twelve-foot-high and 25-foot-long condemnation of war, considered 
one of the great artistic and political works of the twentieth century.65 Steer’s account 
could be considered a culmination of the models of three of the war correspondents who 
came before him: like the reporting of C.E.W. Bean, it reported the hard, bare truth of 
what he had seen without sensationalism; it also brought to light a major event of the 
war that inflamed the public with just one story in the same way Charles Repington’s 
single dispatch had ignited a call to action among the British citizenry; and at the same 
time it was also one of the best examples of war reporting serving as public and human 
advocacy in much the same way William Howard Russell’s stories brought to light the 
mistreatment of British soldiers in the Crimea. 
The Spanish Civil War was closest on the timeline to the Second World War and 
thus some of the faces were the same in the pool of journalists as those in the Second 
World War. It was also the first time when radio reporting, which would become so 
important during the Second World War, was used to cover a conflict directly from the 
battle zones. John Reith, the first Director General of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation beginning in 1927 after its creation by a royal charter, was initially the 
General Manager of the Corporation’s precursor, the British Broadcasting Company, 
founded in 1922. He articulated in 1924 the historic impact he believed radio would have 
on British society and its access to information, his words seeming even more prophetic 
when considered in terms of the extraordinary change the medium would bring 
specifically to the reporting of war news: 
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Till the advent of this universal and extraordinary cheap medium of 
communication a very large proportion of the people were shut off 
from first-hand knowledge of the events which make history. They did 
not share in the interests and diversions of those with fortune’s twin 
gifts – leisure and money. They could not gain access to the great men 
of the day, and these men could deliver their messages to a limited 
number only. Today all this has changed.66 
 
Richard Dimbleby became, in many ways, the symbol of that change for the BBC. 
He gained experience reporting on various domestic stories around Britain for 
newspapers beginning in the early 1930s and then for the BBC from 1937. In early 1939 
the BBC news department broke through initial managerial reluctance to cover the 
politically charged Spanish Civil War, giving Dimbleby his first chance at what would 
become his primary vocation for the next six years. Dimbleby deployed as an “observer” 
to the Pyrenees, where he was the first radio reporter to record the sounds of a live battle 
– gunfire cracking and shells exploding in the distance in the background noise of his 
report – and where he related stories of thousands of exhausted and starving Spanish 
refugees streaming into France, bloodied Republican soldiers piling their weapons at the 
border checkpoint. In his broadcast he narrated the scene: 
 
Since early today… there have been crowds, masses, lines of wretched, 
torn and tattered soldiers going by, throwing down their guns, their 
rifles and their pistols at the guards on the frontier… There are 
machine guns by the dozen stacked up just behind me – I’m sorry I’m 
pushing my way past the Garde Mobile in order that I can get well 
onto the frontier line: he didn’t like it very much… Now here comes 
another procession of lorries. I’m going to stop for a moment and let 
you hear it go by. The first one is a Russian lorry piled high with 
soldiers… The second carries a heavy gun… and behind it is another 
lorry with two soldiers in it, four or five sheep and a cow piled up in 
the back of the lorry. This would be almost comic if it weren’t such an 
appalling tragedy to watch down here…67 
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A Daily Mail critic commented that Dimbleby’s Spanish Civil War reports were 
“inextricably linked with the growth of radio news.” His son and biographer, Jonathan, 
wrote of this time in Spain, “It produced reporting from him of a kind that had never 
been heard before on radio.”68 He would achieve even greater journalistic feats and 
acclaim in the next conflict and will receive frequent mention throughout this study. 
Another reporter chosen to cover the Spanish Civil War, who also went on to fame 
for very different reasons, was Harold Adrian Russell (Kim) Philby. He had already 
worked as a journalist since the mid-1930s on a magazine entitled Review of Reviews, 
the journal Anglo-Russian Trade Gazette, and as a freelancer for the Evening Standard 
and a German magazine, Geopolitics. The Times appointed Philby its temporary 
correspondent in Spain beginning on 24 May 1937. Meanwhile, he had been working for 
the Soviet Union gathering intelligence since 1934 and all these jobs were meant to 
establish his credentials as either politically neutral or a rightist supporter, and the ruse 
nearly came at a very high price in Spain: he was the only survivor of – ironically – a 
Republican artillery attack that killed three other correspondents.69 
These were some of the men who laid the groundwork for the correspondents who 
covered the Second World War, during which the infrastructure of modern war reporting 
truly took shape. The war correspondents of the Second World War were a special breed 
in the fact that they were a very select group who made great sacrifices. In The People’s 
War, Angus Calder writes: “By the end of 1943, well over a third of the nation’s nine 
thousand journalists were in the forces, and a substantial proportion of the rest were 
engaged on non-journalistic work…. The position of war correspondents was rather 
different. There were over a hundred of these in theatres of action at the end of 1943. 
Their papers had to receive War Office permission to send them out, and they were then 
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given a uniform with a distinctive insignia which permitted them to move freely. Fifty 
such men, from Britain and the Empire, were killed or wounded in action. Much of the 
reporting was excellent, and Alan Moorehead’s accounts of the desert war were 
republished, with acclaim, twenty-five years later.” However, Calder also notes the 
difficulty in covering such a far-reaching war with a select few: “But the best men could 
not be everywhere at once. Where it was impossible to give equal facilities to all 
accredited war correspondents, one or more would be selected by rota. In that way, a 
Daily Herald reporter came to cover the 1942 raid on Dieppe for the whole London 
press.”70 For this reason alone – that individual reporters might have to cover 
cataclysmic events for huge audiences and therefore carried an enormous burden of 
professional responsibility – the selection and training of the correspondents was 
extremely important to the media outlets even before the reporters deployed to the war 
theatres. 
 
The New Correspondents 
Reporters in the Second World War had different reasons for going to the combat 
zones, although it should be noted that they were all offered the posts without coercion 
from employers, and in their published memoirs and internal memoranda they 
unanimously expressed enthusiasm for the opportunity. Some might have been moved 
by the pure journalistic urge to cover what would undoubtedly be the biggest story of the 
century, while also an opportunity to enhance their careers.71 Others might have 
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regarded it as a chance to indulge their taste for adventure. As the renowned newspaper 
writer, H.L. Mencken, confessed: “I find myself more and more convinced that I had 
more fun doing news reporting than in any other enterprise. It is really the life of 
kings.”72 A number no doubt believed they were performing a duty for their country, and 
could contribute to the side of “good”. In this vein, Richard Dimbleby perceived the war 
correspondent’s role as “a link between the men fighting at the front and the men and 
women working in the factories and at home throughout the Empire.” He added, “It is 
useless to ask for greater effort from the factory workers unless they have a direct 
connection with their husbands, sons and sweethearts abroad… only the war 
correspondent could bridge the gap between them.”73 
The war correspondents to be discussed came from varying backgrounds – ranging 
from a future viscount to men who worked their way up through the reporting ranks, 
although it should be noted that even those who rose from the lower positions of print 
publications to become war correspondents were generally from the educated middle 
classes. Their experiences were quite varied – Denis Johnston was a playwright who 
became a war correspondent at age forty; Guy Byam attended the Sorbonne and was 
fluent in French and proficient in German and Spanish; Alaric Jacob was born in 
Edinburgh, spent part of his childhood in India and the Middle East, was a boyhood 
friend of Kim Philby, and had already become a playwright and novelist before entering 
the ranks of journalism; Christopher Lumby graduated from Cambridge and initially 
became a teacher; Alan Moorehead worked for the Melbourne Herald during his student 
years and remained with the paper after earning a law degree; Robert Cooper, John 
Snagge and Stewart MacPherson all previously covered sporting events. The 
correspondents came from England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Canada, Australia and 
South Africa. Regardless of their backgrounds, and whether they took on the 
assignments for duty or career or adventure, a phalanx of journalists donned British war 
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correspondent uniforms after being offered the task of covering the Allied fighting 
forces during the Second World War. 
While war correspondents relied largely on their experience and training, it seems 
that the work of these reporters was not entirely a mechanical endeavour: natural talent 
and instincts were considered to have a part in the success of correspondents. Reporters 
had to have innate qualities and powers of perception – what is sometimes referred to in 
journalistic jargon as a “nose for news” – in order to achieve success in the battle zones. 
An article in the 1945 BBC Handbook summarized the traits of a successful war 
correspondent that were intended to describe radio reporters, but could be applied to all 
types of war correspondents. These attributes, the article notes, were not easily defined: 
 
Such first-hand reporting requires particular qualities in the observer: 
not necessarily the ability to speak easily, or even pleasantly – some of 
the best war-commentators have voices and even personalities that are 
anything but endearing – it is mainly a gift of understanding which of 
the small, significant details making up the scene before him will be 
within the imagination of his audience, so that they do not need to be 
told; and which are strange, and can only be shared by his help with the 
people at home.74 
 
The successful war journalist was thus more than just a capable writer or in 
possession of a well-spoken voice; he was someone who could convey the unseen and 
unknown, which would set the scenes for readers and listeners. These intuitive skills 
could not always be taught, yet they were something that made the reporter suitable for 
the front. They were intangible qualities with which some were blessed and others were 
not; these could make the difference between whether a journalist became a war 
correspondent or not. 
The issue of what made a correspondent breaks down into two major components: 
selection and training. While there were many similarities, the print press and the BBC 
were two different animals in terms of how they covered the war and subsequently 
selected and trained their staff. Selection was the process by which the managers and 
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editors of news organisations chose the staff members who would comprise their war 
reporting teams. At newspapers this was a small number of men, while at Reuters and 
the BBC it could be a large pool of correspondents. The work of the frontline reporters 
was very likely considered the most crucial endeavour of the war for these organisations 
and the jobs often fell to the most experienced journalists on staff. Previous war 
reporting was considered an extremely useful credential, although not a strict 
requirement. Factors such as physical fitness and stamina also played a role due to the 
rigours of the war zones. There were exceptions to these rules, of course, but the 
combination of experience and physical fitness was important in the selection of most 
war correspondents, as will be shown. And, as mentioned above, there were those 
elusive qualities that most certainly played a part in the selection of correspondents by 
editors such as Walton Cole of Reuters, who possessed a legendary ability to spot talent. 
Regardless of the varied experience levels and intrinsic talents of those who were 
ultimately selected, specific training was invariably useful due to the very specific nature 
and circumstances of war reporting. Details of military conventions and operations, 
censorship regulations, the mechanics of transmitting stories back to Britain, survival 
techniques in harsh terrain, and other practical matters of the war zone were aspects of 
the job that could be taught. Nevertheless, for the most part newspapers and the Reuters 
wire service preferred to send their best people without any formal efforts at training 
and, by necessity, left their reporters to learn on the job. On the other hand, the BBC was 
a much greater practitioner of correspondent training during the Second World War; 
because large-scale radio coverage of wars was a new phenomenon at the time, the 
Corporation wanted to make sure its personnel were fully prepared. It thus and 
conducted an extensive training programme prior to the Normandy landings. 
 
Selection 
The process of selecting which reporters would be sent to cover wars was never an 
exact science. W.F. Deedes explained in his 2003 book, At War With Waugh – 
recounting his reporting experiences alongside Evelyn Waugh during the Abyssinian 
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war, which spawned Waugh’s famous novel, Scoop75 – that the editor of the Morning 
Post called him into his office in summer 1935 and asked Deedes to cover the African 
nation’s impending conflict with Italy. “Anxious to seem equal to the occasion, I nodded 
eagerly, but felt unable to contribute much to the conversation because at the age of 
twenty-two I had never travelled beyond Switzerland, had never been a war 
correspondent and knew nothing about Abyssinia.” Deedes accepted the offer to become 
a correspondent, but he understood the paper considered him a “good candidate” for war 
coverage not necessarily for his journalism skills, but rather for “being young, 
unmarried, without dependants and easily insurable.”76 
When the German army invaded Poland in September 1939, news outlets quickly 
came to understand that the coverage of this new war necessitated the appointment of a 
larger cohort of reporters than those who had recently covered Abyssinia and the 
Spanish Civil War. Reminiscent of the men who wanted to become war correspondents 
in the First World War, whom Philip Gibbs described as “literary adventurers” and “new 
men of sporting instincts and jaunty confidence”77, the pool of press reporters grew 
exponentially with the size and scope of the conflict as they vied to cover what was 
undoubtedly the biggest news story since the advent of the modern media. 
Over the course of the war, the selection criteria were honed based on lessons 
learned in the field, such as the temperament and fortitude needed, not only to survive, 
but to thrive while producing accurate and compelling news accounts of the shifting war. 
Journalistic experience was an important consideration when selecting correspondents; it 
is safe to say that no news organisation sent a “rookie” reporter into the cauldron of 
battlefield reporting, especially with so many seasoned but still relatively young 
journalists ready to become war correspondents. Men in their mid-twenties and early 
thirties who had already built up solid reporting experience were more desirable than, for 
example, a younger man who might keep up better with the troops but had little 
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reporting experience, or a man in his mid-forties who had reported on Whitehall and 
other important news beats for years, but did not have the stamina for the job. Indeed, by 
the time of the writing of a 1944 letter to the Foreign Office, Times Foreign News Editor 
Ralph Deakin had surmised that young, intelligent reporters were the best sorts to cover 
the war: “As I am sure you know, older men do not last long as War Correspondents in 
these arduous times, and we are anxious to appoint young men who are steady, 
experienced and wise.”78 
Yet at the beginning of the war The Times adopted a policy of using senior 
reporters who were already overseas and then supplementing their ranks with 
newcomers of the type described by Deakin, but who were already on the staff of The 
Times and therefore not a totally unknown quotient. Iverach McDonald wrote of the 
Times’s strategy: “As no one knew what was likely to happen when war was imminent 
in 1939, it was decided to keep most of the main staff correspondents abroad at their 
posts and recruit war correspondents from among the promising younger men either in 
Printing House Square or in secondary posts abroad.”79 A good example of this was the 
coverage of events in Poland. Reginald Oliver Gilling Urch had been stationed 
previously in Russia but then moved to Riga, Latvia, where he remained for years 
covering Russian affairs as The Times would not submit its correspondent to direct 
Soviet censorship. In 1938 he moved to Warsaw and worked from the Polish city, but 
went on holiday in the summer of 1939. The Times sent as his replacement a young 
reporter named Patrick Maitland, who had to cover the Russian invasion of Poland. He, 
in turn, was forced by the movements of German forces to move to Belgrade until 1941 
and then to Lisbon. Urch in the meantime had moved on to Finland, reporting on the 
Winter War in tandem with Manchester Guardian staff writer Evelyn Montague, whose 
reporting The Times used in a cooperative agreement between the sister papers.80 Other 
examples of correspondents The Times took from within its existing ranks for war 
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coverage included Arthur Narracott, who reported from a besieged France. Aubrey 
Jones, a future government minister, and Archibald Gibson both covered German 
movements from neutral Rotterdam. South African Jerome Caminada reported from 
Belgium, although his status as a journalist was not respected when he was captured by 
the Germans and sent to a camp on the Polish border, from which he escaped: “For two 
years, sometimes on the run, sometimes again a prisoner, and for a time at large in 
Budapest, he made a continuously hazardous journey to freedom through 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.” The Times also poached reporters from the 
paper’s parliamentary reporting staff to work as war correspondents, including Philip 
Ure and W.J. Prince, and others from various departments such as deputy night news 
editor Eric Phillips and racing reporter R.C. Lyle. Other re-assignments of veteran 
reporters included Robert Cooper, who was brought back after years in India and Burma 
to be a war correspondent in France during the Phoney War and later headed the 
coverage of D-Day through VE-Day; James Holburn, who had previously covered 
Berlin, Russia and the Middle East; and Christopher Lumby, who had also covered the 
Middle East and was once the chief correspondent in Rome and became one of The 
Times’s most prominent war correspondents.81 These were the sort of flowing, makeshift 
arrangements the newspaper used in ensuring its coverage of the war, making use of all 
its available correspondent resources, both old and new. 
With the need to receive official accreditation from the government to gain access 
to the war zones, the important choice of who would be war correspondents was left to 
newspaper editors and administrators and, in the case of the first official correspondents 
sent abroad initially, in the hands of an umbrella media concern: the Newspaper 
Proprietors Association (NPA). The NPA announced on 20 September 1939 that it 
planned to send an “official eye-witness” to France with the British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF) and provide pool copy for distribution to association members. The fee to the 
publications would be set by the NPA, probably not more than three or four pounds per 
week, and the stories would be available simultaneously through Reuters and the 
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Ministry of Information (MoI). In another mailing to its members the next day, NPA 
head, Bernard Alton explained that the prior evening there had been a meeting attended 
by representatives of The Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, Daily Mail, News 
Chronicle, Daily Sketch, and Westminster Press. The group decided one of the four 
correspondent positions with the armed forces would go to a news agency and the 
ensuing vote ended with Nicolas Bodington of Reuters being nominated. The other three 
correspondents chosen by ballot from six nominations were H.G. Cardoza of the Daily 
Mail, F.G.H. Salusbury of the Daily Herald, and Archie de Bear of the Daily Sketch. The 
other papers agreed the reports from these correspondents would be distributed among 
all of them and they would then issue the stories to an additional three groupings of 
twenty-one newspapers.82 
Despite this agreement to pool resources with the NPA, The Times still made its 
own plans; an internal memorandum of 1 September 1939 put Kim Philby forward as the 
best candidate to accompany the BEF, since the War Office informed the paper it could 
have only one correspondent deployed across the channel. A second memorandum on 4 
September confirmed the appointment and Philby became The Times BEF correspondent 
on 9 October 1939. This selection was likely based on the strong reporting Philby had 
done on General Francisco Franco’s nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War. He 
reported from France until June 1940 when the Germans occupied the country, but after 
returning to Britain he left the paper to join the Foreign Office on 1 July 1940.83 The 
Times attempted to regain his services in late February 1944 when Foreign Editor Ralph 
Deakin, recognising Philby’s notable performances in Spain and France, wrote to the 
Foreign Office to inform it that the paper needed to deploy two new correspondents and 
“we know no one who seems better fitted for one of these two appointments than 
Philby.” Deakin had spoken with Philby, who deferred the decision to his government 
superiors. “With Philby’s consent, therefore, I write to you to ask whether his release 
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may be considered.” Frank Roberts of the Foreign Office replied that Philby was not 
working directly for them at the time, but “he is of particular interest to us…. [W]e 
should be bound to recommend most strongly against his removal from his present job.” 
Roberts added that, “his present work is so important and he performs it with such 
exceptional ability that I am afraid that his departure would be a real loss to us.”84 
In addition to Philby, another early war correspondent for The Times was Robert 
Wright Cooper. He was an excellent example of someone who worked his way up 
through the ranks and eventually garnered the journalistic experience to become a war 
reporter. He joined The Times in 1925 as a typist in London, taking up the same job in 
Paris in 1928 before moving to the sporting staff as a sub-editor in December 1931. In 
October 1939 the paper appointed him a correspondent attached to the French Army, 
although he was forced to leave the country when the Germans occupied it. He 
continued in war reporting duties with the British Home Forces until 1942, when he 
went on to India and Burma. He then returned to cover the British Army’s operations in 
Normandy and remained with the force through its campaign in Holland before 
proceeding to Paris to report from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) – the central nervous system of the Allied armies in Europe under the control 
of General Dwight D. Eisenhower – until the end of the war, when he became a special 
correspondent at the Nuremberg trials.85 
As can be seen from these two examples, experience and the ability to function 
under the difficult conditions of the war zone were important criteria for selecting and 
retaining a newspaper reporter in the field. The Times’ drive to retrieve Philby from the 
Foreign Office demonstrates the crucial role his experience played in successful war 
reporting. Cooper’s years in the profession, beginning on the lowest rungs of the 
newspaper hierarchy and then continuing his work reporting from various countries, 
further demonstrates how important experience was to a war correspondent. 
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The role of personal judgments about an emerging reporter’s abilities was also in 
evidence. When Walton A. Cole, the joint news manager for the famed British wire 
service, Reuters, responded on 11 March 1943 to Doon Campbell’s letter requesting a 
position with the wire service, he replied, “There is an opening for you in Reuters. It is 
for you to decide whether the potential opportunity [it] offers to someone like yourself, 
who in your own words ‘is prepared to tackle any job and go anywhere,’ exceeds the 
current security and comfortable remuneration of Edinburgh.” Cole saw promise in 
Campbell, adding, “I have no doubt that you will not regret the change should you 
decide to make it, and further, that you will make a career for yourself in Reuters and 
become one of the first-flight men in the team we are building up.” The assessment may 
have seemed overly optimistic, but it was based on an already successful young career.86 
Archibald Doon Campbell, who was born without a left hand and forearm, did not have 
a burning passion for journalism when he began. He simply thought it sounded better 
than other occupations: “Unlike colleagues who joined newspapers with a sense of 
vocation, who sought excitement and adventure, who stumbled in or were pushed, I 
escaped into journalism. I had no ambition or motivation to do anything, lacked aptitude 
and qualification, but the prospect of being fitted into a safe slot pen-pushing by day and 
swotting at night to climb an insurance ladder was an anathema.”87 He began with minor 
reporting roles on weekly papers in Scotland, the Linlithgowshire Gazette and the West 
Lothian Courier, and got his first war story using the quick-witted resourcefulness that 
became a hallmark of his career. When German aircraft were reported over the Forth 
Bridge on 20 October 1939, he rushed to the structure between Edinburgh and Fife like 
many other journalists. His more experienced colleagues from bigger papers stayed at 
the scene waiting to see if there was another sighting, but were unable to use telephones 
in the immediate vicinity of the alert due to wartime regulations. Campbell, however, 
hopped on his bicycle and rode to a nearby town where there was a working phone and 
contacted the daily papers in Edinburgh and Glasgow. Rather than wait for their own 
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reporters, they took his account and paid him as a freelancer. “So I made a month’s 
money in an afternoon… saw my first live war coverage in the daily papers and, more 
important, strengthened my contact with those other papers, especially the Edinburgh 
Evening Dispatch.” By 1941 he had gained a full-time position on the Evening Dispatch 
and made a name for himself there through assertiveness and long hours. He was 
subsequently introduced to Cole, a former Evening Dispatch staffer, who was familiar 
with Campbell’s work. On 9 March 1943 he wrote to Cole, informing the Reuters editor: 
“I am totally exempt from call-up [due to his missing hand], have no domestic ties, am 
prepared to tackle any job, go anywhere.” He was so dedicated to the concept of going 
anywhere to work that after receiving Cole’s job offer, he had his soft teeth, which 
caused him frequent toothaches, removed and replaced with a full set of dentures so he 
would never have to search for a dentist in a remote location.88 Campbell began as a 
trainee sub-editor on the night shift at Reuters on 3 May 1943, where he did not 
immediately shine. One night after his second attempt at writing a brief article about the 
death of Chinese National Government President Lin Sen, one of the editors asked him, 
“Campbell, did anyone ever teach you anything about journalism?” Despite this and 
other hiccups, he gained the confidence of his editors and became what Philip Gibbs had 
called one of those “sub-editors emerging from little dark rooms… and asked for their 
Chance”. In September 1943 a German shell killed Reuters correspondent Stewart Sale 
in Italy and the management called on Campbell to take his place. Cole told him: “We 
don’t expect much from you, but try to be competitive with communiqués and 
briefings.” By late November of that year he was deployed to Algiers as an accredited 
war correspondent. In a letter home Campbell called it, “a terrific break.” His subsequent 
career as a war correspondent included covering the battle of Monte Cassino in Italy; 
landing in Normandy on D-Day; crossing the Rhine inside a glider; and being present at 
the liberation of Brussels, the fall of Hamburg, and the surrender of German forces to 
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.89 
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In 1943, Reuters began recruiting new correspondents for the expected second 
front, including journalists from abroad, and this further illustrates the role of talent 
spotting in recruitment that was evident in the rise of Campbell. Cole interviewed over 
forty candidates during a trip to North America and came back with Canadians Marshall 
Yarrow and Charles Lynch.90 Lynch went on to become a famed political reporter; in his 
autobiography, he explained that Cole was in Canada to shore up the reputation of 
Reuters, which “had been dragged through the propaganda mud and it was widely 
assumed that Reuters was an arm of the British government, which to all intents and 
purposes it was.” He stated: “[Cole] set about hiring some Canadians to serve as war 
correspondents to replace those of the old school who had been killed, maimed, or were 
incapable of churning out the kind of stuff he felt would shake the cobwebs out of 
place.”91 Lynch, who had covered Canadian local and national news beginning as a 
teenager at the Saint John Citizen, the Halifax Herald, Canadian Press, and British 
United Press, at which he worked his way up to bureau manager in Toronto, first met 
Cole in a hotel dining room. He recalled Cole “proclaiming that he was assembling the 
greatest staff of correspondents ever dispatched to the battlefields of the world. We 
would not only write history, we would make it; and when the war was over, the world 
would be ours.” That statement, and the promise of $50 a week to cover the Canadian 
troops fighting in Europe, convinced Lynch to join the team. “Thus it was that I became 
the only draft dodger who wound up landing in Normandy at H-hour on D-Day.”92 
Unlike Cole’s strategy at Reuters, the BBC’s recruitment of war correspondents 
came largely from within its existing ranks, most likely because while a talented 
newspaper reporter could continue reporting and writing in a very similar fashion for a 
wire service, radio reporters needed experience in the broadcast medium before they 
could be deployed. Also, while newspaper and wire service stories were often topped 
with the anonymous byline, “From Our Own Correspondent”, or simply, “Reuters”, the 
BBC’s war correspondents came to be regarded by the listening public almost as trusted 
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acquaintances: “men we [the listeners] gradually came to know, men who somehow 
gained a place among those we think of as personal friends.”93 Clearly, the Corporation 
required reporters who were expected to perform above the level of others. Richard 
Dimbleby and Edward Ward were the BBC’s first frontline broadcasters beginning in 
1939: Dimbleby in Spain and then with the BEF; Ward in Finland and then with the 
BEF. The pair, both heralded for their dispatches, set the standard for the BBC war 
correspondents who followed them. 
Ward began working as a BBC announcer in January 1938 and then became a 
reporter whom The Independent newspaper, in his May 1993 obituary, called “one of the 
very best of the BBC’s war correspondents”. He was lauded for his reporting of the 
Winter War, his first combat coverage, and then for breaking the news on 12 March 
1940 of the peace agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union that ended the 
conflict. He was also the first in radio history to record a broadcast from a front line.94 
Ward described in a 1989 interview how he came to be hired by the BBC; a friend 
referred him to a Professor Lloyd-James who “picked a book at random and it happened 
to be an Agatha Christie” and asked him to read from it, but was not impressed at first 
because Ward seemed to be over-acting. Ward tried again, simply reading the text, and 
the professor said “that’s more like it” and recommended him to the BBC and he was 
taken on in 1938 as an announcer. In 1939 he was offered a position in the news 
department and immediately asked if he would go to Finland to cover the Winter War 
with Russia. Ward explained: 
 
Of course it was a terrible gamble on his [Overseas Controller J.B. 
Clark] part, because there had never been a radio war correspondent 
before. I mean there was Murrow, Dimbleby interviewing people in 
farm houses and so on, in France, with not a shot fired in anger, and so 
Clark hadn’t the slightest idea what I would do, and I had no idea what 
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I would do either. But I thought this is a chance not to be missed. So I 
went out.95 
 
A Glasgow Evening Citizen article commented that Dimbleby’s excellent 
reporting from the beginning of the Second World War seemed to be the product of 
some intangible quality: “Probably a faculty like this is inborn and unaccountable. You 
can do something with any cub reporter but no amount of teaching and experience will 
turn the wrong sort of man into the right sort of reporter.”96 Even Fleet Street 
acknowledged as much when The Star wrote of Dimbleby, following his deployment to 
Cairo in April 1940: “The radio war correspondent – a new skilled and dangerous 
profession – has come into being…. The voice of a man who may have risked his life a 
few hours earlier, and who has, in any event, undergone severe physical and emotional 
strain, conveys more than he may intend.”97 
The “unaccountable” qualities required did not put off BBC managers, who set out 
to select men they considered the “right” sort of correspondents. By the spring of 1940, 
the BBC had four “observers”: Dimbleby with the BEF in France and then the Middle 
East; Ward covering the Winter War in Finland and then in Belgium and France; Charles 
Gardner with the RAF in France; and Bernard Stubbs as Dimbleby’s replacement with 
the BEF.98 The Corporation, however, made changes to its line-up of correspondents as 
the war progressed and its personnel requirements developed. This included the decision 
to recall Dimbleby from the Middle East after he fell out of favour with the News Editor, 
A.P. Ryan, in late 1940 and the subsequent decision to keep him on as a “co-ordinator” 
in Cairo supervising regional coverage, while Ward took over the reporting duties from 
the desert frontline.99 The 1945 edition of the BBC Handbook explained: “The addition 
of Ward to the Middle East [in early 1941], where previously Dimbleby had walked 
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alone, indicated the type of reporter the BBC sought for the remainder of the war. He 
was supposed to be an able team player rather than a personality, someone who would 
do the job well without eclipsing it.”100 Jonathan Dimbleby writes: 
 
His [Ward’s] manner and style were quite different from Dimbleby’s. 
He was colloquial, he was lighter, and he would know his place. He 
would make no attempt to broadcast on matters of what he himself 
sardonically would call “high strategy”; nor would he try to step 
beyond the formal bounds of the relationship between Army and 
correspondent; neither seeking nor expecting special consideration, he 
would be content to record the details of battle and the “colour” of war. 
He would certainly not regard himself as the voice of the BBC in the 
Middle East.101 
 
While the BBC employed experienced combat reporters in the early years of the 
war, there were not enough of them to provide the desired coverage of the impending 
second front in the west, prompting the Corporation to seek recruits internally and, on 
limited occasions, from other broadcasters.102 In an internal memorandum written in 
early December 1941, the Corporation’s Director-General queried, “supposing that the 
raids upon the coast of France and all that were to become an increasing feature of the 
war, what arrangements have we to ensure that such raids would be promptly reported 
by eye-witnesses, whether fighting men or correspondents?”103 A was thus despatched to 
the War Office in January 1942 requesting the presence of a BBC reporter on a 
forthcoming operation, something that had not yet been allowed, in order to provide a 
first-hand account rather than copy from another news organisation, such as Reuters: 
“The B.B.C. are most anxious to be represented by one of their own men on the next 
combined operation in which war correspondents are allowed to take part…. The 
advantage of handling these stories on the air through the voice of an eye-witness as 
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opposed to having the announcer read the Reuter or other general message is, I think you 
will agree, obvious.”104 Meanwhile, in April 1942, a report by A.P. Ryan lamented the 
paucity of good frontline observers and showed that managers were actively hunting for 
news correspondents and considering where they might be found, while keeping in mind 
that not just anyone could fill the role: 
 
One of the most likely fields seems to me the inside news staffs of the 
Overseas and European Divisions, both of which have brought in 
experienced writers. This, of course, lays me open to the question: – 
What about the Home news staff? I would have anyone out of that who 
was competent, but we have tried all the likelies on sorties and other 
miscellaneous jobs, and there is no winner among them. The 
combination of qualities wanted is not easy to find in one man. He 
must be able to broadcast, to get on with the Services, including the 
high-ups, on whose good-will he is considerably dependent, and to 
keep his feet in the rough-and-tumble of outside news gathering.105 
 
Ryan argued that to exploit the full journalistic potential of the second front, 
“we’ll need to work to a carefully prepared plan”, and recommended adding new war 
correspondents, putting forth the names of Raymond Glendenning, Wynford Vaughan-
Thomas and Stewart MacPherson as “all good and experienced broadcasters trained to 
ex tempore commentary and eager to tackle the job”.106 By December 1942 the BBC 
staffing goal was to gather “a corps of radio war correspondents strong enough in 
numbers and quality to aim at covering adequately all major battles on land and sea, and 
the picturesque incidents of each campaign; air operations; the general picture from 
G.H.Q.; and interesting activities at bases and behind the lines.” The plan was for 
twenty-one correspondents, including five in Mediterranean and south European bases, 
sixteen in western Europe “from Norway to the Pyrenees”, and two held at home in 
reserve, with no plans for Pacific correspondents. 
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The Corporation was on the hunt for “new men” from within its own ranks and 
elsewhere, especially those who could add “much needed distinction” to the effort: “We 
must aim at acquiring some bigger guns, and not content ourselves with all-around 
average competence.”107 An analysis of the proposed staff additions indicates a 
recognition by BBC editors and managers that the Corporation needed to further develop 
its war reporting team, but not just in sheer size. They could not simply throw more 
bodies into the mix. They needed to grow the experience and skill level that the overall 
group possessed; in other words, “rookies” need not apply. The BBC thus modified its 
list of war correspondents for second front coverage several times as new men became 
available, such as the late additions of Colin Wills and Denis Johnston.108 Johnston was 
selected as the second reporter behind Gillard in Italy following his stint in North Africa; 
although he was a senior reporter to Gillard and in another circumstance would have not 
had to take direction from Gillard, the BBC managers were clearly seeking to strengthen 
their war coverage with veteran broadcasters and Johnston saw the assignment as one 
important enough to take regardless of hierarchy. 
Correspondents were not the only employees sent to the front; the recording and 
transmission technicians were essential teammates for correspondents and presented a 
unique set of issues for the BBC. The engineering division faced a staffing dilemma at 
the start of the war when the armed forces drafted many of its male employees aged 
nineteen to twenty-three: “Faced with these losses of experienced pre-war engineers, and 
of junior engineers just when they were becoming really useful, the BBC had to cast its 
net wider in recruiting staff,” according to BBC engineer and historian Edward Pawley. 
Training female operators was partly the solution, although only for use in Britain and 
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not in the case of war reporting.109 A November 1942 report put the number of technical 
staff needed to go abroad at fourteen, including supervisors and assistants, five young 
engineers with varied experience, two recording engineers and two mechanics. The 
desired qualities of these staff members were also laid out: “They would be carefully 
selected in relation to their technical experience, capabilities for rough and ready 
working, and age. As far as possible it would be desirable to nominate men under 40, but 
this may not be possible in every case.” Significantly for both the BBC and the 
government, the report also asked, “Should the personnel become War Correspondents, 
or are they to go as civilians?”110 
The War Office wanted engineering and other technical staff to remain civilians 
and opposed the provision of an honorary rank and the official accreditation bestowed 
upon reporters. Until December 1943, it refused to accredit sixteen transmitting 
engineers the BBC wished to send into the field. All technical personnel were, however, 
eventually designated “engineer correspondents”.111 They were officially ranked 
captains, like the reporters, although their equivalent pay grade as government 
employees of the BBC only entitled them to the salaries of lieutenants. In this matter of a 
captaincy there was little choice because “the engineers had found out that the Army 
themselves gave accredited war correspondents notional rank of Captain and they did 
not, therefore, see why they should go for less. There was no doubt that many of the 
engineers would have refused to go unless this concession had been granted.”112 This 
was only fair, as the engineers would share the same hardships and dangers in the field 
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as their colleagues holding the microphones. If an engineer was wounded or worse, the 
correspondent could not simply write home and ask for a replacement, so reporters also 
learned how to operate and maintain the recording equipment.113 
 
Training 
When it came to training, it seems the press were inclined to deploy reporters who 
were their most experienced or whom they believed were fit and competent enough to 
handle the war correspondent assignments, without formal instruction. Doon Campbell 
recalled, “Although not fully trained, I was felt to be adequate for the declining story in 
Italy.” He was not, however, speaking of training in the art of war journalism, but rather 
proficiency in the Reuters technique of writing and filing stories.114 For its part, The 
Times seemed confident in using those already working as foreign correspondents, as 
well as bringing up younger reporters from their ranks in Britain. As with Campbell, 
however, even a senior reporter like Kim Philby was seen to be in need of help honing 
certain journalistic skills, rather than his abilities as a war correspondent. In a 9 March 
1939 letter to one of the paper’s correspondents in Spain, Deakin wrote: “Philby, 
promising as he is, has not had the journalistic experience which would teach him to 
overcome certain transmission difficulties. It seems desirable that he should spend some 
more time in this office reasonably soon, learning the tricks of the trade.”115 
The BBC, however, appears to have undertaken an extensive programme of 
training for its war correspondents. There were two basic types of BBC war 
correspondents in terms of training in the Second World War: the “trial-by-fire” variety 
such as Richard Dimbleby, Charles Gardner, and Frank Gillard, who had already been in 
the field; and the second group that followed and received formal training before 
deploying. There had been radio training for some of the senior men; in 1937 Denis 
Johnston attended a three-month broadcasting course in London that included future war 
correspondent Wynford Vaughan-Thomas and John Snagge, who was best known as an 
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announcer in London.116 For the first correspondents, though, much of their training 
came through on-the-job experience during the Blitzkrieg, the Phoney War, or the North 
African campaign, rather than any formal instruction. The 1941 BBC Handbook, for 
example, explains that the BBC’s two news observers in France in 1940, Dimbleby and 
Gardner, learned lessons in dealing with the military when they met “a whole crop of 
restrictions of which they had not dreamed when they went out.” Johnston, meanwhile, 
had his first opportunity for war reporting in 1941 when he broadcast from the scenes of 
Luftwaffe bombings in Belfast and Dublin; a year later, at age forty and without any 
military training, he arrived in Cairo to replace Edward Ward and was on the front line at 
El Alamein two weeks later.117 Yet these “ready or not” experiences taught them quickly 
and aided those who came after them. 
From his post in Algiers in February 1943, Robert Dunnett sent to the BBC a long 
memorandum of war reporting advice advocating that for two months before deployment 
potential correspondents should “do nothing else but study their parts and make their 
contacts and orientate their minds” because they would face innumerable obstacles; with 
this preparation “they will at least be as fully equipped to deal with them as is humanly 
possible.” He added a note of caution about the nature of war reporting: “It is not good 
enough just to know how to broadcast or how to make a recording or write a script. 
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Every BBC man reporting a campaign should be part of the pattern of it before it begins 
and a force within it thereafter to tell its exploits roundly to the world.”118 
Over time the BBC greatly improved the training it provided for its war 
correspondents and began planning specifics of future coverage of the much-anticipated 
second front in Western Europe as early as August 1942.119 By December of that year, 
the BBC sought to put its prospective war reporting staff, both correspondents and 
engineers, through “combined training of the most thorough kind, in which active 
service conditions would, as nearly as possible, be reproduced.” This meant training 
manoeuvres with real military units using all the equipment the journalists would 
employ in the field, such as recording lorries and transmitters.120 
One of the most important developments in this capacity was Operation Spartan. 
Compared to print publications, the BBC was the newest player in war journalism and 
still needed to prove – to the military leadership, Whitehall and itself – that it had a 
group of journalists and the organisational capacity to cover large-scale military 
operations as they happened. The chance came in March 1943 when the army allowed 
two teams of BBC reporters and engineers to take part in a military training exercise 
involving British troops, some of whom masqueraded as the German enemy, entitled 
Operation Spartan. This exercise along the Thames involved three British army corps 
advancing along an eighty-mile front, approximately from London to Oxford, over the 
course of six days. The mock battle manoeuvres enabled the BBC to test its equipment, 
techniques and staff; News Editor Donald Boyd commented that it allowed the 
Corporation’s management “to see what sort of a hand they [correspondents] make of an 
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active war situation of this kind. It should give us additional knowledge of their abilities 
in war conditions to help us in deciding upon coverage of a second front.”121 
The BBC correspondents arrived at Paddington Station on 5 March wearing 
uniforms with steel helmets and respirators, carrying eating utensils and return tickets to 
Oxford. They were told to bring bedding and “be prepared to live rough”, although the 
Army undermined the realism by offering to provide hotel accommodations if requested 
and if possible. The Corporation chose two teams of six, including reporters and 
engineers, with the stated goal to operate as close to “the real thing” in order “to satisfy 
ourselves and also convince the Army authorities that we can run things without being a 
nuisance to them….”122 Censorship rules for this “full dress rehearsal” included, as they 
would in a real battle zone, prohibition on mentioning specific military information: 
numbers of troops; the names of formations, airfields, or senior officers; the capacities of 
defence systems or bridges; and the effectiveness of decoys or deception techniques. The 
BBC advised its transmission stations in Oxford, Cambridge, Reading, Gloucester, and 
Birmingham to anticipate the sudden arrival of correspondents.123 
The BBC correspondents filed more than ninety Spartan dispatches, which are 
interesting both for the obvious seriousness the journalists placed on their mock reports 
and as an imagined version of what might have happened had Britain been invaded. 
Vaughan-Thomas reported from Reading’s Caversham Bridge after its “demolition” by 
Germans; Stewart MacPherson observed the passing of a Crusader tank “with the 
chummy name of Ally Pally”; a broadcasting assistant, T. Vizard, interviewed a pair of 
locals who played along and described improved treatment and food rations since the 
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“Germans” left and British forces arrived. “They’re both English-speaking luckily,” he 
said of the two Henley-on-Thames residents.124 
Macdonald Hastings focused on the BBC when he reported on the exercise for the 
June 1944 issue of Picture Post magazine. He explained that while the soldiers taking 
part must have considered it another “dull little exercise”, Spartan (which he did not call 
by name) was covered by the entire pre-invasion team of BBC reporters, writers and 
engineers, and “was word-reported and sound-recorded more fully than any of the great 
battles of the war.” Hastings noted that the exercise helped the Corporation choose its 
final War Reporting Unit for Normandy and put the BBC personnel through a myriad of 
trials.125 He reported: 
 
The B.B.C. men were tested under all kinds of conditions. They 
broadcast dummy dispatches. They put headlines on imaginary news. 
They worked out ways of getting recording vans over obstacles, tested 
out their equipment’s maximum performance, found out new methods 
of recording the sound effects of the war. They also attended lectures 
on military affairs, got used to working together as a team, and put in a 
stern course of physical training under the eye of an army instructor.126  
 
The article was accompanied by photographs of some of the correspondents who 
took part, along with captions containing biographical and work history on each of them. 
Howard Marshall, Frank Gillard, Robert Barr, Pierre LeFevre, Stewart MacPherson, 
Colin Wills, Stanley Maxted, Richard North, Chester Wilmot, Richard Dimbleby, and 
Robert Dunnett, who was also the subject of the photograph that adorned the magazine’s 
cover, were all shown gathering the news of the campaign in the English countryside.127 
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The Spartan exercise, however, was not limited to BBC personnel. Peter Stursberg 
of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, on his first assignment after gaining war 
correspondent accreditation, recalled being driven from London to a location outside 
Oxford for a military briefing with approximately fifty other Canadian, British and 
American reporters. Stursberg explained the logistics of the operation included mixed 
British and Canadian forces versus “the enemy”, with the RAF taking part as air support 
for ground units. The area in which they conducted the manoeuvres along the Thames 
was divided into fictional territories: “Eastland”, the enemy-held territory that included 
London; “Southland”, a pro-Axis area occupied by the British; and “Westland”, a neutral 
territory. The reporters, according to Stursberg, debated which fake territory represented 
which real area of continental Europe. Perhaps just as important to the correspondents as 
the interaction with the armed forces was the taste of life in the field that they 
experienced.128 Stursberg recalled: 
 
We correspondents stayed at either corps or divisional headquarters at 
night, but we did not sleep indoors. We were lucky if we got a tent, and 
usually we set up our camp-beds under the trees and formed our 
vehicles into a square round us to prevent the wind blowing on us. The 
weather was fine, but it was cold, for Spartan took place at the end of 
February and the beginning of March. We would wake up in the 
morning with our sleeping-bags white with hoar-frost. We would be 
cold by the time we pulled on our boots, and we would have breakfast 
of boiled bacon and hard tack and tea before we ever thought of 
washing even our teeth.129 
 
Stursberg also caught a glimpse of the challenges he and other correspondents 
would face while attempting to report a fast-flowing war: 
 
I began to realize the difficulties in covering a modern army on the 
move. We were anxious to see some of the tank battles which were 
expected to develop, but we never did see them. Nobody could tell us 
definitely where the fighting was taking place. Not even the generals 
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could give us any pinpoint reference, as the front was so fluid that 
information was out of date before it was received.130 
 
This problem of a continually shifting theatre had already proved to be a 
significant hindrance in the real battle zones and would continue to hamper reporters 
long after Operation Spartan was completed. 
Following the exercise, there were evaluations submitted to BBC managers by 
reporters, editors, and technicians, which provide interesting reading on how well 
prepared the radio journalists were for their parts in the upcoming coverage of the 
second front. Boyd, for example, praised the engineers for good sound quality and quick 
transmissions. Conversely, he critiqued the Spartan reporters on various points: they did 
not provide enough background information on the war or use their “powers of 
observation” to the fullest in describing scenes; were at times overly dramatic and 
included material that should have been censored; and improperly labelled recording 
discs.131 Meanwhile, part of the training with the home forces was meant to cover 
“Tactical experiment and planning” with mobile recording equipment. The head of 
engineering found that Operation Spartan had been a valuable lesson on dubbing and 
censoring in the field and the effectiveness of recording equipment; but a portable film 
recorder failed to pass muster.132 These technical aspects will be further analysed in a 
later chapter. 
Dimbleby also produced a long memorandum on the “many problems” 
encountered during the Spartan exercise.133 He warned against deploying personnel, 
especially engineers, unprepared to adopt a military demeanour: “At present they do not 
seem to realise that by donning the uniform, the correspondent is assuming automatically 
the status and most of the privileges of an officer, a status for which any soldier or 
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officer-cadet must work and train.” He contended that it was not enough to be friendly 
with officers; to be taken into their confidence the BBC personnel had to show “military 
discipline and bearing.” Dimbleby singled out the engineer with whom he was paired 
during Spartan as an example. The young technician had worn his cap “at a rakish 
angle” and kept a cigarette constantly dangling from his lip even while talking to a 
general, whom he did not salute and had hailed by calling, “I say.” He also “addressed 
private soldiers, military policemen and sentries, as ‘old boy’.” The BBC’s most 
experienced war correspondent warned that to do the job properly, both reporters and 
engineers “simply must fit ourselves into the landscape and conduct ourselves in 
accordance with the rank whose privileges we enjoy.”134 BBC Director of Outside 
Broadcasts Michael Standing agreed with Dimbleby that Spartan proved WRU 
personnel should be educated in military ways before deployment on “the real job”. He 
stated in a memorandum: 
 
It was pretty clear that those lacking military knowledge were apt to 
flounder for fear of making errors and also were often unable to 
appreciate the full significance of local developments. It is imperative, 
therefore, that anyone accompanying the Army on actual operations 
should be thoroughly versed in his subject. If necessary, personnel 
should be released from some of their present duties to acquire this 
background.135 
 
News Controller A.P. Ryan had already asked the War Office a month earlier for 
permission to send BBC personnel on other exercises, pointing out the benefit of having 
reporters with background knowledge and first-hand experience of the military’s 
“special technique”.136 This became a reality following a presentation of Spartan 
recordings made to the Secretary of State for War and senior officers. General Bernard 
Paget, Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, agreed to attach two BBC teams to army 
units, one British and one Canadian, in order “to train our people in general military 
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routine and practice; to give them a chance of really getting to know the modern British 
solder”.137 The plan to train correspondents was defined in a meeting in March 1943 
with a Major General Lawson, who agreed to assign each reporter to a battalion for a 
fortnight to undergo basic military education, including reading military texts and 
instruction in subjects such as field cooking.138 WRU personnel were directed by editors 
and administrators to act with military bearing, remembering seemingly inconsequential 
things such as saluting: “When you get into the field remember that while you are not a 
soldier you are in uniform and working with soldiers. They will watch you carefully and 
upon the impression you make will depend to a considerable extent the facilities you are 
given for doing your job as a broadcaster.”139 The BBC’s military training began in the 
late spring of 1943 and continued in various guises for a year. Tom Hickman details the 
nature of this initiation into military life: 
 
In the following months a physical training instructor tuned them up 
for life in the front line. They were instructed in gunnery, signals, 
reconnaissance, aeroplane and tank recognition and map-reading. They 
went on assault courses and battle courses, crossed rivers on ropes, 
ducked under live ammunition, lived rough. Some were attached to 
regular Army units, finding themselves competing physically with men 
fifteen years their junior; Stewart MacPherson, for example… trained 
with the Grenadier Guards. ‘The compelling objective was to become a 
member of the Unit,’ he wrote.140 
 
Besides undergoing physical training, correspondents studied topics relevant to 
their reporting assignments. A course at the School of Military Intelligence, Matlock, 
included lectures on battle order, German army organisation, and measures to protect 
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military secrets while in public or a prisoner of war. Field press censorship was also 
covered; the correspondents were not to consider censorship an impediment, but 
“another art to be studied,” a way of making sure information that could aid the enemy 
did not reach the airwaves. According to a BBC internal report, one of the Matlock 
lectures “was illustrated by a dramatic piece in which a German Intelligence Officer was 
seen in his Information Room – tuned in to the BBC 9 o’clock News!” Additionally, a 
week-long course at the Ministry of Information detailed how material was censored, the 
army personnel who would work with reporters, defence notices that dictated the 
censorship regulations, and equipment on the army’s “secret list.”141 Correspondents 
were also advised on the Geneva Convention and told to provide only name and 
profession if captured.142 
Even before this military instruction, the BBC had begun providing 
correspondents with updated broadcast training. This included specific ways of 
formatting, labelling, and handling recording discs; submitting scripts and the types of 
stories desired for each BBC branch; preferred techniques for interviewing, commentary, 
and sound effects; the importance of proper pronunciation of foreign names; methods of 
conveying work back to London; and even how to conduct audience research for the 
BBC’s European Division. They were also ordered to prevent equipment from falling 
into enemy hands: “Members of the team must know the quickest way to destroy a 
recording truck.”143 In the same vein, Standing suggested in early 1943 the creation of a 
“broadcasting battle school” under which reporters, commentators, feature writers, and 
recording engineers could be trained to adapt these specialties to “fighting conditions” 
and acquire an understanding of each other’s work, as to be interchangeable in 
emergencies.144 A cross-posting scheme was also established for the different 
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broadcasting specialties. This began with Dimbleby’s reassignment in December 1942 
from news to Outside Broadcasts. As Overseas Controller J.B. Clark explained in a letter 
to him: “This is an exchange of people between News Talks and O.B’s, so that the 
expert technique of running commentaries can be shared by our people whom we may 
wish to send overseas, and at the same time, the O.B. men may become used to the 
particular problems of news reporting.”145 
The BBC recognized that “actuality” in war reports – which made a “very great 
impression on listeners”146 – not only meant battle noises in the background but also 
vivid, accurate descriptions as the event unfolded, a method that was absent from studio 
news bulletins. Yet, as Clark indicated, news coverage had its own rules and pitfalls that 
needed to be understood. One of the first and most memorable examples of the melding 
of the two techniques had already been displayed in Charles Gardner’s July 1940 
description of an aerial dogfight over “Hellfire Corner” in Kent: 
 
There’s one coming down in flames—there, somebody’s hit a 
German—and he’s coming down—there’s a long streak—he’s coming 
down completely out of control—a long streak of smoke – ah, the 
man’s bailed out by parachute—the pilot’s bailed out by parachute—
he’s a Junkers 87 and he’s going to slap into the sea and there he 
goes—SMASH… Oh boy, I’ve never seen anything so good as this—
the RAF fighters have really got those boys taped.147 
 
The recording was criticised by some members of the public who accused Gardner 
of sounding as if he was commenting on a live sports match rather than the violent clash 
of RAF and German aircraft, but for others it was a realistic taste of the war that 
encapsulated their own feelings toward the marauding Luftwaffe. In defending 
Gardner’s excited reporting of the dogfight over the channel, Frank Gillard articulated 
the progressive attitude of the BBC: “There was no agreed technique for reporting this 
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kind of conflict.”148 For the Corporation, Gardner’s broadcast was a zestful personal 
style that would characterise the remainder of its reporting on the conflict. This was the 
“expert technique” Clark and the BBC wanted war correspondents to master. 
Less than a month before D-Day, Ryan sent a memorandum to BBC 
correspondents and engineers, essentially providing their final training lesson. The news 
head reminded them of key points such as avoiding embellishment, since servicemen 
would know truth from tales; keeping material timely and without need of extensive 
editing; and favouring voices – of troops and liberated citizens – over sound effects. He 
warned, “Field service is no picnic”, and then offered an estimation of the upcoming 
assignment, which could have been sent to all war correspondents, broadcast or print: 
 
There will be times when you get bored and depressed because you 
feel you are not in the picture. You will find yourself temporarily in a 
backwater and hear some of your colleagues have been in the thick of 
it, but by and large you handful of men have been chosen to undertake 
the most important assignment so far known to broadcasting. Good 
luck.149 
 
Clearly the task of covering the Second World War began even before the 
correspondents were deployed to the battle theatres in Europe and North Africa. Without 
the significant vetting done by the media organisations in order to choose the right sort 
of reporters, as well as the experience that had already been accrued by veteran 
journalists or the training undertaken by many of those who had never covered a 
battleground, the reporting of the war would not have been as effective and, therefore, of 
far less use to the public whose access to information about the progress of the conflict 
played a crucial part in holding the nation together. 
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Supporting the Correspondent 
 
Having selected and in some cases formally trained their field reporters, news 
organisations needed to then ensure they were providing the support that the 
correspondents required to properly do their jobs, and that required money. Journalist 
John Boylan explained in 1945 how the wartime news industry involved such fierce 
competition that the concept of news without cost “created Homeric laughter in a world 
asked to regard free speech as something like free air.”150 Boylan stated: “Speech was 
not free. It was one of the most valuable commodities in a war economy. Throughout the 
world anxious people at home waited in suspense for word from the various fields of 
battle.”151 Getting the word from the battle zones to millions of eager readers and 
listeners therefore was big business and a major concern for media organisations was 
how to finance their war correspondents in terms of salaries, insurance, and other 
institutional and personal expenses. It also cost both the employers and their 
correspondents numerous headaches. Field expenses caused arguments between the 
journalists seeking more resources and their managers who wanted to keep costs down, 
and disagreements over salaries were recurrent among correspondents in both press and 
broadcast outlets. The news organisations also had to take into consideration the 
payment of life insurance policies for the correspondents they sent into such dangerous 
circumstances. These expenses did not come cheap, especially considering the 
corporations had to fund each correspondent individually and the payments had to be 
made on a recurring basis, either annually or on some other set schedule. Timely 
arrangements had to be made with the insurance companies and, in the case of a reporter 
being killed, the organisations had to help facilitate payments to the families, making 
this both a costly and time-consuming endeavour. Finally, the organisations had to 
provide monetary support for correspondents who fell into enemy hands. This included 
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payments made to the War Office in order for it to compensate foreign governments to 
maintain journalists while they were held in Prisoner of War camps. 
These were all circumstances specific to media companies with reporters covering 
the British and Dominion forces and set them apart from other industries and 
professions. Therefore, in order to provide context to the salaries and expenses of news 
organisations, it is first important to consider the occupational framework of Britain as a 
whole during the years prior to as well as during the Second World War. 
 
The People’s Pay 
It might be considered helpful to not only provide wartime salaries but also to 
convert them into current values to offer greater understanding to the modern reader who 
might be unfamiliar with the worth of money in the first half of the twentieth century, 
when salaries were much lower than present day. Yet that poses difficulties considering 
the differing circumstances that can be taken into account such as inflation, the 
fluctuating value of industries in the overall economy, and various other issues. There 
are websites that convert the value of money in the past to modern rates, but these 
conversions do not take into account all factors, or they use combinations of factors that 
do not necessarily make an accurate comparison, and each conversion could be 
misleading. For example, when using the website MeasuringWorth.com, an attempt to 
convert £100 in 1940 to its value in 2013 calculates that the “relative value” is between 
£4,747 and £22,050. The website states that this may not be the best answer and that 
there is more than one conversion factor to be considered: “The best measure of the 
relative value over time depends on if you are interested in comparing the cost or value 
of a Commodity, Income or Wealth, or a Project.”152 Using the British National 
Archives online Currency Converter brings up direct conversions of currency rates from 
year to year throughout history but cannot be considered to employ all the requisite 
factors to make comparisons of salaries. Therefore, as this chapter analyses both the 
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salaries of the war correspondents and the capital spent on funding the correspondents 
with insurance and other necessities, using these conversions to modern money is 
impractical. The figures presented will subsequently remain within their historical levels 
rather than trying to make what might be an incorrect direct conversion to modern 
currency. 
In his book, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-79, Guy Routh examines 
the occupational classes of workers in Britain, but only for specific years due to his use 
of figures from the census, which was conducted once per decade and then not carried 
out at all in 1941 due to the war. Routh finds that the number of “professional” class 
workers – business owners and managers, doctors, dentists, lawyers, accountants, 
scientists and writers – were as follows (rounded to the nearest thousand) in the years 
prior to the Second World War: 1911 – 560,000; 1921 – 680,000; 1931 – 728,000. He 
writes that this was not, however, a large segment of the entire working population. “The 
professionals, though their proportion has more than doubled, remain quite a small 
minority of the whole, their growth having been exceeded by that of the clerks.” The 
numbers of British clerical workers were as follows: 1911 – 887,000; 1921 – 1,300,000; 
1931 – 1,465,000. Still, both of these groups were dwarfed by the size of the 
occupational class of manual workers: 1911 – 18,347,000; 1921 – 19,333,000; 1931 – 
21,029,000.153 The number of workers in the professional sub-category of writers, which 
included journalists, did not make any significant dent in the overall working pool: 1911 
– 15,000; 1921 – 14,000; 1931 – 21,000; even by 1951 that number had only increased 
to 26,000.154 Yet presumably because there were far fewer of them and their work was 
specialized and considered significant and influential in society, journalists were paid 
better than clerks and manual labourers. 
In trying to measure pay rates by occupational class, Routh explains there are 
problems that arise due to the economic conditions of the different times: 
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Here we are subject to two restraints: one concerning the limitations of 
the available information, the other the instability of the pay 
structure…. The years 1921 and 1951 were both periods of violent 
economic change, one the aftermath of the First World War, the other 
the middle of the Korean War; and 1931 was a year of falling prices, 
rising unemployment and deepening depression. But there were 
periods of comparative stability from 1906 to 1914, 1923 to 1928, and 
1934 to 1938.155 
 
According to Routh, the average annual earnings for those in the “higher 
professional” class, in which he includes writers, were as follows: 1913-14 – £328; 
1922-24 – £582; 1935-36 – £634. It should be kept in mind that this grouping of the 
highest professionals includes business owners and upper managers who undoubtedly 
had higher earnings than journalists; in fact, Routh calculates that the “lower 
professional” class earned markedly smaller yearly average salaries: 1913-14 – £155; 
1922-24 – £320; 1935-36 – £308.156 Therefore, a determination of the average salary of 
a journalist depends on whether they are considered higher or lower professionals; as 
will be shown further on, their status often depended on factors such as experience, 
perceived importance to the organisation and the medium in which they worked, and 
these could change over the lifespan of a journalist’s career. Still, a comparison can be 
made with the salaries of clerks, foremen and manual labourers – those considered 
below professionals in Routh’s designated occupational classes – over the same period 
of years. Foremen were paid the following average annual salaries: 1913-14 – £123; 
1922-24 – £268; 1935-36 – £273. Meanwhile, clerical workers earned an annual average 
salary that was somewhat lower: 1913-14 – £99; 1922-24 – £182; 1935-36 – £192. 
(These pay scales for foremen and clerks account for male workers, while female 
employees in similar positions earned approximately half of what males were paid, 
although it could be somewhat less or more than half depending on the category and 
year.) The pay for manual labourers continues to drop down the national scale. For a 
“skilled” labourer, the average annual salaries were: 1913-14 – £44; 1922-24 – £87; 
1935-36 – £86. Taking into account “unskilled” labourers, the average drops further: 
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1913-14 – £28; 1922-24 – £73; 1935-36 – £73.157 According to economic historian 
Sidney Pollard’s work, The Development of the British Economy 1914-1967, in the years 
immediately before the Second World War, the working class saw a markedly enhanced 
financial situation; he writes, “Most estimates put the increase in real weekly wages 
between the pre-war years and 1937-8 at between 20% and 33%, while the working day 
was shorter by about one hour.” Pollard notes that once the war began the economic 
situation for the workers further improved while it became worse for those who had 
wealth: 
 
The maintenance or increase of real wages at a time when measures of 
profit limitation were in force… and when heavy burdens of taxation 
reduced the real incomes of the rich, implied for the second [sic] World 
War, as it did in the first, a substantial redistribution of incomes in 
favour of wage-earners. The tax burden of the war on wage-earners 
was estimated at only 13-17% in the later years of the war, compared 
with 35-44% on non-wage-earners.158 
 
In his 1968 book, Britain’s Economic Growth 1920-1966, A.J. Youngson, an 
Edinburgh University political economist, examines the value specifically of those 
working in agriculture and in the engineering fields that produced munitions and other 
materials integral to the war. He writes, “The labour force in agriculture rose from 
711,000 in 1939 to 887,000 in 1945. The labour force in engineering… and in chemicals 
(including explosives) rose from 3.1 [million] to a peak of 5.2 [million] in 1943.”159 
While Routh’s aforementioned “higher professionals” might have received greater 
salaries, Youngson contends that the war years greatly increased the number of workers 
in what Routh might consider the “lower” fields of agriculture and engineering, as well 
as the general worth of their product: “By the end of the war, the value of net 
agricultural output at constant prices was about 35 per cent higher than in 1939…. 
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Farmers, moreover, became prosperous. The spur to increased production was higher 
profit.” Youngson explains that farming in the 1930s was simply a matter of covering 
costs, but during the war the demand for their foodstuffs and the increased 
mechanization of the industry led to the government being more generous with the set 
prices. While not providing any specific figures about the money that agricultural 
workers were paid, he clearly indicates it was an improvement over the pre-war years: 
“Farmers discovered that farming for the nation to government order was a profitable 
proposition.” Regarding the specific industry of fuel, Youngson writes that there was 
also a boon in production and profits: “…in 1944 the Ministry of Fuel carried through an 
extensive overhaul of the entire wage structure in the mines; and the miners, who in 
1942 had been in the lower half of the earnings league, reached 1945 with a level or 
earnings among the highest in the country.”160 
During the Second World War the contribution of these workers – especially 
labourers in factories, on farms, or within other entities producing essential goods both 
for the military and the civilian population – would have been seen as invaluable to the 
economy and the effort to achieve victory. Yet despite there being a great many more 
workers outside of the “professional” class, when taking into account the overall British 
job market, journalists were clearly still considered worthy of higher pay. War 
correspondents, in addition to being a select breed among their fellow journalists, were 
even more rarefied in society; just by deploying to a war theatre, their salaries usually 
increased above those of their colleagues with similar experience and certainly more 
than their fellow citizens in working class employment. In the case of veteran reporters, 
this could be hundreds of pounds more annually than those of clerical workers and 
labourers, which was a significant gap for that time period and especially while the 
nation was suffering financial austerity. 
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Media Pay 
Historically the British press suffered ups and downs in its collective bottom line, 
but since the late 19th century the industry had progressively increased profits and could 
afford to treat its workers well in comparison with other business sectors. Donald Read 
explains that Reuters had a history of being generous providers for its employees, 
although certain standards were expected to be met not only in their work, but in their 
demeanour and behaviour: “…in 1914 they numbered about 150 [employees] in London. 
Conditions of service were quite good for the period. But staff were not expected to 
grumble, and no trade unions functioned within Reuters.” He adds that salaries were 
comfortable, with a senior sub-editor at the start of the First World War receiving 
approximately £400 per annum, while a “specialist reporter” could earn as much as £700 
per year.161 
The outbreak of the Second World War marked the beginning of lean years for 
Britain as a whole, but the media organisations did not suffer as much as others; in fact, 
quite the opposite. The Times, for instance, saw an increase in its profits during the war. 
Iverach McDonald explains: 
 
The company had more money as the war went on. By the time it 
ended [General Manager Christopher] Kent could look back on five 
years of commercial success both with The Times itself and with the 
company as a whole. The paper had made a loss of £17,992 in 1940, 
the first year’s loss in the paper’s history. But then profits rose: 1941 – 
£76,123, 1942 – £309,364, 1943 – £357,557, 1944 – £403,107, 1945 – 
£428,498. That was for the paper alone. For the company that owned 
the newspaper – The Times Publishing Company Limited – the profits 
were not so large; they rose from £45,000 in 1941 to £141,000 in 
1945. Nonetheless the results were satisfactory amid all the dangers 
and upheavals of war.”162 
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In fact, the overall situation improved for the entire press industry, despite the 
paper rationing that shrunk publications and helped the BBC become more of a force in 
the overall media landscape with its increased audience. McDonald recounts how The 
Times was not the only newspaper to enjoy commercial success during the war years: 
 
So did most other newspapers. It is true that the cost of newsprint went 
on rising, but the increase was offset by the fewer numbers of pages 
printed and, in the case of The Times, by the cut in circulation. Staffs 
were smaller than before the war. Sales promotion was no longer a 
costly affair. Though the income on the advertising side was reduced 
so was the expenditure. The war which brought many appalling 
problems greatly simplified others. In fact several newspapers which 
had almost exhausted themselves in the fierce competition between the 
wars found respite from such out-and-out rivalry during the war.163 
 
Despite this increased financial security during the war, there were still numerous 
disputes between the correspondents and their employers regarding money, both in the 
press and the burgeoning BBC. 
 
Correspondent Salaries 
Even though war reporting constituted a special circumstance for any media 
organisation hoping to be involved in coverage of the greatest news story of the century, 
they were all still businesses holding tightly onto the purse strings. Subsequently, 
reporters and management engaging in disagreements over salaries was not uncommon. 
However, all war correspondents – both seasoned foreign reporters and those who were 
elevated from the ranks – received pay increases for stepping onto the battlefield. The 
companies also frequently increased the salaries of most reporters as the war progressed 
and the correspondents became more adept at their jobs and gained greater access to the 
newsmakers. 
The war was a boon to reporters who had no previous experience covering foreign 
nations or conflicts. Their salaries as combat reporters increased at a far more rapid pace 
than if they had stayed in Britain in less hazardous and strenuous situations. Two good 
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examples would be Doon Campbell and George Henry Gerald Norman. Following work 
on the News Chronicle in France, The Star of Johannesburg, and the Natal Daily News, 
also in South Africa, Norman came to The Times on a trial period in January 1939 and 
did not receive a weekly salary of £5 until March. Continuing the trial until May, he was 
hired as a foreign desk sub-editor for another six-month trial period at £8.8 (eight 
pounds, eight shillings)164 per week. On New Year’s Day 1940, now as a full-time 
staffer, his salary increased to £9.9 weekly, or £514 yearly. He waited until February 
1941 for his next rise, to £10.10 weekly, amounting to £525 yearly, but then things took 
off. He gained a pay rise to £600 per year in September 1941. A year later, his salary 
jumped again upon his appointment as a war correspondent in Egypt with a salary of 
£750 per annum, with an extra £2 daily for subsistence once he reached Cairo on 2 
November. While he did not see another salary increase during the course of the war, he 
received a lump payment of £100 in 1943 and another in 1944. He transferred to Paris in 
March 1945 and kept the same salary with a daily expenses increase to £3.10.165 Reuters 
raised Doon Campbell’s salary when he was deployed in November 1943 to Allied 
headquarters in Algiers from £350 pre-war to £500 yearly, with expenses of £1.50 per 
day. He also received a one-time allowance of £75 to purchase kit, such as a war 
correspondent’s uniform and other necessary field supplies. During the war his yearly 
salary rose to £650 and then on 1 April 1945 peaked at £750.166 
Many veteran reporters had their already hefty pay cheques padded by fieldwork, 
as the news organisations had a policy of providing much higher salaries to the best 
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people covering the war. However, even this did not always satisfy some of the 
correspondents. 
Christopher Dittmar Rawson Lumby was one of those senior reporters whose solid 
financial position was improved by the Second World War, although he still found 
reason to express discontent. He joined The Times in February 1914 in its Paris office at 
a salary of £4 per week, £208 annually, which was increased to £6 weekly, £312 per 
annum, the following year. By June 1919 his pay had been raised to £900 per year when 
he took over coverage of Warsaw. In the years between 1925 and 1931, Lumby worked 
for the newspaper in various locations around Europe including Greece, Romania, and 
Belgrade in Serbia, where his annual salary was £1,000 plus £100 yearly expenses. As 
shown by the national occupational pay figures discussed earlier in the chapter, for the 
time period this was well above the averages of those working in most other vocations. 
In 1931 he took up a post in Cairo in what must have been a very sweet deal for a 
journalist: £1,000 salary, £250 expenses plus additional expenses if needed, and paid 
travel back to England every other year. In October 1937 he was posted to Rome at 
£1,000 salary per annum plus an annual £300 cost of living allowance on top of £100 
yearly expenses. He worked in Rotterdam on an equivalent financial package from 
September 1939 to June 1940, after which he deployed to Cairo for war reporting on the 
same salary plus £250 annual expenses and another £2 daily when working outside the 
city; the expenses were increased to £60 monthly in October 1940 to cover everything in 
and out of Cairo. He returned to London, making a salary, reduced from his overseas 
work, of £1,250, until November 1943 when he left for Tangiers and later Rome, both on 
similar salaries to his previous foreign postings, although in Rome The Times also paid 
for his office and a third of his flat rental.167 
Lumby should have been happy in light of his rather extravagant pay package 
compared to other journalists, and the majority of those employed in Britain, but that 
was not always the case. In a 14 April 1943 letter to The Times Manager Christopher S. 
Kent, Lumby expressed mixed emotions about his latest bonus: “Many thanks for your 
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letter of the 12th inst. I am very grateful to the pper [sic] for making me a special grant 
of £250 in recognition of my work abroad during the war. I should, however, have 
greatly preferred that the appreciation should express itself in an increase in my salary.” 
He pointed out that he had not received a pay rise since he went to Cairo in 1931, 
although he had “been deemed worthy since then to fill the posts of Chief Correspondent 
in Rome and Berlin, both of which are considerably more important than Cairo.” He 
wrote that Ralph Deakin, the paper’s foreign news editor, had recently characterized him 
as “almost the senior member of the corps of ‘Times’ foreign correspondents, and a man 
from whose experience and judgment the paper hopes to profit.” Despite this, Lumby 
alleged, “I am still not considered to deserve a rise, although the cost of living has 
increased at least by 25% since the outbreak of war.” He noted that grants and 
subsistence allowances only compensated in part for a low salary and that sterling would 
not regain its same purchasing power, based on the experience of the previous world 
war, and that his pension would be based on pre-war pounds. Keeping his salary at its 
present level was an “injustice”, Lumby wrote, adding that he was sending copies of the 
letter to the newspaper’s chairman and editor. A reply letter two weeks later from Kent 
confirmed Lumby’s salary would increase by £250.168 
P.D.S. Ure also experienced the policy at The Times of receiving “special 
payments”, rather than salary increases, despite being promised a yearly rise as long as 
he was in a war theatre. Appointed to the Parliamentary reporting staff in November 
1928 at £525 yearly, he transferred to the news reporting staff in 1935 but by 1936 still 
only made £11.11 weekly, amounting to £577 per year. In December 1941 he got an 
increase to £650 per annum, which went up to £750 when he became a war 
correspondent on 25 October 1942. Two days before his appointment he received a 
memorandum from manager Kent saying, “From the time you leave, and while acting as 
War Correspondent, we will increase your salary by the rate of £100 (One Hundred 
Pounds) per annum. When you return and resume your ordinary duties this increase will 
cease, but the whole matter of your salary shall be reconsidered.” That did not happen. 
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Internal records show that Ure received a yearly special payment of £100 in May 1943, 
another of £200 in July 1944, payments of £100 each in January and May 1945, and 
finally a £200 payment in September 1945. The paper’s records indicate that he returned 
to work at its headquarters in Publishing House Square on 1 December 1945 at a salary 
of £750, the same as it had been when he began as a war correspondent.169 
Combat correspondents on The Times were not the only ones complaining about 
their earnings during the war; their colleagues in London working as domestic reporters 
and sub-editors handed the managers a letter in July 1941 stating they were unhappy 
taking salaries below those of their equals at other publications. The letter read in part: 
 
We know that we are the lowest paid Editorial staff in London daily 
journalism. We believe that, with few exceptions, our salaries would be 
no more than commensurate with the services we render if the present 
rates were raised by at least one-third…. It can hardly be in the 
interests of the greatest newspaper in the world that many members of 
its staff should be dissatisfied because their remunerations falls below 
the Fleet Street level.170 
 
With this in mind, the ongoing complaints by some war correspondents in the field 
about their salaries and expense accounts – which were undoubtedly higher than the 
earnings of those in London who were checking their copy – would have been an insult 
if those underpaid sub-editors had learned of it, although it is unlikely the details of the 
disputes were ever known outside of the discussions between the correspondents and 
management. 
There were similar disputes on the broadcasting side of the news. Guy Byam and 
Kent Stevenson of the BBC were each in frequent clashes with the Corporation over 
their salaries, although both received increases in pay upon becoming war 
correspondents. 
Prior to joining the BBC, Guy Frederick Byam-Corstiaens was a sub-lieutenant in 
the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, from which he was discharged after cordite from a 
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high explosive shell blinded him in one eye. Byam was educated in France, including the 
Sorbonne, and was fluent in French and proficient in German and Spanish. In October 
1942 the Corporation took him on as a temporary sub-editor in the French section, but 
Byam – he dropped the second half of his surname for work – began his arguments over 
money before even before he started. The Corporation offered him £8 weekly plus a 
cost-of-living bonus amounting to £368 annually; Byam said he would not accept less 
than the £380 he made in his previous job as an aeronautics research engineer. He took 
the job, however, and in January 1943 was made a production assistant. In late April his 
salary increased to £420 per year, although by June he had not signed his contract, 
complaining to management that this was not enough to “pay his way”; he signed after 
European Establishment division head Gordon Yates insisted he was at the right salary 
for the job. Following his first overseas reporting trip with the Royal Navy to Canada, 
which resulted in a minor disagreement with the accounting office over expenses (in this 
case Byam does not appear to have been unreasonable), he was back to complaining 
about his salary in a letter to Yates dated 12 October 1943, in which he claimed the 
Corporation had not fulfilled its promise to readdress his pay after three months and that 
he was doing a yeoman’s amount of labour during work weeks averaging fifty-five to 
sixty-five hours. In a memorandum of 16 November detailing their subsequent meeting, 
Yates explained that Byam did not take the news well when told there were no valid 
reasons why he should receive a special salary: “He then said that if there were no 
likelihood of any increase in salary he would have to reconsider his whole position as he 
found it impossible to live on the money he was getting owing to his personal 
commitments.” Byam stayed on, but this was not the last time he threatened to quit over 
money.171 In November 1943, Byam received a salary rise from £420 to £460. Yet in 
January 1944 he was angling for another bump in pay upon his expected transfer to the 
                                                 
171  BBC WAC, Byam-Corstiaens, G.F. – L1/78/1, European Interview Board, 8 
Oct. 1942; J. Lammin, “Record of Interview with G. Byam-Corstiaens”, 20 Oct. 1942; 
Lammin to Byam-Corstiaens, 21 Oct. 1942; Yates to Byam-Corstiaens, 8 Jan. 1943; 
Yates, “Record of Interview with Byam-Corstiaens”, 18 June 1943; L. Fricker, 
“Facilities Visit: H.G. Venebles and G.F. Byam-Corstiaens”, 24 Sept. 1943; Byam-
Corstiaens to Yates, 12 Oct. 1943; Yates, “Record of Interview with Byam-Corstiaens”, 
16 Nov. 1943. 
96 
War Reporting Unit. Then in February, he complained about being moved to a monthly 
pay scheme. Internal correspondence indicates that each time Byam received an increase 
he still found himself “living from hand to mouth”. An 18 February memorandum from 
Yates explained: 
 
[Byam stated that] he was extremely badly paid for the important work 
that he was doing for the Corporation and with suitable dramatic 
gestures informed me that if an improvement in his salary position 
could not be made he would be forced to hand in his resignation and go 
and seek his fortune elsewhere – which he thought he could easily do 
by writing articles for the Press.172 
 
Byam once again threatened to quit in late April, explaining to H.J. Dunkerley, the 
director of European Organisation, that his BBC work severely interfered with his 
obligations to the Home Guard; Dunkerley arranged for Byam to be relieved of Home 
Guard duty. In the first week of May 1944 the BBC granted him a “special salary” of 
£750 per year in recognition of his upcoming transfer to the WRU, although only while 
he was a war correspondent and without the usual £100 bonus given to combat reporters. 
That same day the news manager sent a memorandum to the salaries accountant that 
read in part, “I should be glad if you would inform Byam-Corstiaens of what is going to 
be done for him, so that he does not inflict any more of his forceful telephone 
conversations upon me!”173 Byam had clearly decided to make use of his preferential 
status at the BBC and a tactic of browbeating and threatening to quit in order to gain 
numerous increases in pay beyond what he might have earned even with the increased 
salary correspondents received upon entering a war zone. 
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The BBC hired Hugh Francis Kent Stevenson at the beginning of April 1941 as a 
broadcast presentation and production assistant with an annual salary of £465. Within a 
year he was in a confrontation with his boss, Empire Presentation Manager Tom W. 
Chalmers, which was evident in Stevenson’s letter of 4 April 1942 in which he stated, 
“It’s safe to say I will not be returning to your Department.” He claimed it was due to 
doctor’s orders regarding an unspecified ailment, but the letter made it plain he was 
angered by various events and would not return to the same job: “If there’s no room for 
me elsewhere in the Corporation please let me know, and I’ll get busy with my own 
plans for the future.” Chalmers wrote an internal memorandum on 7 April stating in part, 
“I really think we can dispense with Mr. Stevenson’s services. We are carrying on quite 
happily without him at the moment.” Yet on 9 September 1942, the BBC offered 
Stevenson a new contract in the Overseas Services Division with a salary of £764, 
retroactive to 5 July. Even then, he still had minor dust-ups with the Corporation, such as 
debating whether or not he owed four pounds for meals the accountants said they had 
advanced him.174 However, the BBC apparently looked beyond internal strife in favour 
of talent, which seemed to be the case with most of the correspondents it selected to help 
with war coverage. A memorandum in April 1943 acknowledged that Stevenson could 
be difficult, but his abilities were worth the trouble: 
 
Kent Stevenson is not an easy person to fit in and he has had a 
somewhat chequered BBC career, but I think he is fixed up better now 
than previously, and he seems to be happy in his work. He is a first-
rate broadcaster and a good writer and producer of interviews…. In 
view of his great ability as a broadcaster it is worth putting up with the 
administrative and personal friction that is apt to follow him around, 
and in any case this friction has become less acute of late.175 
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By June of that year, Stevenson had requested another pay rise, and the 
programme contracts director, W.L. Streeton, advised the Corporation against it as 
Stevenson was already being paid above his grade and “does not appear to be 
undertaking a greater quantity of work, nor probably more responsibility, than was 
envisaged when his Programme Contract was arranged.” Still, in September a letter from 
Stevenson to Sir Guy Williams, the Overseas Services establishment officer, requested 
more than the new salary he was offered in June because he was maintaining separate 
homes for himself and his wife, who had moved to Canada at the start of the war: “The 
salary offer of £800 is slightly less than equal to the 15 guineas176 per week for which I 
asked last May and in June 1942…. I would appreciate this salary being agreed to by 
you now.” In early October, Stevenson signed a contract for £800 and a £28 annual cost 
of living bonus. Later that month he was told he would be engaged full time as a 
member of the War Reporting Unit, which eventually occurred in February 1944. While 
he was clearly informed there was to be no change in his salary, Stevenson in April 1944 
once again requested an increase, this time when he wrote to News Administrative 
Officer G.J.B. Allport: “I am asking your recommendation for this request that my salary 
be set at the maximum for my grade. If I am not now worth that to the Corporation, I 
never shall be. I believe I am.” He said almost four years of separation from his wife had 
become “intolerable” and asked to borrow the amount of the salary increase, stating, “It 
is my turn to act, and without further delay.” In June the BBC turned down the request, 
but informed him that he was eligible for an extra £100 per annum while working as a 
war reporter, an increase that had become a company policy for members of the WRU 
(with the exception of the hectoring Byam). Later that month Stevenson was reported 
missing in action.177 
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While some correspondents complained about their salaries, an almost equally 
troublesome concern for the news organisations was maintaining correspondents in the 
field, which was a major outlay in the overall cost of covering the war and also a source 
of frequent disagreements between reporters and managers. 
 
Correspondent Field Expenses 
Despite being given leave to travel and follow events with more freedom than 
other reporters, the war correspondents were still kept in check by the accountants back 
home. This resulted in frustrated letters and telegrams sent to their head offices in which 
correspondents complained of misunderstandings by the managers and moneymen in 
Britain about the unique circumstances in which they worked, especially in the need for 
expanded expense accounts.  
In order to make expense payments once the war began, correspondents were 
issued “advance books”, which were like chequebooks and could be used to obtain up to 
£100 at one time from army field cashiers. This enabled the media companies to provide 
monthly allowances and keep tabs on the reporters’ spending rather than just sending 
them into the field with large amounts of money. Most correspondent contracts 
stipulated not only their salaries but also the expense amounts they would be provided 
monthly or per annum. The various print organisations set up accounts through the 
Newspaper Proprietors Association and filled the accounts on a regular, pre-determined 
basis or when needed through payment directly to the NPA. To fill the BBC’s advance 
books, Allport requested a “War Correspondents Expense Fund” of £5,000 yearly, which 
was under the meticulous purview of the accounting department.178 Reuters also kept a 
close watch on its expense capital; upon Doon Campbell’s return to London in May 
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1945, the company sent a letter to the NPA asking for a refund of the £79.18 in 
unexpended funds he had been given for expenses.179 
During his coverage of the British Expeditionary Force for The Times beginning in 
October 1939, Kim Philby’s advance book had a £50 monthly expense allowance that 
provided for withdrawals of up to £14 in any given week. This was not paid in a lump 
sum, however, as The Times set up Philby’s account with NPA using a cheque for £168 
to cover the first twelve weeks of expenses paid through the army’s field cashier, while 
the amount of allocations was later raised to a maximum of £20 per withdrawal and £56 
monthly.180 Yet Philby still experienced trouble with the accountants. In one exchange of 
letters he explained that he had billed the newspaper for more than one hotel room at a 
time because he needed to maintain a room in “the good town of X” where the 
correspondents were billeted (presumably Arras, where BEF headquarters was located) 
while also travelling to the French front, Royal Air Force headquarters, the main hospital 
base, and Paris. He explained that he, like other correspondents, did not receive any 
military discounts or access to the army’s mess hall; rather, they were made to pay 
normal prices and “live on the same basis as any other visitor to these parts.” The cost of 
a hotel room included extras such as central heating, tips to servants, laundry and 
cleaners, while meals were a separate expense. He added that trying to form professional 
relationships with military personnel required socialising: “the cost of living is made 
higher by the necessity, at fairly frequent intervals, of returning hospitality received, and 
of establishing new contacts.”181 
The theme of requiring additional funds to socialise and entertain in order to 
cultivate sources comes up in the correspondence between various reporters and their 
managers. Yet this was nothing new to the Second World War, there was a precedent for 
                                                 
179  Campbell, p. 31; Reuters Archive Record, Campbell, 1/9145242, Carter to 
Campbell, 29 March 1945; Walters to Alton, 15 May 1945. 
180  TNL Archive, H.A.R. (Kim) Philby – Managerial File, The Times, Silverwood 
to Philby, BEF GHQ, 4 December 1939; Silverwood to Alton of NPA, 4 December 
1939. 
181  TNL Archive, H.A.R. (Kim) Philby – Managerial File, The Times, Letter from 
Philby to Silverwood sent from Directorate of Public Relations, BEF GHQ, 27 
November 1940. 
101 
this sort of interaction. In his 1911 book, Notes of a War Correspondent, Richard 
Harding Davis says that while covering a war (he does not say which) for an English 
newspaper the officers initially expected it to last only six weeks and subsequently 
“regarded it in the light of a picnic.” He writes, “the mess contractor grew rich 
furnishing, not only champagne, which in campaigns in fever countries has saved the life 
of many a good man, but cases of even port and burgundy, which never greatly helped 
any one.” Davis and the other correspondents were expected to “travel in state” by 
having on hand a number of luxury items to offer anyone of importance who visited 
them: “If, when a man halted at your tent, you could not stand him whiskey and sparklet 
soda, Egyptian cigarettes, compressed soup, canned meats, and marmalade, your paper 
was suspected of trying to do it ‘on the cheap,’ and not only of being mean, but, as this 
was a popular war, unpatriotic.” He explains that not being able to provide this sort of 
hospitality had a direct impact on the work of reporters: “Those who did not, found the 
staff and censor less easy of access, and the means of obtaining information more 
difficult.”182 
While correspondents protested that it was a necessity of the job, they also did not 
hold back when attempting to get their employers to loosen the purse strings to fund 
extras that made life in the field more palatable. Many of the correspondents in the 
Second World War, while willing to live rough in the desert or elsewhere when the 
situation required, also attempted to maintain a certain level of comfortable existence 
above that of the foot soldiers upon whom they reported. Philby said he had a military 
batman in his hotel, at a price set by the War Office. He also filed a report to The Times 
over kit he lost in the retreat from Amiens on 19 May 1940, for which he hoped to be 
reimbursed. Listed items included large (good condition) and small (worn) leather 
suitcases, leather compact dressing case (good condition), pig-skin portfolio (good 
condition), leather stud box, camelhair overcoat (two years’ wear), lounge suit 
(purchased summer 1938), shirts, ties, socks, links, studs, hat, pig-skin gloves, a pair of 
shoes, dressing-gown (worn), two pairs of pyjamas, a pair of glasses, Royal noiseless 
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portable typewriter (good condition), Parker pen and pencil in case (new), Dunhill 
cigarette lighter (new, but needing repair), Dunhill pipe and pouch (six years old “but all 
the better for it”), miscellaneous underwear, slippers, scarves, toilet accessories, thermos 
flasks, maps, map case, pullovers, and waders. He explained the costs he gave for each 
item were only accurate for seven items while the rest were estimated on the basis of the 
Army and Navy Stores catalogue. His reimbursement request tallied £100.16; The Times 
gave him £70.183  
Philby’s trouble with expenses was similar to those of his co-worker, R.W. 
Cooper, who received a special allowance of £40 per month, on top of his £12.12 weekly 
salary, when he was appointed correspondent covering the French Army in October 
1939. After stints back in London and in India following the Nazi capture of France, he 
returned to Europe in March 1945 and worked in the Paris office of The Times. As with 
Philby, Cooper was unhappy with his expense allotment during the war, primarily 
because it did not provide enough to fraternise with the sources he needed for his stories. 
In a 22 February 1945 letter to Publishing House Square, Cooper and fellow 
correspondent G.H.G. Norman complained that “the nominal allowance of £2 a day 
barely meets subsistence charges even in the favoured conditions in which uniformed 
war correspondents are living, and… we strongly recommend to your consideration the 
sum of £3.10 as being fair and reasonable.” They explained that the exchange rate of 200 
francs (fcs) to the pound “bears no relation to the inflated level of French prices.” 
Staying at the Scribe Hotel, where many correspondents billeted, 30fcs per day covered 
the bare minimum for food and lodging without any extras, such as a 220fcs bottle of 
wine or a 40fcs glass of fruit juice. The price for a two-person dinner was nearly £5, 
“and though neither of us would wish to involve the Company in unreasonable expense 
we feel that you will agree that our work both in the political and military fields incurs 
an unavoidable measure of entertaining.” They received a bump up to £3.10 daily 
subsistence allowance, with the stipulation it would be for a maximum of three 
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months.184 This mention of “the favoured conditions in which uniformed war 
correspondents are living” with bottles of wine purchased on the company tab to 
entertain bureaucrats belies the image of hard-scrabble reporters enduring rough 
surroundings that most people had and likely still have, although that is not wrong either. 
As will be shown further on in the dissertation, the correspondents had both a life of 
relative privilege and one of hardship and danger, depending on the location and 
circumstances. 
Dimbleby of the BBC complained about his salary as well as his expenses, despite 
the fact he made increasingly more as his career progressed and he became more 
valuable to the broadcasting organisation. He began work at the Corporation in mid-
September 1936 as a Topical Talks Assistant on £350 per year and his salary steadily 
increased: £460 in 1937, £485 in 1938, and £525 and £542 in 1939 when he covered the 
Spanish Civil War and then the BEF in France. As the war advanced, he received more 
money: £582 in 1940, £622 in 1941, £662 in 1942, and £702 in 1943.185 Even while his 
salary increased, Dimbleby’s expense money was a point of repeated contention between 
the correspondent and his managers. 
Dimbleby’s disputes over expenses were similar to those of The Times men, 
especially in his protests of needing to entertain or attend events as a way of gaining 
access to newsmakers. Yet Dimbleby spent money far beyond the expectations of BBC 
administrators and clashed with London over the issue several times. The arguments 
arose over the BBC’s penchant for appearing to spend lavishly on its guests, while its 
correspondents were expected to be parsimonious. Jonathan Dimbleby tells of how his 
father and Charles Gardner, who also went on to fame as a BBC war reporter, received 
instructions to entertain speakers on the News Talks programme, if only in a meagre 
fashion. He writes, “The BBC maintained a room and a drinks cupboard to help them – 
though it was a firm (if unwritten) rule that a guest should only be offered one drink 
before a programme, and nothing afterwards.” In doing so, Dimbleby and Gardner were 
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also required to mark the new, lower level of liquor on a label affixed to the bottle with 
their name and date after each distribution.186 In the years before the war, Dimbleby 
apparently took it upon himself to wage an administrative battle against the penny-
pinching management by making sure his guests and sources, as well as himself and his 
colleagues, were well taken care of on the company bill. His son explains, “Dimbleby 
had tastes and aspirations which sent a shudder through the Administration and a frisson 
of delight through less courageous colleagues.” Gardner recalled that Dimbleby led him 
in numerous assaults upon the all-powerful Administration: “‘they’ challenged the need 
to buy a pint of beer for someone who had helped us. Fighting ‘them’ became the joy of 
our lives.” Gardner remembered his colleague “ringing all the bells in sight in one 
splendid hotel and ordering a manicure, drinks in the room, and expensive 
sandwiches.”187 While Gardner and others may have perceived these actions as a small 
rebellion by Dimbleby, a continued analysis of his actions leans toward the conclusion 
that in terms of benefits and creature comforts, he wanted to be part of the world 
inhabited by his high-placed sources rather than just an outside observer. 
In early 1940 while with the BEF, Dimbleby took a trip to Paris to smooth over a 
problem regarding BBC transmissions with the French authorities; his British army 
escort was an aristocrat who owned a country estate and the pair placated the French 
officials with what Dimbleby described as “a little expensive entertaining” while they 
lodged at the Ritz. Later in the Middle East, he answered one of the frequent complaints 
from the accounting department by protesting, “I must live as normal a life as possible, 
and therefore I must buy glasses of orangeade in this infernal climate, cigarettes, and 
occasional books.”188 In a memorandum to other managers dated 21 April 1944 – the 
year in which Dimbleby’s annual salary reached £1,000 – news administrator Allport 
explained he had looked back at Dimbleby’s expenses and calculated that its star 
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reporter owed the Corporation £291 due to overspending: “There is little doubt that 
Dimbleby was both extravagant and careless with his accounts, and the total amount 
expended, approximately £4,500 by him alone in just over two years exclusive of all 
salary, is obviously extremely high and far away in excess of anything that we allow for 
war correspondents at the present time.” It was Allport, however, who in a November 
1943 memorandum had approved some of Dimbleby’s most extravagant Middle East 
expenses, including a car, a houseboat and servants who tended it, and suits for travel to 
Turkey where he could not wear a uniform.189 
Yet financing a war reporter, or groups of them, was much more than salaries and 
subsidising expenditures in the war zone. Corporate expenses for sending correspondents 
into the field were high. The BBC, for example, estimated that establishing its War 
Reporting Unit for coverage of D-Day and beyond would require a total capital cost, 
including vehicles and equipment, of nearly £32,000 annually, plus an annual revenue 
cost of £41,000 that covered the salaries and subsistence payments correspondents liked 
to haggle over, but also bureaucratic support expenses such as life insurance.190 
 
Life Insurance and Captured Correspondents 
Speaking at a memorial service in London for three war correspondents killed in 
Italy in 1943, the Rev. A.J. MacDonald summed up the ultimate sacrifice made by many 
frontline reporters, and the reasons they took that risk: “They died for truth. They were 
martyrs of truth. They died to get a true account of battle in the cause of true and sound 
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journalism.”191 His words also indicated why, beyond reasons of simple humanity, their 
employers were willing to put such a high financial premium on their lives. It was 
understood, even before the first correspondent shipped out to cover the Second World 
War, this would be a dangerous – perhaps deadly – endeavour. And of course it was, 
even more so than in the closest preceding conflicts including the First World War, the 
Abyssinian War, and the Spanish Civil War, where reporters were warned to stay at a 
safe distance from the actual fighting and not embed with troops inside the kill zones, as 
they were in the Second World War and most conflicts since then. Subsequently, one of 
the tasks of these employers was regularly updating the life insurance policies of their 
reporters. 
 
Correspondent Life Insurance 
BBC War Reporting Unit head Howard Marshall wrote about the need for drafting 
additional team members as potential replacements for those already assigned to field 
duty because “I think we must anticipate a certain number of casualties.” The BBC 
established a blanket policy for what happened to correspondents’ salaries if a staff 
member was missing but presumed killed: these payments were considered insurance on 
their lives and would continue for up to a year to dependant families, while the salaries 
of single men would continue to accumulate in a fund while awaiting confirmation of 
their deaths. A memorandum of May 1944 laid out specific payments: in the case of 
death there would be a £200 widow’s gratuity, a £150 widow’s pension, £36 allowance 
per child under 18 and £60 pension for a motherless child under 18.192 The only cases 
that invoked the presumed-killed policy were those of the aforementioned Kent 
Stevenson and Guy Byam, who both went down with their airplanes during bombing 
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raids over Germany, in June 1944 and February 1945, respectively.193 Although both 
men were married, neither of their personnel files includes details of any pay-outs to 
family following their deaths. Byam’s file contains only an undated, handwritten note 
with the addresses of his wife and mother, followed by internal memoranda in October 
1951 and May 1953 with information about his dates of service and his death.194 The last 
memorandum in Stevenson’s folder, dated 9 August 1944, is from Allport to a BBC 
accountant regarding the mislabelling of a Stevenson expense record, which totalled 
£2.5. Allport wrote, “The expense sheet covering his June mess bills, which was 
prepared on the 25th July in respect of H.F. Kent Stevenson, who, as you know, has been 
reported missing, was coded to 05020. This should have been shown as 05051.” 
Immediately before that the file contains a 9 June notice about his salary being increased 
to £900, stating that the rise “will cease upon his return to this country or when he ceases 
to act as War Correspondent in the field.”195 
Reuters insured the lives of its correspondents on an individual basis, meaning 
each case had to be handled separately rather than with a blanket payment of the same 
amount for each staff member killed. The company suffered the deaths of thirteen 
employees during the war. Most were staff members who had joined or been drafted into 
the armed forces. Yet five were war correspondents: Alexander Massy Anderson, Royal 
Navy correspondent who drowned in the Mediterranean when a U-boat torpedoed his 
ship near Alexandria, Egypt, on 15 December 1941; Kenneth Selby-Walker, Far East 
general manager presumed drowned off Sumatra, Indonesia, when a torpedo sunk the 
boat on which he and other journalists were fleeing from advancing Japanese forces in 
March 1942; Kenneth Stonehouse, Washington, D.C. correspondent, who returned to 
Europe to become a war correspondent but was shot down while on a flight from Lisbon 
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to London on 2 June 1943; Stewart Sale, killed by a shell near Naples, Italy, on 28 
September 1943; and William Stringer, killed by a shell near Chartres, France, on 17 
August 1944.196 Anderson and Sale are interesting case studies in how Reuters treated 
the families of employees lost in the course of their duties, which differed in each 
instance. The dealings with the relatives of both these correspondents exhibit the lengths 
to which the company was willing to go to provide financial care, as well as the limits. 
Alexander “Jock” Massy Anderson worked for the Eastern Telegraph Company in 
Alexandria and Suez until joining Reuters in 1929. He was the chief of the Alexandria 
bureau in Egypt for eleven years and then with the onset of hostilities he became a naval 
war correspondent covering the eastern Mediterranean. He lost his life at the age of 37 
while reporting from the British navy cruiser HMS Galatea in December 1941.197 
Anderson left a wife and a daughter behind and Reuters did what it could to help. H.B. 
Carter, the corporate secretary from 1932 to 1959, wrote condolences to Anderson’s 
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widow, Dorothy, and noted the company’s board had passed a resolution of sympathy 
and expressed “how much we all regret the death of so able and courageous a member of 
our staff.” The previous day, Reuters decided to give Anderson’s wife £20 per month 
and his mother £50 per month for a period covering the 1st of December until the end of 
March.198 Anderson left all of his savings, estimated at £600, to his 7-year-old daughter, 
Juliet. According to a correspondence in January 1942 to Reuters London from Martin 
Herlihy, one of Anderson’s co-workers in Egypt, his mother and brother were named as 
the executors of his estate because he had “an unfortunate matrimonial experience” that 
was headed for divorce. He suggested that, due to the widow’s “mental condition”, 
young Juliet should be put in the care of her grandmother and that Reuters become “de 
facto guardians of the child” by providing her with £150 per year until she was 21 years 
old, a sum based on the company having insured Anderson’s life for £2,000. Herlihy 
proposed Anderson’s wife should receive one year of his salary, or the equivalent of 
three years’ salary at £20 per month. Somewhat coldly, Herlihy wrote, “…we suggest 
that after a suitable payment the burden of caring for her should be undertaken by her 
parents as it would have been if she had never married or had been divorced or if her 
husband had died of illness.”199 Anderson’s widow and Reuters then became embroiled 
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in an argument when she wrote to them in late May 1942 asking questions regarding the 
size of her husband’s salary and any allowances or additional monies he received as a 
correspondent, as well as the amount of insurance money left for her daughter. Company 
secretary Carter simply responded that she would have to ask the executors of the will.200 
Stewart Sale hailed from Luton, England, but his final resting place was a 
cemetery near Naples. He joined Reuters as a sub-editor in October 1942 after receiving 
an offer of £900 per year. This high sum was undoubtedly predicated upon his previous 
work as a reporter and editor for three local newspapers and then reporting for the 
Sunday News, the Press Association and the Daily Telegraph. At Reuters he moved 
quickly into the ranks of war reporters; the company requested a military deferment and 
war correspondent credentials for Sale even before he began work. His first combat 
assignment came in January 1943, when he was one of a group of correspondents from 
various organisations who flew in a Royal Air Force Lancaster on a bombing raid over 
Berlin, a one-time mission for which the company insured his life for £60. A letter from 
company Secretary Carter to insurers Cox, Tyrie & Co. Ltd. stated that their investment 
returned home safely. At the end of July, Reuters rushed Sale to Algiers after another 
correspondent fell ill; the need was pressing enough that Joint News Manager Walton 
Cole wrote to the Ministry of Information on 29 July asking, “If you could get Sale out 
by the weekend it would be of great assistance to us.” Armed with his advance book 
from the NPA, allowing him to draw £50 per month from the army field cashier, and his 
life now insured for £2,000, he was soon in Africa and then Italy writing copy. Yet his 
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dispatches would not last past 28 September.201 Sale was with three other correspondents 
following the American Fifth Army into Scafati, approximately fifteen miles southeast 
of Naples. Everyone believed the town had been cleared of Germans. “Things looked 
absolutely safe,” recalled Frank Gillard of the BBC, who was also trailing the Fifth. Yet 
correspondent Basil Gingell of the British Exchange Telegraph agency, one of those in 
the group with Sale, explained that things changed quickly: 
 
I had left my jeep and had walked down the road with three friends. 
We stood in a knot by a street corner watching the assembly of the 
armour when there was a blinding flash and a terrific explosion shook 
the ground. I was flung a great distance and buried by falling debris. 
When I was able to look round I saw that my companions were dead. 
 
The tank shell that landed among them instantly killed Sale, Alexander B. Austin 
of the Daily Herald, and William J. Mundy of the News Chronicle and the Sydney 
Morning Herald. The trio were buried quietly in Italy, but a memorial service held for 
them at St. Dunstan-in-the-West church in London, which had been damaged by German 
bombs but was still considered the “newspapermen’s church” due to its location on Fleet 
Street, drew hundreds of mourners from the domestic and overseas press, the British 
government and the armed services.202 
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In October 1943 Reuters arranged with the Imperial Life Assurance Company of 
Canada to posthumously increase – for unspecified reasons – Sale’s life insurance policy 
of £2,000 to £2,500, which purchased annuities for the education and maintenance of his 
two children, aged 12 and 7, until they were each 18 years old. The annuities were to 
provide £315 annually to each child for six years, while in the final five years of the 
younger child’s annuity the amount would decrease to £157 annually. Additionally, 
Reuters granted Sale’s wife, Madge, a pension of £200 annually for five years beginning 
October 1943, to be drawn from its Officers’ Pension Fund. The Reuters chief of the 
audit and accounts department was also deputized as an agent of the company in the 
matter, a move he said would save the company money, although he inexplicably took a 
one percent commission on the £2,500 annuity for the children. The entire endeavour, 
including payment of taxes and an investment of the return in savings bonds, brought the 
net sum of the policy to £2,600. The insurance payments for the children were to be 
made through Mrs. Sale, although in a sign of corporate caution – or mistrust – the head 
accountant suggested the board of directors require her to provide receipts: “We should 
then be able to assess at the end of each year how much out of the total paid to Mrs. Sale 
had been applied specifically on education and clothing purchases and, in consequence, 
how much remained for general and holiday maintenance.” Despite that apparent 
wariness, the relationship never seemed to have soured; Madge Sale’s pension was 
renewed at five-year intervals and in 1958 even increased to £250 per year. Additionally, 
letters from Reuters to Mrs. Sale in late 1963 and 1964 informed her of the company’s 
decision in both of those years to provide her with cheques for £50 “to make a 
contribution towards your Christmas expenses.” She died in October 1972.203 
It is interesting to note the similarities, but more so the differences, in the way 
these two families – the Andersons and Sales – were compensated and treated by 
Reuters. Did the Sales enjoy what appear to be better dealings with the company because 
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Stewart Sale was favoured over Alexander Massey Anderson? Was it a question of 
seniority? Did the families themselves create the circumstances for better or worse, or 
were these primarily business decisions with the personal element being secondary? The 
corporate documents do not provide a clear answer. Yet these cases show that Reuters 
could be both compassionate and humane, but also take a hard tact, with families of the 
correspondents who died in the line of duty. 
 
Captured Correspondents 
While the death rates of correspondents were extremely low compared to the 
military personnel on whom they reported, there was also the danger of capture and 
imprisonment in the field, for which the government had to apply a broad policy and the 
individual companies had to make bureaucratic and financial considerations. Documents 
in The National Archives of the United Kingdom help explain government policy 
regarding captured war correspondents, which the news organisations were required to 
accept. A War Office memorandum from 1942 cites article 81 of the Prisoners of War 
Convention: 
 
Persons who follow the armed forces without directly belonging 
thereto, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, sutlers, or 
contractors, who fall into the hands of the enemy, and whom the latter 
think fit to detain shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, 
provided they are in possession of an authorisation from the military 
authorities of the armed forces which they are following.204  
 
Additionally, a letter from the Associated Press of Britain requests that the 
government arrange a prisoner exchange with the Italian government for the AP’s 
Middle East correspondent, Godfrey H.P. Anderson, to be traded for one of three Italian 
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correspondents being held in India.205 The response from an unnamed official at the War 
Office, presumably Lt. Col. R. Edgeworth-Johnstone to whom the AP letter is addressed, 
clarifies the firm government policy regarding correspondents imprisoned by the enemy: 
 
I assume that your correspondent Mr. Anderson was in possession of 
the requisite authority and was captured by Italian Forces in the course 
of the Libyan Campaign. On that assumption he will receive treatment 
from the Italian Authorities appropriate to a prisoner of war – as there 
are no proposals current for the exchange of individual prisoners of 
war – I regret that this exchange cannot at present be effected [sic]. If 
the three Italian correspondents at present detained in India on the 
outbreak of war are civilians they cannot of course be exchanged with 
Mr. Anderson. A press correspondent who is a prisoner of war under 
Article 81 of the Convention cannot be considered for repatriation on 
an exchange basis as a civilian.206 
 
Another letter from the War Office to the South African authorities in London 
regarding their captured correspondents further elucidates the policy by noting that in the 
previous world war the government had been pressured to make similar exchanges by 
the relatives of internees, but that the military authorities always opposed them “as it 
seemed that those who had influence must be unduly favoured.” In the Second World 
War, the government continued to oppose exchanges, despite the fact it was difficult for 
some, especially family members, to accept that non-military prisoners could be held 
until the end of the war. The War Office letter to the South Africans further stated, “It 
must be remembered, however, that they have the benefit and safeguards of the 
Convention and so cannot fairly expect to be considered for exchange as civilians.”207 
This, as well as a continued dialogue with the AP regarding Anderson that held firm the 
line of not exchanging him, shows that the War Office maintained a strict policy of 
adhering to the tenets of the Prisoners of War Convention and gave no special favours to 
war correspondents. Edgeworth-Johnstone of the War Office summed this up succinctly 
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at the end of a 28 August 1942 letter to the Associated Press: “We have, however, 
always refused to negotiate outside the framework of the Convention, a policy which is 
abundantly justified by experience in the last War.”208 
Reuters historian Donald Read writes that the company’s policy was to pay 
captured correspondents half of their normal salary while in captivity.209 This is 
supported by a 28 May 1942 report to the Reuters corporate board that led with an item 
titled, “Members of staff in enemy hands”, which documented not only war 
correspondents who had been captured, but also the monetary arrangements the 
organisation made for them. The report explained that “generally speaking a reserve will 
be made monthly of half their salaries,” although it listed individual exceptions in which 
the reporter’s spouse was paid a specified amount during his captivity. “In addition,” the 
report noted, “in case we are called on by the Government to make provision for the 
maintenance of a prisoner with military rank, we reserve £23.6.8 a month, the total being 
£1,000 a year.” This concern over the government’s involvement stemmed from the fact 
that British war correspondents were given a military rank, although honorary, and wore 
British military uniform. The report explained: “In the case of Mr. A. P. Crosse, who had 
the rank of Captain, we are reserving £35 a month, from which we pay domestic 
obligations amounting to somewhat over £10 a month. Mr. Crosse’s salary was £600 a 
year.” It added that the Ministry of Information would “carry half the amount reserved 
or, as the case may be, disbursed” to correspondents listed in the report. The polite 
distinction between “reserved” and “disbursed” indicated the uncertainty over whether 
they would make it home.210 By the end of 1944, the Reuters Prisoners of War Reserve 
Account had a credit balance of £7,993 and its debits against the corporation’s profit and 
loss account were approximately £4,800. Based on annual payments of £2,400 made to 
dependants and relatives of captured correspondents, and in light of what was estimated 
as a sufficient amount to “enable them to reshape their lives when they are freed”, 
management determined that no further payments would be made into the account after 
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1 January 1945. On that date, three Reuters correspondents – A.P. Crosse, J.J. Smyth and 
J.H.C. Talbot211 – were still prisoners of war in Germany.212 
A letter from the War Office to the BBC on 5 August 1942 explained that in the 
case of captured war correspondents the Italian government had agreed to treat them, 
and subsequently pay them, as officers. This was the policy under which Edward Ward 
was held for a large period of the war. Ward was the BBC’s first newsman to be 
captured by the enemy. Along with his sound engineer, Bob Crawford, Ward went into 
the Libyan desert to cover the British army’s attempt to take Tobruk for a second time. 
Despite repeatedly coming under enemy fire, they continued to make recordings through 
23 November 1941. The pair was covering the battle of Sidi Rezegh and had stopped at 
the desert headquarters of the Fifth South African Brigade, which had been cut off from 
the British main force, when a South African Radio correspondent with whom they were 
travelling optimistically pointed to the horizon and announced the approach of tanks, 
believing they were British. Ward said, “Yes, it’s the tanks all right, and they’ve got 
nice, big black crosses on them.” He subsequently spent almost three-and-a-half years in 
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Italian and German POW camps.213 After his capture, Ward became an example of how 
the BBC could be stern in its financial dealings with employees. 
Under the policy of treating captured correspondents as officers, Ward was 
designated a captain and subsequently received from the Italians the monthly sum of 
£15.5.7., beginning when he transferred to an officers’ camp, after originally being held 
in a facility for enlisted men. The first remittance was to cover the period of 1 May to 30 
September 1942 and would total £76.7.11.; thereafter, he would receive £45.16.9. per 
quarter. This money was to be paid by the BBC to the War Office, which would then 
forward it to the Italians.214 Ward’s 1946 memoir, Give Me Air, describes his 
experiences during imprisonment, but does not include details of the BBC’s financial 
arrangements for him during captivity. However, he remarked that the Italians told them 
POWs were “entitled to fixed rates of pay”, and he humorously described how the funds 
were used: “With this money we were able to order a few ‘comforts’ from Brindisi. We 
were able to get some precious cigarettes. Junior officers were afforded the edifying 
spectacle of British colonels queuing up for half a dozen gaudy-coloured boiled sweets 
like children at a school treat.”215 
While Ward himself does not go into details about his war correspondent salary, 
his BBC personnel file provides information about the Corporation’s financial dealings 
regarding the captured journalist.216 At first the BBC was rather cold and bureaucratic 
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toward him. A memorandum of 12 August 1942 from the salaries accountant listed 
Ward’s monthly wage as £83.6.8., which had been fully paid to his bank through the end 
of July. Yet the accountant requested a repayment from the reporter, and did not want to 
consider him a “special case” because it would disturb the usual bookkeeping procedure, 
despite Ward and his recording engineer being in a rather special position as the only 
prisoners of war employed by the BBC. The accountant’s note states: 
 
It now appears that £15.5.7. should have been deducted from his pay 
for each of the months May, June, July, 1942 to cover the pay he 
receives from the Italian Authorities while he is a Prisoner of War. 
Consequently he owes the Corporation the sum of three times £15.5.7. 
which equals £45.16.9. Will you please let me know what 
arrangements are made for refunding this debt. For the month of 
August and until I receive information which affects his pay, the sum 
of £83.6.8. less £15.5.7. i.e. £68.1.1. will be paid into his bank account. 
I observe that the War Office suggests payments quarterly in advance, 
but it would help me very much if you could persuade the War Office 
to accept payment monthly in arrears…. This will enable me to make 
the remittances by the normal Salary Department processes instead of 
making a special case.217 
 
The Corporation also wrote a letter to Ward’s wife reminding her of the £15.5.7. 
deduction from the money placed into the family bank account each month and asked 
whether she could handle the additional deduction that was owed to the Corporation. A 
BBC official wrote, “Will you please let me know whether it will cause you undue 
financial hardship if for the month of August, in addition to the £15.5.7d. due for that 
month, we deduct the £45.16.9d. now owing.” He informed her that this would only 
leave £2.5.4. to pay back. “If you cannot agree to such a large deduction from this 
month’s salary, would you please let me know the maximum deduction which you can 
suffer each month in addition to the £15.5.7d.”218 The BBC “many times addressed 
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letters to her” without a reply, according to a 24 August memorandum, and on 26 August 
the BBC again wrote to Mrs. Ward to say that if they did not hear back from her by 
September 12, when the accounting office needed to clear its books, they would assume 
she was in agreement. The date came and went without word from her and the full 
£45.16.9. was deducted from Ward’s pay.219 When they did receive a reply on 23 
September it came through a solicitor, who wanted the terms of the payments and 
deductions explained, as it appeared Mrs. Ward did not understand the POW 
compensation system and why she had not been receiving her husband’s full salary. This 
was explained to her by the BBC in subsequent correspondence; in an apparent attempt 
to seem magnanimous, the letters pointed out that no income tax – usually taken directly 
from a correspondent’s pay – was being deducted.220 Despite having been the subject of 
what could be considered a policy of corporate heartlessness in trying to recoup money 
from a captured correspondent, upon his liberation from a German POW camp in the 
final year of the war, Ward dutifully returned to work for the BBC, deploying again in 
time to cover the meeting of the American and Soviet armed forces at Torgau, Germany, 
in April 1945.221 
The effort to fund war correspondents was indeed costly. Beyond the salaries paid, 
which some correspondents were vocal in complaining were insufficient or unworthy of 
their efforts and expertise, media companies needed to provide expense funds to 
maintain the journalists while they were reporting in the field. These expenses included 
the costs of food, lodging, kit such as uniforms and typewriters, and other necessities for 
doing the job and existing in a war zone; some reporters took advantage of this expense 
system, or stated that the funds were not enough to cover their requirements, which 
caused numerous disputes with their home offices. There was also the need to provide 
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life insurance for men working in extremely hazardous conditions, as well as payments 
for those who were captured by the enemy and held in prisoner of war camps. It 
becomes clear, then, that covering the news of the Second World War was an expensive 
endeavour in many ways for the organisations involved. Speech was indeed not free. 
Having surveyed issues peripheral to the actual field work of the war 
correspondents – including the British media environment of the time, the selection and 
training of the journalists to be deployed, their salaries compared with those of the 
general British public, and other monetary matters involved in supporting them during 
their assignments – it is now necessary to consider the methods of their work and other 
various aspects of their experiences inside the war theatres. This includes the hurdles 
they faced in writing and delivering their stories, whether in print or over the radio. One 
of these concerns had a significant impact on the content of their dispatches and was a 
daily issue to be faced: censorship. 
  
121 
The Correspondent and Censorship 
 
In Tom Stoppard’s 1978 play, Night and Day, about foreign correspondents 
covering a fictional African war, a reporter recounts his interview with a rebel leader in 
which he says the newspaper is “an objective fact-gathering organisation.” The rebel 
press officer demands to know if his paper is “objective-for or objective-against” the 
war.222 This is a somewhat blunter version of the wary mind-set demonstrated by Allied 
censors in the Second World War. Despite the fact that all the correspondents covering 
the British and Dominion forces were “objective-for”, some of the biggest stumbling 
blocks to reporters getting stories out to the public were the censorship policies set and 
the practices employed by the government in London, which subsequently resulted in 
heavy editing by military officials in the field; these can both be categorized as official 
censorship. Yet while the rigorous process frequently frustrated many correspondents, 
some embraced it as a necessary part of their patriotic duty, an attitude resulting in 
varying degrees of self-censorship. This often manifested itself in reporters omitting 
certain aspects of a story in anticipation of the changes the censor would make, although 
at times this was also done as a tactical manoeuver to “scoop” the competition by getting 
stories out faster for publication or broadcast, rather than straightforward loyalty. Self-
censorship also occurred in the newsrooms at home in the form of managers and editors 
who urged restraint in order to conform to government policies. The most serious degree 
of self-censorship, however, was framing a story through the selective use of facts, not 
only to placate the censors, but in order to shape the story so that it fit an agenda, 
otherwise known as propaganda; this was ostensibly to protect and promote the 
perceived best interests of the nation and came into play more frequently than the public 
knew, or perhaps wanted to know. 
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Official Censorship at Home 
Journalist and historian Max Hastings wrote in 2011, “Only a few national leaders 
and commanders knew much about anything beyond their immediate line of sight. 
Civilians lived in a fog of propaganda and uncertainty, hardly less dense in Britain and 
the US than in Germany or the Soviet Union.”223 While this was not a direct comment on 
censorship, it indicates how carefully controlled the flow of information was during the 
Second World War, even by the democratic nations. Censorship pressures and actions on 
the home front by the British government were ever present and rigid. Churchill 
admitted in the House of Commons in February 1944 that he had directed censors to be 
more austere with accounts of the fighting during the Italian campaign in the summer of 
1943. “I myself sent the telegram asking for a stricter censorship on alarmist reports,” he 
said, specifically objecting to the use of vocabulary that made the British military’s 
position seem untenable. He claimed, “Such words as ‘desperate’ ought not to be used 
about a position in a battle when they are false. Still less should they be used if they were 
true.” The second part of his statement is a revealing insight to his attitude toward the 
media’s role in war. Asked, for the sake of comparison, about his own experiences as a 
military reporter in the Boer War, Churchill gave another nod of approval to heavy 
censorship: “I should not have been allowed in South Africa, where I was a war 
correspondent for some time, to say, for instance, that the position inside Ladysmith was 
desperate.” (This met with cheers from the assembled lawmakers.) Churchill agreed with 
the praise one of his Parliamentary colleagues gave to the British correspondents in the 
battle theatres of the Second World War and noted that the “liberty of the Press is of 
high consequence.”224 Yet the Prime Minister also issued a warning about the possibility 
of slips by war correspondents, implying the continued need for a vigilant watch over 
them: 
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I should like to say I think they have discharged their duties with very 
great discretion and this is particularly true of the men who are nearest 
to the enemy and in the same danger as the troops. There is a wish and 
desire among the newspaper correspondents to discharge their duty 
with discretion and to help the troops in every way. At the same time, 
accidents will happen in the best regulated families.225 
 
These potential family accidents were the ostensible reason Whitehall insisted 
upon rigorous censorship measures from above; while the military handled war 
correspondents in the field, the government kept an eye on their employers at home. 
Philip Taylor states in his book, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, that 
“Censorship and propaganda are really two different sides of the same medal: the 
manipulation of opinion”, and notes that the British government engaged in propaganda 
and censorship long before 1939-1945: 
 
During the First World War, when positive means of persuasion – 
propaganda – was becoming an accepted feature of British wartime 
governmental responsibility, negative means – censorship – had 
already come of age. But what distinguishes the British government’s 
manipulation of opinion in the twentieth century from earlier periods, 
in peace and war, is not just the grafting of a positive propaganda 
machinery on to the already established censorship procedures. It is 
also the scale on which the official manipulation of opinion was 
conducted, the size and significance of the audience to be influenced 
and the means and media through which it operated. Never before had 
so much information been available to so many people with so many 
means open to them to express their point of view. Never before had 
their opinions counted for so much in the survival of the state or, 
conversely, in its destruction. Never before had there been such a need 
for governments of all kinds to devote themselves to the struggle for 
the hearts and minds of the politicised masses.226 
 
Taylor states that the censorship apparatus established at the start of the Second 
World War experienced the same difficulties as had been encountered in the First World 
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War: “First, it was dominated by the War Office and the Admiralty, whose principal 
concern, not unnaturally, was to prevent the publication of any information which might 
prove valuable to the enemy. Initially, in both wars, this preoccupation bordered upon an 
obsession and resulted in a dearth of news that merely fostered counter-productive 
speculation and rumour.” The censorship office, officially called the Press Bureau at its 
start, became known as the “Suppress Bureau.” More errors were repeated at the outset 
of the second great war: “If one of the major mistakes of the First World War experience 
was to conduct the whole business of propaganda, censorship and intelligence from a 
variety of different buildings then the same mistake was about to be made in the opening 
phase of the Second World War.” Taylor argues that the relationship in the initial stages 
of the war between the press and the Ministry of Information, which had taken over 
censorship and propaganda duties, was a disaster: “The early months were difficult in 
that the various service departments attempted to keep the public unaware of what was 
going on in the foreign countries where British troops were deployed, which contributed 
to both a sense of frustration and a belief that nothing much was happening abroad.”227 
In his 1979 monograph entitled, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the 
Ministry of Information in World War II, Ian McLaine writes: 
 
The war started tolerably well as far as the news and censorship 
divisions were concerned. The press were delighted with the facilities 
provided for them on the ground floor in Senate House, London 
University. Sir James Grigg of the War Office, in replying to a sharp 
rebuke for having allowed his department to make an announcement 
independently of the News Division, proffered an abject apology 
which promised well for the future authority of the Ministry. This 
pleasing state of affairs did not last long, however. After a few weeks 
the confusion and lack of uniformity which characterised censorship 
rulings made it imperative that the instructions issued to the censors 
should be more closely defined.228 
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MoI Director-General Cyril Radcliffe, who was recruited from the legal 
profession, decreed that Defence Regulation 3, which outlined censorship of information 
regarding national security, was concerned only with the prohibition of information that 
was of military value; MoI censors therefore would not concern themselves with opinion 
pieces, speculation or other material in the press that might undermine morale. “The 
press were assured that there would be no meddling by the Ministry of Information in 
the expression of opinion. Nor would there be any suppression of facts other than those 
which could be clearly shown to be of value to the enemy.” This obviously appeared at 
first to be a boon for the media outlets, however there was a loophole in this 
proclamation, as McLaine explains: “[T]he defence departments, suspicious of the new 
and untried ministry, had the final say as to whether a press message was or was not of 
potential military value.” This created a problem, as the military service branches, 
especially the Admiralty, were not keen on giving the press and radio much leeway. 
Churchill, then serving as First Lord of the Admiralty, stated that “it was for the 
Admiralty or other department to purvey to the Ministry the raw meat and vegetables 
and for the Ministry to cook and serve the dish to the public. If the Admiralty could have 
had their way they would prefer a policy of complete silence.”229 Commenting on the 
same cooking metaphor by Churchill, Taylor writes: “Certainly, the MoI was only just 
beginning to learn its culinary skills but the Admiralty’s offerings did not even constitute 
famine relief and that which did get through to news-starved journalists was distributed 
by a censorship staff largely made up of ex-naval personnel.”230 Angus Calder’s 
assessment agrees: 
 
The Admiralty was especially furtive, and suppressed most naval news, 
except for the results of actions of the losses of ships, until long after it 
had ceased to be topical. So determined was the navy that the Germans 
should not know where its ships were that ignorant and nervous 
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censors at various times deleted mentions of H.M.S. Pinafore and the 
Marie Celeste from press items.231 
 
James Cooper was Alan Moorehead’s assistant correspondent in Cairo. In a letter 
to Daily Express Editor Arthur Christiansen, Moorehead stated, “He’s as keen as 
mustard to be sunk in a battleship so that he can write one of the war’s great stories; I’ve 
got him accredited to the Navy in Alexandria.” Christiansen later wrote in his memoirs, 
“Cooper’s wish came true and he was duly sunk. But the Censors held his copy for three 
weeks in order to keep the Germans ignorant of the identity of his vessel… so that all 
poor Cooper got for his ducking was the anonymity of the spike.”232 
In the early months of the war, politicians, the press and others heaped criticism 
on the MoI, noting that it was overstaffed – 827 employees in its London headquarters 
and an additional 127 in regional offices, totalling 954 but disdainfully rounded up to 
999 in political debates – many of whom were civil servants, academics and other non-
specialists. McLaine writes that Norman Riley – author of a 1940 book critical of the 
MoI entitled, 999 And All That – pondered why MoI was a “dumping ground” for 
unqualified staff members whose previous work had nothing to do with the press or 
propaganda, while Harold Nicholson, future Parliamentary Secretary, stated that the 
ministry “had been staffed with duds at the top and all the good people are in the most 
subordinate positions”. The Observer opined that MoI staffing had been conducted with 
“stupefying absurdity”, and the New Statesman wrote that nepotism was a key factor in 
hiring staff, subsequently producing a “scramble of socially favoured amateurs and 
privileged ignoramuses in the Ministry of Information”. Despite the protestations of War 
Office interference with censorship, even top MoI officials had to admit the initial 
blunders of their entity: “[Head Censor] Admiral Thomson was in agreement with the 
journalists about the lack of uniformity in censorship rulings. The system could not cope 
with the volume of material submitted and in view of the fact that before the war neither 
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instructors nor trainee censors ‘had any idea of the working of the press’ it is not 
surprising that their interpretation of the Defence Notices was unsatisfactory.”233 In 
many cases throughout the early parts of the war, and indeed in less frequent but still 
plentiful instances throughout the latter years of the conflict, this “unsatisfactory” 
interpretation of the censorship regulations by their gatekeepers was proved true, 
occasionally in somewhat absurd examples. On 11 September 1939, Parisian radio 
announced the arrival of the BEF in France, “and, as the Germans could be presumed 
also to have heard the broadcast, the War Office agreed with the Ministry of Information 
that the ban on the story should be lifted.”234 The British newspapers placed the report in 
their upcoming editions and began distributing copies to their vendors around the 
country. Yet shortly before the clock struck midnight, Secretary of State for War Leslie 
Hore-Belisha ordered the recall of the papers after deciding the reports provided more 
detail than the War Office wanted released. McLaine recounts the scenes that followed 
and the resulting embarrassment for the MoI and backward step in relations with 
journalists: 
 
The Home Office called in the police, who occupied Fleet Street 
offices and confiscated copies of the early morning editions from trains 
and astonished motorists. At 2.55 a.m. on the morning of 12 
September, after frantic efforts had been made to print new editions, 
the reimposed ban was lifted and the dazed editors permitted to retrieve 
the situation as best they could. This was the very stuff of farce and, 
quite naturally, the fury of the press was directed at the censorship 
authority responsible.235 
 
The MoI privately argued that censorship was being usurped by the military 
authorities, but the press still considered the ministry culpable in the incident.236 This 
story had a laughable quality that unfortunately would make its way into other incidents 
of disorganized, inconsistent, or simply irrational censorship throughout the war. 
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“Confused and frustrated, Lord Macmillan [the first minister of information during 
the war] could see only one way out of the impasse and that was to divest the Ministry of 
all its news and censorship functions by the creation of an independent press bureau,” 
wrote McLaine, adding that while this move appeared “drastic” it was an empty gesture 
that did not cure the fundamental problem, because “unless there was a shift of authority 
from the service ministries to the censors, the mere transference of news and censorship 
would achieve nothing.” Yet on 3 October 1939 the prime minister announced the 
creation of a Press and Censorship Bureau that would be run by Sir Walter Monckton 
with ultimate oversight by the home secretary; the bureau’s various departments would 
have both the power to censor incoming news as well as to disseminate their own stories, 
which of course would come from the War Office. McLaine called it “a famous victory 
for the service departments.” Perhaps surprisingly, given their past criticism of the MoI, 
the journalists themselves protested the launch of the new bureau; McLaine quotes a 
committee representing over two hundred journalists as saying, “our complaint has never 
been against the… Ministry but has been directed against the stranglehold of the news 
exercised by some of the Government Departments.”237 
The Press and Censorship Bureau only lasted six months. Taylor postulates this 
was because it used the same outdated system as during the First World War in which 
censorship and propaganda were conducted separately, that the various military service 
departments still conducted their own censorship, and because it threatened the very 
existence of the MoI. In 1940 John Reith became the Minister of Information and Rear-
Admiral George Thomson became chief censor for the UK and they set the MoI, and 
subsequently the mechanics of the ministry and its control over the operation of news 
censorship, on the path it would follow for the rest of the war. Although Reith only 
lasted from January to May 1940, when he went out with Chamberlain, Taylor explains, 
“It was in that month, however, that the MoI reabsorbed the Press and Censorship 
Bureau. Up until that point, it has to be said, censorship had been a farce.”238 After May 
1940 the MoI gained control over postal and telegraphic censorship, which had 
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previously been overseen by the War Office. In June 1941 Duff Cooper was forced out 
as head of MoI after demanding greater powers for his department and was replaced by 
Brendan Bracken, who operated what became a fairly smooth operation for the 
remainder of the war.239 Bracken had “excellent press relations, a very close friendship 
with the Prime Minister, bustling confidence in tackling the Ministry’s adversaries, and a 
scorn for the exhortation of the British public.” By 1943 the MoI had grown to number 
2,824 staff, three times as many as under previous ministers.240 Yet this was not without 
its own problems, as McLaine explains: 
 
In the recruitment of staff the cult of the amateur reached its apogee 
and the universities, the legal profession and the ranks of retired 
admirals were thoroughly scoured. While it was difficult to find at 
short notice experts in such nebulous fields as morale and propaganda, 
the possession of experience in, say, psychology and journalism seems 
almost to have been a positive disqualification for employment.241 
 
It was also clear that the different military service departments still wielded an 
inordinate amount of power over censorship, which they used to their own varied means 
rather than the standards set by the Ministry of Information. The Admiralty balked at the 
rule allowing news that had already been published or broadcast abroad to be put 
through without clearance; stories were passed for some news outlets and not others; and 
stories that were already common knowledge and carried no security risks were 
nonetheless blocked. Cyril Radcliffe understood the frustration and stated, “It is not an 
answer to the Press to say ‘We censor this because the War Office wanted it out’…. But 
it is certain that neither now nor later in the war are the Press or the public going to be 
satisfied with something simply because some department or official in it thinks it 
necessary in the interests of the war.” McLaine writes, “So contemptuous of the 
censorship system did the press become that editors simply ignored rulings and risked 
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prosecution, safe in the assumption that the department concerned would not institute 
proceedings against them.”242 
Siân Nicholas supports the argument that the MoI handling of censorship early in 
the war was often counterproductive, both in its relationship with the media and the 
reaction of the public. The information ministry announced it was “not always desirable” 
to publish military news even if it was positive, and along with the War Office and 
military service departments accused the BBC of broadcasting more news than 
necessary; the MoI claimed the BBC informed the enemy of the successful 14 October 
1939 sinking of the HMS Royal Oak by a U-boat at Scapa Flow. The MoI and the 
service departments, at least in appearance, were working in the same direction in 
attempts to quash the release of information, although in a seemingly haphazard 
manner.243 Nicholas writes: 
 
The sheer inconsistency of official policy infuriated broadcasters and 
listeners alike. Some news was released within hours (for instance the 
British bombing raids on Sylt); more usually there were delays of 
weeks or months (or even years). On the orders of the Admiralty, the 
arrival in Britain of Canadian troops was not reported – but was then 
unexpectedly revealed in a broadcast by Churchill himself. In many 
instances the only version of events accessible to listeners was that of 
German radio; in such instances, the BBC argued, the damage to 
morale was particularly acute.244 
 
By May 1940, a Mass-Observation poll reported that a full two-thirds of the public 
thought the news was suspect and by the middle of July only a tenth of the people had 
kind words for the press; the BBC’s stock rose at this time, though, with three quarters 
expressing more trust in the broadcaster than its print competitors. This was despite the 
fact that the press was waging its own campaign against the BBC, trying to undermine 
its credibility.245 
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The system of media censorship in the British homeland worked much like the 
field censorship in the war zones, as will be seen in a following section. Information 
came in and, despite the fact it had already been passed by military censors at or near the 
frontline, the war correspondents’ reports were vetted once again by those Taylor refers 
to as “Blue Pencil Warriors,” referring to the writing implements they used to cross out 
material to be censored from newspaper stories or radio reports. “The essential point 
about it was that all quick (or ‘hot’) news in Britain was censored at the source of its 
arrival.” Beyond this blue pencil system, the government’s involvement was largely 
based on chiding newspapers when they wrote things unfavourable to those in power, 
especially in the form of opinion pieces, despite the fact that this practice had been 
prohibited early in the war by Cyril Radcliffe. The Daily Worker was suppressed 
altogether and forced to stop publication for eighteen months. Additionally, the 
Churchill government had an ongoing quarrel with the Daily Mirror, which was popular 
with the troops and rose in circulation from 1.75 million in 1939 to three million in the 
year after the war. The paper had made negative comments about Chamberlain prior to 
his departure in May 1940 and then, after continued written attacks on government 
policies, Churchill wrote to Mirror proprietor Cecil King on 25 January 1941 telling him 
that the paper was engendering “a spirit of hatred and malice against the government, 
which after all is not a party government but a National Government almost 
unanimously chosen which spirit surpasses anything I have ever seen in English 
journalism. One might have thought that in these hard times some hatred might be kept 
for the enemy.” While Churchill leaned toward further control of the editorial output of 
the Mirror, his Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, and the MoI mitigated his desire for 
suppression by reasonably arguing that an attempt to censor a newspaper’s opinions after 
its factual stories had already been censored was a step too far.246 The row with the 
Mirror came to a head on 6 March 1942 when the paper ran what became the famous 
Philip Zec cartoon of a sailor on a raft, adrift in the ocean and covered in oil, with the 
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caption, “The price of petrol has been increased by one penny (official)”.247 The prime 
minister and many in his cabinet were incensed that the newspaper was suggesting war 
profiteering conducted with government consent, leading Morrison to threaten use of a 
Defence Notice to suppress the paper and prompting an investigation by the War Office. 
With the support of the other Fleet Street institutions the Mirror weathered the political 
storm, but it was a shot across the bow of wartime journalism by the government.248 In 
this sense, the government’s home censorship apparatus included the use of political 
pressure on media outlets by those in the highest reaches of government. Yet the actual 
line-by-line editing of material by office men with blue pencils was still ever present and 
the most direct form of censorship of news from the frontline. 
British government censors were deployed throughout the news distribution 
system, including in the Reuters newsroom in London to check all incoming items from 
correspondents in the field – where they had undoubtedly already been censored by the 
military – before they were transmitted to domestic and international newspapers that 
subscribed to the wire service. Reuters tried to move things along quickly by initiating a 
system of issuing “flash” alerts over the wires that a story was in the hands of the 
censors and would be sent shortly. This became quicker as the war progressed; in 1941 a 
flash of only twenty words took nearly four minutes to pass from writer through censor 
to transmission.249 
Ralph Deakin, foreign news editor for The Times, informed reporter Robert 
Cooper on 21 June 1944 that one of his stories had not made it into the paper, not 
because of anything he had done wrong, or even due to the field censors, but because of 
the additional censorship measures being employed at home: “Your Monday’s valuable 
Tilly dispatch arrived London 2315 hours but was delayed in official hands over four 
hours and missed all editions.” Cooper replied to his editor that reporters received a 
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briefing from the military at 5:30 pm and his stories were all written and sent by courier 
bags that left at 10 am and 2 pm. “I cannot control order in which this is censored in 
London, and all this delay must be at your end (occasionally the aircraft is cancelled for 
weather). Will now try to get this material censored here before going in bag, but 
difficulties are great.”250 
The BBC complained that it encountered a wall of resistance at the MoI, 
especially in terms of different censorship rules and access to stories than the press, but 
the reality was that its continued offensive on the government’s willpower made strides 
in gaining concessions from Whitehall. News coverage of the August 1942 Dieppe Raid, 
Nicholas writes, was “one of the most blatant examples of disinformation of the entire 
war.”251 The citizenry was told there were problems, but not the real extent of the failure. 
Yet, as Nicholas explains, the large audience who heard Frank Gillard’s eyewitness 
dispatches, estimated at 52.3 percent of listeners, enabled A.P. Ryan to claim the great 
public interest in the Dieppe reports proved that “for the sake of civilian morale” the 
BBC should be afforded expanded access to military operations: “In October 1942 the 
MOI and Service Departments agreed that ‘whenever the circumstances of the raid 
allow’, in further combined operations accredited war correspondents would be 
permitted to accompany the Forces. In the two years after Dunkirk, the reputation of the 
BBC soared. The British public now looked to the BBC rather than to newspapers for 
reliable news.”252 
Even with this growing status, however, there were still heavy censorship 
measures with which to contend. Philip Taylor writes: 
 
Propaganda may have been the sole purpose of the MoI, but it was not 
the sole function of the BBC. When Bracken arrived, the value of the 
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BBC retaining a large measure of independence was widely accepted 
within the MoI, so much so that it often served as a shield for the 
Corporation when demands for greater government control periodically 
recurred.253 
 
Yet he notes that the MoI still retained censorship control over the BBC, and 
quotes Head Censor Admiral George Thomson saying the widely accepted notion that 
the BBC was uncensored was “quite incorrect” because often the BBC relied on news 
agency reports that had already been censored. Taylor adds that there were four MoI 
censors at the BBC’s London headquarters, Broadcasting House, with “finger at the 
ready on the cut-out button in the event of an unwitting slip, having already advised 
speakers on the do’s and don’ts of their contributions in talks programmes.”254 The BBC 
understood and accepted the need for close wartime censorship of its broadcasts. The 
issue was security and the 1943 BBC Handbook offered its employees a practical 
explanation of the Corporation’s view: 
 
Nothing has been said so far about the Censor, but he is always with us 
– and rightly so. It is appalling to think what presents we might make 
to the enemy if everything we put out was not most rigidly ‘vetted’…. 
A casual reference, innocently included in a despatch, to this weapon 
or that movement of troops, might be a godsend to Rommel.255 
 
Taboo topics included names, locations, and sizes of regiments; the whereabouts 
of cabinet or royal family members; and weather information that might aid Luftwaffe 
bombers.256 Internal BBC documents stated that an October 1942 meeting between the 
government’s top censor and BBC officials had produced an agreement “that records 
would no doubt have to be censored in the field, and re-submitted to censorship on 
arrival in London” and “Chief Censor should make preliminary enquiries as to whether 
                                                 
253  Taylor, p. 171. 
254  Ibid. 
255  British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1943 (London: BBC, 1943), 
pp. 101-102. 
256  Ibid.; Tom Hickman, What Did You Do In The War, Auntie?: The BBC at War 
1939-1945 (London: BBC Books, 1995), p. 26. 
135 
any use of transmitters by war correspondents in the field would be allowed (on 
censorship grounds)”. Further indication the BBC understood the government’s 
censorship stance came in a memorandum the same month explaining the MoI had 
advised “there would not be the slightest chance of the military authorities agreeing to 
any ad libbing by correspondents with pack transmitters”, and again in a March 1943 
BBC report expressing doubt “if we should ever be allowed to work ‘live’ without a 
script.” By May 1944 the BBC sent a letter to the MoI articulating its planned 
procedures for complying with official censorship.257 Before D-Day, however, the 
Corporation successfully loosened government restrictions, and probably more than 
some government officials wanted. As Nicholas explains: 
 
[BBC News Controller A.P.] Ryan successfully pre-empted Cabinet 
attempts to tighten MOI control over the BBC, and many of the more 
onerous censorship activities quietly lapsed. By early 1944 the rule of 
completely checking back to the MOI had fallen into abeyance, and 
when things were referred it was for the purpose of verifying facts 
rather than submitting texts for approval.258 
 
Despite one of its stated aims, to be the gatekeeper of wartime news by censoring 
anything deemed harmful to the state and helpful to the enemy, the chronicler of the 
Ministry of Information’s history, Ian McLaine, deemed it to be an “anti-censorship 
agency”. McLaine writes: 
 
Freed from peacetime constraints, the government possessed the power 
to impose almost any kind and degree of censorship on the press…. 
Had the Ministry shared the Cabinet’s dark suspicions of the press 
there is no doubt that freedom of expression would have been another 
casualty of war. On the contrary, the Ministry of Information refused to 
act as the catspaw of government suppression. In so doing, it earned 
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the admiration of journalists but at the same time brought a lot of 
trouble on its own head.259 
 
It is not exactly clear from the memoirs of war correspondents whether the MoI 
earned their “admiration” over the course of the war, since their complaints were 
directed primarily at the military censors and leadership in general rather than specific 
agencies within the establishment. Clearly McLaine has the benefit of a historian’s 
retrospective judgment of the MoI and is considering factors outside of just the 
censorship that affected war correspondents, including the Ministry’s political situation 
and other responsibilities such as propaganda to bolster home front morale, but it is fair 
to say that the overall assessment of the censorship system by frontline reporters was not 
as glowing. 
 
Official Censorship in the Field 
By the onset of the Second World War, censorship was still developing, but at the 
same time was nothing new to war correspondents. Therefore, there needs to be not only 
an examination of field censorship during the war, but also a brief look at the restrictions 
on war reporters employed in notable prior conflicts. 
William Howard Russell endured what was likely the earliest example of modern 
field censorship during the Crimean War. The British commander in the Crimea, Lord 
Raglan, refused to speak with him and ordered his officers to do the same in response to 
stories critical of the army’s poor treatment of its foot soldiers that the reporter filed with 
The Times. Russell was also forced out of the military detachment’s camp and had to set 
up his own tent nearby. Raglan urged the government to charge Russell with breach of 
security and aiding the enemy. After Raglan died of dysentery in June 1855, his 
replacement, Sir William Codrington, issued on 25 February 1856 what Phillip 
Knightley calls the first order of official military censorship: “It forbade the publication 
of details of value to the enemy, authorised the ejection of a correspondent who, it was 
alleged, had published such details, and threatened future offenders with the same 
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punishment.”260 In his own book about his experiences in the conflict, The British 
Expedition to the Crimea, Russell explained that he knew the reports of troops suffering 
would be a great disappointment to his readers: 
 
How astonished must have been the good people of England, sitting 
anxiously in their homes, day after day, expecting every morning to 
gladden their eyes with the sight of the announcement, in large type, of 
‘Fall of Sebastopol,’ when they heard that their Guards – their corps 
d’elite – the pride of their hearts… had been so reduced by sickness, 
disease, and a depressing climate, that it was judged inexpedient to 
allow them to carry their own packs, or to permit them to march more 
than five miles a day, even though these packs were carried for 
them!261 
 
Russell states, however, that even when information about the poor state of British 
troops was reported in newspapers among cries of anger and danger to the campaign, the 
Russian emperor did not take heed. “Some people were absurd enough to say, with all 
possible gravity, that they would not be at all surprised if the whole expedition against 
Sebastopol were to be abandoned in consequence of articles in the English newspapers.” 
Russell added that the Czar could obtain far more valuable information from his London 
spies and even from the debates in Parliament than he could from a newspaper article, 
“…so unintelligible to him were the operations of a free press and free speech.”262 The 
rules to which Russell were subjected were very similar to those limiting the scope and 
content of war reporting that came to be employed by the British military in conflicts 
that followed. 
During the First World War, Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour summed up the 
notion of protecting military secrets through censorship by stating: “Let us learn what we 
                                                 
260  John Sweetman, The Crimean War: 1854-1856 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 
2001), p. 68; Knightley, pp. 10-15. 
261  William Howard Russell, The British Expedition to the Crimea (London: 
Routledge, 1858), p. 64. 
262  Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
138 
can from the enemy; let us teach him only what we must.”263 To this end, the Great War 
was the occasion for the first large-scale effort by the British to bureaucratically organize 
press censorship through the establishment of a department known as M.I. 7 (which later 
became M.O. 7). According to an official history of the department written by the British 
War Office in 1938, the guidelines by which it operated were clearly the direct precursor 
to censorship rules in the Second World War, as well as the official procedures for the 
accreditation of war correspondents.264 Essentially, it codified and expanded the 
censorship policies first seen in the time of Russell and remained a source of debate 
between the government, military and the press through the Second World War.265 
Philip Gibbs, one of only five correspondents accredited to the First World War 
British Expeditionary Force, wrote in 1918 of the official censorship that manifested 
itself over the course of the conflict. After he was in the field, Gibbs summed up First 
World War censorship by saying that one night he “scribbled a long dispatch, which 
became a very short one when the British censor had worked his will with it.”266 
Following the Great War, Arthur Ponsonby, an anti-war activist and liberal-leaning 
member of the House of Commons and later the House of Lords, described the 
mechanics of war propaganda and the supporting role of the press in his 1928 book, 
Falsehood in Wartime, in which he wrote that a period of reflection upon official 
proclamations might give average citizens pause, a chance to consider the legitimacy of 
what they were being told, but that could be tactically countered by a fast torrent of lies 
to sway the public and make the government’s actions seem righteous by distorting and 
concealing facts: “The amount of rubbish and humbug that pass under the name of 
patriotism in war-time in all countries is sufficient to make decent people blush when 
they are subsequently disillusioned.” Ponsonby went on to say that this results in a type 
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of “national wink” in which individuals, including members of the press, take up 
falsehoods “as a patriotic duty” that makes them complicit.267 
John F. Williams’s 1999 study of the press in Australia, Britain, France and 
Germany during the First World War expanded on Ponsonby’s belief that the media had 
to be complicit in this wink: “The mass media had no choice but to collaborate with 
government and the military in the implementation of a system of information 
dissemination which inflated minor successes, concealed disasters, incited hatreds, and 
disguised the nature of battlefield experience.” And yet the wink was not enough, 
according to Williams, who argues that despite press collaboration, the First World War 
censorship system was “based on the premise that people could not be trusted with the 
truth” and allowing the full story out via the media would reveal valuable details that 
could aid the other side. Governments of the Entente Powers even put forth the argument 
that censorship would help guarantee that the correct version of events was reported 
during the war, which Williams refutes: “Censorship was always aimed directly at truth. 
The censor was not there to pick up on lies, which, since they were rarely written with an 
eye to anything but boosting morale, could hardly be said to reveal anything of value to 
the enemy.” He notes there is a distinction to be made between military press releases 
that revealed little detail and those that spread lies, although journalists were still 
beholden to both types.268 The result was that communiqués with limited detail and rosy 
situation assessments directly affected reportage in the Great War and continued to do so 
in wars of varying sizes that came after. 
During the Spanish Civil War, Alan Moorehead attempted to cover the conflict 
from the British garrison on Gibraltar in 1937, but was contained and kept ineffective; 
this tactic of marginalizing Moorehead was an oblique form of direct censorship and – 
despite the non-involvement of British forces in the combat – is worth noting because it 
was a direct precursor to the Second World War and the censorship tactics that would be 
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applied then. Moorehead related: “The chief secretary… told me flatly when I called 
upon him that he would expel me from the Rock if I published anything which he 
considered subversive. There was no censorship, of course, he said – nothing like that. I 
just had to be careful.”269 
Allied military censorship during the Second World War was even less subtle. 
Sharing bits of rumour and intelligence among each other, as well as collecting 
information from their sources, were practically the only activities correspondents could 
do without the censors looking over their shoulders. The Allied military held all the 
cards when it came to reporters covering the hostilities. The armed forces handbook, 
Regulations for War Correspondents, states clearly that correspondents were to be 
accredited by the government of the force they aimed to cover, with the Supreme Allied 
Commander holding “the right to reject any application without assigning a reason for 
such an action”, as well as the right to withdraw a war correspondent licence “if, in the 
opinion of the Supreme Commander, such forfeiture appears necessary.” The military 
aimed to align the reporters by nationality by having “the majority of correspondents… 
representative of the nation from which the force is drawn.” Reporters had to have a 
special visa to travel abroad and provide a written promise to pay any charges incurred, 
while the possibility of being removed from war correspondent duty to serve in the 
forces still remained.270 Following official accreditation, correspondents became subject 
to the rules spelled out in the Regulations handbook, an updated version of which was 
published for each year of the war, although the basic censorship rules did not waver 
throughout the course of the conflict. While the reality of the battlefield might have 
offered more freedom, especially in the Desert War where the front was so fluid, the 
journalists were always at the mercy of the military. The 1944 version of the Regulations 
states: “War correspondents must at once carry out any instructions issued to them by 
any personnel of the Allied Forces acting in the execution of their duty.” Reporters could 
not leave the force to which they were assigned without permission of the senior public 
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relations officer. A conducting officer” accompanied them during their travels in the 
field and they were required to keep a correspondent license or a pass on hand at all 
times or face arrest. The rules also stated that while they were “free to converse with the 
forces whenever they wish”, it was not necessarily an open invitation for discussion with 
soldiers, as this interaction was “subject to the approval of the officer in charge of the 
forces in question.” Enforcement of these rules was made easier by the fact that 
correspondents were themselves considered members of the armed forces, wearing 
uniforms and holding honorary officer rank, although they were banned from carrying 
weapons.271 Part of the enforcement system was the looming threat of lost accreditation, 
arrest and expulsion from the war theatre. As stated in the Regulations: 
 
Correspondent may be suspended by the Supreme Commander because 
of distortion or other violations of the approved messages, pictures, 
captions, commentaries, etc…. The Supreme Commander may, 
however, detain a correspondent within the area in which censorship is 
exercised, for such period as he deems fit, and may prescribe the route 
by which he shall proceed out of the area…. Should a War 
Correspondent appear to have committed a serious offence which 
prima facie renders him liable to be disaccredited, his facilities will at 
once be suspended pending the outcome of an official inquiry.272 
 
The military offered correspondents the option of filing a formal complaint under 
these rules and some reporters necessarily availed themselves of this clause. General 
Montgomery, for example, expelled the BBC’s Chester Wilmot from the French war 
theatre in 1944 for broadcasting a speech he wanted unpublicised; “Monty” invited him 
back upon learning his order for a news blackout had not been conveyed to Wilmot. 
General Omar Bradley claimed the BBC had cost America lives by prematurely 
announcing the Falaise Gap’s closure in August 1944, although it was later deemed a 
censorship error.273 Earlier, General Alexander tried in December 1943 to cancel Frank 
Gillard’s accreditation, wrongly accusing the BBC reporter of using a secret transmitter 
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to circumvent army headquarters in Italy, which led to an investigation involving 
Minister of Information Bracken and BBC Editor-in-Chief William Haley.274 Gillard 
maintained Alexander was a “good friend” who confronted him with the transmitter 
accusation after the pair had dinner in a mess hall, saying to the correspondent, “[W]e’re 
very concerned about you... we think you are beating the gun in some way…. You have 
got a secret transmitter, that’s what you’ve got…. You’ve got a secret transmitter and 
you are getting stuff over.” Gillard protested but Alexander continued, “How is it that I 
learn what’s happening on my army fronts from you on the BBC before I get it from my 
own channels?” Gillard retorted, “The reason for that is that your own channels are not 
very efficient!” Years later he explained that the whole episode was the result of a mere 
“trick” of timing the censorship: 
 
Actually what I was doing was quite simple. I discovered that there 
was a forward censorship unit right up with the armies. I did my day’s 
exploration with the army, so I came back at 4 o’clock in the afternoon 
to that little unit, because I knew that at 4 o’clock they got their 
directions from the Head of Intelligence in the army as to what was 
going to be passed that day. I simply said to these people at 4 o’clock 
in the afternoon, “What are you passing?” They said, “You can have 
this... you can have that, you can have the other thing….” I wrote it 
down as they said it and I handed it to them for transmission. So 
information was that immediate you see, and it got to London in a 
matter of an hour or so, not in the voice but by cable, and of course the 
BBC was getting well ahead of everybody else. The other 
correspondents never discovered the trick.275 
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Gillard was detained another time simply for displeasing the military powers with 
the range, rather than the specific content, of his reporting. Staying in a hotel room in 
Tunis as the battles in North Africa came to a close, Gillard recalled an officer coming to 
his room and saying he was under arrest and had a first-class air ticket to Algiers where 
General Eisenhower was going to charge him. Arriving in Algeria he learned “the charge 
was that in my reporting I had given excessive favour to the 8th Army at the expense of 
the 1st Army.” Gillard protested that the charge was ridiculous, telling the military men, 
“I am accredited to the 8th Army, I simply report what the 8th Army has done, 
information has gone back to London, and it’s been used on its merits. I have no choice 
in what was put on the air and what wasn’t.” He added that if they had problems with the 
coverage they should “get onto the BBC’s editors in London about that. It’s not my 
fault.” After some arguing among the Allied officers, Gillard said he received an official 
“reprimand” and was put on another first-class flight back to Tunis.276 
Still, reporters sometimes genuinely broke the censorship rules and suffered the 
consequences. Seaghan Maynes of Reuters, for example, received help from Ernest 
Hemingway and the writer’s friends in the anti-Nazi Maquis underground to enter Paris 
before Allied troops did so in late August 1944. Using a Maquis transmitter, Maynes 
then sent a dispatch to Reuters in violation of censorship rules. Maynes was stripped of 
his accreditation for a time, although during his suspension he filed a report following a 
flight in a Canadian forces aircraft over Nijmegen, Holland, during Operation Market 
Garden in September 1944. The broadcast, blatantly ignoring his suspension, escaped 
the attention of the Allied authorities.277 
The military, of course, had important reasons for employing these weighty 
censorship measures and regulations on the correspondents in the Second World War, as 
it had in previous conflicts. Censorship was not only the military’s attempt to control the 
factual content of the message, but was also part of an inherent mistrust of journalists to 
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frame the context and meaning of the message as bureaucrats and military officials 
wished; while conditions may have changed, these attitudes had endured since the 
Crimea. As journalist Jack Shafer wrote in 2003 regarding more modern conflicts, but 
which rings true for the Second World War, “Why should we expect it to be any other 
way? No government has ever endorsed the notion that the press should have unfettered 
access to the battlefield.”278 This echoes Canadian academic Wilfrid Eggleston, who 
wrote in 1941, “The essence of successful warfare is secrecy… the ideal state of affairs 
from the narrow viewpoint of military operations is a complete black-out on all 
information regarding such matters as the strength of military forces, the disposition of 
units, the nature of defences, the stocks of war supplies, the rate of production of war 
weapons, and so on.” Yet Eggleston admitted this ideal of an information lock box 
creates a Catch-22 in a non-totalitarian state: “Complete acceptance of the military 
philosophy of censorship would raise grave problems in a democracy, which relies so 
largely on an informed public, and on voluntary effort.”279 
News was at times stopped for tactical and strategic concerns, a good example 
being the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in Italy in March 1944 while Allied troops 
operated there. Godfrey Talbot explained the situation: “Vesuvius was an amazing story, 
but one we could not tell fully, at the time – our friends the military security censors saw 
to that: the enemy had not to know that Allied aircraft and some of our vital supply roads 
were suffering from extraordinary violence of nature.”280 This was clearly a unique 
situation, yet it shows how considerable the use of military censorship power could be; 
even a natural cataclysm as loud and obvious as a volcanic eruption could not be allowed 
to offer any indication as to the circumstances of the Allied forces. In this way, the 
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frequent result of field censorship was to degrade the quality of the basic aim of war 
reporting: to let people on the home front know the course that the war was taking 
including both victories and setbacks and, more specifically and important to the public, 
the condition and experiences of the troops – their fathers, husbands, sons and brothers; 
for example, whether soldiers were buried under a lava flow. As a result, while 
understanding its necessity, many correspondents never fully embraced censorship. As 
with the experience of Gibbs in the First World War, the heavy restrictions in the early 
days of the Second World War could be infuriating; while the process of censorship was 
a stringent, machine-like operation, the machine at times had a few loose screws. 
Reporters were at the mercy of censors who put their stories through rigid and 
sometimes nonsensical vetting. While on a temporary detachment with the French army 
during the Phoney War, Dimbleby travelled to Strasbourg and made a recording while 
standing at one side of the Kehl Bridge over the Rhine as a German soldier stood on the 
other side of the crossing watching him. When Dimbleby returned to the safety of the 
French bunker one of the officers informed him he could not divulge their location. The 
correspondent explained he would only say the report was from France. Still, he was 
rebuffed. “But everyone knows we are in France,” he said, “and everyone knows that the 
French Army is in France.” Refused again, Dimbleby shouted, “What shall I say then, 
that we’re on the front line in the middle of Switzerland!”281 Later in the war, Gillard 
highlighted his report on the Dieppe raid as an example of heavy censorship suppressing 
the truth and distorting the story because he was not allowed to give a full account of the 
enormous losses of men and equipment suffered by British and Canadian forces: “I read 
in BBC literature about my ‘memorable report’ from Dieppe. To me it’s memorable in 
all the wrong ways. It’s memorable with shame and disgrace that I was there as the 
BBC’s one and only eyewitness and I couldn’t tell that story as I ought to have told 
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it.”282 Tom Hickman notes, “What was necessary censorship, what was bloody-
mindedness and what was crass stupidity was always a matter of viewpoint.”283 
Sometimes censors delayed the publication or broadcast of stories, not because 
they revealed too much, but simply because the process did not keep up with the news 
cycle. During the Desert War, for example, transmission of stories to London hit a dual 
roadblock due to the policy of censoring them twice, once at the front by the British 8th 
Army and then again at the censorship office in Cairo, where messages going into the 
battle zone, as well as out of it, were examined. Unfortunately for the reporters rushing 
to get their news out, the Cairo office was closed each day from 1 pm to 4 pm and from 
2 am to 8 am. Beyond the office closures and two-tiered censorship system, any queries 
over their communiqués presented further delay for reporters and their editors back 
home because, as Donald Read explains, “If there was any doubt, messages were 
referred to one of seven different authorities.”284 Irritation with the sluggishness of the 
censorship apparatus was a constant for reporters. Alan Moorehead wrote of he and his 
fellow correspondents in Egypt trying to find the comedy in the situation: 
 
Censors were established in the three services in offices so far apart 
that a correspondent had to travel a full fifteen miles in order to visit 
them all and obtain their stamps on his messages. We thought of 
organising a censorship Derby in which each correspondent would 
mount a horse-drawn gharry outside Shepheard’s Hotel, and set off to 
get a message stamped by all three censors. Since the censors were 
frequently at golf or in their clubs or at parties, it was reckoned that 
four hours would have been fast time for the course which was to have 
ended at the cable office.285 
 
Later in the war, Robert Cooper of The Times sent a message to his editor on 21 
June 1944 complaining that he spent day and night looking for material but “the [field] 
censorship is miles away from house where I’ve dug in”; it once took him five-and-a-
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half hours to get a long message to London via the Signals Corps. By 29 June, he said 
his material still suffered continued censorship delays due to the military being ham-
fisted. His telegram read: 
 
If any of these dispatches are appearing in the times it is in spite of 
public relations service that must be one most inept tone operated in 
any theatre war stop Correspondents are called for many miles from 
their sectors to wait hours for conferences that never take place and are 
regimented with an officialness that comes straight out of 
pantomime.286 
 
Live broadcasts by radio reporters were almost universally forbidden, although 
there were a few exceptions made under strict conditions. Peter Stursberg of the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation wrote about his one live broadcast from Rome, 
along with other radio correspondents, and how it was made under rigorous censorship 
conditions. He noted how there was “An atmosphere of excitement and frenzied 
expectation” among everyone, military and correspondents alike, regarding the situation 
in Rome upon its liberation, but that there was still a very bureaucratic bearing about 
how it would be reported. Stursberg wrote: “We had to wait for the official communiqué 
announcing the Allied entry into Rome before going on the air. Then, with our copy 
checked and approved by the censors, who had been brought up to the front, we lined up 
in the order of the draw to go on the air. I was last and I described in part what I had 
seen.” After his dispatch about fighting on the outskirts of the Italian capital, with 
mentions of “the clash of artillery and the sharp clatter of machine gun fire”, he said that 
his was the first live war broadcast for the Canadian radio outlet: “I felt that I was talking 
into a barrel, but I heard later that I was one of the few who got through without too 
much disruptive static.”287 Delaying a live broadcast while the military prepared its 
official announcement and moved censors up from the rear to approve correspondents’ 
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“spot news” reporting was an obvious example of how censorship could slow the release 
of news, especially when it came to radio broadcasting. 
The BBC encountered a unique set of problems that differed from those of the 
print press. Jonathan Dimbleby writes: 
 
Traditionally the Army was suspicious of journalists; it viewed 
broadcasting with consternation – the reporter, with his microphone 
ready to record stray words, was a menace. The restrictions of all war 
correspondents were severe. No reporter could leave Arras without a 
‘conducting officer’; nor could he use a telephone; nor could he report 
without being censored by a blue-pencil mind which instinctively 
regarded all information as secret, and journalists as irresponsible 
muck-rakers. For the BBC it was worse: less understood, it was more 
distrusted.288 
 
Gillard observed that in addition to the various technical challenges of radio 
reporting, such as trying to make an audio recording in a desert sandstorm, the 
difficulties in getting recording disks back to London were compounded by the multi-
layered system of both field censorship and censorship in London. He recalled that after 
cutting a disk he delivered it to army public relations staff, who were then charged with 
delivering it to Cairo for censorship: 
 
In Cairo it had to go through four censors. It had to go through the 
army censor, the naval censor, the air force censor, and the Egyptian 
government censor, who was a civilian. If any one of those censors 
didn’t like something he just took out his pocket knife and scoured out 
on the disk that part of it. And, of course, he scoured out everything 
that led into it and a good deal that followed from it. But the disk, 
finally mutilated as it was, was then transmitted by beam radio to the 
BBC in London, re-recorded in London and used on the air.289 
 
BBC News Controller A.P. Ryan sent a long memorandum to his correspondents 
in the War Reporting Unit a month before D-Day, which contained various pieces of 
information and advice, including a warning about censorship: “You will meet practical 
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difficulties in the field. Censorship, when it is on your plate and off ours, will sometimes 
seem to you slow or unreasonable, or both. There will be arguments about the issue of 
information, about conducting Officers, about transport, maybe of favouritism…. The 
soldiers with whom you work will make mistakes and get het up, the same as you 
will.”290 He was right on every count. Ill-timed or flawed reports that went out over the 
radio were usually not the fault of the correspondents, and even landed some of them in 
hot water with soldiers. 
The control over the message conveyed to the public that the military strove to 
achieve through its censorship of the media, which periodically resulted in misleading 
representations of the troops’ circumstances, had been going on throughout the war. 
Dimbleby, for instance, had endured accusations of unrealistic sanguinity and inflated 
British patriotism by the very people he covered in North Africa. Newspapers would 
often take six weeks to get back to the frontline and therefore could be put into better 
perspective by army personnel, while BBC reports were usually heard just twenty-four 
hours later. It angered soldiers when he recorded a positive story on their progress and 
then the situation changed by the time it was broadcast due to censorship delays, as well 
as transmission limitations. Frank Gillard explained that Dimbleby suffered from a 
strange combination of the delaying process of censorship, as all other correspondents 
did, but also the relative immediacy of radio compared with print news. After filing a 
report, Gillard noted, “if in those intervening twenty-four hours things had gone badly, 
with fortunes perhaps reversed, there was little understanding on the spot for the 
unhappy BBC reporter. With some in the Army [Dimbleby] became discredited, and 
sometimes confused and dispirited fighting men tended to find an outlet for their own 
understandable dejection in voicing harsh judgments against him.”291 This was yet 
another example of the process affecting the product, although it had different impacts 
upon the different mediums; with print, censorship could cause delays that were 
considerably long and cause the news to become old and stale, while with radio it could 
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cause much shorter delays which, however, were just long enough to make the reporting 
seem inaccurate. 
Sometimes reporters encountered problems of misrepresentation of the situations 
upon which they were reporting due to censorship. During the Phoney War, The Times 
correspondent Robert Cooper complained to his editors in letters and memoranda “about 
the whims and stupidities of the military censors, preventing him from pointing out 
weaknesses [in the war strategy] that he saw.” This included what Cooper called the 
Maginot folly, which he was able to write about only after the fall of France. Cooper 
wrote: “Probably the greatest blunder of all was the absurd belief fostered in the public 
mind that the Maginot Line extended from the Channel to the Mediterranean, and here a 
rigid censorship was to blame.”292 In a 25 August 1941 diary entry, Alaric Jacobs of 
Reuters recorded that troops with whom he was inside the siege of Tobruk were tired of 
reading in the papers they occasionally received about “what wonderful fellows they are 
and they live only for the day when the big push comes from the frontier and they get the 
order to break through.” Jacob, who was barred by censors from calling the position 
anything as negative as a “siege”, also said the British and Australian troops in Tobruk 
“don’t like newspaper stories written in Cairo describing the romance of their lives and 
the comfort with which they manage to surround themselves, because their lives are 
unbelievably hard and monotonous and, save for an occasional swim in the sea, they 
know no comforts whatever.” Despite the fact he did not intend to romanticize the 
situation (or perhaps because he did not) the division commander, Australian General 
Leslie James Morshead, told Jacob he wanted to personally inspect all the copy the 
reporter wrote. One of the general’s aides warned Jacob, “He’ll censor every bloody 
word himself, and correct the grammar too.”293 
When the Allies launched the D-Day invasion, correspondents found censorship 
conditions that had been tightened even further since the start of the war. Philip Howard 
of The Times, writing in 2004, explained that in Normandy, “Communications were 
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difficult, slow and subject to strict censorship. The military controlled the medium as 
well as the message…. Censors were provided on the assault craft and even on the 
beaches.”294 Doon Campbell said this was not a surprise, as Monty had already informed 
correspondents of this during a briefing prior to the invasion at a school in 
Hammersmith, London: “He warned that for the first few days censorship would be very 
strict and said, ‘Confine yourselves to what you see going on, describing what the 
soldiers are doing, and do not attempt to tell how the battle as a whole is going or what is 
likely to happen.’”295 This rigid censorship affected the reports dispatched to both sides 
of the Allied Atlantic. Stephen Ambrose explained in his 1994 book, D-Day, that 
American correspondents were confused and their commentary unhelpful to the public at 
the time of the invasion: “Their attempts at military analysis ranged from misleading to 
silly.” Yet the public wanted to hear something about the offensive, so the 
correspondents “chattered away, with little to say except that it was on” because 
dissemination of the most sought-after details was forbidden. Ambrose writes: “SHAEF 
refused to give out the information the American people most longed to hear – what 
divisions, regiments, squadrons, ships were involved…. The reason for this strict 
censorship was to keep the Fortitude operation alive; the price in the United States was 
heightened anxiety.”296 
In rare cases, however, censorship could be advantageous to a correspondent. 
Ernest Hemingway, ever the novelist, used D-Day censorship seemingly as a way to 
dramatize events and make his reporting more compelling, according to Leo Mellor, 
who analysed Hemingway’s report for Collier’s magazine about accompanying troops in 
landing crafts. Mellor says of Hemingway:  
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The fragments of dialogue within the landing craft he includes are not 
explained and the piece closes with an invocation of what the 
correspondent has left out: ‘[t]here is much what I have not written.’ 
That authenticity is the province of the reporter who is there but does 
not tell all amounts to the incorporation of censorship until it becomes 
a stylistic effect.297 
 
Noting that Hemingway hoped the details of a certain fighter aircraft remained 
secret, Mellor called him “the correspondent as – ironically – the non-divulger.”298 It is 
possible that other correspondents used censorship in this way, that is to say a manner by 
which to dramatize events through omission; no reporter would ever say something akin 
to, “the rest of the battle details have been censored.” Yet in knowing something was 
being cut, it created an opportunity to rewrite the dispatch in such a way that some things 
were not fully explained, leaving the news consumer to wonder if there was more that 
had occurred rather than complain about the quality of the journalism. 
Correspondents who were more interested in simply getting the news out found 
the trend of heavy censorship an impediment, but some developed innovative methods to 
cope well within the system. The BBC’s Denis Johnston found a way to get ahead of 
both the censorship and his print competitors in North Africa; Nicholas explains that he 
“would send back to London marked ‘Hold till required’ seemingly innocuous 
descriptions of desert locations that intelligence suggested would be the scene of the next 
military action; when the battle commenced press correspondents on the ground found 
their reports held up by the military censorship while BBC news ran Johnston’s 
eyewitness description of the battlefield.”299 Doon Campbell, like Gillard of the BBC as 
mentioned previously, employed his own trick of timing the censors, enabling him to 
quickly break news from the briefings of which General Montgomery was so fond. 
Campbell wrote “snaps” of just a few lines giving the most important items from 
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Monty’s press conferences. Those quickly passed through the censors and gave his 
editors at the wire service an advantage over the competition; later he sent his full story 
as well as a summary paragraph that could be run in the newspapers.300 
Even with these subtle techniques in place, the censorship was still a daily 
impediment to the flow of news back to those engaged in the People’s War in Britain. 
Donald Read states that one of the greatest causes of this was how the men who redacted 
the words of the correspondents seemingly could work against the media with impunity; 
Read notes, “The censor enjoyed power without responsibility.” Head censor Admiral 
Thomson sent out frequent Defence Notices, although he often left these instructions 
frustratingly ambiguous. Yet, arguing in favour of the censors, Thomson warned, “the 
fact that matter is passed for publication by the censorship does not mean that it is 
guaranteed as accurate or that its publication is desired.”301 Thomson’s scepticism is 
understandable, as it was inherent to his position. Also, Thomson’s point about accuracy 
might have been true in certain cases, Dunkirk being the most obvious. Anderson writes 
that in covering the so-called miraculous evacuation, “The newspapers were not 
interested in the reality.”302 The military and government, then, must have been pleased 
to find a substantial degree of cooperation from the correspondents and their employers 
in the form of self-censorship. 
 
Self-Censorship 
In Tom Stoppard’s aforementioned play, the journalist character is told by a 
businessman that his coverage of the war is going to make the dictatorial president of the 
African country think the reporter’s newspaper is against him. The reporter responds, 
“We’re not here to be on somebody’s side, Geoffrey. That was World War II.”303 While 
fiction, the statement indicates the wide understanding that in the Second World War 
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journalism was biased in favour of the nations from which the correspondents hailed. 
That is not to say they purposely reported untruths, simply that they were partisan. This 
often manifested itself in self-censorship, which was due to both practical concerns and 
patriotism, the latter of which was the greater danger to objectivity. 
As with official censorship, self-censorship was not born in the Second World 
War. The practice has existed throughout modern war reporting. During the Crimean 
War, the British Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, suggested that war 
correspondents should “put it to their patriotism and honour whether they would 
endanger the success of the army by premature and improper publication of its number, 
conditions etc.”304 Thus, the gauntlet was thrown down before correspondents and 
remained there through conflicts that followed. Kevin Fewster, who edited the published 
version of First World War correspondent C.E.W. Bean’s Gallipoli diary, explained that 
the Sydney Morning Herald staffer, who became the official correspondent for the 
Australian Imperial Force in 1915, believed reporters should be fully briefed on any 
military action but he “did not agree with those who contended that it was the 
journalist’s place to question authority or criticise strategy. Bean firmly maintained that 
his rightful role was to report, not criticise. Nor did he see it as his place to sensationalise 
his copy or ‘scoop’ his fellow correspondents on any story.” Bean himself wrote in 1917 
that a correspondent “has to take very great care not to write matter which may be 
valuable to the enemy even though the censor might not realize it.” This was self-
censorship of the patriotic sort that would be seen again in the Second World War.305 
Reuters participated in a type of group self-censorship when the company’s 
management decided even before the war began that full cooperation with the 
government was paramount to itself and the country. As Reuters chairman and managing 
director Sir Roderick Jones told his editorial staff in July 1939: 
 
Reuter must never lose sight of the national interest. Reuter is 
authoritative, more so than any other British press organ, even 
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including The Times, and Reuter is so regarded abroad. This places 
Reuter under the obligation to observe great prudence in handling news 
which may possibly involve the national interest, and to act in close 
collaboration and accord with Whitehall in this connection…. On a 
lower plane, Whitehall is a most important source of news to Reuter, 
and any failure on Reuters’ part to conform to the principle and 
practice of close collaboration with Whitehall would ipso facto close 
that source of news to us.306 
 
Donald Read explains that Jones believed this policy was “perfectly compatible” 
with an independent news organisation because Whitehall was essentially being used as 
another source rather than an overseer of Reuters output. Jones stated, “It is not 
submission to dictation, but consultation of expert advice.” Read, however, argues that 
this collaboration permeated the Reuters editorial philosophy to the point where at times 
it did not require government instructions before censoring news in a manner that would 
have met with official approval: “Support for the national interest could involve 
suppression of news, even without reference to Whitehall.” In one case, in the first days 
of September 1939, Reuters suppressed a report from its own Denmark correspondent 
that the RAF had dropped flyers there that had been intended for Germany, which might 
have brought into question the accuracy of any future bombing campaign.307 
In the Second World War there does not seem to have been much need to 
reconcile the roles of patriot and journalist; the nations of the world had faced off on two 
opposing sides with the fate of both the correspondents and their countrymen hanging in 
the balance. Most reporters made very little attempt to set themselves apart as mere 
objective observers, but rather proudly spoke of the troops as their “own”; in their 
writing and broadcasting it was clear they felt part of the effort, especially in the use of 
the words “we” and “our” when referring to the forces. This journalistic formula of 
kinship with the forces went as far back as the Crimea, when William Howard Russell 
made statements such as “Heavy firing was going on at the time, and a serious affair on 
our right….” and “On the 22nd a furious fight raged along our front.”308 [My emphasis.] 
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Obvious examples in the Second World War came from each of the three news outlets: 
newspaper, news agency, and radio. An unnamed correspondent for The Times, writing 
about Dunkirk on 26 June 1940, referred to “our lines” and “our defensive positions.”309 
Recalling the fall of Fort Rudero in Libya on 27 January 1941, Alan Moorehead of the 
Daily Express wrote, “I could still see odd groups of Italians on the run, but suddenly 
our artillery got onto them and they disappeared in clouds of blown dust and rock. Three 
of us – the photographer and two war correspondents – were asked to escort the three 
senior Italian officers back to our own lines.” Describing the aftermath of one day during 
the Battle of Cape Matapan off the coast of Greece, which lasted from 27 to 29 March 
1941, Moorehead stated, “In all we had destroyed some twenty enemy aircraft.”310 Jack 
Smyth of Reuters reported on 21 September 1944 from the difficult and prolonged 
British assault on the Arnhem bridge: “On this fifth day our force is still being heavily 
mortared, sniped, machine-gunned, and shelled by self-propelled guns…. The medium 
guns of the Second Army have just come into communication, and have begun shelling 
enemy targets that we have signalled.”311 In the same way, the BBC’s Dimbleby narrated 
live as he flew over the Normandy beachhead after D-Day: “The roads are full of our 
transport, all our chaps driving on the right-hand side in the continental style.”312 The 
military, at least publicly, also regarded journalists as part of the war effort: in the 
introduction to a collection of BBC wartime dispatches released the year after hostilities 
                                                 
309  “Brigade that Saved B.E.F.: Heroic Action at Calais, Four Days’ Defiance”, The 
Times (London), 26 June 1940, p. 7. 
310  Moorehead, African Trilogy, pp. 48, 94. 
311  Read, p. 226. 
312  William Grierson, Mark Jones, and Humphrey Walwyn (prods.), D-Day 
Dispatches: Original Recordings from the BBC Sound Archives June 1944, BBC Radio 
Collection, BBC Audiobooks Ltd., 2004; see also Hickman, p. 180. In 2007, after 
hearing of the Dimbleby quote from the plane over Normandy, Allan Little, a BBC 
foreign correspondent, explained that a BBC reporter can no longer say “our troops” or 
“our transport” and he related an anecdote about one modern correspondent who used 
the phrase “our tanks” in a broadcast and an editor sarcastically chided him by saying, 
“The BBC does not own any tanks.” Allan Little, personal conversation with Brian 
Hannon, 10 November 2007. 
157 
ended, Field Marshal Montgomery wrote that “these correspondents made no mean 
contribution to final victory.”313 
Stursberg of the CBC, discussing the taking of Rome by the Allies, notes how a 
broadcast made under stringent conditions, while also reporting such a joyous event, 
could come across as propaganda: “It was a triumphal occasion, this entry into Rome, 
and a war correspondent could be excused for sounding like a booster.”314 Yet in his 
1993 memoir, Stursberg explains how he came to understand that regardless of whether 
the report seemed affected in some way by excitement and patriotism, it was also fuelled 
by the understanding that to a large degree there was no escaping government control of 
the message through the official censorship: 
 
The passage of time has brought the war into focus. As reporters, we 
tended to look at it through rose-coloured glasses, owing, in part, to the 
prevalent patriotic fervour, and, in part, to censorship, which allowed 
no criticism of the war effort. This was total war, and there was total 
censorship. There was no way of evading it – one could leave the 
fighting for the rear, for London, or even for Canada, and the same 
censorship would apply. If one somehow evaded it, or broke an 
embargo, the penalties were severe: dis-accreditation, disgrace, and 
even imprisonment.315 
 
In a review of a Smithsonian Institution exhibition on war correspondents in 1995, 
David Culbert notes that, “reporting, controlled by self-censorship and official 
censorship, functions as a form of propaganda.”316 At times reporters themselves could 
fall prey to the propaganda they helped disseminate, most likely because they wished it 
to be true. Charles Lynch of Reuters wrote, “It was propaganda – everything done by all 
of us was propaganda, though we might not have admitted it or realized it at the time.” 
He recounted visiting a military cemetery years after the war where a headstone read, 
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“Well done, son”. He recognized the part his journalism played in that message to the 
dead: “I reflected that one of the reasons people had felt that way was that we who 
reported on the war had glorified it and made ourselves part of the propaganda apparatus 
required for the waging of total war.”317 Similarly, Alan Moorehead explained that one 
of his first in-depth conversations with a man who would become a close friend, Daily 
Mail correspondent Alexander Clifford, occurred when they were both stationed in 
Greece in April 1940. Moorehead, a junior member of the Daily Express foreign staff, 
said he listened in shock as the veteran reporter, Clifford, dabbled in “subversive talk” 
about how the Nazis at that time had a better army. Moorehead wrote: 
 
[I] answered him with the stock wartime propaganda, which seemed so 
definite and irrefutable in the spring of 1940: the Allies had the oil, the 
money and the manpower. I myself, I said, had just arrived from Italy, 
and even if Italy came in on the German side then it would make no 
difference, for the fascists were half-hearted, venal and frightened. In 
Germany the enemy were already short of food.318 
 
Clifford assured him that was not the case. For his part, Clifford described the 
prominence of his younger colleague’s sentiments among the general populace, recalling 
that upon his arrival in Egypt in the early summer of 1940 the propagandistic belief in 
British superiority and German shortfalls was widespread: 
 
It was still, you must remember, the era of blind confidence. In view of 
what was happening in France it had to be blind; otherwise it couldn’t 
have remained confidence. But the tragedy of France was too big, too 
new, too remote to be digested immediately. It could not at one fell 
swoop efface that long propaganda era when all German tanks were 
made of cardboard, when the German people had been half-starving for 
six years and their clothes were made of ersatz fabrics which melted in 
the rain, when Hitler was an incompetent nincompoop who had no 
following in Germany. The Middle East in June 1940 shared the same 
absurd, illogical inability to recognize probable defeat which carried 
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Britain through that perilous summer and the terrible winter which 
followed.319 
 
Moorehead’s willingness to believe the popular propaganda during what Clifford 
terms “the era of blind confidence” may have tainted his objectivity to a degree, 
although the fact he went on to become one of the war’s most respected print reporters 
suggests he was no more a propagandist than any other correspondent. He was certainly 
not the only war correspondent who took this patriotic view, especially as it was 
practically mandated by those above them. As Trevor Royle explains, “Shortly before 
the ‘Torch’ landings in Tunisia in November 1942 General Eisenhower, in his first 
address to the press, went so far as to tell Allied war correspondents [both British and 
American], that he regarded them as military personnel and would treat them as such.”320 
In this way, Eisenhower appealed to their patriotism and sense of duty in asking for self-
censorship: 
 
I regard war correspondents as quasi staff officers, and I want to 
emphasize that, in my opinion, each newsman has a greater 
responsibility than that of a competitive newsman. I am not prepared to 
treat you as if you were my enemies or a bunch of commercial 
gentlemen. If I thought you were, I tell you here and now I would do 
nothing for you. It is for that reason I do not worry if I see you in the 
corridors of my headquarters, or passing my window or anywhere else. 
I trust you. As staff officers your first duty is a military duty, and the 
one fact which you must always bear in mind is to disclose nothing 
which would help the enemy.321 
 
Royle notes that many correspondents were content to go along with military and 
government controls over their coverage due to patriotic convictions and for security 
reasons. Those who did not quickly learned that it was a tactical error: 
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Eisenhower clinched the issue by adding that he regarded a mass of 
copy covered with [a censor’s] blue pencil marks as failure. Stay on 
our side, tell our story, he seemed to be saying, and we’ll treat you 
well. Give your own version, and you’re out on your own. Most of the 
92 allied journalists in North Africa favoured the former approach, and 
those who attempted to file “bad news” stories – defeats or setbacks, 
criticism of commanders, descriptions of agonising deaths, for example 
– soon discovered a formidable array of military and civilian censors to 
cut their material.322 
 
Eisenhower reiterated his sentiments about news coverage in a foreword to the 
Regulations for War Correspondents: “With regard to publicity, the first essential in 
military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first 
essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and 
mine to try to reconcile these sometimes diverse considerations.”323 This sort of appeal 
to correspondents to adhere to strict lines of war coverage was not only incorporated in 
internal documents, but also in the public sphere. An April 1942 opinion piece in The 
Sunday Times by Maurice Hankey, 1st Baron Hankey and a former British War Cabinet 
minister, provided both practical and moral reasoning as to why journalists and 
politicians alike should engage in self-censorship. An army officer in the First World 
War, Lord Hankey repeated the military line that too much information in the public 
sphere could be helpful to their foes, noting that “politicians, unless exceptionally versed 
in the art of war, do not always appreciate that particular information may be of value to 
an enemy.” Extending the admonishment to journalists, he echoed Lord Panmure during 
the Crimean War when he warned that all criticism of the military command and the 
government “encourages the enemy to some extent.” Lord Hankey, like Lord Panmure 
and General Eisenhower, made an appeal to patriotism: 
 
The would-be critic, then, would do well continually to ask himself the 
following questions: Will what I want to say assist the enemy? Will it 
discourage my fellow countrymen, or weaken their confidence, and 
especially that of the Fighting Services in their leaders? Will it injure 
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national unity and the will to win? Is it constructive or destructive? 
Will it do more good than harm in present circumstances? For the sole 
object of those who guide public opinion must be to make such 
contribution as they can towards winning the war.324 
 
It cannot be overlooked that there were also examples of journalists who practiced 
self-censorship simply in order to get a story out quickly. The BBC’s Godfrey Talbot 
knew much of his written work could by marked off by a censor’s blue pencil, or in the 
case of a recording, a pen knife on a disc, so he took the initiative of censoring himself 
in order to save time: 
 
[I]f it was a spontaneous and unscripted description or interview, 
recorded on discs, we had to take a machine and play the discs back for 
the censor to hear. If I had said anything reckoned dangerous to 
security, mentioning a regiment or location on which there was as yet a 
‘stop’, the censor would have to deface the record and I would have to 
lose the dispatch or try to do the whole thing again. So ‘talking on to 
disc’ was an inhibiting business, and I had to be my own censor as 
much as I could.325 
 
Overall, the appeal to journalists to employ self-censorship was largely 
successful.326 The Dunkirk evacuation is one of the best examples of how journalists had 
already taken up Lord Hankey’s notion of contributing to victory by guiding public 
opinion in a “constructive” manner that essentially resulted in a form of group self-
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censorship, and acted as great ammunition for The People’s War, despite Churchill’s 
declaration that Dunkirk was “a colossal military disaster”. Nicholas notes: “However, 
on their own initiative the press and BBC largely ignored the panic at Dunkirk and 
disillusionment at Dover and instead created an instant myth, conveying some of the 
confusion of the real situation, but in general reporting the retreat in a florid and 
dramatic style.”327 The BBC was one of the worst offenders. 
BBC correspondent Bernard Stubbs broadcast from the docks at Dover on 31 May 
1940, describing the disembarkation of troops from the ships that had just brought them 
back from the Dunkirk beachhead. Stubbs was stark in his descriptions of dirty, haggard 
and wounded men, leaving no doubt they had been through a horrible ordeal, yet he still 
preferred to emphasise the indomitable spirit of the troops. And this was undoubtedly 
what the British people wanted to hear, that the United Kingdom was never truly 
defeated even in such a desperate hour. He broadcast: 
 
All of them were tired. Some of them were completely exhausted. But 
the most amazing thing was that practically every man was reasonably 
cheerful and most of them managed to smile. Even when a man was on 
the verge of collapse from sheer fatigue you could still see by his eyes 
that his spirit was irrepressible. And that is a thing that all the bombs in 
Germany will never crush.328 
 
This was the magic of the media during total war: the journalist could write or 
broadcast that men were on the verge of collapse, even show them wilting on the bow of 
a ship in a newsreel, but then mitigate the image in stating that “by his eyes” it was clear 
that each of those fighting men had irrepressible spirits that could never be crushed and, 
by extension, the surrender of the nation in the overall war never conceded. It was a 
manner of telling the British and Dominion publics that their combined armies had just 
been beaten badly, but the war was not lost. In addition to observational journalism, 
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Stubbs’s report for a news outlet considered otherwise objective was clearly tinged with 
a combination of self-censorship and propaganda. 
On the same day, the BBC broadcast its 9 p.m. newscast, which became an 
essential source of information for most Britons throughout the war. The unnamed 
newsreader (anonymity being the BBC policy for announcers in the early years of the 
war, except in the case of special commentaries) began, as always, “This is the news…” 
and continued with details of the circumstances in Dunkirk, including both situation 
reports and narratives: 
 
A large number of British and French troops have arrived safely from 
northern France; Allied forces are holding out round Dunkirk and on 
the line of the Yser [river]. The Royal Air Force have helped the 
withdrawal of the Allied army by attacking enemy columns and lines 
of communication; unfavourable weather conditions have brought 
about a marked decrease in enemy air activity.329 
 
With the understanding the BBC might not have had the full picture at that point, 
the self-censorship in this case is that at no point in the 9 p.m. broadcast is there any 
mention of the pounding that the Allied forces were taking, instead providing largely 
positive reporting that made it clear fighting was going on, and large numbers of men 
were returning home, but not how dire the situation truly might have been. On the 
contrary, it was made to seem as if the Allies were competing with each other to see who 
could do the better job in fighting back the Germans: 
 
The evacuation of British and French troops from the north of France 
goes on by day and by night. Although no specific figures can yet be 
given, it is known that the number of those who have already reached 
this country is large. The Allied troops in Flanders are now holding a 
covering line some miles from the coast. This line has become known 
as the “Corunna Line” in memory of the famous fighting retreat from 
Spain of Sir John Moore’s army in 1809. French and British troops are 
fighting side by side, and the sight of one another in action has 
produced a healthy rivalry between them.330 
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The broadcast continues with narratives describing British heroism: “About the 
vaunted invulnerability of the German heavy tanks, there is a well authenticated story 
that one British officer stopped such a machine with an ordinary anti-tank rifle, it cannot 
be disclosed what method he adopted, except that he ‘kept his head’, and that anyone 
else could do it in the same way.”331 The announcer adds: 
 
The Germans have claimed on more than one occasion that, in face of 
their pressure, the British Army was fleeing from them in disorder. 
This, of course, is a fantastic libel. The fact is that there is no military 
operation so difficult as a retreat, and that re-embarkation at the end of 
a retreat requires more skill, more courage and more discipline than 
anything else in war. When it is remembered that all this is being done 
– and done successfully [these three encouraging words added to the 
transcript in pencil by a BBC editor] – by our men, for the most part on 
open beaches, without any possibility of concealment, it is perfectly 
obvious that there could have been no disorder and certainly no 
question of the B.E.F. running away from its enemies.332 
 
The broadcast cites an officer returning to London who said that while the German 
bombardment was “terrific” and more intense than anything he experienced in the 
previous war, “the casualties were surprising low.”333 Further along, a redacted 
paragraph crossed out by pencil in the original transcript states: 
 
[One officer] was on one of the beaches when a man in the uniform of 
a British officer and speaking good English came up to him and said: 
“I’ve just got orders that you are to take all your men two miles further 
along.” The officer was just about to do so when he met a naval officer 
and said: “Surely it’s rather stupid to try and take us off down there, 
because the Channel is so much further out.” The naval officer replied 
that there was no intention of doing so. An hour afterwards the point 
and less further on was heavily bombed.334 
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This excised paragraph, speaking of what might have been a fatal error by an army 
unit, was a clear example of self-censorship by the BBC. The broadcast then wound up 
with the final line: “Here on the Flanders coast, however, the battle ground has been so 
narrowed that the soldier has been able to see constantly and continuously, with his own 
eyes, the magnificent work performed by the R.A.F., the Royal Navy and the Merchant 
Navy.”335 This largely positive report was broadcast with a focus on the so-called 
“Miracle of Dunkirk” despite the fact that any of the military personnel they interviewed 
would have been able to relate the true horror of the scenes on the French coastline, 
including the destruction of ships sent to retrieve the troops. This is not to say the 
evacuation was not brave and, in some ways, miraculous in the number of men rescued. 
And there is indeed evidence that in many ways the evacuation was conducted with 
military organisation; in an article for BBC History magazine, Laurence Rees writes: 
 
As the Germans attacked, several hundred thousand Allied troops on 
the beaches around Dunkirk still waited patiently to be rescued. “It was 
just queues,” says Edward Oates, one of the British soldiers who was 
trapped at Dunkirk, “queues of men… and people going out into the 
water. And, of course, the Germans kept coming over, planes, we had 
to keep dashing up to the dunes to stop being hit.”336 
 
Yet Hugh Sebag-Montefiore’s 2006 book about Dunkirk directly refutes the BBC 
9 p.m. broadcast’s claim of “fantastic libel” regarding “disorder” in the retreat with 
historically researched accounts of British troops who did indeed act disorderly. Sebag-
Montefiore writes: 
 
General Voruz, head of the French liaison section, described how, 
while he was waiting on the Quai Felix-Faure in the Dunkirk harbour 
area, a panic-stricken British captain rushed up and seized his car. The 
British officer would not leave the car until forced to do so. Even more 
alarming were the hundreds of British troops who stormed a ship set 
aside for French soldiers including Voruz and his men. According to 
Voruz, there was trouble even after the ship set sail. Her commander 
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was reduced to brandishing his revolver in an attempt to restore order. 
But this did not work for long since the British troops continued to 
insult the French. Worse still, when the British soldiers heard that the 
ship was to dock at Cherbourg before she went on to Dover, they were 
so upset that they went on the rampage, throwing any guns they could 
find into the sea, presumably hoping that if they arrived back in France 
unarmed, they would not be asked to carry on fighting.337 
 
Sebag-Montefiore adds that this sort of behaviour also included actual physical 
altercations between British and French troops: 
 
One Sherwood Forester later confessed that he and his mates were so 
incensed by two French soldiers who had jostled them that they told 
them, “It’s your country; you defend it!” and pushed them off the mole 
into the harbour. These soldiers were not alone; there are many similar 
tales of French troops trying to board boats, only to be thrown back 
into the sea.338 
 
Yet he also recounts how the rear guard bravely covered the retreat of the 
remaining force that was in danger of being overrun by Germans, thus proving that the 
British people did indeed have much to be proud of in spite of the stories of disreputable 
behaviour that the BBC seemed unwilling to report. Sebag-Montefiore writes: 
 
They [the Germans] would almost certainly have succeeded, had it not 
been for the BEF battalions who were ordered to stand in their path. 
Their job was to shield the safety zone or corridor behind them down 
which the rest of the Army was retreating to Dunkirk, and they were 
not to give way until they had fired their last bullet. They were to fight 
to the last man. Hardly any of these brave men made it back to the 
beaches or the Dunkirk ‘mole’. Most remained in the front line until it 
was too late to flee, and were either killed or captured at their posts. 
They are the forgotten heroes of Dunkirk.339 
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A BBC audio retrospective on the war produced in 2004 shows how the British 
people truly considered the BEF evacuation a “miracle”, while also painting a more 
realistic picture of the scene at Dunkirk than the Corporation included in its self-
censored news reports at the time. A woman who observed the convoy of boats leaving 
England to rescue the soldiers recalls the scene: 
 
Do you know, it was marvellous. The sea was like a millpond. It 
looked as if god was there and he was watching over us. And you 
know, there wasn’t a wave, as if there was god watching over us. And I 
believe it today that he was, that he was watching over us and we was 
going to win the war because of that.340 
 
Yet the narrator of the production follows with a less Biblical assessment: “When 
the German troops became aware of the evacuation, they attempted to respond. But their 
efforts were impeded by weather which grounded much of the Luftwaffe. German planes 
were only operational for two-and-a-half days of the nine-day evacuation.” Meaning the 
myth of the little armada of watercraft being the saviours of the BEF was not entirely 
true; for a time the weather played a benevolent part for the Allies, as was very briefly 
mentioned in that 9 p.m. news report. The narrator in 2004 continues: “But when the 
weather cleared, dive bombers attacked the helpless men waiting on the beaches. 
Discipline faltered; many soldiers went crazy with terror. Others mobbed the boats; 
causing them to capsize, drowning their wounded comrades.”341 Indeed, Sebag-
Montefiore relates how a Gunner Lieutenant Elliman and his men fared, including one 
crazed by fear: “Elliman had been spared, but some of his men were less fortunate: his 
medical orderly’s right cheek had been blown away. Two other men had been killed. 
The telephonist was so shocked by the injuries he saw that, as Elliman put it, he went 
‘wackers’ and was carried away laughing uncontrollably.” Sebag-Montefiore also tells 
of the captain of the destroyer HMS Keith, which was sunk and many of its crew and 
passengers lost, who upon reaching Dover, “had a nervous breakdown triggered, 
apparently, by other men on board insisting that they must report to the harbour’s 
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examination vessel. When he heard this, Berthon became abusive, shouting that he was 
Captain D (the officer in charge of his flotilla), and as such did not have to report to any 
‘bloody’ examination vessel, especially after what he had been through.”342 Clearly this 
runs counter to the 1940 BBC broadcast stating that “there could have been no disorder” 
and that each survivor showed “by his eyes” that there was no sense of defeat in them. 
The carnage on the French coast and on the ships being bombed and sunk described by 
the survivors was not reported in any sort of detail in 1940, perhaps due to simple 
propriety in avoiding such harrowing detail, but also undoubtedly as a way of 
maintaining public morale through a focus on the positive aspects of the story. 
And the press was no different. The Daily Mirror headline after the evacuation 
read, “Bloody Marvellous”.343 The Times ran a piece on 26 June 1940 titled, “Brigade 
That Saved B.E.F.: Heroic Action At Calais, Four Days’ Defiance”. As was its policy 
during the period, The Times did not print names of its reporters in a byline, only “From 
Our Special Correspondent”. Yet the story named the two British battalions – the Rifle 
Brigade, 60th Rifles, Queen Victoria’s Rifles, and a battalion of the Royal Tank 
Regiment – along with French troops, all together totalling approximately 4,000 men, 
who held off two German heavy armoured divisions while the rest of the BEF escaped 
across the Channel. The newspaper story quotes Winston Churchill telling the House of 
Commons on 4 June that these groups had “added another page to the glories of the light 
divisions.” It also relates how on 26 May “a flag of truce was passed through our lines to 
the Brigadier, and a demand for immediate surrender was refused.” On two occasions 
the Allied troops are referred to as a “gallant force” who fought on with little food, water 
or ammunition as they attempted to hold Calais, “not realizing that they were thereby 
saving the B.E.F.” in what was termed “a remarkable feat of arms.” It even tells the tale 
of an officer of the Rifles who found a dinghy and rowed alone across the Channel: “A 
feat of great skill and daring.” Another three officers escaped from the column of 
prisoners taken by the Germans and, along with seven French soldiers they encountered 
at a river, used a motorboat to link up with a British destroyer: “This escape showed 
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great courage, determination, endurance, and skill.”344 This was the story which the 
people wanted to hear, and this is the “miracle” that the media gave them. 
Ian McLaine discusses how Dunkirk became a great national legend used to 
repeatedly excite national spirit. Writing in 1979, he states: 
 
British civilian morale during the Second World War has subsequently 
assumed the quality of myth: ‘myth’ in the sense of a story which 
encapsulates for its believers all the qualities they see themselves as 
possessing in circumstances of extreme adversity. Since the war the 
myth has been continually nourished by the tendency of politicians and 
others to call for a revival of ‘the Dunkirk Spirit’ whenever Britain has 
faced a threat to her well-being.345 
 
Angus Calder writes in The People’s War: “Because Britain was fighting a regime 
which burnt books and suppressed the truth, journalists and other intellectuals in Britain 
consented to the suppression of the truth, and gladly took part in the fabrication of 
mendacious propaganda, arguing with themselves that the ends must justify such 
means.” This statement by Calder about “the prevalence of voluntary self-censorship”346 
could be used to explain the edict by the head of Reuters to tow the government line in 
the news agency’s reporting, and even more so in the eager self-censorship by reporters 
and editors who promoted the Dunkirk Miracle. 
While journalists at all the various news organisations may have been hindered by 
military censorship in the amount, content and timing of material sent out to the public, 
they did not have to fulfil Admiral Thomson’s warning that their censored material was 
not necessarily accurate, nor did it have to be pleasing to those in power. William Haley 
of Reuters and Kent Cooper of the Associated Press jointly relayed their attitude toward 
wartime censorship in 1942: “There is acceptance of the right of government to have us 
withhold news for the common good, but no acceptance of any right of government to 
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say how we shall word what we do transmit.”347 Whether or not intentionally, Phillip 
Knightley also refuted Thomson in his book, The First Casualty, when he summed up 
censorship’s overall effect on the accuracy of reports from the field: “The point about 
censorship is that while it can prevent a correspondent from sending a story the military 
does not want published, it cannot force him to send a false or exaggerated one.”348 So 
while there were various examples of self-censorship and even propaganda by Allied 
correspondents during the Second World War, they seem to have been motivated by 
professional and strategic concerns as well as patriotism, rather than any conscious 
attempt to subvert the truth. Knightley expounded on these factors in the practice of 
wartime journalism: 
 
There are basically two types of war as far as journalists are concerned 
– other people’s wars, and our wars. You can hope to get a reasonably 
accurate and objective report of other people’s wars (although idealism 
might interfere) but it’s naive to expect objectivity from journalists 
covering their own country’s war. They are pulled into line by their 
own patriotic instincts, pressure of public opinion and the military 
which puts them into uniform, censors them, and only grants access in 
return for propaganda. It was called accreditation. Now it’s called 
embedding. It hasn’t changed over the years.349 
 
 
Having addressed the structure of official censorship and motivations behind self-
censorship that helped shape or restrict to various degrees the final news product that 
reached the people at home, it is subsequently necessary to analyse the avenues through 
which that news was gathered and dispatched from the field: the techniques and tools of 




                                                 
347  Read, p. 216. 
348  Knightley, p. 77. 
349  Phillip Knightley, “Re: Richard Dimbleby questions”, personal email to Brian 




Correspondent Techniques and Tools 
 
The structural aspects of war correspondents’ work can be broken down into three 
key elements: the techniques for gathering the news stories, methods of transmitting 
these stories back to Britain and the Dominion nations for dissemination to the public, 
and the equipment used to achieve these functions. The techniques for obtaining the 
news can be placed in two general categories: embedding with the troops and/or 
travelling with other correspondents to the war zones to do first-hand, eyewitness 
reporting; and developing healthy working relationships with sources including military 
leaders and civil servants in order to get information such as troop movements, casualty 
statistics and updates on strategy and policy. This was also beneficial to the military 
sources in that it allowed them to shape the stories in a way that advanced their own 
aims, while also helping to buoy the morale of the soldiers in the field and the public. 
Once they had their stories, correspondents needed to transfer the reports from the 
Continent and North Africa. Telegrams were the method most often used by newspapers 
and Reuters, although there were also slower means including letters and, a holdover 
from the First World War, carrier pigeons. Many of these techniques were also 
employed by radio reporters who sent back written dispatches to be read by editors, 
although it was more complicated when they wanted to file their own recordings, 
requiring them to use military aircraft to ship recording discs and, later in the war, new 
recording technology and equipment designed for broadcast transmissions. There were 
various radio outlets using this broadcasting equipment and their correspondents became 
well known to listeners; the most famous of these was not a British or Dominion 
correspondent, but American Edward R. Murrow of CBS, however, Australia, Canada 
and of course Britain also employed this technology to great success. 
 
Eyewitness Reporting 
The most direct form of war reporting in the Second World War, and every other 
conflict since William Howard Russell reported from the Crimea, was fieldwork in the 
battle zones. As previously explained, correspondents needed to gain accreditation to 
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travel with military units and endure many of the same hardships and dangers as the 
soldiers, and the journalists themselves considered this paramount in order to give the 
public a proper feel for what their troops were enduring at the front. Without eyewitness 
reporting, the public in Britain and the Dominion nations would not have had any real 
sense or definitive news of the developments of the war. Correspondents travelled with 
military personnel directly into the most hazardous situations simply because that was 
the best way to convey not only the facts of the war, but also the images of the fighting; 
it could be said they painted a picture of battle, and often in extremely vivid colours. 
This was done to varying degrees of skill, but undoubtedly the readers and listeners were 
granted lucid, dramatic insight to the conflict, perhaps more so than any previous 
conflict. For example, Desmond Tighe’s report from a British destroyer off the French 
coast at Berniere-Sur-Mer at dawn on 6 June 1944 provided the sort of vivid description 
of the Normandy landings that enthralled the wartime public – as well as generations of 
historians, filmmakers and others since then – because Tighe was allowed to convey his 
personal experience, which was the same as the soldiers and sailors whom he stood 
beside: 
 
Guns are belching flame from more than 600 allied warships. 
Thousands of bombers are roaring overhead, fighters are weaving in 
and out of the clouds as the invasion of Western Europe begins. 
Rolling clouds of dense black and grey smoke cover the beaches south 
east to Le Havre as the full fury of the allied invasion force is 
unleashed on the German defence. It is the most incredible sight I have 
ever seen… The air is filled with the continuous thunder of broadsides 
and the crash of bombs. Great spurts of flame come up from the 
beaches in long snake like ripples as shells ranging from 16 inches to 4 
inches find their mark.350 
 
Radio reporters believed they needed to be close to the battle because they wanted 
“actuality” – the sounds of battle in their recorded reports. Peter Stursberg of the CBC 
noted that at Monte Cassino he learned of an upcoming attack that would include the 
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heaviest barrage of the war thus far and he knew that for the full magnitude to be 
conveyed to his listeners he needed actuality: “Obviously I had to get the sound of the 
opening round of gunfire… We had selected the place to make the recording very 
carefully because we wanted to be in the midst of the artillery, in front of the howitzers 
and just behind the twenty-five pounders.” Stursberg provided the audience with a type 
of auditory reference list for the battle noises that could be heard in his recording: “It’s 
an amazing and terrifying sight and yet thrilling. I don’t know how to describe it 
properly in words, and I think it’s easier for you to picture it by listening…. There are 
guns in front of us – they’re the ones that make the sharp cracks – and guns behind us – 
if you listen carefully you’ll hear the whoosh of their shells going over our heads – and 
guns to the side of us.”351 In another example, Stursberg recalled the battle of Coriano 
Ridge, where in September 1944 British and Canadian troops tried to dislodge German 
troops entrenched on an Italian hilltop. Stursberg said he and his crew had to get their 
recording equipment in place the night before as they had been informed that on 13 
September shelling by 700 guns would begin at 1 a.m. precisely. In Stursberg’s opinion, 
having that position so close to the scene was key to making the story memorable by 
enabling them to get “one of the best actualities of a battle.”352 In Normandy, the BBC’s 
Chester Wilmot made the first recording of the wailing sounds of incoming Nebelwerfer 
mortars as he sheltered in a nearby ditch, clearly risking his life to be in close to the 
battle and thereby obtaining a ground-breaking story: “The midget [portable recording 
device] recorded perfectly right through the bursting salvo, for the mortars landed a little 
further away; and so, for the first time, we had a recording of the German weapon which 
our troops most disliked.”353 
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This desire for actuality, which clearly made the broadcasts more vivid, was why 
radio reporters felt the need to be so close to the fighting. Yet did it make a difference to 
how they covered the combat compared to print correspondents? While the newspaper 
and press service reporters undoubtedly made a habit of being in the thick of the action, 
as proven by many of the vivid descriptions of battles that were printed, Charles Lynch, 
a Canadian correspondent for Reuters, put forward a “theory of the correspondents” 
arguing there was not as much of an urgent need for print reporters to be directly on the 
frontline: 
 
The theory of the correspondents was that being in the heat of an all-
out military action doesn’t help you to write about it, because the 
infantryman’s view of things is so narrow and because the chance of 
witnessing classic acts of heroism, the stuff of combat journalism, is so 
slight. It is better to do it afterwards by interviewing survivors and 
getting details like home towns and names, which is difficult to obtain 
when the action is hot.354 
 
Lynch seems to be in the minority of former war correspondents who was willing 
to come out and admit an aversion to the frontline so bluntly. This is borne out by the 
memoirs of journalists who complained about their colleagues, without naming anyone 
specifically, who preferred to report the war from army headquarters in the rear, where 
they took information and quotations from the officers in charge of strategy, movements, 
supply, and other elements of overseeing the forces. In many of these memoirs, those 
types of reporters were considered to be, not cowardly, but rather reluctant or even lazy. 
Correspondents would not have had brushes with danger, to be discussed further on in 
the dissertation, or been captured by the enemy such as Edward Ward, had they 
perpetually languished in the back. Eyewitness reporting indeed comprised the backbone 
of a war correspondent’s work. Yet while the journalism conducted at the headquarters 
in the rear was still considered to be the easier aspect of war reporting, it was still a vital 
part of the job. 
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Dealing with Authority 
Forming good relationships with the military officials at those headquarters was of 
paramount importance to reporters in their efforts to fully understand the bigger picture 
of the war as it progressed. What should be kept in mind is that this type of interaction 
was mutually beneficial; both sides were using each other for their own means. The 
correspondents acquired quotations with which to supplement their stories on the battles, 
and the military was able to disseminate its preferred message, i.e. propaganda, to the 
public. The correspondents also garnered a great amount of intelligence both on what 
was happening at the time, as well as what was very likely to happen in the future, 
although without divulging specifics of upcoming actions. This sort of symbiotic 
relationship with authority is not specific to war reporting, however, it is a regular part of 
most fields of journalism, past and present. The BBC’s Godfrey Talbot summed up this 
relationship when he described both how he made contact with higher-ranking officers 
and their importance to his own eyewitness reporting. He noted that the conducting 
officers provided by Army Public Relations at El Alamein: 
 
[They] all possessed one splendid quality – they seemed to have been 
at school with half the senior officers in the army, which meant that it 
was all Christian names in Divisional H.Q. tents from the start, and a 
smoothed entrée for me into the dugout operations rooms and 
intelligence officers’ map lorries which from now on were my sources 
of information to supplement what I saw of the fighting for myself.355 
 
Clearly Talbot and other correspondents understood that just seeing the battle with 
one’s own eyes was not enough; there also had to be a big picture perspective from those 
who planned the fighting. 
In dealing with the military, the BBC deliberately meant to exploit vanity – in this 
case the lure of being interviewed or being talked about on the radio – as a way to gain 
an edge, as demonstrated in an internal memorandum from BBC Deputy Director of War 
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Reporting Malcolm Frost: “Commanders are only too human in that they attach 
considerable importance to their own prestige and publicity. This is a card which the 
BBC can usefully play in obtaining adequate services.”356 That card might have been 
best played with General Montgomery, who was well known for his acumen and 
enthusiasm in engaging the media, both for communication as well as self-promotion. 
Frank Gillard noted they first became acquainted when he deployed to cover 
Montgomery’s British 8th Army in North Africa: 
 
I knew nothing about Monty and didn’t know him at all. But, as an 
enterprising BBC reporter I made it my business to get introduced to 
him, and to say to him that I hoped that he would from time to time 
receive me, and record interviews and statements and his orders of 
battle and that sort of thing, and that I hoped we could have a good 
working relationship.357 
 
The pair did indeed form a mutually beneficial arrangement, he claimed, due to 
Montgomery’s belief in the power of radio to buoy spirits in the field. “[He] believed 
that through broadcasting he could speak to every man in his army and to their loved 
ones, and this was very important as morale is essential to the soldier in battle.”358 
Gillard also recalled that the general recognised the value of boosting public confidence 
through the media:  
 
Monty said to me, ‘If I can assure the people at home that I am not the 
man to waste lives, that I think we’ve got a fair chance of winning, and 
that I’m going to run this battle as effectively and economically as I 
can, if I can say that to them, that will do good for morale at home, and 
it will also be reflected in the mail that the soldiers get out here.359 
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The relationship Gillard formed in the desert with Montgomery, and the general’s 
conviction that the broadcast outlet served a useful purpose in his war efforts, greatly 
benefitted the BBC when the Allies launched the second front in Normandy. Gillard 
explained: 
 
Now, up to this time, the military authorities had regarded the BBC as 
just another newspaper. So you were only allowed one man out 
reporting with you, and it was a great concession that you got a truck 
and a recording engineer. With this you had to cover the whole range 
of the BBC’s output – home, external, all those vernacular services – 
all had to be done by one person, which was almost an impossibility. 
But once we got Monty on our side you see, we were able to lead 
Monty on. And whereas in the western desert there I was with one 
recording engineer, and that we were the BBC, when we landed in 
Normandy there were 32 of us, and we were with the airborne troops, 
we were with the infantry landing on the beaches, we were with the air 
force during the bombardments, we were with the Navy and, what’s 
more, we took ashore with us our recording equipment, and within a 
few days we had our own transmitters which we took around with us 
from that time onwards right across Europe. We also had a censorship 
unit attached to us staffed by BBC people now serving in the army who 
thoroughly understood our needs and this was all really due to the 
relationship which one could develop with Monty who was really very 
keen to use broadcasting as an arm of warfare.360 
 
On 23 October 1942, the first day of the second battle of El Alamein, Montgomery 
summoned a “small party of war correspondents” to the patch of sand outside his tent, 
according to Talbot, to explain that he planned to attack the German Afrika Corps that 
night: 
 
He then handed to each of us a printed copy of his personal message to 
the troops, the first of his familiar eve-of-battle calls which always 
sounded half Kipling and half school padre. ‘Let every officer and man 
enter the battle with a stout heart,’ it read, ‘and with the determination 
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to do his duty so long as he has breath in his body. Let us all pray that 
‘the Lord Mighty in Battle’ will give us victory.361 
 
Angus Calder notes that this interaction with his men was part of the “mystique” 
cultivated by the general that helped him win over both the soldiers and the public: 
“Monty himself was by way of being the People’s General of the People’s War. His 
mystique was based on his novel concept of leadership, which conformed well to the 
new and swift type of war which was fought in tanks and spitfires.” He adds that 
Montgomery stated a belief that wars were fought by civilians in uniform rather than 
military professionals, and he had never employed a “remote control” philosophy with 
his men, “they are human beings and their lives are precious.”362 It was this attitude that 
set him apart from other military leaders and this was where his communications to the 
soldiers were so important. Calder writes: “His enthusiasm for putting his men ‘in the 
picture’ with familiar and colloquial ‘personal messages’ showed that he understood the 
reasons why ABCA [Army Bureau of Current Affairs] had been created. In the centre of 
‘the picture’, Monty, of course, placed himself; his excellent opinion of General 
Montgomery was part of the legend, though many people in and out of the forces 
disliked him for it.”363 Regardless of the feelings this legend engendered among others in 
the military, it was undoubtedly why Montgomery and the war correspondents had such 
a symbiotic relationship; he needed them to be in the centre of the picture, and they 
needed him to stay on top of the war information they were trying to report. Yet there 
were occasionally negative consequences to this access to power. Talbot wrote of 
Britain’s desert commander: 
 
As the BBC man with his army, I occasionally came under the 
Montgomery lash. He would listen each night to our Overseas Service 
news coming from a small radio set by the bed in his caravan and if 
there was something he didn’t agree with on my day’s report on the 
desert situation as quoted in the bulletin he would have an orderly find 
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me and haul me up in front of him for a dressing-down. He made me 
feel like a small boy in front of a peppery house-master.364 
 
Talbot said he appreciated the close interaction, not only with Montgomery, but 
also with other top military commanders. He was “indebted” to Field Marshal Harold 
Alexander, commander of the Allied armies in Italy, who sometimes invited him to 
dinner at his headquarters: “on those occasions the wealth of information he gave me 
about the whole military situation and his future battle plans formed an absolutely 
invaluable background to my work as a war correspondent.”365 
Many other correspondents had similar working relationships with military leaders 
that helped smooth the way toward obtaining their stories. Alan Moorehead, in his 
trilogy of books about covering the war in North Africa for the Daily Express 
newspaper, related how General (later Field Marshal) Sir Archibald Wavell called a 
group of seven or eight war correspondents to his office in Cairo. They sat around him in 
a semicircle as he stood and explained how his forces had launched an attack in the 
Western Desert earlier that morning, calling it an “important raid” and cautioning them 
from calling it “an offensive” in their stories. He explained to the reporters that he was 
giving them this special briefing to provide time to make arrangements to travel and 
cover the story. Wavell added that he wanted to know if the correspondents had been 
tipped off.366 “He questioned us then to discover if any of us knew that the attack had 
been planned. It was important, he said, since, if the correspondents had not known, 
then, presumably, no one else except the authorised few had known,” Moorehead wrote. 
“Not one of us was able to say he had had any hint of it.”367 This could be considered an 
acknowledgement by the military of the reputation the correspondents had earned for 
doggedly chasing the important stories of the war up to that point, but also the 
importance of developing a close relationship between the two parties. 
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While utilising their patterns and techniques of eyewitness reporting and 
establishing the important relationships with the military authorities who were able to 
give them details of past and future battles and greater perspective on the overall strategy 
of the theatre of war they were covering, the correspondents were still faced with the 
matter of exactly how to record the news they observed and heard. This is what made the 
equipment they employed so important to the work they conducted. 
 
Correspondents’ Tools 
War correspondents have always needed certain tools and provisions to do their 
assignments. These developed over the years as the times changed and the technology of 
war progressed, but historically some have always remained the same, whether or not 
they were truly necessary. Examples used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are 
provided by Richard Harding Davis and W.F. Deedes. Davis, in his 1911 book, Notes of 
a War Correspondent, explained that in his time covering conflicts in various parts of 
the world, including for British newspapers, he had seen different pieces of “kit” 
employed by “travellers and explorers, and… by army officers and war correspondents” 
and that each was a very personal arrangement. “On a campaign you may attack a man’s 
courage, the flag he serves, the newspaper for which he works, his intelligence, or his 
camp manners, and he will ignore you; but if you criticise his patent water-bottle he will 
fall upon you with both fists.”368 Davis goes on to list the items he carried with him on a 
regular basis while in the field, many of which were different than those carried by 
Second World War correspondents simply because of the different time period. Harding 
had many items specific to travel by horse or cart rather than the jeeps and trucks used 
by the reporters in the mid-20th century, as well as items that were unnecessary in a 
more modern battlefield or one in a different type of environment. He included in his list 
extra riding breeches, mosquito net, folding rubber bathtub, an axe, two pairs of drawers 
(“For riding, the best of those are silk”), two briarwood pipes, canvas gaiters, collapsible 
lanterns, a bottle of ink with a fountain pen, and a revolver with six cartridges. (Second 
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World War correspondents were banned from carrying weapons, although some still did 
for personal safety.) Harding said there was no need for more than six cartridges “on the 
theory that if in six shots you haven’t hit the other fellow, he will have hit you, and you 
will not require another six.” Yet some of the items stood the test of time and were 
necessities regardless of which war the correspondents found themselves in: candles, 
matches, tooth brushes, soap, towels, handkerchiefs large enough to tie around the neck, 
playing cards, smoking tobacco, writing paper, envelopes, and books.369 Upon assigning 
W.F. Deedes to cover the conflict between Abyssinia and Italy in 1935, his Morning 
Post editor suspected he might get cut off by the fighting and should therefore take a 
significant amount of equipment to sustain himself. This resulted in what Deedes termed 
“a lively shopping spree” at the Austin Reed shop in London’s Regent Street, where he 
purchased “three tropical suits, riding breeches for winter and summer, bush shirts, a 
sola topi, a double-brimmed sun hat, a camp bed and sleeping bag, and long boots to 
deter mosquitoes at sundown. To contain some of these purchases we bought two large 
metal uniform cases and a heavy trunk made of cedar wood and lined with zinc to keep 
ants at bay.” Continuing on to the Army and Navy Store in Victoria Street, he bought 
quinine pills against malaria and black chocolate as an iron supplement. “Our purchases 
in all weighed just short of 600 pounds – a quarter of a ton.”370 Evelyn Waugh, who 
worked as a correspondent in Abyssinia alongside Deedes, later lampooned this 
exorbitant amount of gear in his satiric novel, Scoop.371 
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When Godfrey Talbot of the BBC set off for the front in the Egyptian desert, he 
took what more experienced correspondents assured him were essentials: a thousand 
cigarettes (to be used for bartering with Bedouins), stomach medicine, a crate of Stella 
beer, three bottles of whisky, rolls of toilet paper, a spade, a hair-horse whisk for beating 
off flies, a bedroll and sleeping bag, suede desert boots with thick soles, and three weeks 
of rations.372 Unlike with Deedes and the purchases made with his editor for the journey 
to Abyssinia, most of these items were unlikely to have been discussed with BBC 
management as necessary supplies before leaving London to cover the Second World 
War because they would have seemed excessive and not directly essential to the job of 
reporting the war. 
Alan Moorehead listed the articles he carried while reporting from Egypt for the 
Daily Express in April 1940 alongside his friend, Alex Clifford of the Daily Mail. In 
addition to buying “large-scale maps of the desert”, he said the correspondents wore 
clothing and carried items specific to the desert, as well as the normal kit issued to all 
correspondents: 
 
We bought desert boots made of suede that came halfway up the ankle, 
knee-length khaki stockings, shorts of khaki drill that fastened with 
two neat buckles at the midriff, drill shirts, and the whole was 
surmounted by the regulation khaki sun helmet. (It was not until a year 
or two later that the army at last agreed that sunstroke came through 
the eyes and not through the back of the neck, and thereafter we wore 
peaked caps or berets.) We were given, also, water bottles, gas masks, 
flat steel helmets and, for the first and only time in the war, a revolver 
each. The revolver, we were told, was not to be used against the enemy 
but against the local population in case it turned against us. Finally we 
bought mosquito net, camp beds, sleeping bags and canvas washing 
buckets; and we were complete.373 
 
While Moorehead was proud of his vocation, he found the insignia worn on the 
uniform purchased as part of his kit and meant to set him apart from regular army units 
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to be a source of embarrassment, rather than pride, in the initial stages of the war in the 
desert: “I disliked the little green tabs we were obliged to wear on our shoulders. They 
were inscribed in gold ‘British War Correspondent’ and gave one the feeling of being a 
delegate at a Rotary convention.”374 He continued with his description of how he felt the 
uniform, while marking him out as an official war reporter, still caused some 
awkwardness: 
 
War correspondents were rare birds at that time, and people in the Turf 
Club [in Cairo] were forever sidling up to us, arching their necks to 
read the inscription, and, having read it, they were apt to laugh 
facetiously among their friends. This was unpleasant, for at heart we 
took ourselves rather seriously and were already in imagination 
projecting ourselves into all sorts of heroic dangers at the front.375 
 
Doon Campbell of Reuters was first called up to cover Italy in September 1943. 
He was given a kit allowance of £75, which he took to the Moss Bros. store in London to 
purchase a gabardine uniform with the war correspondent shoulder tabs that Moorehead 
disliked so much. A colleague, however, informed him that he could obtain free gear in 
the basement of the Reuters headquarters, from which he took a sleeping bag and a used 
great coat that had already been through Kashmir and Jerusalem. Later, in his 
preparations to cover the invasion of Normandy, he was required to get inoculations 
against Typhoid, Tetanus and Smallpox, as well as to acquire a new steel helmet.376 
Charles Lynch, the Canadian correspondent for Reuters, also went to the Moss Bros. 
“used-clothing emporium” for his uniform, acquiring an outfit that he said mightily 
impressed himself. He purchased “a serge dress uniform with leather buttons and a 
cavalry greatcoat down to my ankles and a Sam Browne belt and calf-high officers’ 
boots in pebbled leather and a pair of waterproof veltschoen shoes and a sheepskin 
jacket and a knee-high pair of fleece-lined Wellingtons.” He was sure his visage “would 
strike terror into friend and foe alike” on the battlefield, but he must have looked more 
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like a caricature as he noted that his officer’s cap was so new and stiff that a friend from 
the forces took it from him and literally beat it into a shape becoming of someone who 
had actually been in the field.377 
Although they might have been well equipped at the outset, as with the soldiers 
they covered the war took a hard toll upon the correspondents and, subsequently, their 
kit. A day after coming under ambush in Libya, Moorehead and Clifford went back to 
the truck in which they had been traveling to salvage any useable gear they could find. 
Moorehead recalled: “Smashed cameras and typewriters, bedding rolls riven with 
bullets, suitcases battered into shapelessness, lay strewn about. Even our fine Parmesan 
cheese was pitted like a Gruyere, and a tin of army biscuits had all but reverted to its 
original flour. Razors, glasses, compasses, revolvers, water bottles – everything was 
smashed.” In contrast to the ample amount of supplies they had when first setting out, 
the men were practically stripped to the bone. Moorehead wrote: “We had no food now 
and practically no clothes. Apart from my greatcoat, all I was able to salvage was the 
uniform of an Italian sailor – stuff I had got at Tobruk – and in that uniform I stayed 
until the end of the campaign.” Despite being down to the bare bones of gear, the pair 
did the only thing left to them under the circumstances, the prime dictate of their 
vocation: follow the war. Moorehead and Clifford decided there was nothing else to do 
when history was moving past them except try to keep up: “We were sitting forlornly 
there among our wreckage when the other war correspondents arrived, and we 
clambered aboard their vehicles. There was no time to lose. The advance was going very 
quickly now.”378 This is an example of the lesson most correspondents learned as the 
war progressed: they could make do with far less kit than they had initially thought they 
needed and could subsist on fairly minimal provisions when thrust into difficult 
circumstances. 
Despite all the optional items they could and often did bring, the biggest 
difference between the correspondents and the servicemen upon whom they reported 
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was that they were not officially allowed to carry firearms. However, they had their own 
authorized “weapon” used to do their service in the battle zones, the most important 
piece of kit for all correspondents: the typewriters they all carried. They were 
cumbersome and difficult to heft around the countryside and through cities and villages 
where battles raged, but key to the work of the Second World War correspondent. 
Typewriters were so important because handwritten messages were impractical for 
sending back to Britain, as they could be smudged or their handwriting found to be 
illegible. Moorehead explained that correspondents tapped away at their indispensable 
typewriters in “strange” circumstances and using any surface that was at hand: “We 
typed on the backs of trucks, on beaches, in deserted houses, in gun emplacements and 
tents. We hoisted our typewriters on kerosene cases, on bathtubs and rolls of kit, on 
humps of sand and the steps of cars, or just perched them on our knees.” He also noted 
that they developed the unique skill of being able to type regardless of the conditions and 
distractions, or nearly so: “We wrote by candlelight or lamplight, or with an electric 
torch shining onto the paper. And in the end we could write anywhere at any hour of the 
day or night – anywhere, that is, except during a bombardment, for I tried it and failed 
miserably.”379 Alexander Clifford recalled that although he was desperate to reach Tunis 
after hearing reports of its impending fall to the British in May 1943, he held on to this 
essential piece of gear: “I fell in with a Signals vehicle which took me eighty miles to 
Thibar… Terry Ashwood, the Paramount photographer, and Frank Gillard of the B.B.C. 
were just starting for the front in a truck, and I abandoned everything but my typewriter 
and climbed up behind onto their spare wheel.”380 And once they had put their 
typewriters to use, there was still the problem of getting the story back to Britain and the 
Dominions. 
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Delivering the Story 
War stories were obviously worth no more than a yarn shared between 
correspondents in a tavern unless they reached the vehicles of dissemination – 
newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasters – that distributed them to the public 
hungrily awaiting this information. Unfortunately for the correspondents, getting the 
news to their organisational headquarters could often be just as difficult as accumulating 
the stories in the field. In this, all correspondents shared a common goal and a common 
obstacle. 
In order to get stories out, correspondents made frequent use of telegrams, also 
called cables; to save money on the cost of these messages that were priced by the word 
they employed a type of shorthand called “cablese”. Doon Campbell explained the 
technique: “omitting ‘the’, ‘a’, and prepositions, and creating single words by such 
devices as turning ‘keep up’ into ‘upkeep’ and ‘hold down’ into ‘downhold’, or writing 
‘Londonwarded’ instead of ‘left for London’. Too often these economies were taken to 
excess; some reporters were so creative they were incomprehensible.”381 Yet while the 
reporters to a large extent used telegrams, at times they employed even older methods. 
Campbell, for example, tried a bribe. The first correspondent to land on the Normandy 
beaches from a ship, Campbell wrote his initial dispatch and handed it to a naval officer 
who was returning across the English Channel; the story did not make it to Reuters 
headquarters: “I gave him £5, and never saw him again.”382 Donald Read notes that 
during the D-Day landings, Reuters correspondent Monty Taylor sent a message from a 
ship back to England by carrier pigeon.383 Campbell recalled that in one of the final pre-
invasion briefings, a brigadier general at army headquarters said that carrier pigeons 
could be employed, as wireless (radio) communications “will be pretty shaky.” 
Campbell said that pigeons had a “special resonance for a Reuter man” because it was 
with these birds that Paul Julius Reuter had been able to gain a foothold for his new 
company in 1850 by getting the news out faster than the Brussels-Aachen mail train that 
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was normally used at the time, but that Campbell himself was unwilling to use them for 
reasons he did not state.384 Charles Lynch recalled going over the side of a naval ship 
and into a landing craft on D-Day, disembarking on the beach hefting his own carrier 
pigeons: “I put my typewriter on my head and the basket of pigeons on top of that, and 
jumped, wondering what would happen if my feet didn’t find bottom. They did, and I 
struggled to the shore, keeping the typewriter and the pigeons dry.”385 Lynch 
remembered that he and another correspondent wrote their dispatches on tissue paper, 
which were then submitted to censors who used scissors to cut out the sensitive parts 
before the messages were placed in capsules attached to the legs of the pigeons. They 
were to be released in male and female pairs, “for some sexual reason known only to 
pigeons.” Yet, when the pigeons were released, they turned and flew inland instead of 
going across the Channel toward the English coastline. The sound of gunfire indicated 
they had passed into the German lines, thus revealing the great unpredictability in the 
use of these birds to deliver the war news to a waiting public. Lynch said that thirty-four 
of their thirty-six pigeons flew into France. With the last two birds they went back down 
to the beach, hoping the sight of the ocean would give the pigeons a better idea of their 
task. The result was predictable but still disheartening. Although, as Lynch explained, 
the moment was instantly cemented in war correspondent lore: “They made one pass 
over the breakers and then swerved inland, disappearing in the general direction of 
Germany. Whereupon I shook my fist and, in an utterance that became part of 
journalistic legend, shouted, ‘Traitors! Damn traitors!’” Lynch expressed displeasure 
that when he saw the movie, The Longest Day, the person portraying the correspondent 
shouting those words was British, “assuming that anybody who worked for Reuters must 
be a Limey. That was a Canadian cry, and it came from the heart.”386 Thus, despite the 
new communications technology revolutionising the news industry, even late in the 
Second World War correspondents still employed timeworn methods for dispatching 
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stories. And there were additional problems for print reporters, even with the advent of 
the most modern methods. 
Philip Howard of The Times, in his reminiscences about D-Day in 2004, 
explained, “Getting films and copy back to Printing House Square was a nightmare. 
There were limited and erratic radio links, infrequent courier planes, speed-boats, and 
special facilities for journalists covering D-Day from London.” One of the paper’s other 
correspondents, Robert Cooper, wrote in June 1944 that he could only get his dispatches 
out “very late near or after midnight”, which clearly missed the paper’s deadline. In a 
series of internal communiqués between 21 and 29 June of that year, Cooper and Foreign 
Editor Ralph Deakin discussed how wireless breakdowns had kept Cooper’s stories from 
getting through, which Deakin characterized as “largely a failure thanks to sluggishness 
in transmission and delivery”. He lamented that many of the paper’s Normandy stories 
had been from sources other than The Times correspondents, which can be assumed to 
mean they came from Reuters, but he encouraged his reporter to keep working. He 
stressed that Cooper’s attempts to file via America on more secure channels, which had 
slowed the process, was not the right course and that he should send his stories straight 
to London. Deakin stated in a cable, using the combined words of the so-called cablese 
style of writing, “Please don’t get discouraged and continue filing but importanest you 
file direct not newyorkwise.”387 
Another war correspondent of The Times, John Prince, also had difficulties. Prince 
wrote to Deakin on 21 July 1944, “It is difficult to get through promptly under present 
conditions. We are living in an apple orchard miles from anywhere and getting to the 
front means an all-round jeep ride of six hours or so. We have no newspapers and no 
briefing from the army involved in present operations. The unit I am with is not yet 
operational; when it is the P.R.O. organisation and communications look like being 
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good. Meanwhile, we are remote from everything. A copy of the paper would be most 
useful and much appreciated.” He wrote again on 10 August to thank Deakin for 
reassuring him his dispatches were getting through: 
 
Communications have been very bad. Mostly to London direct they are 
non-existent except for the air courier. Partly this is due to the need for 
constantly moving of camp. We have just moved again and it is hoped 
by tonight to have direct wireless communication with London, though 
for how long no one can tell. These swift thrusts are hard to follow. If 
you keep up with them there is the problem of getting copy back to 
what communications there may be. The great distances to be travelled 
from camp to front have been a very real obstacle. This was especially 
so at the beginning when we were allowed to cover the First Army 
front as a courtesy, had enormous distances to travel from our camp to 
the front, from there to First Army, and then back to our camp, with all 
our copy having a second priority on First Army communications.388 
 
Radio correspondents used some of the same methods of getting the stories out as 
their print counterparts. Peter Stursberg recalled that keeping down the costs of cables 
was a major concern for CBC administrators; one reporter was chided for sending a long 
telegram that cost the equivalent of $70 Canadian. “The CBC never forgot that $70 cable 
and would make snide reference to it whenever there was an austerity campaign, which 
was quite often.”389 
Yet the Second World War saw one of the great sea changes in war reporting 
technology with the rise of the radio correspondent, fundamentally and forever altering 
the technology through which conflicts are reported. The war was a vital period for radio 
news as broadcasting technology made great leaps with the advent of portable recorders 
and other developments that allowed correspondents to bring the sounds of battle and 
reports from the frontlines directly into the homes of their listeners, something never 
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before experienced despite radio’s growing popularity since its launch approximately 
forty years before the war. 
In early 1939, Dimbleby opened a new era in war reporting when he deployed to 
the Pyrenees as an “observer” of the Spanish Civil War and gained the dubious honour 
of being the first radio reporter to record the sounds of an ongoing battle, as previously 
discussed. During the Second World War the technology improved and reports from the 
front, including the noise of bullets and bombs, became commonplace on radio 
networks. This gave war reporting an immediacy and closeness never before 
experienced by the public and made these broadcasts almost a daily necessity, in 
addition to the newspapers through which people were used to obtaining their news. 
They also cemented the reputations of the organisations and reporters broadcasting the 
stories, who became on-the-spot conduits of battle. 
As previously discussed, radio was not entirely accepted by some in the wartime 
journalism world, as it had what the newspapers perceived as an unfair advantage with 
its ability to broadcast at any time rather than only on the set publication schedules of 
daily papers. In Britain, the close relationship between the long-established newspapers 
and the Ministry of Information resulted in the government’s reluctance to let radio beat 
print publications to big stories, instead requiring the BBC to hold broadcasts over until 
the morning hours when newspapers hit the street.390 In the early part of the war Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain even considered doing away with broadcasting altogether. 
Yet the shortage of newsprint and the fact that more than seventy of every 100 
households owned radios helped drive the public toward broadcasting. The BBC’s 
nightly 9 p.m. reports became essential listening and its reporters unreservedly trusted to 
provide news of the war.391 Undoubtedly the same can be said about Edward R. Murrow 
and his CBS radio colleagues for Americans and the broadcasters of the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation for those Allied 
nations. 
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The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, although not a major international player 
in coverage of the war, boasted at having the conflict’s superior broadcasting units. The 
CBC’s best-known war correspondent, Peter Stursberg, stated: “One American reporter 
had a portable recording unit. It was a disc recorder, and it weighed about 20 or 30 
pounds, and its fidelity was absolutely hopeless. I mean, gunfire sounded like a pea 
dropping on deck, but it was good enough for voice but not for sound.”392 A 2005 article 
by CBC News described the Corporation’s portable equipment used during the war as 
“Technology that neither the BBC nor the Americans could match.”393 
That may have been true at some point, but from D-Day to the end of the war the 
BBC was arguably the world leader in radio reporting with some of the most cutting-
edge technology used in the field.394 Edward Ward’s description of the changes enacted 
by his employers at the BBC between the time he was captured by Rommel’s North 
African army in November 1941 and his release from a POW camp three-and-a-half 
years later offered a synopsis of the giant advances the broadcasting media achieved in 
recording and transmission technology: 
 
[T]he B.B.C. had certainly made great strides in their war reporting 
since my days in the desert. During the Wavell push I had no recording 
gear at all, and had to rely on the Australian Broadcasting Company’s 
kindness to make records at all. Otherwise, I simply sent cables. I only 
had a recording set right at the end and that was simply installed in the 
back of an ordinary truck and took at least twenty minutes to get under 
way. Now things were very different. Mobile transmitters were 
scattered over the country. There were almost countless recording vans 
magnificently equipped and which could start operating in a couple of 
minutes. And there were even miniature recording machines called 
‘Midgets’ which were about as big as a portable gramophone and could 
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be taken in a jeep to places where it was difficult to manage the heavy 
recording vans.395 
 
In 1941, the BBC broadcast ninety-nine news talks per month, including reports 
on the war. By late 1942 the BBC plans for dispatching recordings back to Britain 
included, “Direct radiotelephonic transmission”, motorcycle riders, air transport, and 
submarine telephone cables and landlines. By 1943 the Corporation had increased the 
number of its disc recordings from the war theatres to 5,000 weekly and then up to 7,000 
during the week of D-Day.396 This was not all due to the war, it was part of an evolution; 
BBC recording technology had already made great leaps in the 1930s. The Corporation’s 
headquarters moved in 1932 from Savoy Hill, located off the Strand, to a larger, 
purpose-built facility also in central London, Broadcasting House at Portland Place, 
where engineers used German magnetic tape recorders called Blattnerphone-Stille 
machines. These had six-millimetre, steel tapes that recorded for twenty minutes, later 
improved to thirty-minute, three-millimetre tapes. When a new studio opened in 1934 at 
Maida Vale, northwest London, the BBC upgraded to the Marconi-Stille machine, a 
metal box about five feet high with two steel wheels of magnetic tape mounted on its 
face; the tapes themselves were unsuitable for editing and easily damaged. In short, it 
was nothing to take into the field, and certainly not onto the field of battle. The BBC 
therefore began experimenting with significantly smaller machines recording onto discs 
that looked and acted like phonograph records.397 With this technology functional, the 
main engineering goal became the development of mobile recording units. Disc 
recorders with hydraulic levelling mechanisms were mounted in trucks, creating mobile 
studios, although the vehicles were too large and heavy to be practical and smaller 
automobile units came into use. As James Godfrey noted: “The experiment of using 
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single disk recorders in saloon cars proved more successful and a number of these were 
put into service just before war broke out.” In 1939, the BBC had six mobile disc 
recording machines in operation; by 1945 there were twenty-eight.398 
Superintendent Engineer of Recording R.J.L. Pulling opined in January 1943, 
“battery operated recording equipment of any kind is something of a freak.” He 
explained that the BBC’s design of a mobile disc recorder was “the only battery operated 
high quality recorder so far as we know anywhere in the world” and he warned that 
making it so light one person, or even two people, could carry it into the field would 
require significantly more development work; in short, he did not recommend the BBC 
tackle the job.399 Meanwhile, an American portable device known as the Heller 
Recorder, which was battery powered, could record thirty-two minutes of sound, and 
weighed in at only twelve pounds, seemed at one point to the BBC engineering division 
to be “the ideal method of recording for Combined Operations.” They had, in fact, been 
considering both the Heller and a “sound camera” since late 1942.400 Yet additional 
testing proved them both to fall short of the BBC’s desired standards and the 
Corporation eventually opted to invest in its own ingenuity. The result was the “Midget.” 
The invention of the Midget recorders most likely was prompted by a 6 October 
1942 memorandum from Overseas Controller J.B. Clark, who wrote, “It may be a wild 
suggestion for a layman to make, but the sight of the midget wireless field telephones 
used by the U.S.A. army prompts the thought that something more portable than we have 
at present available for recording or broadcasting communication could be devised for 
really practical use.”401 It took the BBC research department until 1944, but the Midget 
was ready before D-Day. Tom Hickman explains: 
 
Officially, it was called the Riverside Portable: spring-wound with two 
recording positions (one to cut out background noise, the other to open 
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up the field of sound so that the pandemonium of battle could be 
heard); a clip-on mike; twelve double-sided 10-inch discs slotted inside 
the lid, giving seventy-two minutes’ worth of recording…. It weighed 
42 pounds and must have been a bitch to hump in and out of trenches. 
Not only that, it was unreliable, too, working on only two out of three 
occasions. It had no playback facility, either, so there was no way of 
knowing if it had recorded. And it was fragile: when they could, the 
correspondents used the detachable dry battery to save wear on the 
wind-up handle, but breakdowns were frequent.402 
 
Yet it proved worthy when Wynford Vaughan-Thomas field-tested it at Anzio in 
March 1943.403 Writing in the June 1944 issue of Picture Post magazine, correspondent 
MacDonald Hastings praised the Midget recorder he saw at work while observing the 
Operation Spartan exercise during which the BBC tested both the Corporation’s and the 
recorder’s readiness for the upcoming second front. He said the quality of the discs was 
not as good as those made in recording vans, but the Midget enabled correspondents to 
take recording gear to places where a van could not reach and that the “chances of sound 
recordings of actual battle scenes have been immeasurably strengthened by the 
development” of the machines, which he likened to a “portable gramophone” and said 
could even be carried by a correspondent during a parachute jump.404 Hastings wrote: 
 
The men of the B.B.C. War Reporting Unit themselves are 
enthusiastic about the possibilities of the new recorders. Given a 
reasonable chance by the military censors in the field, they believe 
that there should be no difficulty now in getting back real sound 
pictures of actual battle. If they can indeed do it, they can change the 
whole character of the B.B.C.’s war news.405 
 
As previously mentioned, Chester Wilmot demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
Midget in Normandy when he clipped a microphone to a tree and recorded Nebelwerfer 
mortars. And, according to Hickman, despite the frequent malfunctions, “it was on a 
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dozen or so of these [Midget] machines… that much of the final struggle for Europe was 
captured for all time.”406 Getting the recordings back to Broadcasting House once the 
long-awaited second front opened on D-Day required the BBC to make special 
preparations prior to the invasion. Midget discs were to be returned by air and sea 
couriers; telediphone units, another type of recording device, were employed as 
dictaphones that could record verbal messages onto wax cylinders for replay to a typist; 
and special recording stations were installed in southeast England so correspondents 
could travel across the channel and send recorded or live broadcasts without having to 
return to London. The BBC kept recording channels open twenty-four hours daily and 
cars were stationed at the main ports to drive correspondents to the transmitters.407 
Mobile transmitters were also an integral part of the system installed for sending 
news back from the continent in the latter part of the war. Well before D-Day, in 
October 1942, the BBC engineering division was asked to look into recording stations 
along the south coast of England so correspondents could report on aircraft deployments 
or quickly deliver reports of commando raids in western Europe. Yet there was also an 
understanding of the need for mobile transmissions from the field; engineers were 
directed to develop more mobile units for war correspondents beyond the six medium-
wave transmitters outfitted on large trucks that the BBC kept for emergency 
broadcasting around Britain. Corporation administrators meanwhile expressed concerns 
over the subsequent technical issue of whether these transmitters would interfere with 
military communications, as well as the need for correspondents and engineers to 
practise using mobile transmitters from spots around Britain before they deployed.408 
BBC engineers planned for mobile base camps comprising “medium-wave transmitter 
lorry, power lorry, and two six-wheeled mobile recording lorries” until more permanent 
and powerful stations could be established.409 They perceived the coming western front 
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offensive in three progressive phases: the invasion, the time shortly after a beachhead 
was established, and the period of permanence when there was no fear of being driven 
off the continent. For each phase, they developed a plan for the amount and type of staff 
and equipment needed; for instance, in Phase One they assumed a need for a pair of two-
kilowatt truck transmitters, the same number of truck-mounted power and recording 
units, a “studio truck”, and a mobile control room. For Phase Two it was to be ten-
kilowatt, medium-wave transmitters and additional short-wave transmitters.410 
The Corporation initially encountered difficulties in getting the War Office to 
provide vehicles on which to load the transmitters. By December 1943 there was 
concern that if the equipment was not ready to move with the army by D-Day then 
American broadcasters would set up their equipment first and the BBC would be reliant 
on these facilities instead of its own,411 which would have been a huge blow to the speed 
of news delivery if BBC correspondents were always second in line to broadcast. Yet the 
Corporation eventually procured trucks from the army and prepared three mobile 
transmitters using equipment acquired from various sources, including RCA in America. 
Each of these transmitters was designated with a call sign in an “MC” series: Mike 
Charlie Oboe (MCO), Mike Charlie Peter (MCP), and Mike Charlie Nan (MCN). MCO, 
a 250-watt transmitter on a three-ton truck, was the first to reach Normandy shortly after 
D-Day, with the five-kilowatt MCP following in July 1944 and established at a semi-
permanent BBC headquarters in Creully before its eventual transfer to Paris. The 7.5-
kilowatt MCN arrived in September. Not everything had been anticipated before the 
invasion and, as the frontline moved further east, MCO could no longer reach London; 
the engineers worked out a system of relaying signals through MCN and then to 
Broadcasting House, as well through captured German aerial masts. Eventually they 
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were able to broadcast directly to the United Kingdom capital, as well as New York and 
Australia.412 
These technological advances did not necessarily make the lives of the reporters 
any easier; sometimes just the opposite. While print reporters were writing notes and 
typing up text as they had always done, the radio reporters had to deal with equipment 
that could cause many problems. Godfrey Talbot was among the BBC correspondents 
who experienced the changes in BBC technology as they happened, from the early years 
of the war until the end. He explained that for radio reporters in the initial years of the 
conflict, “On-the-spot reporting was not a simple business”. While reporting on the 
Desert War he was often hundreds of feet away from his engineer, to whom he was 
attached by a cable between his microphone and the recording truck, where they made 
the discs to be sent back to Britain. He also had to dodge the battle while trying to 
provide an eyewitness account. He wrote: “The [British] tanks were churning up such a 
fog of sand that I could judge the coming of each monster only by the sound of its 
squeaking and grinding; and during the whole broadcast I had to keep leaping backwards 
and forwards to prevent not only the cable but myself from being cut in two.”413 Talbot 
also noted that it was not technically possible to do broadcasts from the desert, 
everything needed to be recorded and then shipped to Britain, and therefore they tried 
different techniques to get the best sound: “The recordings were all on heavy old discs: 
there was no tape at that time. I made many of the recordings standing near the truck, but 
sometimes we would manhandle the gear out and into a smaller vehicle, or use the gear 
out on the sand after the truck had disgorged it and retreated.” The truck, which they had 
named Belinda, was too large and cumbersome for use in forward areas and they were at 
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times told by the soldiers to get the vehicle out of the area, lest it catch the attention of 
the Germans and subsequently bring down shelling.414 
Talbot also recalled that after the recording process the problems were far from 
over: “When passed [by the censor], the recorded dispatches were flown or sent by 
dispatch riders back to Cairo, and from the studios of Egyptian State Broadcasting were 
beamed to London.” The distance between a reporter and a transmitter was sometimes 
hundreds of miles, causing delays in the news being delivered.415 This at times caused 
agitation among the troops and subsequently problems for correspondents trying to get 
information from military sources. Talbot described how at El Alamein he carried discs 
that could hold recordings of four minutes on each side containing the voices of soldiers 
and battle sounds that were edited by BBC engineers in trucks fitted with the equipment 
needed to make the recordings, essentially a mobile studio. Due to the necessity of 
getting the discs to Cairo and then “radio-beamed” to London, there was sometimes a 
day between the event and the story being broadcast. Yet Talbot saw this as acceptable 
due to the importance of, and widespread interest in, the war news: “[T]here was a first-
class story to tell, and my spoken dispatches were on the air every night, top-of-the-
bulletin stuff, heard by millions not only at home in Britain but in the BBC overseas 
services throughout the world.”416 
After the Desert War, when the BBC reporting team moved on to Italy, Talbot 
wrote that they used “army Signals or civilian Cable and Wireless network out of Naples 
to get our broadcast reports back to London” for inclusion in the Corporation’s various 
news programmes. As previously mentioned, the BBC eventually developed its own 
transmitting equipment that gave greater freedom and greatly improved speed and 
transmission capabilities to the correspondents. Yet this did not completely fix the 
problem; as Talbot observed, “Reporters, or their dispatches on disc, still had to be sent 
from ‘up front’ by dispatch riders or small aircraft to wherever the transmitter and its 
tent had been set up, on Roman hillside or Tuscan vineyard, but at least we talked direct 
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from that point to London; editors in Broadcasting House could answer us back, and our 
spoken reports usually reached Britain pretty clearly.”417 Broadcasting from Athens in 
1944, Talbot continued, was a technical problem in that he had to send his reports by 
military wireless and BBC connections; he used a transmitter that relayed his news from 
Greece to Italy, and then on to London. This was lucky because the military and BBC 
channels were free while the Greek economy was crippled and using commercial 
channels, as was sometimes done, was not ideal: “Payment in cash would have been 
difficult: the currency had collapsed, as I realized when I went into an Athenian bank 
and asked to change a pound note into local money. I emerged with a kitbag stuffed with 
notes: the rate was 22,000,000,000,000 drachmas to the pound.”418 Moving on to France 
in August 1944, Talbot was equipped with the new Midget recording gear: “[A] small 
box – revolutionary then – in which recordings were made not on disc but on thin wire: 
yards and yards of it in coils, so that I could talk for many minutes on end.” Once he and 
the other correspondents had this new technology in hand, it allowed the BBC to greatly 
improve and even expand its war coverage. As Talbot noted: 
 
By the time final victory over the Germans was won, dozens of BBC 
men were in the field, combining many skills, performing a 
professional job in personal danger. Armed with the virtues of truth 
and courage – and new technical gear – they forged new broadcasting 
techniques and securely founded British radio’s world reputation for 
swift, accurate and vivid first-hand news spoken by men on the spot.419 
 
Being on the spot, however, was often a job in itself. Even without their carrier 
pigeons, typewriters, Midget portable recording devices or recording vehicles of various 
sizes, traveling to the war zones and moving around within them could be extremely 
difficult, whether due to rugged means of passage or simply a lack of transport 
altogether. And while correspondents considered obtaining and dispatching the news to 
the people in Britain and the Dominions to be an extremely important vocation, they all 
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recognized that life in the battle zones also came with numerous perils and harsh realities 
from punishing weather to the possibility of serious injury or death. The Second World 
War might have been the most dangerous for correspondents, since they were allowed 
such close proximity to the combat and the attendant risks. At the same time, when the 
fighting slowed and the reporters found an opportunity to escape the rigours of their 
work, they enjoyed some advantages and gratuities that were likely never attained by the 
foot soldiers whose stories they were there to record. This is why the travel, perils and 
perks experienced by the Second World War correspondents comprise another important 
chapter in their story. 
  
202 
Correspondent Travel, Peril and Plunder 
 
The Travelling Correspondent 
Matthew Halton of the Toronto Star described riding on a British destroyer 
carrying ammunition and food from Alexandria harbour to Tobruk harbour in August 
1941. This was a perilous journey taken on a regular basis during which it was not 
unheard of for destroyers to be lost to the frequent enemy aerial strikes. British naval 
officers had dubbed it “The Death Ride”. During his journey he heard a thud and thought 
the ship had been hit by a torpedo, but learned that a plane too high to be seen or heard 
had dropped bombs that fell into the sea forty feet from the bow.420 Later, German Stuka 
dive bombers also attacked the ship. Halton wrote: 
 
It is one thing to lie on your back on land and watch the Stukas dive, 
aiming at this or that gun position or group of vehicles in a large area, 
but something else to be on a small ship and know that this time it’s for 
you. The captain, the chief gunner and even the navigator stood there 
giving their commands as if ordering tea, even as the Stukas dived, 
machine-gunning as they came.421 
 
The planes missed Halton’s destroyer and another that was making the run, held 
off by the anti-aircraft guns of the ships. “In five minutes the action was over. I hoped 
nobody had noticed my knees.”422 Having arrived safely in Tobruk harbour, with some 
measure of luck, Halton had learned that even travel was a hazardous undertaking for 
correspondents during the war. 
Just trying to get to the areas where the fighting was taking place could be an 
adventure filled with beauty or danger, but most certainly with difficulty. Alan 
Moorehead summed up the strategy of travelling around the various war zones of the 
western theatre: “Covering the war in these huge countries we always tried to be at one 
of two places – at the front, or back at headquarters. Either way you got the news. But if 
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you were caught halfway you got nothing, and even if you did have any information you 
usually had no means of sending it.”423 Making sure he was in one of those two places 
was paramount to a correspondent’s job, but it was mostly troublesome and required 
resourcefulness, fortitude and especially patience. Direct flights over Europe were out of 
the question due to the German Luftwaffe menace, requiring correspondents to use a 
combination of land and sea travel, as well as air trips over non-combat areas that often 
took them far out of the way while trying to reach their destinations. To add to the 
difficulty, the war was a fluid, moving entity that required many transfers from one 
battlefield to the next. The correspondents were therefore frequently on the go in order to 
reach the next big story. 
Alex Clifford of the Daily Mail took a “flying boat” from Crete to Alexandria in 
June 1940 in anticipation of Italy joining the war and moving its troops to Egypt from 
Libya. Egypt presented serious geographical difficulties, Clifford noted, as it was 
“surrounded on three sides by impassable deserts and on the fourth by the sea.” Along 
with the other journalists in Cairo who “clamoured to be allowed up to this desert front”, 
he had to wait nearly a week for British military permission to move out “on that 
horrible journey I have made so many times since.” He described the travel along a 
“dead-straight, double-tracked motor road” headed toward Mena past the Cheops 
pyramid, moving north out of the Nile Valley toward the coast and then, with a turn 
west, into the desert. His initial expectations of the desert were “vague thoughts of 
rolling golden sand dunes, sheikhs on pure-blooded Arab steeds, romantic green oases”; 
the sort of idealized beauty that caught the imagination of numerous European travellers 
before him. Instead he encountered scrub brush and beige sand, of which he and so many 
other correspondents in the North African theatre complained: “Always there was dust – 
dust as fine as snuff or flour which can seep through closed lips and eyelids, through any 
clothing, which gets into food and bedding and gun barrels and aeroplane engines; 
which, when it blows, makes men pray for deliverance.” There was a dreaded thirty-mile 
stretch of the road, “known to thousands of drivers as the ‘Humpty Dumpty,’ where the 
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tarmac has been laid straight onto the desert surface, without foundations, and faithfully 
follows every bump (the contractor who built it, we learned, was still in prison.)”424 
Clifford also described what many correspondents making their maiden voyages through 
the desert must have become conscious of – its disorientating emptiness: 
 
For mile after mile the road was a shining black-satin ribbon bisecting 
an utterly monotonous landscape. It was all so unchanging that one had 
little or no sense of progression. The road might have been a 
continuous band going round and round. At the end of that first trip my 
memory of it was telescoped into one static picture of a dun-coloured 
countryside slashed by a black strip of sand-proof tarmac…. [The 
desert] is thoroughly bewildering until you know it. You find your 
sense of direction completely fuddled and you can’t tell whether the 
horizon is one mile away or five. You need to get your stomach and 
your mind and your eyes and your habits thoroughly acclimatized to it 
before you can be happy living and fighting in it.425 
 
Alaric Jacob of Reuters took a slow trip to the Middle East when he was 
dispatched to cover the North African war in 1941. A reading of various correspondents’ 
memoirs and letters and memoranda show that his experience was typical. He started at 
King’s Cross Station in London and took a train to Edinburgh. He then boarded a Dutch 
freighter on a seven-week journey that took him 10,000 miles through Atlantic waters 
past Iceland, Newfoundland, the American east coast, the West Indies and Brazil on the 
way to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa before traveling north toward his 
target.426 Godfrey Talbot of the BBC stated that, “It was the very devil getting into that 
war. Most frustrating.” He added that during the war he normally found his travels to the 
battlefields to be “bizarre and baffling.” His first trip to Cairo in 1942 included travel up 
to Scotland, then a voyage with Atlantic and West African convoys that involved the 
danger of torpedoes, a stop-over in Nigeria, “hitchhiking” with civilian aircraft from 
Nigeria to the Congo and Uganda, and finally flying along the Nile. In all it took him six 
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weeks to arrive in the Egyptian capital from London.427 In his field diary kept during the 
war, Chester Wilmot of the BBC described transferring to different ships seven times 
during his initial deployment, using his sleeping bag to get a hard nap on one ship: 
“While the others breakfasted I curled up on wardroom seat for a cold sleep.”428 Halton, 
who eventually left the Toronto Star to work for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
said travel by sea was “a waste of a good life.” He deployed in April 1941 on a ship that 
was part of a convoy carrying 20,000 troops and other war correspondents to the Middle 
East, a trip he found stultifying. “I vegetated for several weeks – weeks in which time 
seemed not to pass,” Halton wrote. He recalled that during the trip he endured the worst 
condition of all for a news man – very little news: 
 
For news of what was happening in the world we had only the briefest 
of daily bulletins. On May 10th the Germans bombed London and the 
night was an apocalypse of flames and horror – we read three lines 
about it in our daily bulletin. Greece fell and the British Army there 
was evacuated – we had six lines in the bulletin. The Germans sank the 
Hood and the British sank the Bismarck – in another six lines. Rudolf 
Hess flew to England – in one line.429 
 
These accounts indicate the sort of tedious, frustrating and often uncomfortable 
conditions that were the norm for correspondents deploying to the war. Meandering 
routes across both sea and land were not unusual and often necessary, sometimes for 
safety precautions in order to keep away from the German land and air forces, but more 
often due to the paucity of available transport. 
In spring 1941, Alan Moorehead experienced what was a familiar and frequent 
predicament for correspondents in the Second World War: working desperately just to 
find adequate transportation as a distant story slipped away. Arriving in Nairobi, Kenya, 
Moorehead heard that Italian-held Addis Ababa was about to fall to the Allies and he 
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wanted to reach the Abyssinian capital to cover the story in person. He began by taking a 
flight of a few thousand miles, the pilot landing twice at refuelling stations and finding 
that only the first had any petrol, before reaching a muddy airfield located miles outside 
the Abyssinian city of Harar. The field was “wet and dangerous” and soldiers told the 
pilot they had been trying to radio him with a warning not to land. The soldiers then 
could not risk getting a vehicle stuck on the sodden runway so “there was nothing for it 
but to struggle across a mile of mud with our baggage in the darkness” to a waiting 
truck. Moorehead found, however, that this detour in the journey was more of a 
roadblock: “No plane was going onto Addis Ababa. No convoys were going. A private 
car I could not have, since hostile banda tribesmen were swarming along the roads and 
attacking single vehicles.” He said the British Army’s intelligence unit in Harar offered 
to let him send two hundred words per day back to his paper with its signals equipment, 
“but everyone was too busy and too harassed with their own job to bother about a stray 
journalist.” The British forces were moving into Addis Ababa and Moorehead was stuck 
three hundred miles away, a bitter pill after having travelled 3,000 miles for the story.430 
Rather than be cowed, however, Moorehead adopted the singular principle 
employed by so many other correspondents beset with travel difficulties, which is a 
recurring theme in their war memoirs: reach the story by any available means. The Daily 
Express reporter spent the night in a R.A.F. mess hall and waited in vain the next day for 
a flight out of Harar. In the evening he therefore decided to take his chances on a 
military convoy of three trucks and an officer’s staff car that held the promise of 
reaching the capital in twenty-four hours, but heavy rains in the mountains forced them 
to stop at 2 am. In the morning they realized they were on the wrong road. By 2 pm, 
following an encounter with African soldiers, the party reached the spot where they had 
spent the previous night and embarked upon the correct road. Over the next twenty-four 
hours they travelled through a valley that dropped several thousand feet and whose roads 
had been ripped apart by Italian explosives and then became “an interminable series of 
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small switchbacks through the thick scrub” before rising 7,000 feet above sea level to 
Addis Ababa.431 
BBC radio engineer Bob Crawford described how the difficulties of travelling in 
Africa could become dangerous, partly due to his headstrong broadcasting partner, 
correspondent Edward Ward: 
 
There were times we went out on the desert with a vehicle that 
shouldn’t have been off the tarmac. There was one occasion when 
[Ward] wanted to get to this particular unit and we followed the 
telephone wires which should have led to them, except we met a 
signals unit vehicle coming in the other direction, rolling the wires in. 
Now the sensible thing to do would have been to go back to the 
starting point, but Ward reckoned that we were fairly close so on we 
went. We went 10 miles, 15 miles, another 15: and now we were in 
trouble because we were at a barbed wire fence and the posts with the 
death’s head on them; we were either in a minefield or the other side of 
a minefield. It got dark so we bedded down. The next morning, looking 
over this little hill, we could see a sandbag enclosure with anti-aircraft 
guns. But we hadn’t a clue if we were in front of our own troops or 
what. So we put our hands up and walked forward. Luckily they were 
British and we got breakfast.432 
 
An internal report by BBC engineer M.C. Donovan to managers in London dated 
13 April 1942 is informative not only regarding the difficulty of travel, but also about 
the resourcefulness and determination with which the reporters and sound engineers 
dealt with their transport problems. “Throughout the various Campaigns our greatest 
concern and difficulty was to get dispatches back to the nearest base where the Records 
could be mailed off by plane,” Donovan wrote. He explained that in the Desert War he, 
or Dimbleby, or both of them, would overcome the paucity of dispatch riders by 
themselves driving a truck – a six-wheeled vehicle commandeered from the Italians and 
loaned to them by the British Army – anywhere up to 200 miles “simply to set a couple 
of Records rolling towards the nearest Turntable about 2,000 miles distant.” He said the 
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conditions of these trips, usually taken after a day in incredibly high temperatures, were 
far from ideal and taxed the men to the edge: “We have often had to stop driving through 
sheer physical exhaustion to take ten minutes ‘shut eye’ on the bare ground to recuperate 
sufficiently to drive another few miles in safety before having to repeat the process.” He 
mentioned narrow escapes when one or the other fell asleep at the wheel on twisty 
mountain roads. What he termed a waste of petrol, time and energy could have been 
avoided, he claimed, if they simply had a portable Morse Code transmitter.433 
Travel in Europe later in the war could be just as scattershot or dangerous as in 
North Africa. As in Africa, correspondents in Europe at times had to travel by whatever 
means they could muster, or randomly encounter, or beg from officials. Often they were 
just as reliant on the military for getting to the story as for the story itself. Yet at times 
even the military seemed unsure as to how to navigate the issue of transport for 
correspondents. A War Office file compiled in July 1944 includes notes for Eisenhower 
and his Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, for a briefing of correspondents that 
was held on 22 May 1944.434 On the job of the war correspondent, Smith addressed what 
were perceived as the “two controlling forces” of a combat journalist’s work: to get the 
facts and to get the story to their respective press or radio outlets. “The great problems 
are transportation and communications. It would be ideal if we could provide each one 
of you with a personal driver, a jeep and a walkie-talkie tuned to London but that is out 
of the question,” he told the reporters at the briefing, discussing how in the early days of 
the Second Front it would be better for correspondents to work in groups due to limited 
communications resources.435 He further remarked: 
 
The transportation problem, aside from the limited number of vehicles, 
also offers a problem to correspondents. The crowded conditions of 
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pools cuts into valuable time and sometimes nullifies the enterprise of 
a correspondent. Take the case of a group wishing to visit a certain 
division. The distance is not great, but the roads are jammed with 
transport. There are cases in the Mediterranean theatre where a single 
bridge formed a bottleneck which took eight hours to pass. Naturally, 
the car carrying the correspondents would have to wait its turn to get 
across. It will be a case of weighing the value of the story against the 
time consumed in getting it – that is for your judgment.436 
 
This reveals that Smith and the rest of the planners at SHAEF were well aware of 
the situation on the ground for reporters and the difficulties, especially in the area of 
transport. He also made clear that the correspondents were largely on their own once out 
in the field. 
While they might not have been a top priority in terms of transportation, the 
military did not completely abandon the correspondents to fend for themselves. In fact, 
one part of the SHAEF hierarchy wanted to ensure it had oversight of the movement of 
correspondents. A memorandum of 18 July 1944 to Smith from SHAEF staff discussed 
the handling of correspondent transport by the military’s Public Relations Division. The 
document recalls a request earlier that month by PR Division to be the “sponsoring 
authority and also authorising agency for movement of war correspondents.” It also 
indicates that the request was turned down by SHAEF leadership on the grounds that the 
travel and accommodation problems were so strained as to prevent oversight of the 
correspondents at that time. This memorandum renews the request, arguing that “the 
functions of the Public Relations Division cannot be properly and expeditiously carried 
out unless it has complete control and authority over the movement by air, sea and land 
of accredited war correspondents.” The PR staff sought not only to coordinate initial 
travel arrangements for correspondents into combat areas, but also to follow up with 
arrangement of substitutions for wounded journalists, facilitate rotation of 
correspondents in and out of the war zones, as well as to help provide additional 
reinforcements of the press corps when it was necessary in a specific field of operations. 
“Rotation plans, shifting of correspondents, replacement of casualties, reinforcements, 
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etc. are all accomplished in accordance with quotas established by the Public Relations 
Plan and accommodations for correspondents already exist.”437 This was clearly a 
bureaucratic attempt to exert control over a potential scenario in which correspondents 
went wandering about the battlefield using whatever transportation they could manage 
rather than remaining under the purview and authority of the army authorities, even if 
they were with an accompanying officer. Yet the military attempting to facilitate the 
transport of correspondents around the combat areas only benefited the journalists in 
terms of obtaining vehicles from the military rather than always being left to their own 
devices. 
Talbot described how all of the BBC’s transport was on loan from the British 
Army, stating that during his Italian service he “wore out two jeeps, one fifteen-
hundredweight truck and a military staff car.” He recalled that in 1944 alone two 
vehicles were stolen from him “in that cesspit of thievery—Naples….” He appealed 
personally to General Montgomery, who wrote a note to his staff: “Issue to Mr. Talbot, 
one jeep.” This got him a brand new vehicle from the Press Relations corps. Four 
months after the war ended, back in London, Talbot received a phone call from the War 
Office informing him that his jeep was waiting for him and asking him to provide his 
home address for delivery. Talbot, who was flabbergasted that Montgomery’s scribbling 
had been taken as actually giving him a jeep rather than just loaning it, turned down the 
gift, not wanting the expense of obtaining petrol during the austerity of post-war Britain. 
The BBC, however, took the vehicle and used it for future overseas reporting 
assignments, until it was eventually stolen in Greece.438 
Some correspondents employed resourceful but more unorthodox modes of 
transport. In late April 1945 Edward Ward needed to report the much-anticipated 
rendezvous of American and Russian forces on the Elbe at Torgau, Germany. He was 
informed that SHAEF planned to block release of the story for twenty-four hours, if not 
longer, so he wrote a long cable about the meeting to be sent to the BBC and then 
                                                 
437  TNA, WO204/2215/AFHQ/2048 (July 1944), “Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, 
Subject: Travel of Accredited War Correspondents”, 18 July 1944. 
438  Godfrey Talbot, Ten Seconds From Now: A Broadcaster’s Story (London: 
Hutchinson, 1973), pp. 95-96. 
211 
headed off with the intent of reaching Paris by airplane, where he could transmit directly 
to London. He took a jeep ride from a press camp at Eilenburg to the airfield in Weimar, 
but inclement weather prevented more than one in five flights from departing that 
morning and he was informed he would certainly not find passage to Paris from there. A 
call to BBC correspondent Frank Gillard confirmed the weather had also grounded 
flights out of Wiesbaden and there was no chance of sending a small plane to collect 
Ward and take him to Paris. So he decided to move west by the only manner left to him: 
“Frank advised me to try and get road transport to Wiesbaden and broadcast from there 
over the B.B.C. transmitter. But it was impossible to get transport of any kind. There 
was only one thing for it. Hitch-hiking.”439 Ward had to thumb his way 200 miles in 
seven hours to make the BBC’s nightly 9 pm broadcast: 
 
I had no sooner reached the road when a jeep driven by a negro soldier 
approached. I stopped him and asked if he was making for Frankfurt. 
No, he was going to Fulda. But that would take me a good bit on my 
way, and if I cared to jump in he’d be glad to drop me on the 
Autobahn. I should be able to pick up something else there easily 
enough. We drove at breakneck speed for seventy miles, and just off 
the Autobahn I found a convoy of trucks just about to take off. One of 
the drivers said they were going to a place about half-way to Frankfurt, 
and if I cared to come along with them I would be welcome. I added 
another fifty miles to my total. I had no sooner jumped off the truck 
than a jeep came up just as if I had ordered it. It wasn’t going to 
Frankfurt, but to Mainz. That was even better. Two American officers 
were in the jeep and they made room for me between them. I told them 
my problem and explained how vital it was for me to get to Wiesbaden 
before nine o’clock. I pointed out that Wiesbaden was only a few miles 
from Mainz, and asked them as a great favour to take me there…. But 
between Frankfurt and Wiesbaden a tyre burst, and precious minutes 
were lost changing the wheel. And then we took a wrong road…. By 
means of almost shameless persuasion I had got them to go a very 
considerable distance out of their way and they had ended up in 
Wiesbaden on a pouring wet night with no prospects even of finding 
anywhere to spend the night. So I felt it was only what I deserved when 
I was dumped in the street after they had found some military police 
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who offered them shelter for the night. By this time it was past nine 
o’clock, and I had missed the news.440 
 
As Ward indicated, by the end of the war the transport situation was probably 
bordering on chaotic in terms of reaching anywhere. Ward, who had managed to make it 
to Paris and then London and then back to Paris in spring 1945, was told to report on the 
3rd US Army, which he could reach via a plane flying out of Le Bourget. Ward 
explained his situation to a sergeant at flight control, but the sergeant’s response was 
indicative of the confusion that permeated logistics in the fast-moving last days of the 
war in Europe: “‘Haven’t an idea,’ he said cheerfully. ‘Would you suppose it’s in 
Germany? Because we’ve got one [flight] going to Germany at 11.15….’ I thought to 
myself that I’d better get on this plane since nobody seemed to know anything about 3rd 
Army H.Q. here, and anyway Germany would be a step in the right direction.”441 
Even getting away from the war could be difficult. Peter Stursberg said that when 
he was called back to London from Algiers, he first flew to Rabat, Morocco, but then 
had to remain there for four days: “Every day and sometimes twice a day I would visit 
the airport, only to be told that people with higher priorities were ahead of me.”442 Yet 
he was not cowed, as the travel difficulties during the conflict had given him some 
unusually helpful life skills, boasting in a letter home, “The war has made me a 
marvellous hitch hiker.”443 Travel along standard routes, including civilian transport, 
also held troubles and even dangers, as described in a second-hand account of a fateful 
trip by Kenneth Stonehouse written by his Reuters colleagues: “Transatlantic travel in 
wartime held risks of attack from the air and by submarine. Stonehouse and his wife, 
Evelyn, a vivacious 22-year-old, 13 years younger than him, sailed from New York on 
12 May 1943, aboard the Portuguese liner S.S. Serpa Pinto. Portugal was a neutral state. 
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They reached Lisbon on 28th May.”444 The story explains that their flight to London was 
booked for five days later: 
 
At 9.30 a.m. on Tuesday 2nd June, the Stonehouses left Lisbon for 
London aboard a DC3 of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, 
BOAC, forerunner of British Airways. There were 13 passengers and 
four Dutch crew members aboard. Over the Bay of Biscay shortly 
before 11 am, the aircraft reported it was under attack by a German 
plane. Then the radio went dead. The wreckage was never recovered 
and there were no survivors.445 
 
However, war travel was not all gloom and frustration; there was still easy and 
even enjoyable passage in some places. Peter Stursberg said it hardly seemed like there 
was a war at all when he was moving about in southern France.446 Moorehead, an 
airsickness sufferer, said there was one trip by air over Africa he could “almost enjoy”, 
which was the flight up the Nile River Valley on a flying boat. “Even the meaningless 
and utterly boring shapes of the Pyramids achieve a faint distinction from the air. All the 
rest of the journey is just the green ribbon of the Nile and the desert roasting itself under 
the ‘unrelenting triumph of the sun.’ You are not obliged to look at anything, since there 
is nothing to see.”447 Matthew Halton, who professed a hatred for travel, especially by 
sea, said quite the opposite about his first expedition to Africa during a “wonderful four-
day trip in a British flying boat.” Halton wrote a glowing description of the sights of the 
Dark Continent: 
 
We took off each morning, from Durban, Mozambique, Lake Victoria 
and Khartoum, in breath-taking sunrises. The first day’s flight was 
over the Africa of miasmic swamps and jungles and oozing sludgy 
rivers. The second was over Uganda and Kenya, the Africa of hot dry 
uplands and native villages and the snows of Kilimanjaro. The third, 
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after a night on the equator at Lake Victoria, was over the Sudan, and 
the pilot flew the aircraft very low for three hours to show us hundreds 
of giraffes, thousands of elephants, tens of thousands of deer, herds of 
rhinoceroses and zebras.448 
 
These descriptions and anecdotes demonstrate that there was no standard, or 
usually easy, form of transportation for correspondents in the Second World War. The 
recurrent tales of roundabout journeys, hitching rides, begging or borrowing transport, 
facing dangers on the road, getting stuck in various exotic or more often remote 
locations, or simply getting stuck in the mud, shows that reporting a story was at times 
less difficult than merely getting oneself to the story. This was clearly one of the more 
arduous tasks of a correspondent’s job, although it was hardly the most stressful aspect 
of life in the war zone. 
 
Correspondent Perils 
Speaking to reporters prior to the D-Day landings, General Walter Bedell Smith 
said he was aware of the hazards which the correspondents would endure in the coming 
days and cautioned them not to act recklessly for the sake of a story: “There is no need 
to elaborate on the dangers that you are to face. The record of war correspondents in this 
war and the list of casualties speaks for itself. However, needless exposure to danger 
serves no one. A wounded or dead correspondent doesn’t produce any copy except the 
story of his own misfortune – and that has to be written by someone else.” He added that 
the reporters were about to cover “the greatest news story of modern times… not in the 
quiet corner of a library, but in the blazing hell of battle. You will be called upon to do 
this when you are tired, dirty and hungry – C rations get mighty boring at times.” Yet he 
said he was sure that, as with the military, the correspondents were “determined to do 
better than our best.”449 This was all true: the correspondents went beyond the normal 
call of their journalistic duty throughout the war, and at times suffered for it. 
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This has been the case for years through many conflicts, and still is today. In his 
2008 book, War Journal, NBC News foreign correspondent Richard Engel outlines his 
theory of the four stages he believes correspondents go through when covering war 
zones: 
 
Stage One: I’m invincible. Nothing can hurt me. I’m Superman. Stage 
Two: What I’m doing is dangerous. I might get hurt over here. I’d 
better be careful. Stage Three: What I’m doing is really dangerous. I 
am probably going to get hurt over here no matter how careful I am. 
Math and probability and time are working against me. Stage Four: I 
have been here too long. I am going to die over here. It is just a matter 
of time. I’ve played the game too long.450 
 
While the Second World War correspondents did not articulate this theory in their 
memoirs, it is likely they went through stages and had thoughts very similar to those 
described by Engel. This was clearly a very different type of journalism than what they 
had performed in the offices, meeting rooms, town halls or streets of Britain and the 
Dominion nations prior to the war. Even the most hard-nosed newspaper beats, such as 
coverage of the police and fire-fighting forces, did not include being shot at and dodging 
explosive ordinance; but for the correspondent covering the fighting in the Second 
World War, this was a frequent occurrence, especially as they were allowed to be in 
much closer proximity to the fighting than in previous conflicts. Yet while they were all 
working as war reporters on a voluntary basis and could have stopped covering the war 
and gone home if they felt its risks and adversities were too much for them to endure, 
their dedication won out over thoughts of personal danger and once they arrived at a 
battle zone, by whatever means necessary, the correspondents willingly endured many of 
the same privations and risks as the combatants themselves. 
This occupational hazard was something that was understood by news consumers 
as part of the lives of soldiers but not necessarily those of the news reporters who 
brought them the combat stories. Correspondents did not discuss their personal safety in 
                                                 
450  Richard Engel, War Journal: My Five Years In Iraq (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2008), p. 177. 
216 
dispatches, since print page space was too tight and radio airtime too short to discuss the 
dangers of gathering wartime news, although descriptions of battle clearly conveyed 
they were often in treacherous circumstances. But with soldiers dying around them on a 
daily basis, the reporters would have been seen to be putting themselves in a category of 
greater importance had they showed anything other than the same fortitude as the 
subjects of their stories. Therefore, they did not express their state of mind about the 
peril they faced. That did not mean, however, they were not concerned for themselves 
and their colleagues. Alan Moorehead described his feelings upon departing from a 
group of his fellow correspondents: “When they had gone it was in my mind that 
anything might happen and we might not meet again.”451 
Edward Ward was not able to meet with his fellow reporters in the field for years 
following his capture in November 1941, which occurred during a Panzer attack on the 
makeshift desert headquarters of a South African army brigade. The soldiers and the 
correspondents covering them – including Ward and his sound engineer Bob Crawford, 
Harold Denny of The New York Times, and journalists from the Associated Press and 
South African Radio – were surrounded by German forces whose tanks and shells were 
getting closer by the moment. Ward and his colleagues dug slit trenches that would keep 
them below the level of the surface sand and, ostensibly, any bullets and bombs flying 
overhead.452 He described the incoming munitions in acoustic terms: 
 
The orchestra had stopped tuning up. The symphony had started…. 
Things were warming up in a rising crescendo. Harold at last climbed 
into his slit-trench. We were all lying down now…. The brass gave 
way to the strings. A pizzicato of machine-gun bullets followed the 
screaming, booming shells. Then the shells started again…. The din 
was overpowering. And then came a deep, rumbling noise, which was 
greatly magnified through the fact of my being below ground-level. It 
grew louder and louder, and as the noise increased the machine-gun 
bullets came thicker and thicker, until they hummed a few feet over my 
head like a wasps’ nest…. The firing died down somewhat. Then came 
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an appalling noise. I looked up and saw a German tank heading straight 
for my slit-trench.453 
 
These are the sorts of stories that did not appear in the newspapers or on the radio, 
but were left to the memoirs of correspondents. An analysis of these memoirs and other 
sources, such as internal memoranda, does, however, show a fairly common pattern: 
while the details and locations differ, correspondents routinely risked their lives to get 
the news to the public. In the case of Ward, his book focuses on how he lost his freedom 
for a large stretch of the war and suffered in the squalid conditions of Italian and German 
POW camps. Yet, like other correspondents, he accepted personal hazards as a part of 
his job. 
Frank Gillard of the BBC was pragmatic about these risks: “As a war 
correspondent I operated on the front line.” He explained that his first overseas 
assignment was at the Allied general headquarters in Cairo before moving outside of 
Tripoli to cover the British 8th Army. He was dedicated to the premise of reporting just 
“what I could see with my own eyes.” He believed he could only be sure of his stories if 
they came from his own experiences: 
 
And that was my policy right through the war from then on. I was not a 
base reporter, I was a front line reporter. I trained with the troops and 
knew what it was like to have a shell exploding right beside us, and 
men dropping dead at my feet. This didn't happen often but if you are a 
war correspondent, you naturally go to the area where action is taking 
place. Therefore, you are bound to be exposed continuously to these 
dangers. You accept that.454 
 
Indeed, correspondents working so close to the action were often in as much 
danger as troops. Clifford and Moorehead found themselves the target of attack, rather 
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than observers, in Libya in February 1941 while travelling with Australian troops 
hunting Italian forces. Along with their conducting officer, British army Captain 
Geoffrey Keating, they moved up ahead of the column of regular Australian army with a 
patrol of British armoured cars, encountering Italians who were ready to surrender and 
who told them the road was clear for miles up ahead. The patrol found another group of 
Italians around a corner, but these were setting mines and scattered into bushes alongside 
the road when they saw the approaching Allies. The British disembarked from their 
vehicles and began tearing up the mines. Moorehead recalled, “As they worked, the 
Italians, about half a dozen in all, emerged onto the road a little higher up and stood 
watching us. It was strange they did not surrender. ‘Give them a burst,’ someone began 
to say, and then from the hill ahead a long whining scream of bullets came down the 
roadway. We were ambushed.” They tried to take cover by the side of the road but came 
under heavy fire from Breda machine guns and mortars a few hundred yards away. “The 
fire was very close and very heavy and our cover not more than eighteen inches, so we 
had to stop and be still from time to time,” Moorehead wrote. “Clifford was nicked 
neatly in the behind. Another bullet passed through the folds of the sleeve of my 
greatcoat, and, certain I was hit, I remember waiting frigidly for the pain to come. By 
now the line of cars was blazing, and although the enemy could see Clifford and me 
alone, trying to bind up the wounded men, they concentrated all their fire upon us.”455 
Moorehead later reflected on the incident the introspective hindsight of nearly three 
decades: 
 
This was my first acquaintance with death, and I think I can remember 
it very well. I never thought of surrendering. I thought only: this is too 
cruel, they cannot realise what they are doing to us. If they were here 
with us they would see it and they would stop. No one, not even a 
hungry beast, could inflict harm like this. There could be no hatred or 
anger in the world which would want to hurt us so much.456 
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He described its effect on his subsequent performance as a correspondent, which 
was antithetical to the image of the swaggering, death-defying reporter conjured up by 
Hemingway or war films: “I do not think that I ever recovered from this incident. Often 
afterwards we were obliged to put ourselves briefly in the way of danger, but I never 
again did it with any confidence or even with any feeling of dedication. Whenever I 
went into danger I did it as a duty or because I thought that others were watching me.”457 
This theme of great danger is present in the stories of other correspondents; their 
memoirs or biographies include admissions of fear and mortality that were a departure 
from the straight factual accounts put out to the public in the newspapers and over the 
radio. Richard Dimbleby was frequently in danger and was brave in its face, but may 
also have been harbouring fears. In Eritrea, he had some very close calls. A British 
airplane accidentally bombed the Allied base camp at the battle of Keren and killed six 
soldiers in close proximity to him. On another occasion, as he looked over a ridge at a 
nearby Italian position, a bullet struck a rock near his head, prompting a soldier to 
remark that the enemy normally did not shoot at that hour, adding, “It must be your size, 
thought you were a general I expect.” Continuing on with the British troops toward the 
Red Sea, an Italian mortar attack caught Dimbleby and an officer exposed in a road; one 
of the shells landed within feet of him, but failed to detonate. While in Greece, an Italian 
dive-bomber dropped its payload next to a car carrying Dimbleby and two other 
correspondents and blew out the vehicle’s windows. In late August 1941, on a mountain 
road in Iran, a group of men brandishing rifles and sticks tried to stop a car carrying 
Dimbleby and The Times correspondent James Holburn. The driver slowed before the 
two correspondents loudly ordered him to drive through the outlaws and Dimbleby used 
a thermos to smash the hand of a man hanging onto the car door. Jonathan Dimbleby 
related, “The next day German radio announced that two British correspondents had 
been captured in Persia – before the two reporters had had time to report it – and ever 
afterwards Dimbleby was convinced that the ambush had been arranged by the Germans 
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to silence him.”458 In January 1943 Dimbleby was among the first group of journalists to 
climb aboard RAF Lancasters for a bombing run over Berlin; he eventually flew on 
twenty missions.459 Considering the extraordinary number of casualties suffered by the 
Royal Air Force – nearly 70,000 killed, with almost 56,000 of those from Bomber 
Command460 – Dimbleby took a huge risk by going on so many flights. That became 
even more obvious with the deaths of two of his colleagues during bombing missions 
over Germany.461 Despite his brave flying record, however, Dimbleby was so anxious 
about his first bombing mission that on the way back he just missed a crew member 
when he vomited. Jonathan Dimbleby wrote, “At the best of times he was frightened of 
flying; he always felt ill and was frequently sick.”462 
Writing about the fall of Tunis in May 1943, Alexander Clifford described the 
dangers of close-quarters combat and how he was at one point literally in the firing line: 
 
The worst thing about street fighting is that you don’t know where the 
bullets are coming from or where they are going. I edged along the 
street jerkily, wondering where to go for cover. Just across the way 
hand-grenades started to explode. I drew in my breath sharply as a 
burst of fire whined straight across beside me above my shoulder, and I 
stared bewildered when I saw that a British soldier had fired it. Then I 
looked behind me and a German was squirming in his own blood in the 
garden of a villa.463 
 
In such close quarters with combat, these brushes with death were commonplace, 
and the risk of injury was just as high. In this way the correspondents lived – or died – in 
nearly the same way as the soldiers. Although, as Talbot explained, escaping unscathed 
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was sometimes simply a matter of luck or, in some cases, physique. Talbot recalled 
ducking into a roadside track to avoid an incoming anti-personnel bomb. He lay 
alongside his conducting officer, who suffered bomb splinters in his backside: “I was 
lucky that time: he was a fat man and his bottom stuck up more than mine did.”464 
At times some reporters also took direct part in combat activities, breaking not 
only Allied regulations but also the unwritten law of journalists to be observers only. 
Cyril Ray of the Manchester Guardian delivered a message to a platoon ordering it to 
withdraw after its commander and sergeant had been killed, bringing the men back to 
safety. He volunteered for the job.465 Clifford was an equally bold sort of correspondent, 
although even his friend, Moorehead, admitted to being unsure whether the former acted 
out of bravado or necessity: “With Alex I could never tell.” Moorehead recounted the 
example of a RAF flight over Sicily during which the mid-ship gunner was wounded and 
Clifford took over his weapon and shot down an enemy fighter plane. “But the 
interesting thing was that he experienced no elation from the exploit, or at any rate he 
never expressed satisfaction of any kind. Later on he went on other bombing raids as 
well, usually without telling me beforehand, and as the months went by it became clear 
that he was one of those men who from time to time have to test themselves in some 
adventure lest they should grow to fear too much.”466 After Clifford took over the gun of 
that wounded airman, the incident was kept quiet because of the non-combatant status of 
war correspondents, a protection Clifford likely would have lost in the eyes of the 
Germans if the event had ever been publicized. Already facing the risk of capture run by 
every British and Dominion correspondent who wore a military uniform and travelled 
with Allied forces, the near certainty of execution if he was captured would have made 
his continued work as a battle-zone journalist untenable. Then there was the more 
obvious issue of breaking one of the basic rules for correspondents, who were banned 
from engaging in combat or even carrying a weapon, although this regulation was 
disregarded by some correspondents who considered being armed or taking part in a 
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fight simple self-preservation.467 If called upon, some correspondents, while not actually 
taking part in combat, were willing to do so. Gillard explained that this idea of self-
preservation was taken up at the BBC office in Cairo: “The climate among the staff was 
a very, very worried climate. And I remember sitting in on discussions about ‘what do 
we do if the Germans come here? What do we do then?’ And there were some members 
of the staff, of course, who said ‘we fight ‘em.’”468 
Being under the path of bombs or shell-fire was another occupational hazard in a 
conflict with such a fluid frontline. Reporting on the siege of Tobruk, Alaric Jacob 
returned to his tent after a bath in an old wine barrel when he heard aircraft overhead. 
Watching bombs drop on the port from the front of the tent, he was thrown off his feet 
and began digging into the sand inside his shelter. He felt objects coming through the 
material, which later turned out to be splinters, and smoke and sand filled the air. Wadi 
Auda, a small oasis of only eight tents which was near Tobruk and he recommended to 
friends as a place of rest, had been targeted by at least twenty-five Stukas. “Scraps of 
metal lay on the floor, still hot, and there were holes all over my roof. I had been very, 
very lucky,” he recalled. “The soft sand had absorbed much of the blast, otherwise I 
could hardly have hoped to get away with it.”469 In his memoir, Edward Ward explained 
he had faced significant dangers from the air before he was captured: “I thought of the 
time Geoffrey Cox and I had lain on the ground under the bell-tower of Tournai 
cathedral, when the Germans had blitzed the town. That had seemed like the end, too. 
Only that last bomb had hit a house just in front of us – instead of hitting us. I’d been 
surprised that time that I hadn’t felt frightened.”470 Soon after he was taken prisoner, 
however, Ward endured bombing by his own side while being transported in a German 
truck: 
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My mind went back a few months to the time when I had been in 
Tobruk myself at an O.P. [observation post] which was directing 
artillery fire on Italian transport travelling along the very same road. It 
had been highly accurate fire, too. Now I was under the same fire 
myself. A shell burst right alongside a lorry a hundred yards behind 
mine, killing several prisoners. Other shells burst uncomfortably near. 
The German drivers continued grimly on their way. We had a brief 
respite from the shelling, and then the R.A.F. took up the attack. This 
time the lorries stopped, and we were allowed to get out and take 
cover.471 
 
In Italy, the war was not always the most immediate danger. At times the locals 
could be a hazard on their own. Talbot was in a car accident between Naples and Rome 
in which the vehicle hit a tree and landed upside down. He and the driver climbed out 
after being trapped inside for a short time, only to find men and boys running away with 
the baggage and tools that were in the trunk of the auto. “They had thought us dead or 
knocked-out and were making sure of the loot.” He recalled that a short time later, on a 
road not far away, an American general was held up by a band of armed robbers.472 Even 
Mother Nature could pose hazards for correspondents. More than a few journalists in 
their memoirs described the weather being a hindrance, if not worse. The whipping 
sands of the North African deserts, the cold of winter in France and Belgium, the mud 
and rain encountered all over the European continent; these were all impediments to 
getting the news and at times presented risks that were obviously far less predictable 
than the enemy. 
 
Perks and Plunder 
While facing many of the same dangers, clearly the correspondents lived a 
different sort of frontline existence than the fighters. Clifford described the early days of 
the Desert War, when “a whole method and standard of living was being worked out 
empirically” among soldiers and reporters alike, which was very different than the 
situations in military camps as described by Richard Harding Davis more than thirty 
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years earlier when correspondents were expected to offer food, alcohol and other 
comfort items to officers so they were not accused of doing their deployments “on the 
cheap”. Clifford wrote: 
 
There was in those days a rule that in camps there should be a distance 
of two hundred yards, not only between vehicles, but between camp-
beds. We used to sleep dotted about all over the landscape, each with a 
grave-like slit trench beside him. We war correspondents made a point 
of being completely self-contained. Every drop of water we used we 
had to bring with us from Cairo, and we almost never accepted the 
hospitality that was offered us for no one had anything to give away.473 
 
At the start of their deployments some of the correspondents found life quite 
comfortable. In Khartoum, Sudan, Moorehead discovered a great oasis at the city’s 
Grand Hotel, where local dignitaries gathered to enjoy the fruits of the British Empire’s 
wealth and listen to the BBC on the radio: “Here on the terrace, which is perhaps two 
degrees cooler than the smiting sunshine outside, you meet ivory hunters and coffee 
planters from Juba and Wau up the river. On that terrace I was introduced to the pleasant 
custom of taking a bottle of iced beer for breakfast. From there I saw my first wild 
hippopotamus floating down the White Nile.”474 However, he found in the early summer 
of 1941 that the realities of the heightening North African war had crept into and altered 
this idyllic scene: 
 
There was great movement in the lounge and the terrace was crowded. 
Soldiers and airmen moved about everywhere… all these in addition to 
the habitués. And Wavell and de Gaulle coming from opposite 
directions were expected on the morrow. Two Tomahawks flew by, 
and staff cars kept driving up to the hotel. Down the road headquarters 
had filled a whole great red-brick block and the place buzzed like a 
hive. You no longer knew each officer by name – the staff had 
multiplied out of all knowledge and lurked behind strings of initials 
placarded upon its office doors.475 
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This change in atmosphere as the war progressed was noted in several accounts by 
correspondents; rather than the comfort and grandeur that previously welcomed 
travelling journalists, when they returned to their favourite pre- and early-war haunts in 
various African and European cities they found them crowded or emptied or dulled in 
various ways. 
Yet even after the end of what might be called the “Khartoum days”, the war 
correspondents still found ways to wring perks and small comforts from the war zones. 
Arriving in the European quarter of Derna in Libya in early 1941, Moorehead recorded 
that he and other correspondents chose to stay in a villa “close to the sea, richly hung 
with flowering bougainvillea”, that had been abandoned by the retreating Italian 
commander, Marshal Graziani: “Except for minor looting, everything had been left as it 
was, and soon we had good wines on the table and a fire going. I wallowed in the bath, 
washing away a week’s dirt.” He reminisced, “For three nights we slept in Derna on 
made beds. We lived luxuriously, and friends would drop in to taste our cooking and 
selection of wines. Two officers driving up from the rear left cards on us, and we sent 
them a couple of bottles of the marshal’s better brandy.”476 Toward the end of the Desert 
War, Moorehead talked about living in “comfortable safe billets behind the line”. As the 
war moved north and Naples fell to the Allies, he then “settled with our friends in a 
comfortable apartment in Posillipo, and fattened a turkey for Christmas.” He 
subsequently turned down an assignment to cover the battle at Anzio; considering the 
conditions described there in numerous accounts, this was probably a prophetic decision. 
When the long-awaited Second Front came with the D-Day invasion, Moorehead was in 
attendance but admits he was “plucked by a muscular soldier off a landing barge and 
was dumped on the Normandy beach without so much as getting my feet wet.” While his 
loved ones in London wondered whether he was alive, that night he “was eating a six-
course meal at the Lion d’Or Hotel in Bayeux.”477 
Doon Campbell also described periods of relative extravagance when he was 
reporting from Italy, even in places ravaged by the war: 
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We dined that night with field officers in the former Fascist HQ in 
Foggia. Hundreds of starving Italians huddled outside, a few yards 
away, offering their bodies for a few crumbs of bread. We had a six-
course meal and slept in a palace. The next night I was also 
sumptuously housed, this time in Naples…. There I was telephoned by 
Haig Nicholson, formerly of the Edinburgh Dispatch and now Reuter 
correspondent based with 5th Army, who arranged to pick me up next 
day, and soon I was settled with other correspondents in a hilltop villa 
where the food was even better. Major Nigel Dugdale ran this five-star 
super mess with two Viennese cooks whose profusion of delicious 
food was so rich that a cold table of plain beef and ham was kept for 
those with simpler tastes. Mess secretary David Heneker, a gourmet as 
well as a composer of popular songs, would sing and play the piano 
after dinner.478 
 
(As with all the frequently changing conditions of war, however, Campbell said 
the “luxury was short-lived. Within a few days I crossed Italy from Naples to ‘Dysentery 
Hall’ in Vasto, a bleak square toiletless house on the edge of the Adriatic, where the 
remnants of correspondents accredited to Montgomery’s 8th Army lodged in 
overcrowded and sometimes slum conditions.”479) 
Moorehead said it was not until many years later that he realized something he had 
taken for granted during these campaigns. One very important aspect of their existence 
was not only that they were western reporters, but specifically British correspondents: 
“We were rich and powerful.” This is not always stated as explicitly in the memoirs of 
other correspondents, but in reading them the same sentiment – that correspondents were 
of a different order – is present. Moorehead explained that they found it easy to consider 
the local indigenous population in North Africa as “people belonging to a lower social 
order.” This sense of entitlement came because they were on what they considered 
“British soil”. He wrote: “Like the children of very wealthy parents it seemed quite 
natural to us that we should occupy the best houses and hotels, that we should have at 
our command cars, motor launches, servants and the best food.” He continued about this 
ingrained imperialism: “Even if their poverty and their illiteracy did not set them 
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irrevocably below us they were still inferior because we were fighting the war and they 
were not. The British were the committed ones, the fighting cocks, the men with the 
guns. The others were the camp followers. I don’t think we were arrogant, but then 
whoever recognises arrogance in themselves?”480 Without always stating these views as 
outright as Moorehead did in his retrospective 1970 memoir, he and others who worked 
as the chosen ones of journalism during the war clearly saw themselves occupying their 
own special place. 
Another perk was that in the course of their work, some of the war correspondents 
became celebrities. This was not necessarily a new phenomenon, as it had already been 
seen in previous conflicts. When George Steer, correspondent for The Times covering 
the Abyssinian war, married Margarita de Herrero, a fellow correspondent for Le 
Journal of Paris, “to the sound of rifle fire instead of wedding bells”, the news of their 4 
May 1936 nuptials in the British Legation compound in Addis Ababa – while the 
citizens outside looted the city in anticipation of it being overrun by the Italians – made 
the pages of The New York Times the next day. “The wedding trip,” the newspaper 
reported, “consisted of a drive around the British Legation park, including the refugee 
camp where hundreds of foreigners have found safety from the mobs in the city.”481 As 
biographer Nicholas Rankin recounts, after Steer died in a car accident on Christmas 
1944 he received numerous commemorations in the world press: 
 
The Yorkshire Post compared G. L. Steer to T. E. Lawrence and The 
Times called him ‘one of the adventurers of this generation….’ The 
Birmingham Post said he had died a soldier, but would be remembered 
as a journalist’s journalist: ‘He was one of the most brilliant, and at the 
same time one of the most sober and reliable, of that younger corps of 
special correspondents whom the years before the war produced.’ 
African World said: ‘Few men have lived a fuller or more exciting 
life.’ South Africa magazine described him as: ‘an elusive mortal, as 
restless as he was brilliant… a man of strong opinions and a liberal 
mind’. Kingsley Martin wrote in the New Statesman on 6 January 
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1945… He was one of the best of that adventurous school of 
journalists who have by and large fought on the side of decency in all 
the wars since the Japanese began the series in Manchuria.482 
 
The Second World War, however, marked the great blooming of the 
correspondent as a celebrity and made household names of several of them. Some of the 
biggest names were American: Edward R. Murrow, Eric Sevareid, Ernie Pyle, and A.J. 
Liebling. Yet many of the reporters who covered the British and Dominion forces were 
equally well known in their own nations. Godfrey Talbot claimed that at the end of the 
Second World War BBC reporters “were as famous as film stars.” He noted that they 
even received fan mail. One letter said all work at the letter writer’s factory stopped 
when he came on the air. Another divulged that the writer kept Talbot’s photo from the 
Radio Times under her pillow and added, “Here is my number for when you are on 
leave.” He rationalized this fame by judging the spoken word over the radio as 
transcending the written word of newspapers and magazines because it had more 
“impact and immediacy” and gave the listeners a sense of involvement with the 
broadcasts, almost considering the reporter to be a family member (or prospective 
boyfriend) with whom they could personally relate.483 
Upon returning to their home countries many of the correspondents drew crowds 
who wished to hear them speak about their experiences. Peter Stursberg was surprised to 
find himself after the war on a speaking tour of Canada set up by the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation. He recalled: 
 
There were very big turnouts. In fact, in Chilliwack just around here, 
they closed the shops in order to hear me, which is an indication of how 
important the reporting of the war was. I must have spoken thirty times 
across Canada, and there were very big turnouts, and everyone wanted to 
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hear about the coverage of the war, and I gave the same speech thirty 
times. You know, I didn’t have to look at my script at the end.484 
 
Doon Campbell spoke to the Scottish Arts Club in Edinburgh when he returned 
shortly after the end of the war. The Scotsman summarized his tales of friendly 
encounters with German peasants while the Dumfries Standard described his 
“remarkable experience” of being present at the handover of Hamburg to the Allies, and 
pushing up the road in a Jeep and arriving two hours before the official surrender to find 
a city full of armed German troops. The Standard also related how Campbell told the 
club members of the sights he encountered inside Belsen concentration camp within two 
days of its liberation: “He said the accounts that had been published of the horrors of this 
camp were in no way exaggerated.”485 Rather than promoting themselves, the 
correspondents in these instances were personally bringing their eyewitness narrative of 
the war directly to their readers and listeners, but also performing a sort of public service 
by confirming that the stories, such as the nightmarish depictions of the Holocaust, had 
not been embellished. This likely helped those who had fought The People’s War 
reassure themselves that their suffering and struggles on the home front had not been in 
vain. 
While not all war reporters experienced personal renown, nearly every 
correspondent, whether from radio or print, at one time or another enjoyed a bit of 
plunder in the field. On the day the Allies captured Leipzig, the BBC’s Ed Ward, along 
with Harold Denny of The New York Times, found the Rathaus (city hall) and were 
shown inside its bullet-ridden walls by an American colonel, who led them down into a 
stocked wine cellar. The colonel invited the reporters to enjoy the spoils of war when he 
opened a vintage bottle of Veuve Clicquot champagne and told Ward, “I think you’d 
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better take a case of that back with you. And why not have some cognac too while 
you’re about it?” Ward recalled: 
 
Harold and I didn’t have to be asked twice. We collected a couple of 
cases. They were very heavy (we discovered to our delight later that 
they contained 24 bottles each and not a dozen), and we loaded them 
on a wheelbarrow which I found in the alleyway. We got them out to 
the jeep, stacked them on the back seat and covered them with our 
coats.486 
 
As the pair left the city, Ward noted that the corps of Germans, whom the 
Americans had deputized as Leipzig’s police, announced over loudspeakers that looting 
would be punished by death: “I tucked our coats a little more securely round the wooden 
cases in the back of the Jeep and we headed for home.”487 
The correspondents could also be generous with their plunder. Ward and Pidsley 
went to the Battle of the Nations monument in Leipzig, a pyramid-like structure of red 
granite standing a couple hundred feet tall, where the American military had just 
overcome and removed the last defending German soldiers. Inside, there were “enough 
provisions to have kept a division going for a month,” according to Ward. “There were 
tubs of Danish butter, cases of Norwegian brisling, French wines, Dutch cheeses. There 
were literally millions of cigarettes and cigars.” Ward said he and Pidsley took what he 
estimated to be 20,000 cigarettes and a few thousand cigars, along with up to sixty bread 
loaves, with the intention of distributing them to displaced persons they encountered. 
“For ourselves we took a small case of the Norwegian sardines, which were first-rate,” 
he wrote. Stopping outside the Leipzig Rathaus, Ward unintentionally created a mob 
scene when he gave a loaf of bread and some cigarettes to a French labourer, which 
brought many other foreign workers “all screaming for food.” The pair left and refrained 
from handing out any more German supplies until they reached the countryside, where 
they could be surer of the crowd size. The result for Ward was one of the most fulfilling 
trips he had taken during the war. “Outside Weissenfels we came upon a group of about 
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a hundred Russians. We gave each of them two cigars and a couple of packets of 
cigarettes as well as a good many loaves of bread,” Ward wrote. “Their gratitude was 
almost embarrassing. They had been treated like animals for so long that they could 
scarcely understand anyone being kind to them, and many of them wept when they were 
given their cigarettes – things they had scarcely tasted for years.”488 This, of course, 
would have done nothing to diminish the notion among correspondents that they were in 
a different, somewhat elevated class of individuals in the war. 
Beyond plunder, there were other comforts a correspondent could enjoy in 
between the harrowing scenes of the fighting and ruins. Finding himself in a peaceful 
artists’ village outside of Tunis in 1943 as Germany’s desert army was crumbling before 
the Allies, Alexander Clifford expressed how the occasional benefits of working as a 
correspondent in beautiful foreign locations could make the war seem far more bearable: 
“That evening we sank deeply into the peace of Sidi Bou Said. Here, you felt, you could 
end your days in happiness, surrounded by the things that are best in life – reading and 
writing and good conversation, good food and wine, sitting in the sun, swimming in the 
sea, making love. Especially making love – the setting was perfect.” Yet the draw of the 
action and the thrill of chasing the story, what he referred to as “the fever”, were always 
too strong to give in to temporary serenity: “But next morning the fever had taken hold 
of us again and we were off back to Cap Bon to watch this fantastic [battle] climax once 
more.”489 This feeling was the desire to be out in the field with their fellow 
correspondents, driven by both camaraderie and the competition to get the story. 
 
Conduct, Camaraderie and Competition 
The “fever” brought them into the midst of a world that was a far cry from villas 
and vintage champagne or even charitable acts for peasants and displaced persons, and 
changed their perceptions on most everything. The memoirs of correspondents who 
reported the Second World War indicate that at times they found their perspective – on 
reporting, on war, and on life itself – was altered by their time spent so close to the stark 
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realities of the frontline. Moorhead described losing his sense of what was newsworthy 
to readers who were back at home following the conflict through his words: 
 
It was a strange sensation, writing dispatches away here in the blue, 
never knowing whether they would get back to Cairo, let alone London 
and New York. We had been away now so long without word from the 
outside world that I, for one, had lost my ‘news sense’—that sense of 
proportion you have that tells you whether a thing is worth writing or 
not. Everything here to us at this minute was vital and crammed with 
interest. But was it interesting to the Home Guard in England, to the 
sheep farmer in Australia and the commuter in New York? You just 
couldn’t know. So in the end I used to find myself putting down what I 
had seen and felt without trying to make a rounded ‘story’ of it, and 
without the slightest idea of whether it was worth publishing or not.490 
 
Some correspondents developed a sort of ghoulish enjoyment in the horrible 
events that made a story. Following Australian army brigades in January 1941, 
Moorehead and his group came upon an aerodrome near Derna. At first the Australians 
took the facility from Italian tank crews, but then endured three or four days of 
retaliatory shelling. “Once again the Italians got onto them, and the Australians were 
pursued with a chain of bursting shellfire across the aerodrome into another building and 
out of that,” Moorehead wrote, explaining that his reaction to the attack made him 
realize later that his time in the war zone had warped his outlook. “Watching from only 
four hundred yards away, where it was quite safe, that incident seemed funny to the rest 
of us. I do not think it is funny now, but it was then, at a moment when one was keyed to 
meet the tension at the front and the small manners of living were diminished or 
forgotten entirely.”491 
Once they had been acclimated to the combat zone mentality of reporting it seems 
some the correspondents could not regain their small manners of living, and the rough 
and ready ways of tackling a story took over. The best example would be when a group 
of correspondents were invited to meet Pope Pius XII at the Vatican the day after the 
Allies liberated Rome, on 6 June 1944 as the D-Day forces were thrusting into 
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Normandy. Talbot described it as “what must have been one of the most extraordinary 
audiences in Vatican history: a reception of British and American war correspondents, 
pressman of all shades and shapes, agency chiefs and newspaper staff writers, together 
with their photographers, engineers and drivers. We were indeed a motley pack.” He 
recounted how they met in a lavish room of the papal palace, with the combat journalists 
still in their crumpled uniforms angling aggressively for a quote or photo as they could, 
no different than if they were still in the field with soldiers: “When the Pope tried to 
address the throng, the picture boys surged forward, their cameras whirring and clicking 
and flashing. Ignoring the horrified hands upraised by attendant clergy and the menacing 
halberds of plumed and helmeted Swiss guards, the rude journalistic tide swept on, 
elbowing and shouting, and the Vicar of Christ was all but knocked to the ground.” He 
tried to forgive his colleagues by suggesting that they were products of their wartime 
environment, noting, “They had just come from a field of war and were unaccustomed to 
the niceties of throne rooms.”492 Peter Stursberg of the CBC was at the same audience 
with Pope Pius and recalled it was the first time that news camera operators were 
allowed to meet with the pontiff and that, “these war cameramen were a tough, 
undisciplined lot. They scrambled to get the best shots, some of them kneeling, others 
even lying on the floor, and there were a series of ‘Hold it, Your Holiness.’” He said 
some of the Catholic reporters in attendance were indignant at the scene, with a British 
correspondent calling it, “The Rape of Rome”, while an American journalist stated, “I 
was never so embarrassed or ashamed at the conduct of my fellow workers before.”493 
Needless to say, it was not the most shining performance put on by the correspondents in 
the field during the Second World War. 
This behaviour may be explained by Moorehead’s description of the war zone as a 
world of “black or white, or perhaps death instead of living”, where the correspondents 
existed “exactly and economically and straightly” and priorities were reduced and 
flipped from those in the civilized world: 
 
                                                 
492  Talbot, Permission to Speak, pp. 64-65. 
493  Stursberg, The Sound of War, pp. 185-186. 
234 
Most of the things it takes you a long time to do in peace-time—to 
shave and get up in the morning, for example—are done with 
marvellous skill and economy of effort at the front. Little things like an 
unexpected drink become great pleasures, and other things which one 
might have thought important become suddenly irrelevant or foolish. 
In a hunter’s or a killer’s world there are sleep and food and warmth 
and the chase and the memory of women and not much else. Emotions 
are reduced to anger and fear and perhaps a few other things, but 
mostly anger and fear tempered sometimes with a little gratitude. If a 
man offers you a drink in a city bar, the offering is little and the drink 
still less. You appreciate the offering and often give it more importance 
than the drink. At the front the drink is everything and the offering 
merely a mechanical thing. It is never a gesture, but a straight practical 
move as part of a scheme of giving and receiving. The soldier gives if 
he can and receives if he can’t. There is no other way to live. A pity 
this is apparent and imperative only in the neighbourhood of death.494 
 
One aspect that was not diminished, and was actually heightened by their 
proximity to death, was the camaraderie shared by the war correspondents, especially as 
they were a unique club with a limited membership. Moorehead and Clifford struck up 
their friendship in April 1940 after a night in Athens drinking Ouzo and arguing over the 
politics of the war. They both wished to travel to Cairo to cover the desert war but knew 
they were not in a position to tell their editors where they should go. So they came up 
with a clever ruse to exploit the rivalry between their two London newspapers: 
Moorehead told his home office that Clifford had gone to Cairo and Clifford told his 
editors the same about Moorehead, both hinting that there was something afoot. In this 
way they were each able to gain permission to head for Egypt – travelling together, 
unbeknownst to their employers, and cementing what became a lifelong bond.495 At 
times their travels around the varied nations might have seemed like an adult version of a 
Boy Scout camping adventure, with camaraderie and roughshod road meals (such as 
eggs and whisky) fuelled by the spoils of war. Moorehead described he and Clifford 
enjoying “a day’s looting” on the Cape Bon peninsula of Tunisia in 1943: 
 
                                                 
494  Ibid., p. 92. 
495  Moorehead, A Late Education, p. 7. 
235 
We selected a German Volkswagen, piled it high with wines, cameras, 
tinned food, typewriters, binoculars and clothing (all of which we were 
subsequently obliged to surrender), and then set off on the three days’ 
drive down to the coast to Algiers. We were alone. When it was hot we 
stopped and dived into the sea. At night we slept in farmhouses and 
cooked extravagant meals. In the morning in the bright sunshine we 
went on again.496 
 
Charles Lynch, in his memoir, spoke highly of his fellow Canadian correspondent 
Matthew Halton, whom Lynch described as having an outsized personality when they 
covered the Second Front in France alongside each other. Like Moorehead and Clifford, 
they worked for competing news organisations – Lynch for Reuters and Halton for the 
CBC – but still became comrades in the field. Lynch said of his reporting companion: 
 
Matt Halton continued to be fascinated by my lack of knowledge of 
military matters, and I soaked up as much as I could from him and the 
others, all of whom had covered the Italian campaign…. Each night, 
we would decide where we were going the next day to get near the 
fighting. As Matt would put it, “We leave at sparrow fart, and we will 
face death.” He really did talk like that. Between his own 
dramatizations, he would recite Shakespeare or Keats, especially the 
lines from “Ode to a Nightingale” that go: “Darkling, I listen, and for 
many a time, I have been half in love with easeful death.” He would 
repeat the words “Darkling, I listen” over and over again with awe, as 
though in wonderment that anybody could write better stuff than he 
himself.497 
 
This account not only expresses Lynch’s admiration for Halton, but reinforces the 
detail previously discussed that the correspondents, in addition to being newsmen bent 
on acquiring facts, were also educated and literary, which is why they were able to 
produce some of the most impressive and florid descriptions of war in modern times. 
And undoubtedly, as Lynch’s recollection of Halton also suggests, they buoyed each 
other’s spirits. Doon Campell, recounting a letter he wrote home, mentioned the 
affability of the men with whom he shared an office in Naples: “Other correspondents 
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here include Alan Moorehead of the Daily Express, Alex Clifford of Daily Mail, Basil 
Gingell of Extel, H. R. Knickerbocker of Chicago Sun, Frank Gillard of BBC. As at 
Algiers they are a great lot, good company.”498 
Camaraderie of this sort was extremely important for the correspondents, for it 
added a sense of community and normality to their otherwise hectic, and often 
dangerous, lives. It was very likely the closest thing they felt to home, and perhaps might 
have helped maintain their sanity to some degree in a world otherwise gone mad. Talbot 
described some of the nights in Italy, during which he was managing the group of BBC 
correspondents there, when the war seemed to fade away in the company of his 
colleagues: 
 
I have rarely known such hilarious evenings as when this group of 
men, when their paths to and from this or that sector of the front 
crossed, sat after a meal in some B.B.C.-camp tent or billet, with the 
vino flowing and the tent’s air near-lethal with dense tobacco fumes, 
and told tale after backstage tale from their professional pasts or 
embroidered the lighter adventures of the last few days of battle.499 
 
Talbot added that he was ostensibly the chief of this group, which meant he held a 
degree of responsibility these men of such individual temperaments did not always 
recognize (“I failed to ‘manage’ any of them”) but noted that through a sense of shared 
mission they made their operations work: “They were agreeable and stimulating 
coadjutors. Stints and movements up and down Italy were arranged between us amicably 
enough: ructions of artistic temperament were only a routine preliminary to getting down 
to the job.”500 Even the military conducting officers, who were there to police the 
correspondents as part of the censorship apparatus, were sources of enjoyment at times. 
Talbot recalled why they were good to have around: “My own party was frequently 
embellished by one or other of these aristocrats and landed gentry as time went on, and I 
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recall a marquis and three baronets, valuable fellow travellers – they had endless 
supplies of whisky and cigarettes. Really, you could not help liking them.”501 
There was still a line, however, to be drawn between friendship and work. Print 
publications wanted to generate original stories from their own correspondents, giving 
the public a reason to purchase their newspaper over another. One exception, outside of 
publications that subscribed to the Reuters service for use of its wire copy, was the 
arrangement under which the Manchester Guardian purchased stories written by 
correspondents for The Times and, as they did in The Times, carried the by-line “From 
Our Special Correspondent”, but at the bottom were labelled “Times and Manchester 
Guardian Service”. This seeming anomaly in the aggressive newspaper business was 
allowed to occur, explains Guardian biographer David Ayerst, because the two papers 
were not really competitors – neither was read to any great extent in the other’s home 
market.502 Otherwise, newspapers as well as the broadcasting outlets expected the 
correspondents they deployed in the field to bring them distinctive – if not exclusive – 
stories, even if reported from the same battlegrounds. Therefore, despite their 
camaraderie, the correspondents maintained a high level of professional competition. 
Edward Ward wrote of how he and Harold Denny found the Oberburgomeister 
(mayor) of Leipzig in the city hall, where he and his family had committed suicide. 
Other correspondents, who surveyed the city hall but were not aided by a local caretaker, 
as Ward and Denny had been, incorrectly identified another dead man as the mayor in 
their own dispatches and photographs while the pair hid the true facts of the story: 
“When it was discovered that Harold and I had seen the real Oberburgomeister and had 
locked the doors behind us, we came in for a good deal of hostile criticism from our 
colleagues.”503 Earlier in the war, Moorehead and his travelling companions had chosen 
not to accompany Australian troops to the Libyan port of Derna on 30 January 1940, 
thinking the Italians would resist being driven out. “The first Australian patrols entered 
the town the following morning…. We did not ride with them,” he wrote. “We missed 
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all this. It was one of those wrong decisions, inevitable sooner or later. We had thought 
Derna would hold a day or two longer, and while the town, unknown to us, was actually 
being evacuated by the enemy, we were driving far southward across the desert to visit 
the armoured division at Mekili.” Moorehead was still in his sleeping bag the following 
morning when he received the news of the fall of Derna from a soldier who had just 
heard it in a BBC broadcast. He was astonished and angry at himself for not being on 
hand to chronicle the breaking story of another Italian defeat: “We could not believe it. It 
seemed impossible that the B.B.C. thousands of miles away had beaten us to the news of 
something only fifty miles from us – something which we had waited for days to 
happen.” He added that, in addition to being disappointed with himself, he felt shamed 
by being beaten to the story by rival reporters: “We were met in the town by the other 
correspondents who had been there for hours. Competition among us was strong. It was, 
in a way, the most galling moment of the whole campaign.”504 
While the competition was intense, it was healthy, and the correspondents became 
a professional and at times personal fraternity. Competing reporters frequently travelled 
together, albeit due to transport necessities, but there was little animosity and in 
numerous personal accounts the correspondents refer to their rivals as colleagues. The 
camaraderie found in their shared journalistic adventures, and recreation, manifested into 
very real concern for one another’s lives. This was illustrated, for example, in 
Moorehead’s recollection of the departure of Clifford and Ward to cover Greece, which 
was expected to be not only a difficult battle for the Allied forces of approximately 
60,000 British, Australian and New Zealand troops, but also a very dangerous one for 
anyone there, including correspondents. Moorehead believed he was also headed to 
Greece and he, his wife, Clifford and Ward were in a very sombre mood when they 
“gathered gloomily” in a hotel the morning they were to deploy from Alexandria in 
April 1941. “None of us were optimistic about the campaign ahead,” Moorehead wrote. 
“We ordered champagne and drank a toast to ‘the new Dunkirk at Salonika’. I don’t 
know how far that feeling went through the army, but we had it pretty strongly at the 
time.” At the last minute Moorhead was instead ordered to Addis Ababa in Abyssinia 
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(Ethiopia), which brought a conflicting emotional mix of relief, disappointment and fear 
for his colleagues. In this moment, the correspondents were not competitors, but 
friends.505 
Moorehead had logged many hard days during the Desert War and admits that 
during his coverage of the Second Front he and his friend Clifford “became more 
cheerful and yet more selfish, more materialistic than we were before.” He also says they 
were more cautious; after four years covering battles they did not want to ruin their 
streak of good fortune as the war came to a close. Moorehead wrote, “We were bound of 
course to expose ourselves at the front for a few hours every day, but we tended now to 
let other vehicles run to the head of the column and explore the unknown bend in the 
road ahead.” He added that they were still covering the war as professional journalists, 
but they were “more concentrated upon ourselves than upon the war. We tended to be 
more sickened by ruins than stimulated by danger, and skirmishes at the front which 
once would have filled our day’s horizon now often seemed to us repetitive and useless 
folly.”506 At the end Moorehead and Clifford lost interest in covering the war altogether, 
speaking to the weariness and personal toll some correspondents suffered, the same as 
actual soldiers. Moorehead said he and Clifford even opted to skip covering the Allied 
entry into Berlin. He wrote, “When ruins are piled on ruins, when the end is inevitable 
and the battlefield becomes a vast camp of inert and desperate refugees, there is not 
much excitement in victory, merely a desire for rest…. We could not bear to see another 
ruined city.”507 Yet Moorehead might have summed up best the draw of a job that 
presented so many difficulties and dangers as that of war correspondent: 
 
It was days before we reached the front. For ever the forward troops 
vanished ahead of us as we sat stranded in our broken vehicles. 
Messages went astray for days or were lost altogether. We scraped 
what food we could from the desert or went without. We hitch-hiked 
when our vehicles broke down. Often we abandoned sleep in order to 
catch up. None of this, of course, was comparable to the difficulties the 
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soldier in the line was putting up with. But it was a new kind of 
reporting: exasperating, exciting, fast-moving, vivid, immense and 
slightly dangerous. And what we had to say had such interest at the 
time that our stale descriptions were published fully when at last they 
did arrive in London and New York. It was a job that was for ever a 
little beyond one’s reach.”508 
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The Correspondents’ Stories 
 
Having analysed the various facets of the professional lives of the war 
correspondents, it is important to also consider the product of these many factors by 
looking at a cross-section of the news stories they produced from a selection of 
important battles fought by British and Dominion forces in the Western European and 
North African theatres. 
The 8 March 1944 edition of the Daily Express reported that Minister of 
Information Brendan Bracken spoke at the Press Club in London, located off Fleet 
Street, and lauded the work of the war correspondents then in the field. The story quoted 
Bracken as saying: 
 
The British Government and the public owe them a very great debt. A 
despatch from a war correspondent on the battlefront is a hundred 
times more valuable than all the hand-outs of the Ministry of 
Information or the War Office. The stuff from the field of battle bears 
the mark of truth. There is no sign of Government sub-editing and it 
keeps the public far more in touch with the troops than our palatial 
building in Bloomsbury or the War Office.509 
 
Yet Angus Calder notes that in the early years of the war the British prospects 
looked grim: “In the middle of February, Lieutenant General Rommel had arrived in 
North Africa. From then until October 1942, the British public was not to hear of one 
victory on land (in the Middle East or anywhere else) which seemed at all meaningful. 
There was a monotonous process of evacuations, sieges and defeats.”510 As a result, 
people in Britain were increasingly less inclined to closely follow the media reports on 
the war. Calder writes: 
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Along with this venial apathy [toward government appeals regarding 
public behaviour] went a growing lack of interest, or professional lack 
of interest, in the war news. In May 1940, only one person in eleven 
had told Mass Observation that he or she was not following the news, 
or was uninterested in it. By the autumn, this proportion had more than 
doubled; in May 1941, no less than four out of ten returned such 
answers, though perhaps they meant that the respondents had some 
idea what was happening, but had no stomach for hearing or reading 
about it.511 
 
A Mass Observation report of 22 May 1940 entitled, “Report On The Press”, 
noted that war news at the time was taking a back seat to more domestic stories that fell 
under the category of “sensational” news: “Murders, divorces, etc., fall under this 
category, when there are exceptional circumstances about them. Typical observations… 
on what people read, show that in April this year, in the middle of the Norwegian 
campaign, people were glancing at the war news in evening papers and then turning 
immediately to the Campbell Divorce case.”512 However, the report adds that did not 
necessarily mean a lack of interest in the conflict, but rather that there were other reasons 
including the arc of the war, censorship, and the handling of the news by the press itself: 
 
Newspapers are now full of information about the war; that is what 
people want to read about. In fact, this report shows… that people 
complain of not getting enough straight, informative news about the 
war. Why should this be? Partly because for many months nothing 
much happened of a military kind; partly because the censorship 
suppresses some news, but also because the press often does not report 
news in a straightforward way. It tries to give it ‘human interest’…. 
Too many ships have been torpedoed or sunk since the beginning of 
the war for a sinking now to be considered good, straight ‘news’. But it 
can be made news by getting a story from one of the survivors.513 
 
Another Mass Observation report that surveyed Londoners between 21 and 25 
April 1941 stated that a total of twenty-one percent of those polled did not read a 
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newspaper regularly, and of those thirteen percent were male and thirty percent were 
female. Among the respondents who did usually read a daily newspaper, only thirty-
seven percent said the part they read the most was the news. The report states: “The 
category ‘news’ contains references varying from the headlines only, to distinctions 
between war and other news. A considerable number of those making these answers 
mentioned specifically ‘headlines’ or ‘front page’. This does not of course mean that is 
not read so carefully.”514 
Regardless of the numbers of those reading the papers on a regular basis, the 
headlines and the news stories regarding some of the major battles of the war provide 
interesting insight to the news that the people were receiving in the days that the history 
we now study was being made. 
 
Dunkirk 
In his critique of war journalism, Phillip Knightley writes, “It is worth looking at 
Dunkirk, because it became the first great myth of the Second World War, perhaps the 
greatest, the origin of the ‘Dunkirk spirit’ that many believe was crucial to victory, and 
the way it was reported at the time was a major factor in establishing this myth.” He 
added about the rosy reporting of the event, “One reason for this was that there were no 
British war correspondents writing from Dunkirk. They covered the whole of the 
evacuation second-hand, from the south-east-coast ports where the troops landed.”515 
Ian McLaine discusses how the famed retreat and rescue of Allied troops from the 
French shore holds a special place in the British psyche and that many historians appear 
reluctant to write about wartime morale that was buoyed by the Dunkirk myth, which 
was largely created by the coverage of both the print and broadcast media of the time: 
 
For a subject which appears to occupy so important a niche in the 
national consciousness, one might also say the folk memory, surprising 
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little has been written about wartime morale…. As if fearing that too 
close an inquiry might erode the foundations of the myth, many writers 
have been content to assert that the nation won through because the 
morale of the population was indestructible. Of course the difficulty for 
anyone interested in the nature and quality of wartime morale is the 
very imprecision of the term and, more importantly for the historian, 
the ephemeral and diffuse character of the sources to which he must 
turn. The risks of producing a compilation of random impressions and 
reminiscences are considerable.516 
 
As previously discussed in the chapter concerning censorship and self-censorship, 
the news coverage of Dunkirk was largely focused on the miracle aspect of the rescue of 
the troops, specifically as represented by the BBC. Yet the broadcaster was far from 
alone in that respect; the British newspapers gave very similar treatment to the Dunkirk 
rescue. While not a correspondent’s story, the following is an excerpt from an opinion 
article published in The Scotsman in June 1940 that serves as a good example of the 
overly positive spin the British newspapers worked to put on the events of Dunkirk: 
 
Already spoken of as the most glorious retreat in our military history, 
the withdrawal from Dunkirk has aroused as much admiration across 
the Atlantic as here. Full recognition of this great exploit must await 
more propitious times, although it has been suggested that London 
should mark the occasion as it did the victory over the Graf Spee, by 
giving an official welcome to men of the B.E.F. When the time comes 
to commemorate the events of the past week the precedent of the 
retreat from Mons by the Old Contemptibles will surely be borne in 
mind. Just as the Mons Star was awarded to the men of 1914, so should 
there be a Dunkirk Star for the men of all four services – the Army, the 
Navy, the Air Force, and the Merchant Service – and the heroic band 
of nurses who took part in the withdrawal.517 
 
The Scotsman changed its tune in an editorial two days later following Winston 
Churchill’s speech about Dunkirk to the House of Commons. The editorial stated, “Mr. 
Churchill was right to tell the nation bluntly yesterday that thankfulness at the escape of 
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our army at Dunkirk, the evacuation of which has now been completed, must not blind 
us to the fact that we have suffered a colossal military disaster.”518 Yet the British people 
were still engrossed by, as The Scotsman originally termed it, “the most glorious retreat 
in our military history”, and the stories in other media outlets reflected, and undoubtedly 
magnified, that public feeling. 
Daily Express, 1 June 1940, page 1: headline – “Four-fifths of B.E.F Home, Still 
they come! More thousands snatched from Dunkirk beach, Ammunition by parachute for 
rearguard, ‘Corunna holds’”; story – “Nearly four-fifths of the B.E.F. who were trapped 
in Flanders have now been snatched by the Royal Navy from seemingly certain 
annihilation. All last night ship after ship burst through the storm of steel outside 
Dunkirk to bring their troop cargoes to south-east ports.” 
Daily Mirror, 1 June 1940, page 2, by Bernard Gray: headline – “Nothing could 
break B.E.F.’s Discipline”; story – “Some of them singing – and with death all round 
them – Gort’s Unbreakables swam, rowed and paddled from the sandy beaches round 
Dunkirk as the most epic evacuation in military history went steadily forward yesterday. 
Off shore, waited a motley collection of ships. Overhead screamed Nazi bombers, 
dropping bombs or swooping down to machine-gun.” 
The Scotsman, 1 June 1940, page 9, From Douglas Williams, Our Correspondent 
recently with the B.E.F. in France, At A South-East Coast Port: headline – “Ferrying the 
B.E.F. Home, Navy Continues Its Glorious Work, Rearguard Heroes”; story – 
“Undeterred by heavy German gunfire and  constant bombing, which increased as the 
day wore on, the Navy to-day continued the stupendous task of ferrying the B.E.F. home 
to Britain across the Channel under the very noses of the encircling German army. As 
the German forces thrust impatiently against the British rearguard, an amazing flotilla of 
boats of all sizes and descriptions assembled in haste from every available port, inlet, 
and waterway, shuttled to and fro across the 45 miles of water in an intensive effort to 
evacuate the large body of soldiers still remaining on the beaches around Dunkirk.” The 
correspondent took the step, not the norm for newspaper reporters then and even today, 
to place himself in the story; this was more often done by radio reporters who did not 
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have the benefit of a dateline on a page to explain the location from which they were 
reporting. It seems, however, that Williams found the Dunkirk story to be important 
enough – even going so far as to call it a “miracle” – to require a mention of his first-
hand account: “From dawn this morning I stood for hours on the dock and watched a 
succession of vessels unloading endless columns of tired, hungry, dirty, but cheerful 
British and French soldiers, rescued as by a miracle at the eleventh hour from what had, 
a couple of days ago, appeared to them inevitable elimination.” 
Another newspaper reporter also put himself in the story, in this case describing 
the evacuation through his own experience aboard one of the boats. Daily Mirror, 3 June 
1940, page 1, By Ewart Brookes: headline – “How Little Ships Rescued the B.E.F.”; 
story – “For seventeen hours we have been pulling aboard members of the B.E.F., just 
some of the many thousands at Dunkirk. I was one of the volunteer crew of a motor 
yacht which left a south-east coast port. We were the Harry Tate navy. Open motor-
boats, slick varnished motor-cruisers, hard-bitten tarred fishing boats, Thames barges 
and the ‘shilling trip around the lightship’ pleasure boat of the peace-time beach. 
Everything that could move and float. It looked like a holiday cruise. Then we closed up 
to the Flanders coast…. When the coast-line was only a grey smudge, above us was 
heard a deep drone. Bellowing German machines flew over the bigger ships off the 
coast, ships we were to load from our trailing string of small boats.”  
The reporting of The Times was more tempered than some of the other papers, 
with less excitable and religious language speaking of a miracle, but still positive in its 
tone and with much praise for the military even in its hour of defeat. 
The Times, 1 June 1940, From Our Military Correspondent: headline – “Rapid 
Flow of Troops Through Dunkirk, Withdrawals Far in Excess of Expectations, 
Operations By All Allied Arms, Weather Hampers German Pilots”; story – “British and 
French troops are being steadily re-embarked at Dunkirk, and the number already 
withdrawn has surpassed the most optimistic expectations. The operation of retreat and 
embarkation in view of the enemy, the most difficult in warfare, is being carried out with 
success to the ably coordinated action of the three arms of the Allies. The losses, though 
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inevitably heavy in numbers, have been unexpectedly small in proportion to the 
effectives involved.” 
The Times, 1 June 1940, From Our Special Correspondent, A South-East Port: 
headline – “Homecoming of B.E.F., Men Weary But Undaunted, Steadiness Under 
Cruel Test”; story – “Protected by the ceaseless patrol maintained by British warships 
and aeroplanes in the English Channel, a steady stream of khaki-clad figures is pouring 
on to the quays of our south-eastern ports. The British Expeditionary Force is returning 
home from Flanders, pending its transfer to other battlefields. The cruel rearguard action 
against overwhelming odds which the King of the Belgians imposed by his defection is 
yielding results that justify the sacrifices endured. Fighting back with tireless 
determination, French and British troops have held open the Dunkirk corridor, and the 
number of men who have been withdrawn already from the theatre of war in Flanders is 
much greater than was thought possible earlier this week. The aim of the German High 
Command to encircle and annihilate the British Army has been frustrated.” 
The Times, 1 June 1940, From Our Military Correspondent: headline – “Enemy 
Checked By Floods, B.E.F. and French on ‘Corunna Line’”; story – “The flow of British 
and French troops to British and in some cases to French ports has already surpassed the 
most sanguine expectations, but it still continues. The numbers withdrawn have 
increased enormously in the last 24 hours, though the precise figures cannot yet be 
revealed. A line of defence covers the withdrawal, and has hitherto prevented the 
entrenched camp of Dunkirk itself from being assailed by the enemy. This line is known 
to the British as the ‘Corunna Line,’ but French troops fighting by their sides and in 
friendly rivalry are taking part in its defence in spite of its name.” As previously 
discussed in the chapter regarding censorship, this mention of a “friendly rivalry” 
ignores the animosity and confrontations that occurred between British and French 
soldiers who were desperate to board the ships that would take them away from the 
deadly Dunkirk beachhead. 
For the media as a whole, this was an extraordinary manner in which to report a 
resounding defeat, although the press apparently wanted to give the public some good 
news at a time when the war abroad was not going well and the Battle of the Atlantic 
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was being scored in the number of ships sunk by German U-Boats. Knightley writes, “It 
would be wrong to suggest that in the face of the disaster of Dunkirk an organised 
campaign now began to change the evacuation into a victory. But the newspaper reader 
of the day could certainly be forgiven for thinking that something wonderful had 
happened to British fortunes in the war.”519 Some correspondents even felt remorseful 
over their Dunkirk coverage. According to Knightley, “Alexander Werth, a war 
correspondent for The Manchester Guardian, writing after the collapse of France, 
described his feeling of guilt at the ‘soft soap’ he had been feeding his readers.”520 
While the people may have rejoiced at the great escape from Dunkirk, the British 
and Dominion nations together would soon experience a long period without much to 
celebrate in the war when their forces deployed to North Africa. 
 
The North African Desert 
The campaign to sweep the Italians out of the seaports of northern Libya initially 
seemed to be a resounding success, and the correspondents’ dispatches trumpeted the 
accomplishments of the British military.521 
The Times, 2 January 1941, page 4: headline – “British Armoured Units Near 
Tobruk, Patrols 70 Miles Into Libya, R.A.F. Raids On Harbours In Southern Italy, 
Warships Bombed At Taranto”; story – “While Bardia is being shelled and bombed, 
British armoured car patrols have penetrated 70 miles beyond the frontier to a few miles 
south of Tobruk, and are occupying points on the coastal road between Tobruk and 
Bardia.” 
The Times, 6 January 1941, page 4, From Our Special Correspondent, Outside 
Bardia: headline – “Final Break Through, Enemy Defences Crushed, Surprise Attack By 
Navy”; story – “Bardia, reeling and broken by the mightiest British onslaught of the war, 
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began to crumple a few hours ago. In the crimson glow thrown up by many fires and 
shell explosions isolated groups of Italians are fighting in the semi-darkness.” 
The Times, 7 January 1941, page 4: headline – “Onward To Tobruk, British 
Advanced Forces In Action, Concentrated Bombing By R.A.F., More Than 30,000 
Prisoners At Bardia”; story – “The British communique from Cairo yesterday announced 
that the advanced elements of our forces were already approaching the Tobruk area. 
More than 30,000 prisoners have been counted at Bardia. Quantities of tanks, guns, 
equipment, and stores of all sorts have been captured.” 
Daily Express, 7 January 1941, page 1, Daily Express Special Correspondent: 
headline – “Wavell’s panther tanks reach Tobruk defences”; story – “Advance units of 
General Wavell’s panther tank columns have reached the outer ring of Graziani’s 
defences at Tobruk, the great Italian naval base in Libya, it is learned in Cairo tonight. It 
is at Tobruk, seventy-five miles from the Italian frontier that the Italians are expected to 
put up their strongest resistance. There is no indication yet, however, that Tobruk is cut 
off anything like Bardia was for some time before the frontal assault.” 
The Times, 8 January 1941, page 4: headline – “British Nearer Tobruk, Italians 
Abandon El Adem Aerodrome, Forty Aircraft Captured, Blackshirt Commanders Desert 
At Bardia”; story – “The British forces in Libya are continuing satisfactorily their 
advance towards Tobruk. The enemy has abandoned El Adem, the aerodrome for 
Tobruk, which lies 15 miles south of that port, and 40 aeroplanes which had been 
rendered unserviceable by R.A.F. bombing have fallen into British hands.” 
When the Germans joined the fray to bolster their Italian allies the tenor of the 
news stories became less triumphant and more wary; there were still positive reports of 
British and Dominion victories, but the sense of victory had gone and was replaced with 
a more tempered outlook in the reporting. 
Daily Mirror, 12 April 1941, page 1: headline – “Battle Starts Near Tobruk”; story 
– “News that a battle near Tobruk may be expected was given in a War Office 
communique last night. It stated: – Libya: Our troops are in contact with the enemy west 
of Tobruk.” 
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The Times, 12 April 1941, page 4, From Our Special Correspondent: headline – 
“How Generals Were Captured, 2,000 British Lost”; story – “Official silence, which has 
been unbroken all week concerning the situation in the Western Desert, was slightly 
lifted this evening when authoritative circles here described briefly the present situation, 
and gave a lengthy explanation of the manner in which the three British generals were 
captured.522 It was emphasized, as Mr. Churchill said, that it was not originally our 
intention to advance farther than Tobruk, and thus the forward posts were very lightly 
held, so that they had to be withdrawn when the Germans attacked…. During our 
withdrawal, which has been along an extended line from Agheila, we have lost, all told, 
2,000 men, which considering the circumstances and compared with the Italian losses in 
withdrawing in the other direction, is remarkably small.” The story is not only notable 
for the manner in which the tone changed since three months earlier when the British 
were rolling through Libya, but also the way in which the correspondent attempts to 
mitigate the loss of 2,000 men by suggesting that was small “compared with the Italian 
losses”, proffering shades of Dunkirk. Additionally, as discussed earlier in the 
dissertation, the reporter employs personal wording that casts the correspondent himself 
as part of the British fighting forces with the phrases “our withdrawal” and “we have 
lost.” (As explained by Allan Little of the BBC in 2007, this type of personal wording 
associating a correspondent or the news outlet for which he works directly with the 
fighting forces is no longer used in modern reporting.523) 
By mid- to late-May 1941, the siege was officially on and the news outlets began 
to admit that the opposing sides had come to a sort of stalemate, although fighting 
continued. 
The Manchester Guardian, 19 May 1941, From An Australian Correspondent: 
headline – “Slugging Match In Western Desert, Artillery Duels from Wrecked Forts”; 
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story – “Both sides in the Western Desert are looking for weaknesses in the other’s 
defence.” 
The Manchester Guardian, 23 May 1941: headline – “The Stand At Tobruk”; 
story – This was not a full story, but rather a photo of an entrenched piece of artillery 
with the caption, “A British gun at Tobruk, which is besieged by enemy forces.” 
As the year went on, however, there were still those who attempted to continue 
reporting the situation in the greatest possible light. 
The Manchester Guardian, 26 May 1941, page 6, With The British Forces In The 
Western Desert: headline – “Nazi Tanks Knocked Out In Libya”; story – “Eight German 
tanks were destroyed when two columns of German armoured units attempted to force 
their way through Halfaya (‘Hellfire’) Pass, near the Egyptian border town of Sollum. 
This brings the German tank losses to eleven in forty-eight hours…. This is the heaviest 
defeat for General Rommel’s Panzer units since the Nazis made their appearance in 
Libya.” 
The Observer, 30 November 1941, page 5, by A Naval Correspondent: headline – 
“Navy’s Help in Libya, Fine Co-operation By All Services”; story – “Since the opening 
of the offensive into Libya, attention has naturally been chiefly centred on the progress 
which the Army has made and is making. Yet there has never been a better example of 
the co-ordination of the three Services or of the access of strength that that co-operation 
brings with each. For instance, it has been customary of late to speak of the ‘siege’ of 
Tobruk; yet Tobruk has never been beleaguered, since sea communications with it have, 
thanks to the Navy’s dominance of the Eastern Mediterranean, been open without 
interruption.” This is a clear example of propaganda via the media, by saying that 
Tobruk was not at all a siege simply because the forces holding Tobruk could still speak 
with naval forces using wireless communication. This seems more a matter of wishful 
thinking by the reporter in that some positive facts are reported rather than the whole 
situation; perhaps this was a case of censorship by a military that did not want the full 
nature of the situation to be revealed, but in the use of a phrase such as “there has never 
been a better example of the co-ordination of the three Services” there seems to be 
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willing co-ordination with the reporter as well. The next month, the newspaper printed 
verbatim a press release from the military. 
The Observer, 12 October 1941, page 6: headline – “Tank Battle at Tobruk, Close-
Range Fight in Darkness, Cairo”; story – “To-day’s communique from British G.H.Q., 
Middle East, states:– Libya: During Thursday night the enemy deployed an even larger 
number of tanks in the areas outside the perimeter defences of Tobruk. After putting up a 
stout resistance a small post manned by nine British other ranks was overpowered and 
only two of our men managed to withdraw.” This is not an indication that the newspaper 
and its correspondent were taking their marching orders from the military, but more 
likely that there was no further information available or that the correspondent was not 
able to personally observe the incident and simply had to run with the press release. Yet 
it supports the argument that the correspondents were extremely reliant on the 
information the British military provided them and could not always give first-hand 
knowledge of its veracity. 
By the early days of winter, it was widely agreed that 1941 had largely been a 
siege year for British and Dominion forces at Tobruk, and the war reports reflected that, 
even as the Australian forces left the siege and were replaced by other Allied troops. 
The Times, 25 November 1941, page 3, From an Australian Correspondent with 
the A.I.F.: headline – “Navy’s Tobruk Exploit, How Garrison Was Changed”; story – 
“Most of the men who wrote the name of Tobruk in glowing colours in the history of 
Australian courage and determination were relieved before the present offensive began, 
after fighting one of the most notable sieges of this or any other war. The story of how 
the 9th Australian Division was withdrawn by sea over a period of four months, 
beginning in August, has a dramatic flavour. It is also the story of another inspiringly 
efficient operation by the British Navy which snapped its fingers at Axis aircraft and 
submarines to enter the harbour of the beleaguered town and carry off about 15,000 
fighting men. The whole operation was carried out under the noses of the Axis besiegers 
surrounding Tobruk—the removal of the greater part of the original garrison and the 
replacement of them by fresh, eager English and Polish troops.” 
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With the fight in Libya resuming heavily in the spring of 1942, the tone of the war 
correspondents’ reports was far more sober and realistic, focusing on hard facts of battle 
rather than sounding triumphant or propagandistic. 
Daily Express, 28 May 1942, page 1, Express Staff Reporter Eric Bigio, who is 
with the British Army in Libya, sent this despatch, first of the new Libya war: headline – 
“Libya: Three Big Tank Battles, Rommel attacks British in north, centre, south”; story – 
“Three tank battles are raging on the Libya front tonight. Rommel has sent his forces 
against the British and Empire troops at the northern, coastal end of the line across the 
desert; against four strong points near the centre; and against Bir Hakeim, strategic 
water-hole in the south.” 
The Times, 2 June 1942, page 4: headline – “Battle For Gaps In Libyan Minefield, 
Enemy Effort To Extricate Armoured Forces, Over 100 Tanks Out Of Action, Afrika 
Corps Commander Captured”; story – “The battle in Libya has now resolved itself into a 
struggle for control of the gaps which the enemy made through the British minefields, 
and our Special Correspondent in the Western Desert states that the position is 
considered satisfactory.” 
Daily Mirror, 4 June 1942, page 1: headline – “Fresh tank units smash at 
Rommel”; story – “Fresh British tank units thrown yesterday by General Ritchie into the 
battle raging round the ten-mile gap forged by the Nazis in our desert minefields 
between Gazala and Bir Hacheim, forced Rommel to fight on British terms…. The 
battle, in which the Eighth Army is using entirely new tactics, is being fought out in 
blazing heat amid whirling sandstorms which choke and blind the combatants.” 
At times correspondents provided eyewitness accounts of a battle, giving the 
people on the home front a direct conduit to the combat in foreign lands. Although it was 
not considered standard operating procedure in  print journalism to insert oneself into a 
story, as previously discussed, in an account of this type it provided the most effective 
and visceral method of reporting the news. The Times, 12 June 1942, page 4: headline – 
“Eye-witness’s Account”; story – “The British United Press Correspondent, writing from 
outside Bir Hakeim, says: – From the top of a riddled German bomber I watched 100 
German dive-bombers swoop on Bir Hakeim. It was the greatest dive-bomber raid ever 
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unleashed in the desert. Rommel had to make this mighty assault on Bir Hakeim because 
he had been held in the Cauldron by a ring of British ‘iron boxes’—something new in 
desert fighting. He had to get round the southern flank and the result was the attack I was 
watching. I could see the smoke rising in clouds from Bir Hakeim. One moment it was 
bombs—the next an avalanche of shells. The Germans had dragged forward their 88mm 
guns and massed them north and north-east of the point…. The battle went on all the 
afternoon in torrid heat. The throb of engines made our eyes turn to the sky. They were 
our Kittybombers. A few seconds later we saw spirals of smoke as they dropped their 
loads on the enemy. Our fighters and fighter-bombers then kept up relays of attacks 
against the enemy’s batteries.” 
Alaric Jacob also provided his own observations of the ongoing combat, but 
refrained from using any first person language or references, as he also admits in his 
report to having received supporting information from Reuters. Daily Express, 27 June 
1942, page 1, Express War Reporter Alaric Jacob: headline – “Panzers Mass For Battle 
Of Matruh, Rommel forces join along coast front only five miles wide”; story – “An 
advance column of Axis troops is in the neighbourhood of Mersa Matruh today. This 
column consists of armoured cars, some lorried infantry, and motor-cyclists of the 
Bersaglieri, Italian shock troops. It was engaged on the coast road outside Mersa Matruh 
by a famous North of England regiment…. [A Reuter message says that Rommel 
appears to be concentrating most of his forces on a five-mile front between the breach 
and the railway….]” 
In late June Tobruk fell to an attack by German forces, with The Times 
announcing on page 4 of its 22 June edition, “Fall of Tobruk, Perimeter Breached By Air 
And Tank Attack”. On page 4 of its 24 June edition the paper noted that the first eye-
witness reports were coming in, but were confused and contradictory, thus leaving 
readers unsure as to the fate of their countrymen. It seemed that even with 
correspondents on the ground the full story was not yet to be had, giving an example of 
how news at the time of an event, especially during war, could clash with the historical 
record that was compiled in hindsight. It was not until weeks later that The Times 
correspondent was able to obtain and dispatch a version of events from a Tobruk 
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eyewitness. The Times, 9 July 1942, From Our Own Correspondent: headline – “What 
Happened At Tobruk, Indian Army Observer’s Story”; story – “An Indian Army 
observer cabling from the Middle East gives an account of the German assault which led 
to the fall of Tobruk. The observer was in Tobruk until the day before the Germans 
completed their investment by cutting the Tobruk-Bardia road. By that time the British 
main armour had taken up positions within the perimeter in the triangle south-west of 
Tobruk.” 
In July, there were savage battles in Egypt, especially between Allied and Axis 
tanks, and the correspondents provided a running tally of the gains made by the British 
forces against Rommel’s forces in Libya and especially at El Alamein in Egypt. By the 
end of the second summer in the Western Desert the Allies had learned not to 
underestimate their German opponents, especially the Desert Fox Rommel, and even 
with a break in the fighting the newspaper correspondents were telling their readers that 
the silence did not necessarily mean victory had yet been achieved. 
The Times, 13 August 1942, From Our Special Correspondent: headline – 
“Rommel Prepares To Try Again, Lost Axis Supplies”; story – “The lull which has now 
lasted several weeks in the desert fighting is doubtless the lull before the storm. It is 
hardly to be expected that Rommel will dally here, with the rich country of the Nile delta 
and the port of Alexandria almost within sight, without making another determined 
attempt to reach them.” 
Yet the lull in day-to-day combat gave the correspondents the opportunity to 
provide retrospective analysis and laud various arms of the British and Dominion forces 
for their efforts up to that point. 
The Times, 20 August 1942, From Our Special Correspondent with the Middle 
East Forces: headline – “Stemming Rommel’s Advance, The Role of Three Empire Air 
Forces, Concentrated Bombing Attacks”; story – “As the months have passed the air arm 
has assumed an ever-increasing role, and nowhere has this been so strikingly 
demonstrated as in the Libyan campaign. Under blazing blue skies, usually devoid of 
cloud cover, and over an almost featureless and roadless desert, pilots of the Royal Air 
Force, the South African Air Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force are writing 
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history as surely as their comrades did in the Battle of Britain, the first decisive air 
battle.” 
The Times, 3 September 1942, From Our Special Correspondent, page 4: headline 
– “Gen. Montgomery’s Statement”; story – “Speaking to correspondents at battle 
headquarters to-day, General Montgomery, Commanding the Eighth Army, said: ‘In no 
part of the front have the enemy penetrated our organized defended areas.’ There was 
little activity over the entire front to-day, and it is still too early to obtain any clear 
picture of the fighting in the Western Desert.” 
The historical record shows that by the end of 1942, the Allies were gaining the 
upper hand against the Axis in the desert. Enough so that Alaric Jacob’s dispatch for 
Christmas Eve told readers how the British army was too focused on routing the enemy 
to make merry on the holiday. 
Daily Express, 24 December 1942, From Alaric Jacob: headline – “M. and V. for 
Christmas dinner, 8th Army too busy to celebrate”; story – “The spearhead of the 8th 
Army will eat Christmas dinner of tinned meat and vegetable stew (the famous “M. and 
V.”), biscuits, tinned fruit and tea as they continue the pursuit of the enemy this 
Christmas Day. Everything that could give a little suggestion of festivity has been 
sacrificed so that that pursuit may go on.” 
 
Cassino/Anzio 
Monte Cassino Abbey, according to David Hapgood and David Richardson, was 
chosen by Saint Benedict as the sight for a monastery in the year 529. “The Roman road 
passing below was then ten centuries old; the Romans had built a citadel upon the crest, 
which in Benedict’s time had become a temple to Apollo…. Over the centuries the 
Abbey of Monte Cassino grew to be the largest and most important of Western 
monasteries.”524 Yet neither the Allies nor the Axis were interested in Monte Cassino 
and the surrounding area for its historical or religious legacy, but rather for its strategic 
value. Hapgood and Richardson write: “There was only one practical way from Naples 
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to Rome through the mountains of central Italy…. The key to the road to Rome was the 
great mountain ridge on which the abbey stood. The Germans would have to defend that 
keystone; the Allies would have to attack it; the abbey would be engulfed in the 
battle.”525 To get through Cassino and onto the road to Rome, however, the Allies also 
had to hold the Anzio beach-head where they had landed their forces. And that is exactly 
as it was reported, in dramatic fashion, by the British media on a daily basis. The 8th of 
February in particular presented a particularly busy day for dispatches of events. 
Daily Express, 8 February 1944, page 1, From Norman Smart, Near Cassino: 
headline – “Little Rubble Forts, Wily Germans Using Disappearing Guns”; story – “This 
struggle for Cassino, keystone to the centre of the German Gustav Line, becomes more 
fantastic every day. You can sit about the five-mile-square amphitheatre in which it is 
being fought and see it almost like a man watching a rather slow chess game. My jeep 
winds up the narrow track on the opposite side of the valley to that where the Germans 
are entrenched. It is only three miles across that valley. Since yesterday we have split 
open the side of the castle which stands at the back of Cassino, right underneath the 
mountain. It is laid quite bare, as if somebody had cut it open with a knife.” 
Daily Express, 8 February 1944, page 1, Combined Press Reporters, Anzio: 
headline – “Kesselring big guns pound beach landings, New Panzer Rushes Halted”; 
story – “Tightly ringed by growing German forces on land, and with their sea 
communications under air and artillery attack, Allied beachhead troops threw back two 
German attempts to break through their outposts today.” 
Daily Mirror, 8 February 1944, page 1: headline – “Italy battles near crisis: new 
German attacks are held”; story – “Crisis point is likely to be reached in the next thirty-
six hours in the two big battles raging in Italy. More strong counter-attacks are being 
made against the British and U.S. troops on the Anzio beachhead. So far, all have been 
beaten back, but reports from the front indicate that the peak of the German assaults has 
not yet been reached, says British United Press.” 
The Manchester Guardian, 8 February 1944, page 5, From our Special 
Correspondent: headline – “Cassino Battle Goes On, Americans Near Crest of 
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Monastery Hill”; story – “The struggle for Cassino, key-point in the German defence of 
the road to Rome, is not yet over. United States troops of the Fifth Army north of the 
town have pressed on beyond Monte Majola and captured three more heights to the west, 
thus threatening the main road, that by way of Castilina, on that side of Cassino…. 
During recent fighting in the beachhead sector the British have taken 300 more 
prisoners…. Ahead of the British forces north of Anzio Allied bombers attacked enemy 
positions along the railway at Campoleone…. Beaufighters of the City of London 
squadron the previous night destroyed one Dornier 217 which was encountered over the 
beachhead and chased thirty miles north of Rome. Since the Anzio landings the 
squadron has shot down ten enemy aircraft at night. On the main Fifth Army front, apart 
from the Cassino sector, there has been active patrolling, and an attack against British 
forces in the hills north of Suio, in the Garagliano river area, was beaten off.”  
The Times, 8 February 1944, page 4, From Our Special Correspondent, Algiers: 
headline – “Struggle for Cassino, More Heights Captured, Prisoners Taken at Beach-
Head”; story – “The grim struggle for Cassino, the keypoint in the German defence of 
the road to Rome, is not yet over. American troops of the Fifth Army north of the town 
have pressed on beyond Monte Majola, and have captured three more heights to the 
west, thus threatening the main road, the Via Casilina, on that side of Cassino…. In the 
Anzio-Nettuno beach-head area the Germans are continuing their attack along both the 
British and American line of advance. Two miles north of Carroceto enemy infantry and 
tanks which were forming up to attack the British were dispersed by our artillery fire.” 
As in the previous large conflicts, The Times would also supplement its own 
reports from correspondents in Italy by printing the text of communiqués directly from 
the military and adding a headline to them, such as: 11 February 1944, page 3: headline 
– “Battle In Streets of Cassino, Pill-Box Defences”; story – “The following 
announcement was made yesterday by Allied Headquarters:– Fifth Army troops 
continued to fight fiercely in the streets of Cassino against determined enemy resistance 
from pill-boxes and emplacements. The enemy launched counter-attacks elsewhere on 
the main front, which were repulsed. On the Anzio front the enemy continued to probe 
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our defences, and there was hard fighting in the process. Very bad weather on the Eighth 
Army front limited activity to patrolling.” 
Daily Express, 10 February 1944, page 1, Express Military Reporter: headline – 
“Attacks on Beachhead Still More Violent, Pressure from all sides: Some contraction”; 
story – “On this 19th day after the Anzio landing the bridgehead is touching its crisis. On 
all the surrounding hills the enemy has drawn up heavy guns which range from our 
perimeter to the seas.” 
The Times, 12 February 1944, page 4, From Our Military Correspondent: headline 
– “Defences Holding, Germans’ Propagandist Tactics”; story – “On Thursday afternoon 
there was a pause in the fighting round the Anzio beach-head. It may have been in part 
due to the weather; for the country was swept by heavy showers which created a great 
deal of mud and made large-scale movement of vehicles difficult. Some correspondents 
speculated as to whether the Germans had become exhausted by their efforts to reduce 
the beach-head and stated that the enemy’s losses had been heavy, many dead visible 
from the allied lines. It is hard to believe that the enemy will abandon his attacks while 
they offer any prospect of success. A victory would be invaluable to him from the 
military point of view, and would also provide a great moral stimulus…. [T]he Germans 
are using the same propagandist tactic as at Salerno, trying to create alarm by the 
confidence of their tone and their reports of unceasing successes.” This report was 
obviously born of a somewhat slow news day, as it states, due to a pause in the fighting. 
However, it is notable for taking a departure from a straightforward war dispatch by 
employing the somewhat unusual tactic of using the assessments of other war 
correspondents to evaluate the situation for the reader. The Times military correspondent 
then offers his own opinion that the speculation offered by the other reporters regarding 
the state of the Germans’ energy and morale was likely wishful thinking and 
overstatement and that the Germans must be fortified by their need for a victory. He also 
does a quick evaluation of German propaganda, another departure from the typical 
dispatch, perhaps as a way to explain that while other correspondents were being too 
optimistic in saying the Germans were on the brink of defeat, the German propagandistic 
reports of “unceasing successes” were also hugely overstated. Of course, since it has 
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already been shown in the example of Dunkirk that the British media were willing to 
engage in their own propaganda to aid their country, it should not be wholly unexpected 
they would try to undermine the German attempts to do the same, although it would be 
more likely for that to be the focus of editorials, such as those that tried to reduce the 
impact of the pro-German broadcasts of William “Lord Haw-Haw” Joyce. 
The BBC, for instance, conducted discussions early in the war both with the 
government and internally regarding how best to counter Joyce, since he drew listeners 
away from their own broadcasts. Among the British public Joyce was considered 
comical in his grand proclamations of German ultimate superiority, but also could be 
accurate in his reports, occasionally beating the BBC to important news due to the 
embargo against the BBC broadcasting developments before the morning newspapers 
came out, as previously discussed in the dissertation. The BBC even made occasional 
propaganda broadcasts of its own and considered developing shows to that end, but the 
Ministry of Information counselled that the Corporation’s best tactic to counter Haw-
Haw’s overblown claims of German superiority was to accurately report the facts. J.S. 
MacGregor, who had been seconded to the MoI from the BBC, wrote: “A prompt and 
regular supply of significant news will be far more effective at home and overseas than 
the desperate effort to contradict every false story from Germany, which seems to be an 
obsession with so many people.”526 For its part, the Daily Mirror encouraged readers to 
cut out a registration form that was printed in the newspaper and read in part, “Please 
register me as a member of the Anti-Haw Haw League… and may Heaven help the 
rumour-mongers I meet”, and mail it back to the paper.527 
The slow news period ended in Italy when the Allies began to gain the upper hand. 
The Times, 14 February 1944, page 4, From Our Special Correspondent: headline – 
“Enemy’s Forces Divided, Landings Part of Combined Plan”; story – “The news from 
the Italian battlefronts again centres in the bitter struggle for Cassino, where our forces 
are making gradual progress against extremely stubborn existence; and in the Anzio 
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beach-head, where the main fighting has been in the area near Carroceto, held by the 
British. The position in the Anzio beach-head sector as a whole is described as 
‘generally satisfactory.’ That phrase is apparently used as a corrective to impressions 
which have been given at home and are re-echoed in the Mediterranean theatre: first, that 
all was going superlatively well, and then that the initial success was dwindling to 
something approaching failure.” This dispatch, then, was intended not only as a 
“corrective” to rumours but also reassurance to those fighting The People’s War on the 
home front that the war on the continent was not being lost. 
Daily Express, 15 February 1944, page 1, Express Special Correspondent, Allied 
H.Q.: headline – “Leaflet-guns Warn the Monastery, ‘Italians, go at once! Batteries are 
ready’”; story – “Eleven thousand leaflets were fired last night into the Benedictine 
Monastery on the hill overlooking Cassino – the monastery we would not shell. They 
gave a last warning that this German-transformed fortress, guarding Highway Six, the 
road to Rome, will be blasted to rubble. The leaflets, addressed to ‘Our Italian friends’, 
said:– ‘We have been especially careful to avoid shelling Monte Cassino Monastery. The 
Germans know how to benefit from this. But now fighting has swept closer and closer to 
its sacred precincts. The time has come when we must train our guns on the monastery 
itself. We give you warning that you may save yourselves. Leave the monastery at once.’ 
The message was signed simply, ‘Fifth Army.’” By sharing this leaflet with the media, 
the army headquarters may have been making an attempt to use the media to broadcast a 
message much further afield than the Germans holed up in the monastery and the monks 
and residents in the immediate vicinity. With such a historical location at stake, this 
story could have been intended to bring Italian political and even international pressure 
to end the siege. One of the great uses of the media, especially during the war, was to not 
only spread information but also to help manipulate situations in favour of those 
controlling the flow of information: the Allied military. Regardless of the intent, 
however, ensuing headlines told of the result. 
Daily Express, 16 March 1944, page 1: headline – “Cassino Wiped Out, Then 
Fierce Fighting; Massed bombers drop 1,200 tons on one small town in 3½ hours: 
Infantry go in and through after greatest softening up ever; Eaker: ‘We fumigated it and 
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melted it down’”; story – “Fifth Army infantry – with British forces predominating – 
went into action in an all-out offensive towards Rome in the Cassino sector yesterday 
afternoon, following the greatest front-line air bombardment in history, which wiped the 
town of Cassino off the map.” 
The Times, 17 February 1944, page 4, From Our Special Correspondent: headline 
– “Monte Cassino Bombing, German Defence Shattered, Abbey Destroyed”; story – 
“The bombing of the abbey of Monte Cassino has shattered the Germans’ strongest 
defence of the road to Rome and of Cassino itself…. It is now confirmed that we hold 
roughly one-third of the town of Cassino. Allied air force reconnaissance photographs 
are reported to show the complete destruction of the abbey…. Americans in the Cisterna 
area repulsed two enemy patrols, and British troops drove off a patrol in the Carroceto 
area; Carroceto itself is reported to be in enemy hands. On the Eighth Army front a 
small-scale attack by German infantry with tank support, which was advancing against 
Indian troops, was smashed by our artillery fire.” As with earlier examples discussed 
including Tobruk, this correspondent is making use of the personal wording linking 
himself to the forces with the phrases “we hold” and “our artillery fire.” 
In addition to writing as if the correspondents themselves were part of the force 
facing the enemy, at times the correspondents could actually become part of the story 
being reported. In this report, it is unlikely that the general originally intended for his 
words to go beyond the correspondent briefing from which it originated, but clearly it 
was able to pass the censors. The Times, 17 February 1944, page 4, With Fifth Army, 
Feb. 14 (delayed): headline – “Gen. Alexander’s Confidence, ‘Second Round Being 
Won’”; story – “In a talk with Press correspondents after he had toured the Anzio beach-
head, General Alexander said that the first round of the battle for the beach-head has 
been won and the second is now in the process of being won. He said he was surprised at 
the amount of rubbish about the beach-head that he had been reading. General Alexander 
toured the beach-head by jeep and on foot, and came under shell-fire during part of his 
journey. ‘I found morale and confidence extremely high,’ he said. ‘It was a pleasure to 
meet men and officers in the field. I am full of confidence in this beach-head. I feel that 
what I have been reading in the Press has been rubbish: there can be no comparison to 
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Dunkirk’…. Correspondents replied by stating that they felt their reports to be objective 
and not alarmist, and that alarmist reports must have come from other sources…. 
General Alexander continued: – ‘It’s no use blowing hot and then cold, first saying that 
we’ll be in Rome in 24 hours and then swinging round. You are responsible people. 
Your work is vital because it is meant to give the people at home a true picture, but I 
have received an urgent telegram that reports from the beach-head are alarming people. I 
beg you not to take that attitude.’” This could be considered another example of the 
military asking the war correspondents to employ self-censorship, in this case so that 
their dispatches would not upset the news consumers on the home front and hurt morale 
with reports that had a defeatist tone. 
For the readers and listeners, after the long months of the Tobruk and El Alamein 
stories of sieges and slogging desert warfare, the events in Italy must have been playing 
out like a thriller, as is shown by the continuing storyline the month after Cassino was 
reportedly “wiped out”. 
Daily Express, 3 April 1944, page 4, From Norman Smart: Overlooking Cassino: 
headline – “Cassino is ‘tougher than Second Front will be’”; story – “The town of 
Cassino, held, as it is, by really good German troops, is reckoned to be tougher than 
anything we shall have to meet on the Second Front. Because air attack has not broken 
the German defences here, it does not mean that it will fall against the kind of fixed 
German which we shall meet in Western Europe.” This is interesting for the fact that it is 
trying to predict the resistance that will be met throughout the remainder of the war, 
once the anticipated Second Front is launched, based on the experience of Cassino and 
Anzio. Norman Smart makes a sweeping prediction, which was not normally found in 
factual articles by war correspondents. Their expertise and opinion were called upon to 
analyse situations, but usually not on such a large scale that involved making future 
predictions. Although, in this case, the prediction was not far off, as it proved to be one 
of the toughest battlefields of the war. 
Daily Express, 3 April 1944, page 4, From James Cooper, Advanced Air H.Q., 
Italy: headline – “Allies Begin Bomb Blockade of Germans in Italy, Round-Clock 
Drive”; story – “An experiment in air strategy second only to the Harris Plan to bomb 
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Germany into near defeat has begun in Italy. Mediterranean Air Force operations of the 
last few days make it obvious that attempts are being made to cut rail, road and sea lines 
to the German forces at Anzio and Cassino, the Adriatic front, and even across the 
Adriatic in Yugoslavia. It is a blockade by bombers. And it has been intensified by the 
failure of the experiment to blast the Germans out of Cassino.” 
Daily Express, 3 April 1944, page 4: headline – “Anzio Drive ‘Imminent’”; story 
– “Germany’s news agency said once again last night that a big Allied attempt to break 
out of the Anzio beachhead is ‘imminent.’ According to the Germans, General Clark on 
Saturday night brought up considerable reinforcements of troops and material and at 
mid-day yesterday ‘these reinforcements continued under cover of a smokescreen.’” 
This type of story, reporting what the German news agency was saying, was likely not 
only an attempt to help people understand the mind-set of the enemy, but also simply to 
add another angle to the story which was at the time the main focus of the war 
correspondents and their readership. 
Daily Express, 17 May 1944, page 1: headline – “Pitched Battle Rages For 
Cassino Mile, Half buried tanks and fanatical young Nazi paratroops fight to keep Allies 
from cutting off Cassino, Germans flood Liri Valley to stop 8th”; story – “British troops 
and tanks in the Liri Valley bridgehead were last night fighting the most savage battle of 
the Italian offensive for the Cassino Mile – the last 1,760 yards of the desperate struggle 
to get across Highway Six, which leads westward up the valley to Rome. A front-line 
despatch received early today said that the Germans had now begun to flood the valley 
in the area of the Eighth Army bridgehead, in a desperate attempt to save Cassino from 
being cut off…. The road across the valley southward from Cassino has already been cut 
and a little further down a famous British division has gone into action and is threatening 
to sever it again at Pignataro. The advances of the French and American troops of the 
Fifth Army in the mountains between the Liri and the sea make it clear that the Gustav 
Line has not only been breached but turned, cables Daily Express reporter James 
Cooper.” 
Meanwhile, Anzio had proved just as difficult to crack as Cassino. CBC 
correspondent Peter Stursberg, while waiting for Allied troops to regroup for an 
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offensive on Cassino in April, visited Anzio. He could not reveal the full facts of the 
situation at the time due to military restrictions, but described it years later in his 
memoir, The Sound of War: 
 
In a letter home I observed that the beachhead was a “very interesting 
and exciting place – almost too much like a story book to be real.” 
Actually, Anzio was a disaster: the only Allied landing since Dieppe 
that had failed. When they went ashore at this seaside resort on 22 
January 1944, the British and American forces caught the enemy 
completely by surprise, there was no opposition whatsoever. But 
indecisive leadership allowed Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the 
German commander in Italy, to rush up troops from as far away as 
France and Germany and almost drive the attackers back into the sea. 
The Allies hung on grimly to a coastal strip no more than six miles 
wide: and Anzio became as Gallipoli.528 
 
As the historical record shows, both Anzio and Cassino were eventually 
conquered by the Allies in May 1944, with the war correspondents on hand to document 
the finale of this monumental battle for a key sector of southern Italy. 
BBC, 18 May 1944: “The Polish flag is flying over the ruins of an ancient Italian 
monastery which has been a symbol of German resistance since the beginning of the 
year. Polish troops entered the hill-top abbey this morning, six days after the latest 
attacks began on this strategic stronghold at the western end of the German defensive 
position known as the Gustav line. British troops have taken control of the fortified town 
of Cassino at the foot of ‘Monastery Hill’.”529 
The Times, 19 May 1944, page 4, From Our Special Correspondent: headline – 
“Desolation Of Cassino, Visit After The Battle, A Tortured Town”; story – “Here is a 
scene of utter desolation such as only this war can produce. It is nearing noon, and the 
last Germans left this relic of a tortured town some few hours ago; they were prisoners. 
Their last stronghold—Hotel Continental—had gone up with a bang a little while before 
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that; it was the final retreating blow that the Germans in Cassino struck. There were 
fewer than 30 prisoners taken in Cassino itself. Our men felt bitter about that. ‘This is 
the first time I have ever been able to stand outside in the open air,’ said one of them, 
‘and now I have only seen 10 Germans.’” 
For all the difficult and deadly fighting of Cassino and Anzio, however, they were 
both a prelude to the greater battle that was to come: the opening of the Second Front, 





BBC, 6 June 1944, Frank Gillard: “Astern of us, the assault craft have assembled. 
You know that they are neatly marshalled there, in formation, but you can only make out 
the leaders. The loud hailer checks them over. Voices reply faintly out of the darkness. 
The Naval Commander is looking at his watch. He puts the microphone to his mouth. 
‘Off you go then—and good luck to you.’”530 
The Times, 7 June 1944, page 4: headline – “The Great Assault Going Well, Allies 
Several Miles Inland, Battle For Town of Caen, Mass Attack By Airborne Troops, 
Continuous Fighter Cover Over Beaches”; story – “The Allied Expeditionary Army was 
fighting last night several miles inland from the beaches… where it had landed in the 
morning in the greatest operation of its kind in history. Mr. Churchill announced last 
evening that the… operation was proceeding ‘in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.’ Mass 
airborne landings have been made behind the enemy lines, and the Germans report 
landings in Guernsey and Jersey.” 
The Times, 7 June 1944, From Our Military Correspondent, page 6: headline – 
“Gamble On The Weather, Invasion Postponed For A Day, Difficult Coast”; story – 
“The landing of British, United States and Canadian forces on the Normandy coast has 
so far met with less opposition than was expected. The concentration not interfered with; 
convoys were not heavily attacked; the sweeping appears to have been extremely 
successful; hostile ‘air’ was not very active. Above all, the coast-defence artillery has, it 
would seem, been put out of action or neutralized in the target area by the terrific attacks 
carried out during the night of Monday and early Tuesday by the allied heavy bombers, 
later by the Tactical Air Force, and subsequently by naval bombardment. But in other 
respects the absence of strong resistance at the first stage means little. It means only that 
the enemy held back his Luftwaffe and had not brought his main land forces into 
action.” The previous two Times stories were important because they explained the vast 
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scope of the invasion, but the analysis in the second story also let the people on the home 
front know that the fight was far from over. 
Daily Express, 7 June 1944, page 1: headline – “Tanks 10 Miles In, No longer any 
opposition on the beaches, Luftwaffe Is Still Absent”; story – “Allied invasion troops, 
surging into France in mighty non-stop waves, have fought their way into Caen, town 
ten miles from the coast. Heavy street fighting is going on. The Germans are saying that 
the defenders are being ‘sorely tried.’ Along the whole front of between 80 and 100 
miles from Cherbourg to the mouth of the Seine the offensive is gaining momentum. 
Already terrific convoys have been assembled on the one-time holiday beaches. Our 
tanks are well inland.” The story was headed by a map showing the Normandy coastline 
with arrows pointing at the points of invasion, as well as a caption that read, “The 
invasion dispositions on this Daily Express map are based on news received yesterday 
from Germany. From Germany, too, came the claim that paratroops had been landed in 
the Channel Islands.” 
Daily Mirror, 7 June 1944, page 1: headline – “We Hold Beachhead”; story – 
“Within a few hours of the mightiest assault in history Allied troops established a 
beachhead on the Normandy coast yesterday. Airborne troops are fighting some miles 
inland. More than 640 naval guns—from 4 to 16 inches—had practically silenced the 
German coastal batteries. The Allied air force was in absolute control. All through the 
day, from the 7 a.m. landings until dusk, Allied fighter-bombers were dive-bombing, 
glide-bombing and strafing German defences and communications. They flew into the 
mouths of guns and dived within feet of the bridges.” 
In contrast to the historical works – including written and cinematic versions – on 
the invasion that came later, the news stories focused on the encouraging progress of the 
Allies and did not provide death and injury tolls or delve into any of the gruesome 
details that have come out in historical accounts. This is undoubtedly due to a 
professional sense that particulars of such a dramatic nature should not be released both 
for the sake of decorum – this was during a time when the gore that is regularly 
described and viewed today would be unthinkable – and simply so as not to upset the 
relatives of the men who lost their lives. The closest that correspondents might have 
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come to such writing and broadcasting might be seen in the example of Guy Byam’s 
report in which he describes a point at which a plane “disintegrates” in the air. 
BBC, 8 June 1944, Guy Byam: “The whole sky is a fantastic chimera of lights and 
flak, and one plane gets hit and disintegrates wholesale in the sky, sprinkling a myriad of 
burning pieces all over the sky. The job of the unit with which I jumped was to occupy 
the area and prepare the way for gliders—we were to rendezvous near a copse, but I 
can’t find it, so I go to a farm-house and ask the way of a farmer and his wife standing 
on the porch of their house. It’s a tricky business this moving about the enemy 
countryside at night. But we are well in hand and at the most I shall only meet my own 
patrols. I find the unit after having been sniped at once and challenged a number of 
times. They are assembling under a hedge.”531 Rather than simply give an update on the 
progress of the forces, this story gives a glimpse into how close Byam was to the action 
and the type of activities that war correspondents were conducting and difficulties they 
were encountering during the invasion and ensuing battles, giving the public more 
insight to the job of a war reporter. Also, his use of the language, “The whole sky is a 
fantastic chimera of lights and flak”, provides a descriptive narrative and demonstrates 
how BBC correspondents often engaged in more florid language than newspaper 
correspondents who usually had stricter space restrictions in their print publications. 
This sort of description was frequently demonstrated in the reports by Richard 
Dimbleby, and is one of the reasons he became one of the most famous of the war 
correspondents. 
BBC, 11 June 1944, Richard Dimbleby: “I saw the shining, blue sea. Not an 
empty sea, but a sea crowded, infested with craft of every kind: little ships, fast and 
impatient, scurrying like water-beetles to and fro, and leaving a glistening wake behind 
them; bigger ships, in stately, slow procession with the sweepers in front and the escort 
vessels on the flank—it was a brave, oh, an inspiring sight. We are supplying the 
beaches all right—no doubt of that. We flew on south-west, and I could see France and 
Britain, and I realized how very near to you all at home in England is this great battle in 
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Normandy. It’s a stone’s throw across the gleaming water.”532 This narrative reporting 
very likely caught the imagination of the people on the home front more so than straight 
news reporting of facts or regurgitating of dry military press releases. And the mention 
of the closeness to England, with its coast in sight, undoubtedly made the British public 
feel more connected to their military forces battling in Normandy. 
Yet straight news reports could still be just as stirring as personal narratives, as 
exhibited in the following story. Daily Mirror, 12 June 1944, page 1: headline – “Our 
Forces Hold Unbroken Line of 51 Miles”; story – “With the fighting around our invasion 
bridgehead becoming heavier hourly the Allied forces continue to widen their grip on 
Normandy. Outstanding feature of the fighting is the terrific intensity of our air assaults 
on the Germans’ gun emplacements and supply columns. Marauders, which formerly 
bombed from medium heights, are now sweeping the country-side at the hitherto 
unheard of altitude of 200ft., playing havoc with their heavy-calibre machine-guns, and 
the enemy can do nothing about it. The Luftwaffe has been afraid to commit itself even 
at night. A barrage from ships and shore batteries almost as heavy as London’s greets 
every German plane which approaches the beachhead, while swarms of night fighters, 
both 2nd Tactical Air Force and Air Defence of Great Britain, are ready to shoot them 
out of the skies.” As with Dimbleby’s report mentioning the proximity to England, the 
comparison to London’s air defences against the Luftwaffe gave those at home a direct 
connection to their own experiences in The People’s War. 
Daily Mirror, 1 July 1944, page 1: headline – “Wedge Troops Maul The Huns”; 
story – “Rommel flung fresh troops into the Normandy wedge battle yesterday, but the 
British troops, which had already withstood forty-eight hours of continual counter-
attacks, not only held on but made the salient firmer than ever. Our bridgehead over the 
Odon is now solid. English and Scottish troops who held a big panzer blow against the 
west bank of the wedge resumed their drive to broaden the corridor.” Besides 
specifically featuring the actions of “English and Scottish troops” rather than calling 
them “Allied” or even “British”, the article is somewhat noteworthy for its large, 
boldfaced headline using the word “Huns”. This is an example of how news coverage, 
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even of wars, has changed dramatically since the Second World War; in the coverage of 
modern warfare, such as the Afghanistan and Iraq wars or other conflicts in the Middle 
East, a slang term as inflammatory as Huns would never be allowed in the media, even 
about the enemy, although it is widely known that both soldiers and the public use such 
negative sobriquets. 
As with previous battle reports such as the 11 February 1944 story from Cassino, 
The Times printed another Allied press release as its 5 July 1944, page 3 story with the 
headline, “Two Major Attacks In Normandy, Capture of Carpiquet and Verson”, 
followed by, “Communique No. 58, issued from Supreme Allied Headquarters last 
night….”533 While the military press releases provided valuable information that 
informed the public of its progress, the stories of the movements and observations of the 
war correspondents – whether reporting danger to themselves or lighter moments – still 
provide far more compelling reading. 
BBC, 9 July 1944, Frank Gillard: “The patrols which we sent forward last night 
towards Caen have reported that it was almost impossible to find an entry into the city. 
Every roadway was completely blocked. So, when our infantry and tanks went forward 
down the slope from Hill 64 just before eleven o’clock this morning, they had bulldozers 
well up with them. It was close on two o’clock when the commander received a message 
which made him turn to us and say, ‘All right; if you want to go in, you can go.’ Feeling 
very much like a military target, we shot over the open brow of the hill in our jeep, until 
we reached a cross-roads beyond which there was so much German fire that it was 
obvious that the only way was to continue on foot, ‘playing musical chairs from slit 
trench to slit trench’, as one officer on the spot put it.”534 
BBC, 11 July 1944, Robin Duff: “Yesterday they were at work routing out the 
Germans themselves. They were searching a deserted farm-house, when one of them 
saw a boot sticking out of a corner of an attic. They fired through the floor and nineteen 
German soldiers, fully armed, surrendered to four soldiers of the Resistance…. While he 
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[the Maquis commander] was in the courtyard of his headquarters a report came in that a 
German parachutist had been seen near by…. As we went along, searching as best we 
might, three small children joined us. There was a boy of fifteen and his two little sisters. 
They asked us whether they could help us look for les Boches. Armed with some 
chewing gum, some toffee, and a cigarette, they tagged along. And suddenly, we wanted 
to laugh.”535 
Overall, the reporting from the Normandy landings and the weeks that followed 
gave the correspondents an opportunity to provide some of the most exciting and 
perhaps most encouraging coverage of the war to that point, as was befitting the greatest 
operation of the entire conflict. 
  
                                                 




The second great war of the 20th Century marked a new era in conflict journalism, 
and in some ways in journalism in general. The increased role of the reporter as a 
credible observer of a clash that engulfed multiple countries resulted in improvements of 
existing procedures and even some innovations in a progressively vital profession. 
Despite the difficulties of balancing bureaucratic restrictions, state and military 
censorship, changing technology, and the inherent dangers of reporting from battle 
zones, the Second World War combat correspondents were able to flourish in their 
assigned task of delivering to the public news of this prodigious struggle. They showed 
courage, creativity and fortitude, and many of the correspondents who covered the 
British and Dominion forces in the Western Theatres proved themselves to be among the 
finest in this rarefied club. 
At the same time, the media organisations themselves matured in their methods of 
enabling the reporters to gain access to the most important events of their time in terms 
of monetary support, equipment, and other substantial services that maintained the 
journalists in the field. This was coupled by changes in the overall British media 
environment, in which a settlement between the government, the press and the growing 
medium of broadcasting was negotiated and subsequently changed the rules of the news 
business in Britain. The press still remained a major player, but also had to make room 
for the swelling popularity and respectability of the upstarts in radio news. The 
interaction between the government and the news organisations was changed in the same 
way, with Whitehall having to recognise the BBC as an equal to Fleet Street. 
Meanwhile, the effect of the government on the media, especially in the wielding of 
censorship, changed in a way that, while the flow of information was still controlled to a 
great degree, the public was assured more access to the facts than the favourable 
government and military assessments of the First World War. The government and the 
news organisations also collaborated more closely on endeavours such as Operation 
Spartan that ensured the correspondents would be better prepared not only to work with 
the military in collecting the war news, but to return it to the home front in a timely and 
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accurate fashion. This proved to be ground-breaking when the biggest military assault in 
history, and subsequently the biggest news operation, occurred with the launch of 
Operation Overlord on 6 June 1944.536 
The Second World War provided an unfortunate opportunity for combat reporters 
to continue the work as it was developed by the correspondents who reported on 
previous conflicts, but also to use new approaches developed to meet the monumental 
task of covering a war that was far beyond the scope of all those that came before it. In 
terms of reporting technology and technique, the correspondents of the Second World 
War straddled the past and the future: while telegrams, letters and even carrier pigeons 
were being used to deliver the news of the war back to Britain, radio reporters were 
utilising the latest developments in recording and communication including the Midget 
portable recorder and transmitter trucks that could beam recordings from the continent 
back to Britain. However, regardless of the medium in which they reported, all war 
correspondents still relied on typewriters, notebooks and pencils. 
There were many notable war correspondents in the Second World War, each of 
whom had somewhat different reasons for taking on such an enormous assignment full 
of danger and deprivations. Alaric Jacob summed it up well: “Somebody has to write up 
wars in the newspapers. It’s an essential job of work, but not one of transcendental 
importance. And the men who do it aren’t figures of romance. Just reporters in uniform. 
Some turn out to be brave and resourceful, others ought never to receive the army’s 
license.”537 
Subsequently, the selection and training of war correspondents was obviously of 
the greatest importance to the correspondents themselves and the media outlets that 
employed them, but also had a high level of significance for the people at home who 
relied on the media to deliver the daily news from the battle theatres. Without 
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correspondents who were able to cover all the fronts of the war and to distill their 
importance, as well as give more than grey descriptions of both the fighting and the 
conditions of the troops, the public would be left with an incomplete understanding of 
what was happening. The connection with the war on foreign soil was vitally important 
to those fighting The People’s War in Britain in that it gave them reason, beyond mere 
survival, to maintain their great fortitude. Had the news companies simply chosen 
whichever members of their reporting staff were most senior or were simply available 
first, the level of reporting could have suffered. With the public hanging every day on 
the printed and broadcast words of the war correspondents, ensuring the top people were 
not only chosen but, as much as possible, properly prepared for the monumental job set 
before them was key. As it was, the correspondents who hailed from both the UK and 
Dominion nations had among their ranks some of the finest to work in wartime and as a 
group kept the public as fully informed as possible, which in the end was what the 
people really desired. During the dark hours of their war at home, they wanted to have as 
much light as possible shed upon the war abroad. The BBC understood this, reminding 
their war correspondents that their reporting “must include a good deal more than battle 
news; for broadcasting must link families at home with the men at the front by 
interpreting them as human beings and not only as soldiers… war reporters must not get 
so steeped in Service knowledge that they forget that civilians, the majority of them 
women, form the bulk of their audience.”538 
The BBC’s careful selection of its roster of correspondents and thorough training 
regimen proved a great success in the long term for the Corporation. D-Day marked the 
official debut of the wholly formed War Reporting Unit and the launch of the BBC’s 
flagship programme of the latter part of the conflict, War Report, whose first broadcast 
at 9:15 pm on the day of the Normandy invasion was heard by an estimated 17- to 20-
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million listeners.539 With an average civilian audience of between 10- and 15-million, 
there were a total of 235 War Report programmes, comprising between 1,500 and 2,000 
dispatches. War Report broadcast several war journalism milestones, including the first 
British report of the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life; a live recording of the French 
liberation ceremony at Notre Dame, where snipers tried to assassinate Charles de Gaulle; 
the first news of Heinrich Himmler’s suicide; the announcement of the German army’s 
surrender in Italy and the fall of Berlin that same night; and an exclusive recording of the 
meeting in which General Montgomery accepted Germany’s unconditional surrender.540 
Despite these historic moments in broadcasting, for the BBC correspondents on War 
Report, the Normandy invasion produced what are likely their most memorable reports. 
Stanley Maxted recalling tracer fire zipping over his head during a skirmish led by a 
torpedo boat skipper: “That man’s a fire eater…”; Guy Byam recounting his leap out of 
an airplane with British paratroopers: “The whole sky now is a fantastic chimera of 
lights and flak…”; Chester Wilmot aboard a glider: “We virtually crash landed in the 
plowed field…”; Howard Marshall on a barge: “Soon the air grew heavy with the smell 
of cordite and loud with the sound of explosions, and looking along the beach we could 
see the explosions of our artillery creating a great cloud and fog of smoke…”; Richard 
Dimbleby describing the scene below his Mosquito aircraft: “Fires are burning in every 
direction, there’s smoke going up in clouds….”541 These are the broadcasts that made 
household names of some of these BBC correspondents, and a handful of them went on 
to enjoy prosperous post-war careers in radio, television, and books. 
As with the BBC, newspapers and wire services also put a premium on selecting 
and supporting their war correspondents because they understood the enormity of the 
mission they faced. Without well-chosen correspondents, for example, The Times would 
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not have been able to print a morale-boosting story from the Anzio beachhead in Italy 
with the headline, “Great Stand By Grenadiers: 18 Hours’ Fight in Beach-Head”, as well 
as a piece critiquing military tactics headlined, “After the Anzio Landing: New 
Developments In Amphibian Operations: Problems Which Must Be Solved”, both from 
February 1944. During the First World War, when correspondents relied heavily on 
government press releases that provided favourable estimates of the military situations, 
the first story most likely would have been allowed by censors while the next very likely 
would not. Yet in this new war both these stories reached the public eager for 
information not only due to a more permissive censorship, but because of the abilities of 
the correspondents to get the stories and, in the second example, to explain military 
techniques to a lay audience. Also like the BBC, a handful of those print journalists 
skilful enough to provide this sort of information to the public – Alaric Jacob of Reuters 
and Alan Moorehead of the Daily Express, for example – also went on to well-deserved 
renown. 
As A.P. Ryan told his BBC correspondents shortly before they deployed to 
Normandy: “Field service is no picnic.”542 The reporters across all the different news 
agencies experienced that colloquialism to varying degrees; from sticking out their 
thumbs and hitching rides with military vehicles, trying to sleep through desert sand 
storms or frigid Belgian winters, to being shot at and bombed. Describing the Second 
World War for an eager public at home was an extremely difficult job for the 
correspondents with numerous factors that played upon their lives every day, and in 
unfortunate cases even cost them their lives. 
However, it is unlikely any of them would have traded their position for another. 
Because despite all the factors that contributed to field service being no picnic, at times 
they did in fact have literal picnics, lounging in deserted villas or supping on the pilfered 
stocks of German officers who had gone on the run only hours earlier. They were able to 
move with a relatively large amount of freedom around the war theatres, gain access to 
important military personnel as far up as generals, take leave as they wished (or as 
allowed by their employers), enjoy billets in hotels and have dinner with officers that 
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they then charged to their company expense accounts, and appropriate numerous spoils 
of war such as large amounts of alcohol and food while the troops lived on canned 
rations. Robert Capa, the famed war photographer, summed up the combat journalist’s 
life this way: “I would say that the war correspondent gets more drinks, more girls, 
better pay and greater freedom than the soldier.”543 Clearly the correspondents had 
experiences that put them in a different category from the soldiers with whom they often 
shared the dangers of the battlefield; they were both part of and apart from the soldiers 
they covered. 
Yet it was obviously far more of an endeavour – and far more important – than 
going out and taking part in adventures, both perilous and pleasurable. The People’s War 
in the United Kingdom benefited greatly from the work of the war correspondents 
covering the British armed forces, keeping those on the home front abreast of the events 
of the conflicts, as well as maintaining a connection to their family members and 
countrymen involved in the fighting abroad, and perhaps by doing so giving them the 
strength and hope to keep up their own struggle. The Dominion nations undoubtedly 
benefited in the same manner from the work of these British correspondents, as well as 
the reporters from their own nations such as those from the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation and newspapers in Australia and South Africa. 
Historical works often use information from war correspondents as grist to help 
analyse and explain the war, and in doing so quote news stories or recall anecdotes 
involving reporters. Historical works that focus on the media as a whole or large media 
companies, such as The Power of News: The History of Reuters by Donald Read, often 
do so in a big-picture fashion rather than drilling down to the details of the practice of 
reporting. Meanwhile, there are books such as the memoirs of correspondents that 
provide more small scale, intimate perspectives, but focus on the individual experiences 
of those writing them. 
This dissertation attempts to fill a gap in the historiography of the Second World 
War by supplementing both the generalised views of the workings of journalism at the 
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time as well as the personal stories of the practitioners. In broad ways, the dissertation is 
intended as a study of the media in general during the conflict. Radio became as big as 
the printed media, ending the pre-war dominance that Asa Briggs and Peter Burke called 
“the age of the press barons”.544 Ground-breaking new broadcasting technology was 
developed. War news was brought to the home front on a far wider scale than in 
previous conflicts, ensuring the public was not only better informed, but that its 
expectations changed about the breadth of future media coverage of wars, and perhaps 
politics and society as well. Censorship grew into a giant, machine-like entity the likes 
of which had not been seen before, but press freedom grew along with it. Despite 
examples of self-censorship, such as with the reporting of Dunkirk, as correspondents 
got closer to the war and emerged with a greater amount of information than had been 
previously collected in war reporting, the news organisations seemed to acquire an 
increasing willingness to publish and broadcast more news with a greater scope, not just 
communiques from the military. The welfare of troops had always been a concern, as 
shown as far back as the reports of neglect and mistreatment of foot soldiers written by 
William Howard Russell, but the human stories of the fighting men became 
commonplace topics alongside those of policy and strategy and military outcomes. As 
stated in Mass Observation’s “Report On The Press” from May 1940: “Ordinary war-
time events, such as soldiers arriving on leave, or setting sail for France, are given 
‘human interest’ in this way. Thus, after the news of a battle has been printed and 
become stale, it is usually followed up by accounts of interviews with those who took 
part in it, what they said, what they felt, etc.”545 These are all important topics in British 
war reporting that, when taken together, should contribute to media history. 
Yet the specific focus of this dissertation – and the prism through which the media 
is analysed – is the corps of war correspondents on the front lines. The correspondents of 
the Second World War who covered the British and Dominion forces did not recreate 
journalism, the path of war reporting had already been laid before them, but they did 
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help redefine the direction that the profession would take for years to come. The manner 
in which correspondents were chosen, and the new methods used to train them, 
developed along with the modern warfare they covered. The infrastructure to support 
them – not only through salaries that were markedly higher than the general public, but 
also equipment and financial safety nets such as life insurance and payments to those 
who were captured – was improved to deal with the greater expanse of this war over 
others. In discussing these subjects as they relate specifically to the war correspondents 
as a group and as individuals is where the previously untapped value of this dissertation 
lies. 
As stated in the introduction, the intention of this work has been a gathering of 
many disparate sources that together enabled an analysis of how the war correspondents 
did their jobs, including personnel files of BBC reporters that had never before been 
viewed for academic study; various memoirs of war correspondents that had previously 
stood alone rather than collected and compared; and numerous news stories that had not 
formerly been subjected to close analysis together. These sources were crucial to a study 
of how the everyday work of these correspondents not only provided the immediate 
information of the war but also subsequently updated and even changed the genre of war 
reporting, as well as how in some respects the Second World War dramatically changed 
the landscape of journalism in general. 
Yet the work could be expanded further. With additional sources and related 
topics available upon which to enlarge this study – such as the war correspondents in the 
Pacific Theatre and the female correspondents, each group having had its own unique 
experiences and issues in the course of their jobs – the research specifically focused on 
the working lives of war correspondents with both an institutional and personal focus 
could go forward and make more contributions to the field of Second World War media 
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The following is a list of noteworthy people who practised or somehow affected the 
development of British war reporting in the western theatres of the Second World War. 
The list is far from complete, especially regarding correspondents, but is representative 
of the figures who played an important part in gathering and organizing – and in the case 
of military and political actors, those who attempted to closely control – the war news 
disseminated to the Home Front. 
 




Associated Press of Britain 
Godfrey H.P. Anderson – Notable because the Italian government made requests to the 
British government to arrange a prisoner exchange for Anderson, the AP’s Middle East 
correspondent, for one of three Italian correspondents being held in India. The British 
refused, invoking a policy that was also used in the case of captured BBC correspondent 
Edward Ward. 
 
The Daily Express 
Alan Moorehead – Moorehead, an Australian, worked for the Melbourne Herald while 
he was still a student and then continued with the paper after receiving a degree in law. 
He joined the Daily Express and covered the Spanish Civil War from the British outpost 
at Gibraltar and then was moved to the Middle East and North Africa, where he made his 
name covering the British Eighth Army. He later wrote books about his experiences in 
the Desert War, which were compiled in his African Trilogy. He was in Normandy for 
the opening of the Second Front and continued covering the Allies through the liberation 
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of Paris, Belgium and Holland. He continued to write books through the 1950s and 
1960s but suffered a career-ending stroke in 1966. He died in 1983. 
 
The Daily Mail 
Alexander Clifford – Clifford was initially with Reuters covering the Spanish Civil 
War and then as its Berlin correspondent until the Second World War commenced, at 
which time he went to France as an eyewitness representing the British press. In 1940 he 
was a Daily Mail staffer in Greece and Yugoslavia, and then in North Africa in 1941. 
From 1943-1944, Clifford was on the Italian front and was cited for “gallant and 
distinguished services”. In 1944 he joined the Allied forces in France and covered the 




Alexander Massy Anderson – A Royal Navy correspondent for Reuters, he drowned in 
the Mediterranean when a U-boat torpedoed his ship near Alexandria, Egypt, 15 
December 1941. He was one of the small number of Reuters reporters killed on 
assignment during the war. 
 
Archibald Doon Campbell – A correspondent who enjoyed a long career with Reuters, 
Campbell became a standout reporter for the wire service after working for newspapers 
in Scotland, including the Edinburgh Evening Dispatch. He came to be considered one 
of the best discoveries to be recruited by the famed Reuters editor and manager, Walton 
Cole. He was the youngest journalist accredited to Allied headquarters in Algiers and 
was at the infamous battle of Monte Cassino in Italy. He later became the first war 
correspondent to touch the beach on D-Day, famously giving his dispatch the dateline, 
“A ditch 200 yards inside Normandy”. He also survived the crash landing of an 
American glider along the Rhine. All of this with only one hand due to a birth defect. 
Following the war he covered China, where he obtained a rare interview with Mao 
Zedong, and India, where he reported the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. He stayed 
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with Reuters as an editor until 1973 and in 1984 was awarded the OBE. He died in 2003 
at the age of 83. 
 
John Chetwyd-Talbot – A fifteen-year Reuters veteran at the age of 33, Talbot had 
already covered military action in the Arctic, Russia, North Africa, the Mediterranean, 
and the Middle East before moving to the Balkans, where he was escorted to Josip Tito’s 
secret mountain hideout in what is now Bosnia by Major Randolph Churchill, son of 
Winston. He subsequently became one of only two reporters providing coverage of the 
Partisan forces for the rest of the world media. In May 1944, he was captured by the 
Germans and slated for execution before the intervention of an American news 
photographer saved him. Talbot spent several months in captivity, but remained with 
Reuters as a European and African correspondent until 1975. 
 
Walton A. Cole – The editor and joint news manager of Reuters during the war, “Tony” 
was famous for spotting talent; some of his recruits, including Doon Campbell and 
Charles Lynch, were ranked among the most distinguished Reuters journalists of the war 
and beyond. He was also the main point of contact in London for combat reporters in the 
field, making him a critical piece of the machine that disseminated news to numerous 
print outlets and, subsequently, provided information about the war to the rest of the 
world. 
 
Alaric Jacob – Born in Edinburgh, Jacob lived in India and the Middle East as a child 
before being educated in England. He was a Washington reporter for Reuters in the 
1930s until deployment as a war correspondent in France in 1940, later enduring a close 
escape from the country during the German invasion. He wrote in his memoir that 
having “run into a German ambush at Evreux without damage and come safely away 
from Brest a good twelve hours ahead of the enemy, I had no illusions about the ‘glory’ 
of the profession.”546 Yet at age thirty-two he once again volunteered for war 
correspondent duty and left London’s King’s Cross Station in May 1941 to embark upon 
                                                 
546  Ibid. 
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a journey to Egypt to cover the war in Africa, a job which he stated in his memoir would 
be “an enormity”. He then covered the Middle East and Africa, including the fighting in 
Tobruk in late summer 1941 and the battle of El Alamein in 1942. Jacob left Reuters for 
the Daily Express and went on to cover Burma in the Pacific theatre and then Russia in 
1944. 
 
Charles Lynch – Recruited by Cole from Canadian newspapers, Lynch went on to a 
long career at Reuters that included war coverage on the Western Front and, after the 
war, a position as a well-known and highly regarded political commentator. Lynch was 
immortalized in war correspondent lore when the film The Longest Day – based on the 
1959 book by Reuters and Daily Telegraph war correspondent Cornelius Ryan – re-
enacted the moment when Lynch tried to send a message from the Normandy beach 
back to England via carrier pigeons and the birds instead turned and flew toward the 
Germans inland, prompting Lynch to shout, “Traitors! Damn traitors!” 
 
Stewart Sale – He was a war correspondent killed by a shell near Naples, Italy, on 28 
September 1943. Before joining Reuters, Sale worked for English newspapers including 
the Daily Telegraph. He accompanied a bombing raid over Berlin and then was posted in 
August 1943 to North Africa, from which he reported on the invasion of Italy. 
 
Desmond Tighe – Desmond Tighe began working as a Morse code operator in London 
in 1930, but then took a position working for the Reuters commercial service in Egypt in 
1935. He subsequently became a Reuters war correspondent and had a series of close 
escapes from the Germans, first in Oslo in the spring of 1940 when he had to flee to 
Sweden to avoid the Nazi invasion force. He later travelled a very roundabout, 7,000-
mile route through Moscow, Odessa and Bucharest to reach Paris, where he took the last 
plane out to London before the arrival of Nazi troops. He was Alexander Massy 
Anderson’s replacement covering the British navy in the Mediterranean after Anderson 
was killed. Tighe was on a ship off the coast of Italy in 1943 reporting on the Allied 
invasion there; he also stood on a British ship at dawn on 6 June 1944, resulting in the 
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sort of vivid description of the Normandy landings that have been invaluable to 
historians: “Guns are belching flame from more than 600 allied warships. Thousands of 
bombers are roaring overhead, fighters are weaving in and out of the clouds as the 
invasion of Western Europe begins…. It is the most incredible sight I have ever seen….” 
After the D-Day landings, Tighe was cited in a Reuters internal report as filing “the best 
published descriptive dispatch of the invasion”.547 
 
The Times 
Robert Cooper – Cooper, a Canadian, took a post as a sports writer at The Times in 
1924. Then in 1939 he went to France to cover that nation’s military as a war 
correspondent. After Dunkirk he worked again in England before reporting from India 
and Burma, but returned to Europe for the D-Day invasion. He later covered the Parisian 
liberation, the end of the war in Belgium and then moved to Germany to observe the 
Nazi surrender. Following the war he covered the Nuremberg trials for the newspaper 
and became its chief Germany correspondent. 
 
Ralph Deakin – The paper’s Foreign News Editor, Deakin was perhaps the most direct 
point of contact for Times war correspondents on the continent. He had helped choose 
them, stating that “young men who are steady, experienced and wise” were the best sorts 
to cover the war, although this was not always the case. Deakin contacted the Foreign 
Office in 1944 in an attempt to regain the services of Kim Philby, who had previously 
worked as a war correspondent for The Times in Spain and France, but the government 
would not relinquish Philby. 
 
Christopher Lumby – His 4 November 1946 obituary in The Times summing up 
Lumby’s long reporting career stated, “During the last war, in the Middle East, in North 
Africa, and in the reoccupation of Italy, he was numbered among the most efficient and 
trustworthy of allied war correspondents.” A graduate of Cambridge, Lumby began as a 
                                                 
547  Donald Read, The Power of News: The History of Reuters 1849-1989 (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 220, 224. 
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teacher but then joined The Times in 1913 as a Paris correspondent. When the First 
World War broke out he worked as a combat reporter for a time but then joined the ranks 
as an officer. After the war he returned to his former employer and took assignments in 
Poland, Vienna, Paris, Berlin, Italy, the Balkans and then six years in the Middle East. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War he went to Holland until the Wehrmacht 
invasion forced him to escape. He then became The Times’s senior war correspondent in 
North Africa. In his mid-fifties he was temporarily prevented from frontline coverage 
due to ill health, but returned to the battle zones in 1943 to report on the liberation of 
Italy. Iverach McDonald notes that for a man of advancing age, Lumby was a very active 
reporter: 
 
Christopher Lumby had been on the battlefields of North Africa from 
the earliest days of fighting in the Western Desert…. Illness and 
tiredness – he was in his late fifties – had prevented his accompanying 
the British armies in their victories in Tripolitania. Nothing could stop 
him from returning to the war to witness the final collapse of Italian 
Fascist power and the rolling back of enemy forces in Italy from the 
Campania beach-heads northwards. 548 
 
Lumby was in Milan in April 1945 when partisans came to see him to announce 
that Mussolini had been captured and killed and asked if the reporter would identify the 
body, as Lumby had known the Duce while working as a Rome correspondent. Lumby 
filed a report that was published in the paper on 30 April describing the body of the 
Italian leader “heaped together in ghastly promiscuity” with that of his mistress, Clara 
Petacci. “Lumby returned to Army Headquarters to tell an amazed American general that 
the city which his soldiers were so carefully surrounding had already fallen.”549 Lumby 
continued to work in the Mediterranean but ill health got the better of him and he died 
following an operation. 
 
                                                 
548  Iverach McDonald, The History of The Times, vol. V, Struggles in War and 
Peace 1939-1966 (London: Times Books, 1984), p. 89. 
549  Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
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George Steer – After receiving his education at Oxford, he began work with The Times 
in 1935, covering the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and subsequent war, from which he 
was later expelled by the Italians for unflattering reports. Steer then covered the Spanish 
Civil War and gained international renown for his eyewitness report of the bombing of 
Guernica, which insinuated that the Luftwaffe had assisted the Spanish Nationalists in 
destroying a village with no military significance, killing many civilians. His searing 
account of the decimation of Guernica could be considered the first widespread 
revelation of Nazi atrocities and was the impetus for the iconic, eponymous painting by 





British Broadcasting Corporation 
 
Guy Byam – Guy Frederick Byam-Corstiaens was educated in France, including the 
Sorbonne, and was fluent in French and proficient in German and Spanish; he also had 
some freelance journalism experience. This made him an attractive candidate to the BBC 
after his career as a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) ended 
when cordite from a high explosive shell blinded him in one eye. In October 1942 the 
Corporation took him on as a temporary sub-editor in the French section of its European 
division. He transferred to the War Reporting Unit in 1944 and participated in coverage 
of the Second Front. Byam was in a U.S. Air Force bomber that was shot down over 
Germany on 3 February 1945. 
 
Richard Dimbleby – One of the best-known and most distinguished reporters of his 
generation, Dimbleby was one of the deans of radio war correspondents. The scion of a 
newspaper family that owned the Richmond and Twickenham Times, Dimbleby worked 
for small publications in England and then as the youngest editor of a Fleet Street paper 
before joining the BBC as a Topical Talks Assistant in 1936. After garnering a 
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reputation as a solid reporter on stories around England, including Chamberlain’s return 
with his promise of “peace in our time”, Dimbleby first encountered the Nazis at the 
handover of the Sudetenland. He surprised the officials of the German Ministry of 
Propaganda in Aachen (to his great amusement, no doubt) when he greeted the 
contingent with his arm extended in the Nazi salute, saying “Heil Hitler” and 
clicking his heels. Dimbleby covered the Spanish Civil War and was the first 
person to make a live broadcast of the sounds of battle from his nearby position 
across the border in the French Pyrenees. He served a frustratingly uneventful 
deployment with the British Expeditionary Force in France before moving to 
cover events in Greece and the Middle East. In 1942, he re-joined the British 
forces for the Desert War in North Africa, where he did memorable reporting that 
solidified his position as one of the most famous correspondents of the war. 
After being recalled to Britain for a time, Dimbleby was present for the D-Day 
landings at Normandy and thereafter remained with the forces as the Allies 
pushed east into Germany. He was the first correspondent to pass through the 
gates of Belsen concentration camp, producing an historic broadcast describing 
the horrors within that shocked the world, and was the first Allied correspondent 
to enter a fallen Berlin. Dimbleby left the BBC for a time after the war but 
returned to become the original host of the BBC’s flagship television news 
programme, Panorama, as well as serving as the network’s voice for historical 
events such as Sir Winston Churchill’s state funeral. He died in 1965. 
 
Charles Gardner – Making up the other half of the team, along with Dimbleby, that 
provided coverage of the BEF in France in 1940, Gardner was one of the original 
“observers” in the Second World War for the BBC. He had already made a name for 
himself with his sensational and somewhat controversial broadcast as he watched a 
German plane being shot down by the RAF over “Hellfire Corner” in Kent during the 
Battle of Britain in July 1940; some said it sounded like a play-by-play for a sports 
match and was beneath the dignity of the esteemed state broadcaster. 
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Frank Gillard – Gillard was another one of the BBC correspondents who gained 
experience of war reporting in the early years of the conflict before joining the War 
Reporting Unit formed to cover the Second Front. He was with the British forces at 
Dieppe, a report he said was so heavily edited it did not allow for the truth of the great 
loss. He also provided extensive coverage of the fighting in North Africa and Italy, as 
well as the Second Front in Western Europe. 
 
Denis Johnston – A successful writer and playwright from Ireland, Johnston got his first 
experience of war reporting for the BBC during the 1941 German bombings of Dublin 
and Belfast. A year later, the 40 year old with no military training arrived in Cairo to 
replace captured correspondent Edward Ward and was reporting from El Alamein two 
weeks later. He then aided Frank Gillard in covering the war in Italy before also joining 
the War Reporting Unit and covering the fighting in Normandy and the Allied push 
across Western Europe; he was one of the first correspondents to report from the 
liberated Buchenwald concentration camp. Johnston went on to become a director of the 
BBC television service and then a university professor in the United States. 
 
Howard Marshall – Marshall was the head of the War Reporting Unit, helping to 
recruit and organize its correspondents, as well as serving as one himself. Marshall 
began his on-air work in the early 1930s as a commentator on cricket matches, and later 
moved to the BBC’s home news service in London in the early 1940s. In 1943 he was 
appointed a special correspondent for frontline broadcasting and deployed to North 
Africa. He reported from Normandy for the first time on 6 June 1944, as he described it, 
sitting in wet clothes with no notes as two of the boats in which he travelled during the 
invasion had capsized. He was one of the correspondents who covered the liberation of 
Paris and was at one time suspended by the military for broadcasting messages from a 
Parisian radio station that had not yet been cleared by SHAEF. In his administrative 
capacity for the WRU he had direct dealings with General Bernard Montgomery, who 
was not always pleased with the unit’s work, as well as arguing with the War Office over 
matters such as accrediting sound engineers. 
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Stewart MacPherson – Born in Winnipeg, Canada, he moved to England in 1936 and 
by the next year his experience with his national sport and his Canadian accent helped 
him acquire a position as a BBC commentator for ice-hockey games. In 1942, when the 
BBC turned its attention inward in search of experienced broadcasters who could join 
the war reporting team, MacPherson’s name was put forward and he jumped at the 
opportunity. He trained with the Grenadier Guards, at first reluctant to take the 
assignment alongside men with whom he believed he had nothing in common, but he 
said they eventually found great mutual respect; he also took part in the War Reporting 
Unit’s large-scale training exercise, Operation Spartan. MacPherson participated in the 
BBC’s coverage of the Second Front from RAF raids over Germany to reporting on the 
ground war from Normandy to Arnhem. After the war he became a renowned figure on 
BBC radio entertainment shows, but later moved back to Canada where he remained 
until his death in 1995. 
 
John Snagge – After leaving Oxford in 1924 he joined the BBC, four years later 
becoming a regular broadcaster for rowing events such as the annual Oxbridge race. 
During the war Snagge was one of the anonymous news announcers conveying the latest 
events in the conflict and was instrumental in changing the policy that allowed 
broadcasters’ names to be aired. He was the first to introduce what became the War 
Reporting Unit’s flagship programme, War Report, and most famously delivered the first 
news of the landings at Normandy, reading the official announcement of the invasion 
from Supreme Commander Eisenhower. Before reciting the communique, Snagge began 
the broadcast with a simple declaration that has been etched in journalistic history: “D-
Day has come.” 
 
Kent Stevenson – The BBC hired Hugh Francis Kent Stevenson at the beginning of 
April 1941 as a broadcast presentation and production assistant. He was troublesome and 
clashed with his superiors regularly regarding his salary, but was kept on and promoted 
throughout his BBC career due to what were considered superior broadcasting skills. 
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The RAF Lancaster from which he was reporting during a bombing raid went down over 
Germany on 22 June 1944. He was reported missing and presumed dead. 
 
Godfrey Talbot – Talbot was a key player for the BBC in covering the Second World 
War and might be considered – along with Dimbleby, Gardner, Gillard and Edward 
Ward – one of the pioneers of the Corporation’s war reporting. He joined the BBC in 
1937 after working for the Yorkshire Post, the Manchester City News and the Daily 
Dispatch. During the Desert War he was at the second battle of El Alamein from its 
onset in October 1942, and later covered the Allied invasion of Italy and the push toward 
Rome, observing the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and heavy censorship of the story to 
prevent revealing the extent to which the event held up Allied forces. He also covered 
the fighting in Greece and then France in 1944, although not until two months after D-
Day. After the war he became the BBC’s first official royal correspondent accredited to 
Buckingham Palace and wrote popular books about royalty and the queen in particular. 
He died in September 2000 at the age of 91. 
 
Wynford Vaughan-Thomas – The Welshman born in Swansea attended Oxford and 
joined the BBC in the mid-1930s, in time to provide Welsh-language commentary for 
the coronation of George VI. Recruited as an experienced broadcaster to become a war 
reporter, Vaughan-Thomas reported with the RAF on bombing raids over enemy 
territory and was the first to field test the revolutionary new Midget field recorder from 
the beach at Anzio in March 1943. He took part in the Operation Spartan training 
exercise as part of the War Reporting Unit and then participated in coverage of the 
Second Front in Western Europe. Other notable broadcasts included one from the desk 
of Lord Haw-Haw and another from Belsen concentration camp. He was appointed an 
OBE and then CBE before his death in 1987. 
 
Edward Ward – Ward, who eventually succeeded to the title seventh Viscount Bangor, 
was educated at Harrow and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and later became a 
Reuters correspondent in China and other spots in the Far East. He began working as a 
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BBC announcer in January 1937 and then became a reporter who achieved great renown 
for his coverage of the Winter War, where he was the first correspondent to take 
recording gear to a front line and later obtained the exclusive story on the peace treaty 
between Finland and Russia in March 1940. He transferred to North Africa to cover the 
Desert War but was captured in November 1941 during a Panzer attack, leading to his 
captivity in both Italian and German POW camps until almost the end of the war. He 
was released in time to be present for the link-up between American and Russian forces 
at Torgau in April 1945. 
 
Chester Wilmot – Born in Melbourne, he joined the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation in 1940 and covered his country’s fighting forces in the Middle East and 
Greece. He then covered the war in North Africa, including the siege of Tobruk. During 
his coverage of the Pacific theatre that followed, Australian General Thomas Blamey 
revoked Wilmot’s accreditation due to personal clashes between the two men. The BBC, 
however, had taken notice of Wilmot’s Tobruk broadcasts and hired him as a 
correspondent for the remainder of the war. He was the first to record the frightening 
sound of incoming German Nebelwerfer mortars with a Midget recorder as he lay in a 
ditch. Wilmot also broke the news of the German surrender to the Allies. He was killed 
in a plane crash in 1954 while on assignment for the BBC. 
 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
 
Matthew Halton – Halton was a teacher before going to the University of Alberta, 
where he became a reporter and editor for the school newspaper. In 1929 he took up 
study in London and wrote over 200 articles for Canadian newspapers. Upon returning 
to Canada in 1931 the Toronto Star hired him and sent him back to London as its 
correspondent and he eventually covered the Spanish Civil War and the Russo-Finnish 
War. After a brief stint in Washington, the Star deployed him to North Africa to cover 
the Desert Rats; he also made recordings for the CBC, which hired him in 1943 as its 
senior war correspondent. He was present during the Sicily and Italy invasions, on the 
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beach in Normandy, and reported the push through France, Belgium, Holland and 
Germany. His last war report came from Berlin on V-E Day. He remained a CBC 
foreign correspondent until his death in 1956. 
 
Peter Stursberg – The CBC’s best-known war correspondent, Peter Stursberg began at 
Canadian newspapers and the Daily Herald in London and then reported in Canada for 
the CBC before the state broadcaster moved him abroad. He covered the war in North 
Africa and then recorded the sounds of battle at such famed clashes of the Italian 
campaign as Monte Cassino and Coriano Ridge, as well as an eyewitness account of the 
Allied entry into Rome, the only live broadcast he was allowed to make during the war. 
Afterward he moved on to coverage of the Second Front, from southern France to 
Holland and into fallen Berlin. After the conflict he found himself on a speaking tour to 
describe his experiences for audiences across Canada, not realizing his radio work had 
made him a national celebrity. In the post-war years he has worked for the Canadian 
prime minister’s office and as a television commentator, as well as a writer. At the time 






Harold Alexander – Field Marshal Harold Alexander commanded the British 15th 
Army in Italy and later became supreme commander of Allied forces in the 
Mediterranean. He was in direct contact with reporters such as Godfrey Talbot, willing 
to discuss the Italian campaign over dinner in his field headquarters. Yet he was still a 
strict military commander when it came to perceived misconduct by any correspondent 
travelling with his troops: Alexander tried in December 1943 to cancel Frank Gillard’s 
accreditation, wrongly accusing the BBC reporter of using a secret transmitter to 
circumvent army headquarters in Italy and forcing an investigation involving Minister of 
Information Brendan Bracken and BBC Editor-in-Chief William Haley. After the war 
Alexander was named governor general of Canada and then served as defence minister 
under Winston Churchill from 1952 until his retirement in 1954. 
 
Thomas Blamey – The commander of Australian forces perhaps made his best 
contribution to war reporting in the European theatre by clashing several times with 
Chester Wilmot of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the last being when Blamey 
took over in New Guinea. Blamey rescinded Wilmot’s war correspondent accreditation 
and sent him back to Australia, which led to Wilmot being loaned to the BBC for the 
remainder of the war, a serendipitous occurrence for the British broadcaster as Wilmot 
became one of its most esteemed correspondents. 
 
Dwight D. Eisenhower – The supreme commander of Allied Forces and later president 
of the United States, Eisenhower was the ultimate authority on Allied military policy, 
including censorship and other controls over war correspondents. He told reporters that 
while they wore their official war correspondent uniforms he considered them a member 
of his staff and welcomed them, but also warned that if they strayed too far from the 
official story line and their copy regularly became covered in the blue pencil marks of 
the censor, then he would make sure they were cut off from the sources of information 
they needed for their stories. 
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Bernard Montgomery – “Monty”, as he was popularly known, was the commander of 
the Eighth Army, the main British force fighting in the Desert War, including El 
Alamein, and in Italy. He helped plan the D-Day invasion and was given charge of all 
ground forces for the offensive. Field Marshal Montgomery continued as the primary 
Allied ground commander for Western Europe through the end of the war, including the 
failed Operation Market Garden, and personally received the unconditional surrender of 
the German military on 4 May 1945. He was known to be very congenial with the media 
and held numerous press conferences or small meetings with war correspondents, 
although he was still a military man and reporters often came under what some called 
“Monty’s lash”. His judgments could be strict but in the end fair: Montgomery expelled 
the BBC’s Chester Wilmot for broadcasting a private speech he wanted unpublicised, 
but invited Wilmot back upon learning his order for a news blackout had not been 
conveyed to the reporter by the military staff. 
 
Political and Government Figures 
 
Neville Chamberlain – Prime Minister of Britain from 1937 until he was replaced by 
Winston Churchill in 1940, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain considered doing away 
with radio broadcasting altogether over complaints from Fleet Street that the BBC, 
which could broadcast whenever it wished, would always be able to beat the newspapers 
to stories due to their morning publication times. This quashing of British wartime radio 
never came to pass, largely because of a decrease in the availability of paper for print 
publications and an increase in the popularity of broadcasting among the public, with 
approximately seventy of 100 homes renting or owning a radio. 
 
Winston Churchill – Prime Minister of Britain for the bulk of the Second World War, 
from 1940 through 1945, he was previously an army officer while concurrently working 
as a war correspondent. During the 1895 Cuban uprising, Churchill reported for the 
Daily Graphic; while posted with his regiment in India he sent dispatches to the Daily 
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Telegraph that were criticized for being overly political but resulted in a book, as did his 
observations accumulated during his assignment in Khartoum in 1898. In 1899 he fought 
in the Boer War while at the same time covering it for the Morning Post, circumventing 
the rule against officer-correspondents that had been established as a direct result of his 
own work in the Nile Campaign of 1898; he bypassed this censorship by writing letters 
home addressed to “my dear”, with his dearest actually being the editor of the Post. This 
is ironic because after becoming an established politician, and especially during his time 
as prime minister during the Second World War, he was a strong proponent of 
censorship. Churchill admitted in the House of Commons in February 1944 that he had 
directed censors to be more austere with accounts of the fighting during the Italian 
campaign beginning in summer 1943. “I myself sent the telegram asking for a stricter 
censorship on alarmist reports,” he said, specifically objecting to the use of vocabulary 
that made the British military’s position seem untenable. He stated, “Such words as 
‘desperate’ ought not to be used about a position in a battle when they are false. Still less 
should they be used if they were true.” 
 
Hugh Pattison Macmillan, Lord Macmillan – The first minister of the Ministry of 
Information, appointed when the war began. A former judge from Scotland (educated in 
part at the University of Edinburgh), he was ineffectual in the post and only lasted four 
months. 
 
Sir John Reith – The second Minister of Information, appointed 5 January 1940. He 
also only lasted a matter of months. Having been refused additional powers by Prime 
Minister Chamberlain and unable to achieve much, he was sacked by the incoming 
Churchill government. 
 
Duff Cooper – The third minister of the Ministry of Information, appointed 12 May 
1940. Ian McLaine writes of him, “though creating a good impression in the House of 
Commons, managed to alienate the press and, worn down by attacks upon the Ministry 
of Information and Churchill’s indifference, merely wanted to be left in peace.” Cooper 
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resigned his post a little over a year after his appointment, on 20 July 1941, “with a sigh 
of relief.”550 
 
Brendan Bracken – The British Minister of Information under Churchill beginning in 
summer 1941 until 1945, the Irish-born Bracken, who tried to hide his Republican 
family roots, was the chief conduit and arbitrator between the wartime media 
organizations and the government. Media administrators and editors exercised a direct 
link to Bracken and it was during this time that the BBC rose to prominence as a news 
organisation, surpassing the near-monopolistic control of the press over the 
dissemination of news. Previously, in 1940, then-Minister of Information Alfred Duff 
Cooper assured new Prime Minister Churchill that MoI could exert “complete control” 
over news reporting. Bracken came to understand this was not true and focused his 
efforts on media management rather than complete suppression, although in keeping 
with wartime standards the censorship rules remained strict. 
 
Cyril Radcliffe – Director-General of the Ministry of Information, Radcliffe fought the 
military service departments over their excessive censorship practices. Radcliffe 
commented in 1939: “It is not an answer to the Press to say ‘We censor this because the 
War Office wanted it out’. This is partly the Departments’ fault, because they as for 
much too much to be kept out. But it is certain that neither now nor later in the war are 
the Press or the public going to be satisfied with something simply because some 
department or official in it thinks it is necessary in the interests of the war.”551 
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